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THE GOVERNABILITY DILEMMA: 
PROGRESSIVE POLITICS UNDER LULA AND THE BRAZILIAN WORKERS’ PARTY 
SUMMARY 
 
 
 
This thesis addresses the challenges and dilemmas that progressive parties of mass-based 
origin confront when they exercise state power, by looking at the governing experience of the 
Brazilian Workers’ Party (PT), with an emphasis on the administration of Luiz Inázio Lula da 
Silva (2003-2010). It draws on 140 interviews with party and social leaders at all levels, as 
well as on secondary sources and archival research. Drawing on the notion of governability, 
the study offers a systematic understanding of the constraints that the party faced in national 
executive public office, how such constraints were perceived by some of the most influential 
party leaders, and how these leaders acted upon them. This work contributes to the party 
literature by paying more attention to the way in which progressive parties create conditions 
to govern, which has so far been neglected, and by introducing into the party literature the 
notion of governability, present in Latin American political debates. The study distinguishes 
between two different types of governability strategies used by progressive parties: the elite-
centred and the social counter-hegemonic. The former accepts the current distribution of 
power; the latter seeks to alter the balance of forces within state institutions by relying on 
civil society, mobilisation and participation. I argue that one of the most important 
transformations in the PT has been the switch from a social counter-hegemonic strategy, very 
influential in some cities, to an elite-centred one. As a secondary aim, this study provides a 
new interpretation of the changes that occur in party-civil society relations when progressive 
parties of mass-based origin gain executive power. This thesis challenges the current 
accepted wisdom in party and social movement literature that parties tend to move away from 
their social allies when they enter government; the PT example offers evidence that this is not 
always the case.  
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to carry out those reforms that gave us important victories in some cities.”  
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (1995:12), during a 
meeting with party and social leaders. 
 
 
 
“In 2002, what was the meaning of governability for us? Governability meant having a 
majority in Congress, maintaining our social and historical base of support and broadening 
it towards other sectors, particularly the business sector, while also making sure that the 
economic crisis would not deepen. If the economic crisis had deepened, Lula would not have 
lasted even one year in power”. 
Interview with José Dirceu (07/01/09), Minister 
for the Civil House of the Presidency.     
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 Introduction 
This study addresses the challenges and dilemmas that progressive parties of mass-based 
origin face when they exercise state power, by looking at the governing experience of the 
Brazilian Workers’ Party (PT) during the Lula administration (2003-2006/2007-2010).  Many 
observers emphasise that Brazil under Lula not only became a global player and one of the 
most dynamic emerging economies in the world (Kupchan 2011; Onis 2008:77; Roett 
2010:66), but it also saw remarkable social achievements.  In a favourable economic context, 
Brazil experienced the highest reduction of poverty in its history (Barros, De Carvalho et al. 
2006; Loualt 2011; Singer 2009; World Bank 2010), which benefited more than 20 million 
people, and even reduced income inequality, as measured by the Gini Coefficient (Anderson 
2011:11; Loualt 2011; World Bank 2010:3).1 Some 12 million jobs were created in the 
formal economy; 12.6 million families became beneficiaries of an ambitious cash transfer 
programme, Bolsa Família (Family Grant); the minimum wage doubled in real terms 
(Departamento Sindical de Estatísticas e Estudos Socioeconômicos 2008:3; Magalhães and 
Araújo 2010:2) and the purchasing power of the Brazilian population reached the highest 
levels since 1979 (Loualt 2011:3). 
Nevertheless, if rather than comparing the Lula administration to previous governments in 
Brazil or others in the region we consider both the distinctive elements of the progressive 
agenda that the PT had promoted since the early 1980s and the way it was advanced in its 
sub-national administrations, a different picture emerges. For several years, the PT was 
considered by scholars to be an inspiration for progressive politics in Latin America and the 
world (Heller 2001; Mainwaring 1995; Roberts 2002, 1998). Because of its capacity to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 During the two Lula administrations the Gini coefficient went down from 0.59 in 2003 to 0.518 in 2009 (IBGE 
2	  
	  
provide institutional expression to social movement dynamics (Heller 2001) and to promote 
broad-based participatory mechanisms as part of its strategy to promote socio-economic 
redistribution – a  model rhetorically known as the “PT way of governing” (Abers 1996; 
Avritzer 2009; Baiocchi 2003a) – the party was considered as a “true political laboratory” for 
progressive politics (Stolowicz 2004:186).2 Given its distinctive features, such as the party’s 
solid base in labour and social movements and its programmatic profile, the PT was seen as 
an “anomaly” (Keck 1992:158) as well as an “exceptional political enterprise” (Sader and 
Silverstein 1991:3). Among other scholars, Nylen (1997a:7) claimed that the PT was not “the 
typical Brazilian populist’ party of elites cutting deals among themselves while making grand 
promises to an inert mass of client-supporters”. Instead, scholars saw the PT as a party 
constructed “from the bottom up” (Nylen 1997a:7) and firmly rooted in civil society (Keck 
1992; Sader and Silverstein 1991:3). 
The major developments during the Lula government, however, were “a far cry” from both 
the kinds of structural reforms and policies the PT pursued while in opposition (Hunter 
2007:17) and the policies that the party promoted in its sub-national governments (Baiocchi 
and Checa 2007). From the first years of its existence, the party advocated socio-economic 
redistribution by changing economic and social policies “in favour of the less privileged” 
(Keck 1992:3) while implementing deep structural reforms based on the premise of a 
“significant redistribution of property or income away from the rich to the poor” (Hunter and 
Power 2007:17). Even in the 2002 presidential campaign, despite the fact that Lula toned 
down the party’s radical discourse significantly, his electoral manifesto spoke about the need 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For a number of scholars, mobilisation and participation are central to the progressive politics agenda. Huber, 
Rueschemeyer and Stephens (1997:323), for instance, claim that “a shift in the balance of power in civil society 
favouring subordinate classes would also advance the cause of greater social and economic equality”. Likewise, 
Roberts (1998:55) holds that given the “structural advantages” that “capital” enjoys over “labour and other 
subaltern groups”, “substantive levels of political mobilization are needed to support a program of radical 
change” (For similar views on progressive politics see Chalmers, Vilas et al. 1997; Chávez 2004; Fung and 
Wright 2003; Gaventa and McGee 2010; Goldfrank 2004; Heller 2001; Huber, Rueschemayer, and Stephens 
1997; Laclau and Mouffe 2001; Mouffe 1992; Osterman 2002; Stolowicz 2004). 
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to carry out structural reforms, including fiscal and agrarian reforms aimed at making the tax 
system more progressive and egalitarian (Coligação Lula Presidente 2002a:16-7) and 
accelerating the land reform process (Coligação Lula Presidente 2002b:13; 2002a:21-2). 
Once in office, however, the PT continued the orthodox economic policy put in place by the 
Cardoso administration and, according to some scholars, even favoured an unprecedented 
accumulation of capital by the financial sector (Amann and Baer 2006; Amaral, Kingstone et 
al. 2010; Filgueiras and Gonçalves 2007; Hunter 2010:147; Loualt 2011). Rather than 
structural redistributive reforms, the Lula government promoted compensatory policies, while 
neither a fiscal reform nor an ambitious land reform took place (Boito 2005:60; Brandord 
2009; Carter 2010; Ondetti 2006; Sauer 2008; Vergara-Camus 2009).  
It is when examining the most distinctive elements of the PT agenda, however, that one 
realises the extent to which the Lula administration embarked on a very different political 
path. This agenda relied heavily on strengthening civil society (Sader and Silverstein 
1991:106), as well as on promoting a notion of radical democracy that was central to the 
party identity. As a number of scholars have argued, the Lula administration failed to 
promote meaningful and broad-based participatory mechanisms comparable to those 
implemented at the sub-national level, leaving aside the so called “PT  way of governing” 
(Baiocchi and Checa 2007; Couto 2009; Feres 2010; Grzybowski 2004; Hochstetler 2010; 
Hunter 2011:318-0; 2010; Leite 2008; Moroni 2009; Ricci 2008, 2007a; Samuels 2008). The 
social achievements seen under Lula happened not only without threatening “privileged 
interests” (Hunter 2010:175) and the existing order, but also without significant levels of 
social mobilisation (Singer 2009:84). Along these lines, Perry Anderson (2011:4) wrote in a 
recent article that if Roosevelt’s social reforms in the 1930s were “introduced under pressure 
from below, no comparable forms of collective action “either sustained or challenged Lula”.  
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Like other progressive parties of mass-based origin, the PT confronted several challenges in 
public office, which constitute the main concern of this thesis. Progressive parties are 
expected to favour socio-economic redistribution and respond to the demands of their social 
bases, and like many other parties in public office will probably seek to keep social 
mobilisation and contestation against the administration at low or manageable levels (Hipsher 
1998:157; Meyer 2007:126). But progressive parties also have to confront what Lievesley 
(2006:6) calls in a rather general way “the exigencies of government”. Progressive parties in 
office need to balance the interests of a wide range of groups and actors – some  of which are 
particularly influential in state institutions and are likely to oppose redistributive reforms or 
policies that affect their interests – such as large business groups, foreign investors, local 
oligarchies or conservative parties.  
While some of these groups have an ability to disinvest (Block 1977; Claus 1984; Lindblom 
1977) or to trigger capital flight (Campello 2008, 2007; Martínez 2003; Santiso 2004), others 
have sufficient power to generate political gridlock (Amorim 1994; Figueiredo and Limongi 
2000; Raile, Pereira et al. 2010) or even cause a state of crisis and instability that might put at 
risk the capacity of any party to stay in power (Camou 2001, 2000; Coppedge 2001, 1994; 
Winn 1986). In particular, the PT faced great constraints in dealing with a political and socio-
economic environment dominated by conservative elites, and an economy largely vulnerable 
to the movements of the international capital, as well as a highly fragmented political system 
that has created major obstacles for parties in the executive to achieve legislative majorities 
(Abranches 1988; Amorim 1994; Figueiredo and Limongi 2000). Because of this system the 
PT had the weakest representation in the legislative branch among all the other contemporary 
left-of-centre leaders in Latin America (Jiménez 2007). 
Neither the literature on political parties nor the existing academic works on the 
transformation of the PT (Amaral 2010c, 2010b, 2003; Hunter 2010, 2007; Martins 
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Rodrigues 1997; Miguel 2006; Nylen 1997b; Ribeiro 2008, 2007, 2003; Samuels 2004), 
provide a framework to explain how progressive parties of mass-based origin are affected by 
the need to reconcile conflicting interests while creating the necessary conditions to govern 
(see further details in Chapter 1). In order to fill this gap the main contribution of this study is 
to introduce the notion of governability, present in Latin American political debates (Camou 
2001, 2000, 1993; Coppedge 2001, 1994; Mayorga and Córdova 2007; Santos 1991; 
Tomassini 1993), within the party literature as a means to analyse the constraints and 
opportunities that parties face in public office.  
The central question that this study explores is why progressive mass-based parties such as 
the PT modify their agenda and change their relationship with allies in civil society when 
they governed. The thesis' main hypothesis is that the PT altered its discourse and strategy 
not only because of electoral motivations, as most of the literature on political parties and the 
PT suggests, but also because it confronted what I call the governability dilemma: the need to 
maintain consistency in pursuit of policies that derived from the party’s origins, while at the 
same time accommodate the interests of adversaries as well as allies. Once in office, the PT 
needed to reconcile the competing interests between its own social bases seeking socio-
economic redistribution and concrete gains, and the interests of dominant strategic actors 
(mainly opposition parties, business elites and the financial establishment) who acted as veto 
players and whose power was critical to pass legislation and create conditions to govern.  
I suggest that the governability approach can be used to look systematically at the difficulties 
which progressive parties face in public office and their scope for advancing their policies 
and reforms. This notion of governability is crucial for this study because it sheds light on the 
adoption, transformation or rejection of certain policies and strategies, as well as on the way 
in which the party in the national executive interacted with its own social allies – another area 
that I examine in this study. I contend that the “governability dilemma” – the need to balance 
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conflicting interests between strategic actors, both allies and adversaries – is an important 
reason why progressive parties have difficulties in keeping programmatic goals and 
maintaining their identities when they enter executive office. 
 
It was not the first time the PT had faced this dilemma when it occupied national executive 
public office in 2002. At the sub-national level, the party had already accumulated a rich 
governability experience, which I also examine in this study. This experience is particularly 
interesting because through a commitment to civil society and participatory democracy a 
number of PT administrations provided alternatives to the historic problems of governability 
faced by parties of mass-based origin when entering public office. Indeed, the PT set out a 
governability model, which I call social counter-hegemonic, which differed from the elite-
centred governability strategies put in place by most political parties in Brazil and Latin 
America. In the social counter-hegemonic strategy put in place by many PT administrations 
(though not all of them), civil society was a core part of the governability strategy and its 
inputs were seen as a way to solve governing problems. Participation and mobilisation were 
not only ideological preferences; they were also part of a strategy to alter the balance of 
forces within state institutions in which the elites often enjoy comparative advantages.  
It is the contention of this study that one of the most important transformations in the 
trajectory of the PT in public office was the switch from a social counter-hegemonic 
governability strategy, influential in several cities governed by the party, to an elite-centred 
strategy that tends to accept the existing distribution of power and institutional arrangements 
and seeks to accommodate the dominant strategic actors. Such a strategy was already seen in 
some PT local governments, particularly towards the late 1990s, but it became predominant 
in the national sphere. How did the Lula administration accommodate the interests of the 
most relevant groups and actors to secure governability? What were the implications of 
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adopting an elite-centred strategy? Why was the PT at the national level – in particular Lula 
and his inner circle – reluctant to engage in social counter-hegemonic strategies such as those 
put in place at the sub-national level? These are some of the main questions addressed in this 
work and which, I believe, can shed light on the challenges, obstacles and possibilities of 
progressive parties in government both in Brazil and Latin America.  
A second contribution of this study is to elaborate a new interpretation of the changes that 
occur in party-civil society relations when progressive parties of mass-based origin gain state 
power. The literature on both social movements and political parties persistently argues that 
parties and social movements are able to maintain closer ties when they are in opposition than 
when they are in office (Maguire 1995; Schwartz 2005; Taylor 1993:134). Different authors 
have found, for instance, that when social democratic parties in Europe entered government 
they loosened their ties with their traditional associates, the trade unions (Haugsgjerd 
2010:86; Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Taylor 1993).3 In the PT case, several observers 
have claimed that the party “lost touch” with its social base (Nylen 2000:143), and moved 
away from or abandoned its allies in civil society (Baiocchi and Checa 2007; Handlin and 
Collier 2011; Oliveira 2006b, 2006a; Ribeiro 2008; Ricci 2008, 2007b).  
I argue that what mainly changed in the PT was not the distance between the party and civil 
society organisations, but the way in which the party engaged with these organisations due to 
the increasing involvement of both the PT and many of its social allies with state institutions. 
My contribution to the literature on party-civil society relationships, therefore, is to conceive 
these relationships not only in terms of distance, proximity or strength, but also in terms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Scholars have also shown that the ties between a number of labour and social democratic parties on the one 
hand, and trade unions on the other, have weakened in the context of a shift from a state-led to a market-oriented 
economy. This has been found both in Western Europe (Arter 1994; Astudillo 2001; Aylott 2003; Fox Piven 
1991; Howell 2001; Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 2010; Mendez Lago 2000; Minkin 1991; Morlino 1998; 
Padgett and Paterson 1991; Piazza 2001; Poguntke 2002b; Taylor 1993; Thomas 2001) and among labour-based 
parties in Latin America (Burgess 2004; Collier and Handlin 2009; Levitsky 2001; Murillo 2001).  
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the nature of their relationship and the way in which it changes when a party enters 
government. Most work on political parties does not capture the complex and multiple 
relationships that can be established with civil society organisations. It is my view that the 
relationships parties in government establish or maintain with civil society need to be 
understood as part of a larger political game to preserve political, social and economic 
governability. 
In order to show how the relationships between the PT and civil society organisations have 
changed, I draw on the literature of party linkages (Aylott 2003; Cayrol and Jaffré 1980; 
Deschouwer 2008; Haugsgjerd 2010; Ignazi, Farrell et al. 2005; Kitschelt 2000; Lawson 
1980; Lawson and Merkl 1988; Merkl 2005; Poguntke 2002b; Roberts 2002; Schwartz 2005), 
which has mainly been used to characterise relationships with interest groups. I will explore 
how some of the programmatic linkages that bound together this party and its allies in civil 
society were partly supplanted by reward-based linkages in the form of state subsidies and 
jobs in the state apparatus. I will also show that direct and inter-personal linkages between the 
party and social leaders, which have existed since the party’s creation, bringing together the 
PT and its allies in civil society, are still influential. These relations illustrate that the party 
maintained close and long-lasting relations with its allies in civil society, even after it entered 
public office. 
Conceptually, this work is different from other studies on parties because it does not look at 
the party as a narrowly defined unit of analysis. In order to capture the complex and changing 
nature of relations between the PT and some of the most important civil society organisations 
in Brazil who have identified themselves with the party, I introduce the notion of the party 
socio-political field (or party field)4, a term which allows to look beyond the formal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This term has no direct relationship with the broader concepts of political and social fields used by Pierre 
Bourdieu. 
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boundaries of party and civil society organisations. The party field is a network of social and 
political actors that act beyond their formal organisations, independent from their 
membership to the party or to a specific group in civil society. Such actors often move back 
and forth between civil and political society, and their activities are not restricted to their 
formal organisations. The notion of a party field captures a whole web of informal relations 
between the party and social leaders which take place beyond institutional mechanisms. It 
covers a large network of cadres, leaders and social activists who are strongly identified with 
the party, even if they lack any formal affiliation.  
Research strategy 
In a narrow perspective of political power, some attributes of governability have been 
measured through rates of legislative success, which give an indication of the capacity of a 
government to pass legislation in Congress. In the broader perspective on governability 
adopted in this thesis, however, governability cannot be empirically tested with specific 
measurements. To the extent that governability is understood as “getting things done” and 
avoiding the paralysis that can result from political, economic or social instability, it can be 
seen as an outcome. Yet the main interest of this work is to look at governability as a process, 
that is, at how governability can ultimately be achieved. In this study governability is 
explored in a qualitative fashion by looking at political dynamics, by identifying the presence 
or absence of episodes of crisis, and by mapping relationships or observing the types of 
alliances made among strategic actors. Because many dimensions of governability are highly 
subjective, the perceptions and interpretations of political actors are a critical part of the 
analysis of governability undertaken in this thesis. These perceptions and interpretations are 
an important part of the evidence on which this work draws in identifying whether or not 
governability has been achieved. 
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This thesis draws mainly on 140 interviews conducted between 2008 and 2010 with actors in 
the PT and its socio-political field. Political parties are not unitary actors or monolithic units. 
Understanding how and why they choose certain governability strategies requires a research 
design that can distinguish between different groups and subsystems which coexist within 
them (Belloni and Beller 1976; Bettcher 2005; Hine 1982; Katz and Mair 1993; Rose 1964; 
Sartori 1976; Von Beyme 1985; Zariski 1960). Such a disaggregation is particularly 
necessary in the PT case, recognised since its origins by the significant internal divisions 
among its members, which stem from the plurality of their ideological backgrounds (Amaral 
2010a:Ch.5; Bueno 1995; Freire 2002; Ozaí 1998; Ozaí 1996; Petit 1992). If one wishes to 
understand why one set of ideas and policies became dominant over another, it is necessary to 
look at different influential groups within the party. In particular, it is important to consider 
the role played by Lula’s faction and his own inner circle in public office, which became 
increasingly autonomous from the party structure even before reaching the national executive 
(Hunter 2010:127-8; Ribeiro 2010:120-3). 
 
In order to capture the complexity of the PT and its field, the transformations over time and 
the changing perspectives and strategies to construct governability, I disaggregate the party 
internally along three dimensions – (i) the party organisation and the party in government; 
(iii) the major factions; and (iii) sub-national and national. I also broaden the focus and 
explore the party’s socio-political field by looking at four organisations which have 
maintained close relationships with the PT and its administrations since the formative years 
of the party. In relation to the first dimension, this study makes a clear distinction, following 
Katz and Mair (1993:549) between party leaders in public office and party leaders in central 
office or in the party bureaucracy. The “party in public office” (Katz and Mair 1993:549)  is 
dominated by party leaders who have won either legislative or executive elections, or who 
become appointed as high level government officials. The “party in central office”, in 
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contrast, includes two (often overlapping) groups of cadres: the national executive committee 
(or committees), and the central staff or secretariat. It is typically made up of party 
bureaucrats, many of whom make their political careers within the party hierarchy, rather 
than within the political system (Katz and Mair 1993:600). 
In this study I mainly focus on the party in public office, because this is where the 
governability dilemmas are mainly present. Among the total 140 interviews conducted, 63.5 
per cent of them were with leaders who had some kind of experience in public office (for 
further details see Appendix I and II). My focus was particularly on those leaders who 
occupied executive branch positions at the highest levels and were more directly aware of the 
constraints of being in government. At the national level, I relied on key interviews with 10 
former ministers, 18 state secretaries and 13 presidential advisors, six of which worked 
directly for Lula; I questioned them about a wide range of issues, mainly about the way in 
which they perceived the governability dilemma before they enter the national executive and 
during their time in office. At the sub-national level, I interviewed 7 former mayors and 27 
secretaries who were mainly asked about the different types of governability strategies put in 
place. It was also useful to interview staff members at lower levels, who were often more 
willing to offer straightforward answers, or technocrats with no party affiliation but 
influential in national government, particularly in the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of 
Planning.  
In relation to the second dimension, this thesis observes the differences among the most 
representative intra-party groups or factions on a Right-Left continuum. This is not only 
important in order to consider the ideologically plural make-up of the PT, but also to show 
the diverse views on governability that largely stem from the fact that moderate factions have 
12	  
	  
been more exposed to executive public office than those situated in the party Left.5 The party 
factions are important because they were also strategic actors in the efforts of the PT 
administrations to establish governability. The party has more than 10 factions, but I have 
focused on three which have dominated the party apparatus: Campo Majoritário (Mayority 
Camp, CM), the moderate faction led by Lula and trade union leaders which was relabelled in 
2005 as Construindo um Novo Brasil (Building a New Brazil”, CNB); Democracia Socialista 
(Socialist Democracy, DS), which also in 2005 formed the Mensagem ao Partido (Message 
to the Party, MP); and Articulaçao de Esquerda (Left Articulation, AE). At least 83 of all my 
interviewees (59 percent) were identified with one of these factions. Because Lula’s faction, 
CNB, was the hegemonic group in the Lula administration I interviewed 48 of its members.6  
In relation to the third dimension, this study contrasts the governability strategies on which 
the PT relied at the sub-national and national levels, and how these strategies changed over 
time. The PT city governments varied in the governability strategies they adopted. I selected 
cases that highlight contrasts between administrations that sought to rely on mobilisation to 
advance social-counter hegemonic strategies (Diadema, 1982-1985; São Paulo capital city, 
1989-1992); others that combined mobilisation with more institutionalised participatory 
mechanisms (Porto Alegre 1989-2005); and others that prioritised the accommodating of 
dominant strategic actors in an elite-centred fashion (São Paulo capital city 2000-2004). The 
experiences that I look at are mainly in the states of São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, which 
are key socio-political bases for the PT as a whole. Many in the party’s national leadership 
drew crucial lessons about the challenges of governability from these experiences. A large 
number of leaders who participated in these governments also occupied key positions during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The “party Left” is an expressions used within the PT field to refer to the more ideologically-oriented factions, 
which I also use in this work. Conversely, the “party Right” is the term used to label the more moderate or 
pragmatic factions.  
6 48 interviewees identified themselves with the CNB, 23 with MP and 11 with AE.  Of the remainder, 13 
interviewees belonged to other factions and 23 declared themselves to be independent. 
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the Lula administration and are very influential in the PT bureaucracy. Among my 
interviewees, at least 55 leaders were associated with the party in the state of São Paulo and 
33 with the party in Rio Grande do Sul. Interviewing them was particularly useful in order to 
trace a clear story of the PT from the sub-national to the national level.  
In order to understand the evolution of the party’s social field, I interviewed 30 leaders from 
across four large civil society organisations, which allow for variation in discourses and 
strategies, from moderate to more radical rhetoric; as well as in the representation of labour 
unions, and urban and rural organisations. Above all, I gathered testimonies from social 
leaders from these organisations who have maintained close relationships with the PT since 
the party’s foundation. I mainly interviewed leaders or activists who have also been PT 
members or have maintained close relationships with the party. I selected four organisations 
in the PT field.  At one end of the spectrum I interviewed leaders from the Central Única dos 
Trabalhadores (Central Workers’ Union, CUT), the largest labour peak organisation in the 
country, which was born out of the same process that led to the PT’s creation. At the other 
end, I interviewed members of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (Landless Rural 
Workers’ Movement, MST), a very visible organisation in Brazil and one of the main 
governability challenges in the relationship with civil society. I also spoke to members of the 
Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura (National Confederation of 
Agricultural Workers, CONTAG), which represents the rural trade unions, and also to the 
Housing Movement in São Paulo, one of the most influential civil society organisations in the 
city.    
The concrete experience of the leaders interviewed for this study largely shaped my 
understanding of the PT trajectory in public office and the way in which some of its most 
influential figures understood and responded to the challenge of governability. My interviews 
were semi-structured but included a number of structured questions in order to be able to 
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compare quantitatively across members of different factions, and the national and sub-
national dimension, as well as groups within the party field. Among the issues about which I 
asked all the interviewees was their position on policy arenas that posed challenges for 
governability, such as land reform or economic policy; the extent to which they supported 
counter-hegemonic governability strategies and their assessment of the Lula administration in 
areas that are key for my study, such as social participation (for questionnaires and main 
answers see Appendix 3). The interviews are not a random sample, but these structured 
questions nonetheless still reveal important differences across particular groups. Most semi-
structured interviews were recorded, with exceptional cases7, and were analysed using Nvivo 
8.0 software for qualitative analysis.  
This investigation draws on a vast literature review of published and unpublished studies on 
the PT, its party administrations at the sub-national level or its relationships with specific 
social allies. Many of these issues are covered in Masters and PhD theses in Brazil, which are 
not available in English. In order to offer evidence on issues such as policy preferences or 
relationships with social allies, I have relied on a number of surveys conducted by the party’s 
main think tank, the Fundação Perseu Abramo, among party delegates during successive 
party conferences or congresses – considered in the literature as representative decision-
making bodies of middle level party elites (Amaral 2010a:28; Mair 2001; Reif, Caryrol et al. 
1980; Rohrshneider 1994) – and other survey studies, including those conducted by 
independent scholars. 
I conducted archival research and analysis of newspapers in particular, to triangulate 
interviews and to cover specific periods for which there is no living memory. The archive of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I offered all my interviewees the opportunity to speak anonymously if that was their wish, or to turn off the 
recording machine at specific moments. Although the great majority agreed to speak openly, I have indicated 
those cases in which I quote an anonymous source. I have cited interviews with the complete dates on which 
they were conducted and have included an Appendix (number II) with the interviewees’ most important 
biographical features. 
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the Fundação Perseu Abramo provided a large number of party documents and publications 
from the 1980s and 1990s, which I mainly used in order to map discursive changes and 
changing approaches to civil society organisations. PT documents were used with particular 
care and preferably in combination with other methods. Many students of the party have 
relied heavily on these sources to trace the PT’s programmatic transformations, on the weak 
assumption that they mirror the party ideology (Amaral 2003; Bueno 1995; Coelho 2005; 
Garcia 2000; García 2008; Moraes de Souza 2001, 1994; Ozaí 1998; Pomar 2007).8 This can 
be misleading because the PT, as Singer (2010:108) notes, never revised its historical 
positions and it certainly did not experience an ideological purge as the SPD did in 1959, 
when it officially abandoned Marxism and its nationalisation programme in Godesberg, or as 
the British Labour Party did, when it excluded its famous Clause 4, under Tony Blair. As 
Singer (2010:108) highlights, even in 2007 the Third PT National Congress still defended 
“the social property of the means of production”. 
 Furthermore, as Leôncio Martins (2007) tells us, the radical content of some PT documents 
has much to do with the fact that they are “influenced and sometimes drawn up by the small 
left-wing groups” which are “very strong in internal conferences or meetings”, but not among 
the congressional representatives or “the more prestigious elected leaders” (Martins 
2007:311). Early on, when conducting fieldwork, I found that PT documents do not always 
reflect the majority views, ideas and values and they are written in a language that is hardly 
ever the one that party leaders use when addressing the electorate.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Authors such as Amaral, however, have adopted different approaches in recent years, by relying more heavily 
on surveys in order to map ideological changes in the PT (see 2010c; 2010b, 2009). 
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Thesis outline 
This dissertation is organised into nine chapters. Leaving the first chapter aside, in which I 
offer a theoretical framework, it is divided in two main parts, the first one (Chapters 2 to 4) 
looking at the PT, both in opposition and in government, prior to Lula’s arrival in power; the 
second part (Chapters 5 to 9) studying the PT in national government during the Lula years.  
 
In Chapter 1, I develop a perspective of governability, explaining the way in which this term 
can be used as an analytical tool and distinguishing between the two main governability 
strategies, the elite-centred and the social counter-hegemonic. This chapter defines three main 
dimensions of governability – political, economic and social – and shows how the 
relationships between parties and civil society organisations are also shaped by a rationale of 
governability. 
I dedicate Part 1 (Chapters 2-4) to looking at the transformations in the PT prior to Lula’s 
arrival in power. This part is important because despite the fact that changes in the party 
became more visible after the party assumed power at the national government, many of them 
started to take place years before and were the result of a gradual process. I look at these 
changes by relying heavily on secondary sources, and also by adding new empirical evidence 
to complement existing explanations, thereby bringing in elements that have been neglected, 
challenging certain views, or making re-interpretations whenever necessary.  
In Chapter 2, I look at the formative phase of the PT, by characterising the party as the by-
product of a heterogeneous socio-political field. I explore some of the characteristics that 
made the PT a useful instrument for progressive politics, showing how this party was 
different from most of its Brazilian and Latin American counterparts. Three distinctive 
elements of the PT identity are highlighted – the belief in participatory democracy, the hope 
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for a transformative role of civil society, and the strong inter-personal linkages between party 
and social leaders.  
Chapter 3 explores the reconfiguration of the PT socio-political field as a result of its 
increasing hold of state institutions. I show how the party-civil society relationships were 
affected when the PT moved closer to the centre of the political spectrum and entered public 
office. In this chapter I challenge the assumption that the PT abandoned its social allies and 
show how some programmatic linkages weakened or dissolved, while reward-based linkages 
became more influential. 
Chapter 4 studies the learning process of governability at the sub-national level and the 
changing strategies from the early 1980s up until 2002. I show how the PT at the sub-national 
level balanced the interests of different groups and actors within and outside the field and 
how party administrations deployed different types of social-counter hegemonic and elite-
centred strategies. The chapter explains how a number of PT administrations sought to rely 
on mobilisation or participation to overcome their limitations in formal representative 
institutions or to put pressure on them.  
The second part of this thesis (Chapters 5-9) mainly analyses the different dimensions of 
governability – political, economic and social – and the switch from the social counter-
hegemonic to the elite-centred strategy. It is in this second part that I examine the experience 
of the party in national executive public office and I make my strongest empirical 
contributions. 
Chapter 5 analyses the political challenge of governability, mainly by exploring the ways in 
which the PT dealt with its minority status in Congress. I show how the elite-centred strategy 
became increasingly influential and eventually predominant. In this chapter I try to explain 
some of the reasons why the most influential leaders, mainly within Lula’s inner circle, were 
18	  
	  
reluctant to engage in a counter-hegemonic governability strategy based on social 
mobilisation. 
Chapter 6 looks at the economic dimension of governability. It examines the economic 
policy decisions adopted by the PT as part of an elite-centred strategy to accommodate the 
interests of the financial establishment, even before winning the election. In this Chapter I 
argue that the conservative economic policy, rather than being an ideological shift to 
neoliberalism, was a pragmatic response to accommodate the interests of dominant strategic 
actors with sufficient power to generate a crisis.  
Chapter 7 shows how participation under Lula did not help to support a counter-hegemonic 
governability strategy. I examine the participatory agenda and show how despite 
achievements in some areas, the most far-reaching innovations initially promoted in key 
policy arenas fell by the wayside. The chapter shows how participation lost momentum at the 
national level as the most influential leaders allowed the elite-centred strategy to prevail.  
Chapter 8 studies the social dimension of governability by looking at the relationship 
between the party in government and its social allies. Four main forms of engagement are 
studied: the strong leadership exercised by Lula over the PT field, the distribution of jobs in 
the state apparatus, the allocation of massive state subsidies and the existence of direct and 
interpersonal linkages between party and social leaders.  
Chapter 9 examines which policy outcomes the PT’s social allies achieved under Lula and to 
what extent programmatic linkages were maintained in office. I argue that the PT in 
government was willing to deliver to its social allies and honour some of its pledges. 
However, its capacity to do so largely depended on the balance of forces among strategic 
actors on any given issue and their relative power. I look at three examples: land reform, the 
trade union reform and the rise of the minimum wage. 
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In the Conclusion I reflect on the challenge of governability for progressive politics and the 
lessons learned from the PT experience.  
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1. The challenge of governability for progressive parties 
 
In this study I bring the notion of governability to the party literature in order to look at the 
challenges that progressive parties face when they occupy executive public office. Unlike the 
most common views on governability, often focused on politico-institutional aspects, I 
broaden the lens by incorporating two important dimensions, the economic and social, both 
closely inter-related with the political dimension. I emphasise that governability can be both 
an analytical tool and a specific strategy that results from certain ideas and values. Hence, I 
use governability analytically to examine the way in which the PT accommodated the 
interests of key actors. I also look at governability as a strategy based on two different 
perspectives vis-à-vis such actors: the elite-centred and the social counter-hegemonic. It is 
my argument in this thesis that the governability approach can shed light on the types of 
constraints that progressive parties face in public office. These constraints, I argue, are 
perceived and interpreted by party leaders in government and influence their responses. Such 
an approach is useful to examine the performance of parties in public office, the impact of 
holding office on the goals and strategies of political parties, as well as on their relationships 
with civil society organisations.9  
In the first section of this chapter I critically examine the literature on political parties in 
general and the PT in particular in order to identify some of its gaps when looking at the 
dilemmas that parties face in public office. In the second section I set out the case for 
incorporating the notion of governability into the study of political parties. I then explain the 
way in which I use governability as an analytic tool, by relying on the strategic actors’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Civil society is seen in this study as “a part of society distinct from states and markets formed for the purpose 
of advancing common interests and facilitating collective action” (Edwards 2004:vii). I use the terms “civil 
society” and “civil society organisations” interchangeably. My definition includes groups such as trade unions, 
non-governmental organisations and social movements. Although many of the groups that I study in this work 
where in its origins social movements (and some of them are still recognised as such within the PT field), they 
no longer constitute “a loosely coupled conglomerate of different components”, neither are they informally 
coordinated “horizontal” structures (Anheier, Toepler et al. 2010:1441). For these reasons I prefer to call them 
civil society organisations.  
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approach. As part of this section, I distinguish between the two main governability strategies, 
the elite-centred and the social counter-hegemonic, and define the three main dimensions of 
governability –political, economic and social. In the third section, I show how the 
relationships between parties and civil society organisations are also shaped by logics of 
governability. Drawing on the literature on party linkages, I develop a typology to 
characterise the relationships between parties and actors in the field, explaining how different 
forms of engagement can act as instruments to secure governability. 
1.1 Beyond the current approaches on party change 
The existing academic work on the transformation of the PT, as the literature on political 
parties more generally, do not provide a framework to analyse the obstacles, opportunities 
and challenges faced by parties in executive public office. Scholarly work on party change 
has focused on two important explanations: one that highlights that the transformations of 
political parties are driven by electoral politics and vote-maximising strategies, and a more 
recent one emphasising the increasing holding of public office. These two types of 
explanations for party change, which I address below, mainly concentrate on the 
organisational apparatus of political parties, but they pay little attention at the way in which 
they deal with different groups in order to create conditions to govern. This is also the case 
among students of the PT (Amaral 2010c, 2010b, 2003; Hunter 2010, 2007; Martins 
Rodrigues 1997; Miguel 2006; Nylen 1997b; Ribeiro 2008, 2007, 2003; Samuels 2004).10 
 
In seeking to explain changes among political parties, the most influential scholars on parties, 
from Anthony Downs (1965) to Otto Kirchheimer (1966) to Adam Przeworski (1980) and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 At the sub-national level there is a vast literature that explores PT administrative experiences, but the attention 
is disproportionately placed on the promotion of participatory instruments, such as Participatory Budgeting (see 
among others   Abers 1996; Avritzer 2009; Baiochi 2003; Feres 2005, 2002; Goldfrank and Schneider 2003; 
Hernández 2005; Marquetti 2003; Navarro 2005; Schneider and Goldfrank 2002; Sousa 1998; Wampler 2004). 
Only a few scholars have looked more broadly at the challenges that PT administrations faced at the local level 
or addressed the governability dilemma specifically (Couto 2003, 1995; Goldfrank and Schneider 2003; 
Macaulay and Burton 2003:132; Ottman 2009:71). 
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Przeworski and Sprague (1986), most scholars have focused on the influence of electoral 
politics.11 In the Downsian logic, parties move to the centre in order to win a majority of the 
mass electorates (Downs 1965:96,113).12 In a similar vein, Kirchheimer (1966) observes that 
mass-based parties in Western Europe, after the 1950s, were becoming electoral machines 
that would seek support almost wherever they could find it, thereby turning into what he 
called “catch all” parties. Concerned with their immediate success in elections, this author 
claims, parties would make “all possible efforts to reach a wider audience” (Kirchheimer 
1966:184-6).13  
In line with the most influential works on party politics, most authors who have written about 
the transformation of the Brazilian Workers’ Party since the 1990s emphasise electoral 
competition as one of the main driving forces (Amaral 2010b; Hunter 2007; Martins 
Rodrigues 1997; Miguel 2006; Nylen 1997b; Ribeiro 2008; Samuels 2004; Singer 2009). 
When observing the trajectory of the PT since its formation in the late 1970s, students have 
found that during the 1990s, the party became more pragmatic and moderate in its strategies 
and discourses, making a movement to the centre of the political spectrum, and according to 
some interpretations, away from its traditional bases of support (Hunter 2010; Ribeiro 2008). 
Over a quarter of a century, scholars argue, the PT followed the historical trajectory from a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The importance of electoral competition has been emphasised in several studies of parties, from Social 
Democratic parties in Western Europe (Kitschelt 1994; Sainsbury 1980; Wilson 1994), to right-wing extremists 
parties such as the French National Front and the Austrian Freedom party (Merkl and Weinberg 2003). In Latin 
America, despite the existence of fewer studies on the subject, scholars have also looked at the ways in which 
parties to the left of centre have shifted their goals in order to achieve electoral majorities (Armony 2007; 
Cameron 2007; Castañeda 2006; Cleary 2006; Motta 2006; Panizza 2005b). For conservative parties see 
(Loaeza 2003; Magaloni and Moreno 2003). 
12 Downs’ spatial theory of party competition predicts that the major left- and right-wing parties, particularly in 
two-party systems, will move towards one another in pursuit of the median voter and change their policy 
positions to correspond with the preferences of the majority of voters. 
13 In their studies of social democratic parties in Western Europe, Przeworski (1985, 1980) and Przeworski and 
Sprague (1986) explain how these organisations sought to appeal to citizens other than workers, particularly the 
middle class, in order to achieve a majority at the polls, because workers do not constitute a numerical majority 
in their societies. 
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mass-based left wing party to a more “catch-all” party, like many social democratic parties in 
Western Europe (Hunter 2010, 2007; Ribeiro 2008; Samuels 2004).  
According to Hunter (2010:21-2), who has authored the most detailed book on the 
transformation of the PT in English, these changes in the party started to occur by the late 
1980s, but took greater impulse after the mid 1990s, when it became evident that the party 
had to expand its alliances with other groups beyond its organised social base and widen its 
appeal among voters.14 The electoral dilemma that the PT faced, however, was not so much 
to get support from middle income sectors, which in the European context were sufficient to 
reach majorities,15 but rather to reach and overwhelming sector of the unorganised poor, as 
Singer (2009:98-9) has recently highlighted. This is because historically Brazil has been a 
highly unequal society16 in which the number of citizens involved in union or movement 
politics, the main groups that the PT represented since in its origins, is very low. In order to 
secure electoral victories, the party needed to see beyond its main social allies, which 
contributed to the party’s formation in the late 1970s. Increasingly, many party leaders hoped 
that Lula’s humble origins and charisma would help to attract supporters (Hunter 2010:Ch.5; 
Singer 2009:100). As a result, the strategy that the PT put in place from 1995 not only 
pursued moderation and pragmatism, but also more emphasis on Lula’s personal attributes 
(Mendes 2004:39). From 1998 onwards, Lula also made increasing efforts to gain “autonomy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 According to Hunter (2010:24), the party changed primarily because it developed within a political system 
that contains “strong institutional incentives for normalization”, most importantly, the need to achieve electoral 
majorities in order to capture executive office. PT candidates running for the executive, she explains, had a 
powerful incentive to moderate because capturing a majority of votes in a direct popular election is particularly 
important to secure electoral victories in mayoral elections within large municipalities as well as in presidential 
elections.  
15 In many countries in Western Europe, as Przeworski (1980:41) noticed, social democratic parties could 
incorporate an overwhelming majority of the population by appealing to the middle classes. In Britain, for 
instance, a programmatic document of the Labour Party issued after the I World War stated that the party could 
claim support of four-fifths of the whole nation by reaching the middle classes (Hendersen 1918:125, in 
Przeworki 1980:41). In countries such as France, it was considered that the working class could comprise eighty 
per cent of the population together with its allies –white-collar workers, small businessmen, housewives, 
pensioners and students, among others (Przeworski 1980:41-2). 
16 By the late 1980s, more than 40 per cent of Brazilians were living below the poverty line (60.6 million in 
1989). In 1989 income inequality reached one of the highest levels in Brazilian history, with a Gini Coefficient 
of 0.64 (Paes, Henriques et al. 2000:125,132).  
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from radical elements in the party bureaucracy”, as part of a strategy to empower “party 
moderates” and strengthen vote-maximising strategies (Hunter 2010:108; see also Ribeiro 
2008).  
These types of accounts mainly focus on the changes that the party underwent before coming 
into power, but they say little about how it dealt with different groups in government and how 
its agendas, strategies and relationships with civil society changed in office. Recent work 
published in Western Europe shows that parties experience deep changes in their goals and 
preferences when they occupied public office (Deschouwer 2008; Ignazi, Farrell, and Romele 
2005; Mainwaring and Scully 2003; Merkl 2007, 2005; Merkl and Weinberg 2003; Olsen, 
Koss et al. 2010; Poguntke 2001). In a comparative study of parties such as the Lega Nord in 
Italy, the Greens in Belgium, Germany and Finland, and the Freedom Party in Austria, 
Deschouwer (2008:14) emphasises their experiences in public office as a “new phase” in the 
life of these parties; as “the crossing of a new threshold” in which they faced the pressures to 
adapt to new demands and requirements (Deschouwer 2008:3). The Green parties in Western 
Europe are revealing cases (Biorcio 2002; Poguntke 2002a, 2001; Rüdig 2002; Stravrakakis 
2000). When these parties first participated in national government coalitions, deep changes 
at various levels took place. In Italy, for instance, the Green’s platform on environmental 
issues became less radical, and a rupture with the Federation of Environmental Movements 
took place after the party supported Italian participation in the Kosovo war (Biorcio 2002; 
Poguntke 2002a:137). In Germany, soon after its accession to power, the Green Party rewrote 
its basic programme, which dated back to the 1980s, and promoted an “ideological purge” 
(see also Poguntke 2002a:137; Poguntke 2001:14; Rüdig 2002).17 These studies are important 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In Latin America, like in Western Europe, there is also some evidence that progressive parties have faced 
great transformations upon coming into power. The most prominent examples are the Peronists in Argentina 
(Levitsky 2001), the Chile Socialists (Roberts 1998) or the Brazilian Social Democrats under Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso (Kingstone 1999), all of which adopted pro-market reforms and switched towards centre or 
right of centre positions during their administrations. 
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because they acknowledge that some of the greatest transformations experienced by political 
parties have taken place after assuming government responsibilities, when they are 
confronted with some of their toughest decisions. However, such works do not explore in a 
systematic way how have these parties reconciled conflicting views and interests in 
government and how this shaped the public policies they  adopted. 
Some students of the PT have also acknowledged the importance of the party’s growing hold 
of public office (Amaral 2010b; Hunter 2010; Ribeiro 2008; Samuels 2004). Samuels 
(2004:1015) thinks, for instance, that the experience of the PT in municipal administrations 
was an essential driver towards “moderation and pragmatism” because “many radical leaders 
altered their evaluations of the relative weight of ‘ideological’ versus pragmatic concerns and 
gradually moderated their views after serving in government”. In his book on the evolution of 
the party from 1980 to 2005, Ribeiro (2010) provides strong evidence that the PT party 
organisation changed as a result of its growing presence in the state, as public institutions 
became important basis of institutional and political support. Ribeiro argues that the PT’s 
growing dependence on the state machinery contributed to displace its original goals and 
policy preferences. However, neither this author nor other PT scholars tell us that one of the 
main elements that drove these changes was the fact that party leaders had to face 
governability dilemmas. By and large, they tell us little about how actually governing 
changes parties. 
These issues are not analysed in the party literature because political parties and governments 
are usually explored in different literatures; or perhaps because we adopt a cynical approach, 
regarding it as something natural that parties make certain promises and alliances to win 
elections and then just leave them aside. This gap in the literature makes it appear as if a 
party that assumes office ceases to be a political party and dissolves itself into the 
administration until the next electoral cycle. For the party literature it is important to look at 
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parties in government because those elected for office not only remain as party members, but 
they also make political decisions that affect the party and its next electoral outcomes. In 
many cases, key decisions that are formally adopted by parties are de facto made by those 
who occupy relevant positions in government. The evidence shows that a number of party 
leaders who occupy public office remain largely influential within their parties.18  
Defining the boundaries between parties as organisational apparatus and parties in 
government is not easy task. To sharpen the main focus of this research, the approach that I 
adopt disaggregates parties by following the party sub-systems suggested by Katz and Mair 
(1993:549). As I noted in the introduction, this study differentiates between party leaders in 
public office and those who are mainly located in the party bureaucracy or in central office. 
These two sub-systems or faces of political parties entail different sets of material resources, 
institutional constraints, opportunities and motivations. The party in public office is 
dominated by party leaders who have won either legislative or executive elections, or who 
become appointed high level government officials.19 The party in central office, in contrast, 
includes two (often overlapping) groups of cadres, the national executive committee (or 
committees), and the central staff or secretariat. It is typically made up of party bureaucrats, 
many of whom make their political careers within the party hierarchy, rather than within the 
political system (Katz and Mair 1993:600).20 It mostly organises party congresses, selects 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This is clearer in several parliamentary systems, in which the prime minister remains as the main leader of 
his/her party, but it is also often the case in presidential systems. 
19 In a parliamentary system in which parties form government coalitions, the party in public office is not the 
whole government because only a few members in parliament will form the cabinet and take on executive 
functions. This is also true for the hybrid political system that exists in Brazil, in which the head of the executive 
branch often includes members of other parties in his or her cabinet in order to gain legislative support (see 
further explanations in Chapters 4 and 5). Strictly speaking, however, even in presidential systems governments 
are not exclusively composed of party affiliated members; they also include civil servants or technical cadres 
with no party affiliation. 
20 The party in central office is usually located in the capital. In a federal system such as Brazil, in every state 
and municipality in which the PT is present there is a party branch. Whenever I refer to the party in central 
office, I mean the PT national bureaucratic structure, which includes the National Directorate, the National 
Executive Commission and even the party delegations that gather for national conferences or congresses. In all 
other cases, the locality and specific institution is clearly stated (such as the PT municipal directorate in Sao 
Paulo; or the party directorate in Rio Grande do Sul).  
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candidates for public office, organises political campaigns and drafts party programmes, but 
it is not in the government or the state and therefore cannot implement public policies (Katz 
and Mair 1993:600).  
Studies on the transformations of the PT have mostly focused on the party in central office. It 
is important to look at parties in public office because, in having to represent the state, they 
are confronted directly with the governability dilemma. There is, however, a profound 
difference between party members who gravitate around the party bureaucracy or the 
grassroots and those who are at the helm of the state machinery. The members of the party in 
central office, as Katz and Mair (1993:596) argue, tend to value the “distinctiveness” of the 
party’s own brand and are more concerned with programmatic integrity. In contrast, the 
members of the party in public office are in a key position to formulate and implement public 
policy and benefit from state resources. They usually value electoral victories over 
ideological purity and are more likely to “appreciate the constraints and limitations on policy 
making” (Katz and Mair 1993:596). Party cadres in government have greater constraints not 
only because they are “electorally accountable for the general condition of the country” (Katz 
and Mair 1993:596), but also because governing for the nation as a whole, not just for the 
segments they might represent, is key to their legitimacy. This dilemma has been neglected in 
studies of party politics, obscuring our understanding of their performance in government.  
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1.2 Bringing a governability approach to the party literature 
Experience shows that progressive parties (or even political parties in general) are not always 
capable of advancing their agendas once in office. This is not only due to the commitments 
they make in order to win elections, but also because they have to make a compromise with a 
wide range of groups and actors. However committed to certain issues political actors may 
be, their motivation is not enough to promote change. Very often, governing parties in liberal 
democracies cannot fulfil their entire platform either because they lack formal institutional 
power to pass and enforce legislation and implement public policies, or because they need to 
accommodate the interest of groups in society with sufficient capacity to undermine stability, 
spread violence or affect the country’s economic performance. 
 
Scholars have found that parties find several constraints in the political systems (Haugsgjerd 
2010:98-1; Olsen, Koss, and Hough 2010). The need to form parliamentary alliances is one 
of the reasons that has limited the potential of social democratic policies in Western Europe 
(Padgett and Paterson 1991:127). In the mid 1940s, for instance, the fact that labour parties in 
Britain and Norway were able to form majority governments was key to the implementation 
of their economic programmes in government. In Britain, the overwhelming parliamentary 
majority of the Attlee government allowed the administration to create a sizeable economic 
sector owned and administered by the state. This was not possible at the time in countries in 
which social democratic parties formed coalition governments (Padgett and Paterson 
1991:127). The reasons mentioned above are only two among many others. A more 
systematic approach is needed to study the nature of the constraints and the types of 
challenges that parties face in government.  
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I suggest that the notion of governability, which has been part of Latin American political 
debates over the last three decades,21 is a useful tool for looking at the possibilities for 
progressive parties in government, provided that one differentiates its discursive and 
normative aspects, which influence the adoption of certain governability strategies, from the 
analytical use of the term. The notion of governability in Latin America has spread beyond 
academic circles and become part of a political language used by the media, commentators 
and politicians alike. These discourses associate governability with a wide range of different 
issues ranging from institutional capacity, to social stability, public order and lack of 
conflicts, to the ability of any government to perform its basic functions, and to design and 
implement public policies in a way that is simultaneously effective, efficient and legitimate 
(see among others Alcántara 1994; Arbós and Giner 1993; Camou 2000; Mayorga and 
Córdova 2007).  
Giving a precise definition of governability is not an easy task because many of its attributes 
and conditions vary depending on the political, geographic or historical contexts. Moreover, 
governability can be a problematic term because it has a strong normative dimension. 
Attributes commonly associated with governability, such as stability, efficiency or 
legitimacy, can be highly subjective. For a progressive political agenda, in particular, the 
language of governability is troubling because it is ideologically conservative in its origin and 
in some of its motivations.22 Often, governability has been used to justify small government, 
to limit the scope of citizen participation (see Huntington, Crozier, and Watanuki 1975), to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Although this notion is hardly ever used among Anglo Saxon scholars today, the word “governability” was 
first introduced by Samuel Huntington, Joji Watanuki and Michel Crozier in the mid 1970s in their report to the 
Trilateral Commission. This was a private foundation created by David Rockefeller and a number of politicians 
and businessmen from the United States, Japan and Europe. The basic idea of this report, which was later used 
to justify conservative economic measures, was that developed countries were facing a deep crisis due to 
excessive state intervention. Its authors argued that the expansion of democracy had “overloaded” the political 
system with demands that governments were not capable of satisfying, thus resulting in inflationary measures  
(Huntington, Crozier et al. 1975). 
22 See, for instance, Claus Offe (1990)’s piece on the “rebirth of the conservative theories of crisis” in which he 
criticises how such theories regard the problem of governability and conceptualise it a result of the overloaded 
social expectations. Such expectations would be responsible for the increasing social polarisation.  
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promote hierarchical views of power based on a raison d’État, or even to defend the 
permanence of certain political regimes (Dos Santos 1991:293). In a study on the post 
democratic transition Chile, for instance, Cecilia Baeza-Rodríguez (2008) found that the 
discourse on governability was used to validate top-down and technocratic visions of power. 
In her view, such a discourse limited political disagreement, stigmatised public disorder and 
subordinated grassroots activity by creating an idea of political consensus that can only be 
reached through agreements among the elites. 
Due to its ambiguities, strong ideological connotations and the broadness of the term, some 
analysts have suggested abandoning governability altogether and have renounced using it as 
an analytical category (see among others Garretón 1994). Others, however, consider that 
governability, although a valuable term, should be treated as a “general principle” or a 
“notion” rather than a concept with a clear definition and a rigid characterisation (Curzio 
1998:189-0). This is the approach that I ultimately prefer. In this work, governability is 
broadly understood as the capacity of a party in government to “get things done”. In polities 
with a significant history of political, economic and social instability such as Brazil, this not 
only means the capacity to pursue a positive agenda but also the ability to avoid the negative 
consequences that may come from instability in any of these three spheres. Hence, 
governability in this study is also understood as the capacity to avoid episodes of crisis that 
can put at risk the ability of a government to last over time.  
Political governability exists when a party in public office is not only able to find support for 
its major policy initiatives and reforms, but also to overcome legislative gridlocks, judicial 
investigations or any type of institutional crisis. Economic governability consists of a 
government's faculty to gain the confidence of the most relevant economic actors and thereby 
avoid capital flight, speculative attacks, financial turbulence or any other phenomena capable 
of affecting the main macro-economic variables. Finally, social governability is found when a 
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government is perceived as legitimate by its civil society interlocutors, when there is social 
peace, and when social unrest, contestation, disruption and conflict stay at low or manageable 
levels. Looking at governability is important for this study because it sheds light on the 
adoption, transformation or abandoning of certain policies and strategies, as well as on the 
way the party in government interacted with its own social allies. 
1.2.1 An analytical tool: the strategic actors 
Scholars consider that a reasonable degree of governability is reached when the interests of 
different groups are adequately represented in proportion to their power (Coppedge 
2001:214) in a way that presupposes a certain social legitimacy (Camou 2001:10). Along 
these lines, a crisis of governability (or a situation of ungovernability) might occur when key 
players do not receive a guarantee that their interests will be respected or when such actors 
have deep disagreements that preclude them from negotiating stable formulas to solve their 
problems (Camou 2001; Coppedge 1994; Santos 1991). Whatever strategy is adopted (elite-
centred or social counter-hegemonic), without certain agreements being reached among the 
elites, political conflict and instability is almost inevitable.  
 
Coppedge (2001:215) uses the term “strategic actors” for groups that enjoy sufficient power 
to influence political processes and undermine governability in a particular country. These 
actors are strategic because they control at least one important power resource, which can 
range from the power to influence ideas and propagate information, to control over capital 
and “the means of production”, as well as being able to distribute public jobs, affect public 
order or even generate social unrest and violence. Among the strategic actors, Coppedge 
identifies in Latin America the media, powerful economic groups, trade union confederations 
and the military (Coppedge 2001:216). However, strategic actors change over time and across 
geographic settings, and therefore so do the conditions for achieving governability. In 
economic terms, an analogy of the role of strategic actors can be found in theories of 
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structural dependence of the state on capital. Such theories argue that, under capitalism, all 
governments must respect and protect the essential claims of those who own the productive 
wealth of society (Block 1977; Claus 1984; Lindblom 1977). This is because capitalists’ 
ability to disinvest fundamentally conditions policy choices in democratic capitalist systems.  
Historical accounts of social democratic and labour parties in Western Europe have explored 
how the balance of forces among strategic actors and the need to accommodate their interests, 
both in the political and economic sphere, have set conditions as to what is possible and 
shaped progressive agendas. On the political sphere, for instance, Padgett and Paterson 
(1991:Ch.4) explain how in the second half of the 20th century the position of the labour and 
social democratic parties vis-à-vis other political parties in parliament produced different 
outcomes. Whereas majority labour party governments, in countries such as Britain and 
Norway, allowed the implementation of ambitious nationalisation programmes after the 
Second World War, coalition governments in which socialists or social democrats lacked a 
clear majority took more moderate economic decisions. In the economic sphere, as Padgett 
and Patterson (1991:143) tell us, the “balance between capital and labour” also played an 
important role. In places where the interests of large enterprises were more consolidated, and 
their allied parties were strongly represented in government, "capital was able to set the terms 
of government intervention and veto any radical social programs" (Padgett and Paterson 
1991:143). In contrast, in countries where trade unions were stronger and better represented, 
more radical socio-economic transformations became possible. In more recent decades, 
authors argue that the growing power of the financial establishment, forced many social 
democratic parties in government to prioritise budgetary austerity and monetary stability at 
the cost of their previous aspirations, generating major reversal in the economic policies they 
defended (Callaghan 2003:127). 
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I distinguish between two types of strategic actors which the PT had to deal with in public 
office: dominant strategic actors and strategic actors in the party’s socio-political field. 
Dominant strategic actors – paraphrasing Gramsci’s notion of the dominant bloc (1971) – are 
actors with supremacy over other social groups and more influence over the state as a whole. 
Under the Lula administration, these actors were mainly large business groups, the financial 
establishment; landowners, rural producers and their allies in formal representative 
institutions, as well as conservative political parties, particularly strong in the Brazilian 
political landscape. I call the second group strategic actors in the party’s socio-political field, 
which are mainly civil society organisations such as CUT and the MST, and intra-party 
groups or factions. The need to accommodate the interests of these types of actors has shaped 
the PT administrations at both the sub-national and national levels.  
Analyses emphasising the role of strategic actors and how they have shaped the agendas of 
progressive parties in Latin America are few. Notwithstanding, accommodating the interests 
of these actors has been part of the fundamental dilemma that these parties face in 
government in order to avoid capital flight, political gridlocks or episodes of crisis and 
instability; promote economic growth, and at the same time meet expectations of socio-
economic redistribution; respond to their social allies and keep mobilisation and contestation 
at low or manageable levels. My work focuses on strategic actors to understand some of the 
challenges that the PT faced in sub-national and national executive public office and the 
extent to which the need to accommodate their interests forced programmatic 
transformations, changed the nature of the relationships between the PT and its social allies in 
office and altered the PT participatory agenda. 
1.2.2 Two governability strategies 
The approach of governability used in this study assumes that the adoption of a certain 
strategy to achieve governability is not only the response to a set of “objective” constraints 
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that force parties to adopt certain courses of action, but also, as Camou (1993) suggests, the 
by-product of certain ideas and values. Unlike the structural or institutional approaches, this 
work goes beyond the assessment of constraints such as the electoral laws or the political 
system. Rather, it pays attention to ideational aspects and the way in which political actors 
perceive their constraints. My study not only focuses on events, but also on people’s 
interpretations of those events and how such interpretations shape their responses. The 
underlying assumption is that people interpret their governability choices and respond to 
them based on imperfect information. These types of approaches, which emphasise ideational 
aspects, have been used in the literature on social democratic parties in Western Europe 
(Berman 1998; Fox Piven 1991; Kitschelt 1994; Sainsbury 1980). Fox Piven  (1991:17) 
argues, for instance, how labour parties construct “interpretations” about what is “within the 
realm of the politically possible” and Sheri Berman (1998:33) explains how ideas shaped the 
policies that social democratic parties formulated during the inter-war years. In her view, 
such ideas affected the way political actors “perceive the constraints and opportunities 
provided by their environment” (Berman 1998:33).  
 
The elite-centred and the social counter-hegemonic governability strategies are two of the 
main ones present in Latin America and used by progressive parties such as the PT.23 The 
elite-centred strategy, which accepts the existing distribution of power and institutional 
arrangements as given, seeks an accommodation with dominant strategic actors and 
emphasises the need to make agreements with them in a way that is usually top-down. In this 
perspective, the raison d’État is what mostly prevails. Civil society is not necessarily 
excluded and even mechanisms for citizens’ participation might be welcomed. However, 
these mechanisms do not play a central role because citizens participate mainly as electors. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 This conceptualisation partly draws on the work of Camou (2001:51-3; 2000), who distinguishes two 
“paradigms” of governability in Latin American political debates, the “conventional” and the “unconventional”, 
as well as on the notion of “progressive governability” in the writings of Suárez (2002:3-5). 
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The most conservative visions of governability, represented by Huntington and colleagues 
(1975), tend to consider that excessive participation can make societies ungovernable. These 
views are troubling for progressive politics because they adopt the state reason a critically, 
neglect a major role for civil society and embrace a narrow perspective of democracy that is 
limited to its formal representative dimension. 
Elite-centred strategies often embrace views of “elitist democracy” (Nylen 2003) – also  
referred as “elite democracy” (Cohen and Arato 1992) or “democratic elitism” (Avritzer 
2002)– in which certain groups, particularly the economic elites, have more material 
advantages and greater influence within formal representative institutions than the popular 
sectors. Nylen (2003:4-5) argues that in “elitist democracies” the “powerful” and “well 
connected” are more able to use the “institutions and procedures” of representative 
democracy in their benefit, while  the political relevance of citizens is reduced to “the 
periodic casting of votes”. In “democratic elitism”, voters do not set the political agendas, do 
not make political decisions and do not choose policies (Avritzer 2002; Gaventa 2006). Only 
their leaders are capable of aggregating interests and decide which of those interests are to 
become potentially salient (Gaventa 2006). These views are an obstacle to progressive 
politics because they ultimately embrace the idea that democracy needs to narrow the scope 
of participation in order to be preserved, and are therefore inclined to restrict the role of 
mobilisation and participation.  
Frequently, elite-centred strategists engage in technocratic approaches, which are presented 
as the best way to “get things done”. The technocratic view, as Heller (2001:135-6) defines it, 
is the “unbounded faith” in science and “the ability of experts”. Technocrats believe that the 
common good can be objectively identified, based on scientific knowledge (Leach, Scoones 
et al. 2005), and because their power is unquestioned, participation loses value. Technocratic 
approaches are frequently used by elite-centred strategists to promote policies that benefit 
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certain groups. Writing on Mexico’s neoliberal elites, for instance, Centeno described how 
technocracy became a “state elite committed to the imposition of a single, exclusive policy 
paradigm based on the application of instrumental rational techniques” (Centeno 1997, in 
Heller 2001:135). In certain technocratic views, some economic policies which follow the 
concerns of the international financial sector and the principles of the Washington Consensus 
are perceived as key to the “good functioning” of the economy and the state.  
In contrast to the elite-centred perspective, with its emphasis on elite bargains and the 
common adoption of technocratic approaches, social counter-hegemonic governability 
strategies24 rely heavily on citizens and civil society to mobilise extra institutional support. 
The defenders of these types of strategies tend to be ideologically committed to participation 
and seek to engage civil society organisations or common citizens in decision-making 
processes. Progressive parties deploy counter-hegemonic governability strategies to alter the 
balance of forces in their favour and to overcome their weaknesses in state institutions. In this 
work I identify at least three types of social counter-hegemonic governability strategies 
promoted by the PT: Mobilisation for reform, defensive mobilisation and broad-based 
participation. In mobilisation for reform (also referred as counter-mobilisation), a party 
proactively builds political support in order to promote certain reforms or policies that 
dominant strategic actors are likely to oppose, such as those pursuing socio-economic 
redistribution. In defensive mobilisation, parties might reactively gather support among social 
allies and instigate collective action in order to defend themselves against dominant strategic 
actors, avoid political crisis or secure their own survival. In broad-based participation, 
progressive parties pursue similar objectives as in mobilisation for reform, but they rely on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 I borrow from Gramsci’s notion of “counter-hegemonic power” as one capable of promoting new 
understandings and practices capable of challenging dominant ideas and norms. Hegemony in the Gramscian 
sense means that the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in economic, political, intellectual and moral 
leadership. The concept denotes a form of power that predominantly operates through consent and only 
exceptionally through coercion (Gramsci 1971:57-8). 
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more institutionalised mechanisms provided by participatory mechanisms that are used to 
build alternative sources of democratic legitimacy.25 
At the sub-national executive level, the PT deployed the different governability strategies 
referred above. The social counter-hegemonic governability strategy put in place by several 
administrations was not counter-hegemonic in the sense of seeking an overthrow of the 
“dominant bloc” or promoting an assault on the privilege sectors. As I study in Chapter 4, 
most PT leaders did not seek to confront strategic actors directly, but to creatively neutralise 
their influence in state institutions through a triad of mobilisation for reform, defensive 
mobilisation and broad-based participation.  Chapters 5 and 7 will show how such a strategy 
lost momentum when the PT entered the national executive. 
1.2.3 Three dimensions of governability 
Governability is a multidimensional concept with a number of mutually reinforcing 
synergies. Authors have generally distinguished political, economic and social dimensions of 
governability (Mayorga and Córdova 2007; Prats 2001; Tomassini 1993). In this study, I 
mainly associate political governability with the way in which the interests of parties or lobby 
groups representing specific interests in the Legislative branch are accommodated in order to 
avoid legislative gridlocks, secure support for government initiatives or maintain the stability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Social mobilisation and social participation are usually addressed in separate literatures. It is not easy to draw 
a narrow line between them because mobilisation can be considered as a form of participation and some forms 
of participation might entail mobilisation. In this work mobilised actions mostly refer to forms of protests or 
other attempts to have an influence which are mainly organised outside the formal political institutions 
(Woldsfeld 1998:23, in Kubik 1998). By participation, in contrast, I understand more institutionalised processes 
by which civil society organisations and citizens in general might have a say in public affairs or share decision-
making power with governments. The main concern in this study is with participatory processes that seek to 
include the poor, the unorganised and the ordinary people, on attempts to create structures by which citizens 
share decision-making power with elected governments (Cornwall 2008:278; Fung and Wright 2003; Gaventa 
2006; Gaventa and McGee 2010; Pateman 1970). My interest is particularly  on processes by which relevant 
economic, social and political decisions can be derived from participatory mechanisms (Cornwall 2008:273) as 
well as on participation as a means to construct what Fung and Wright (2003:260) call “countervailing forms of 
power”. That is, processes capable of providing “a variety of mechanisms that reduce, and perhaps even 
neutralize, the power advantages of ordinarily powerful actors”. The underlying assumption of this study is that 
participation can be used as part of a counter-hegemonic strategy by which the popular sectors, whose power is 
limited within democratic representative institutions, can acquire greater influence. 
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of elected governments (their ability to last over time), by avoiding, for instance, judiciary 
investigations that could result in the impeachment of elected officials. The political 
dimension of governability (see Chapters 4 and 5), is emphasised in this study not only 
because it represented a major challenge for the PT since its election to local public office, 
but also because it affected other dimensions. In Latin America, the most common view holds 
that governability exists when the executives are able to build cross party legislative 
coalitions to pass key legislation (Curzio 1998; Foweraker, Landman et al. 2003; Prats 
2001).26 
 
Economic governability is a general notion used to explain the role of “the markets” in a 
capitalist economy and the restrictions they might impose on democratic governments, in line 
with the so called “structural dependence of the state on capital” (Block 1977; Claus 1984; 
Lindblom 1977), referred earlier. As an analytical tool, economic governability, studied in 
Chapter 6, mostly focuses on the way in which a party in office accommodates the interests 
of powerful economic actors with sufficient power resources to destabilise the economy, such 
as large business groups or the financial sector.  
Finally, social governability focuses on the process by which a party in government creates 
conditions to keep conflict with civil society organisations at low or manageable levels, 
promote social peace and secure a minimum sense of public order. In this study I mostly look 
at some of the strategies by which the PT in government sought to reduce contestation, 
appeased sources of opposition, upheld its legitimacy and avoided social unrest. In doing so, 
party administrations needed to fulfil electoral promises and accommodate the interests of 
various social groups, many of them its own allies (see Chapters 4, 8 and 9).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 In Brazil, due to the nature of the electoral system, and the many obstacles that it creates for parties in the 
executive to form parliamentary majorities, governabilidade in the country´s political jargon is usually 
synonymous with legislative support for the executive and the absence of political gridlock (more in Chapter 5). 
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The political, economic and social dimensions of governability are inter-related. In the same 
way as an economic crisis might cause political and social unrest, conflicts involving civil 
society organisations might pose challenges for political stability. In Bolivia, for instance, as 
in other Andean countries, several presidents have been thrown out of power by street 
mobilisation despite having a majority in Congress (Hochstetler 2006). In these countries, the 
political dimension of governability has a strong social component. In the context in which 
Lula assumed public office in 2003, as Campello and Zucco (2008:6) observe, “no social 
movement represented a ‘threat’ to the political system”. Yet I would argue that the capacity 
of civil society organisations such as the MST to promote disruption cannot be 
underestimated, especially because severe disruption could affect the relationship between 
the PT and dominant strategic actors. 
 
 
1.3 Parties and civil society: A relationship shaped by governability 
The relationships parties in government establish with civil society organisations, my 
secondary aim in this study, are also understood here as part of a larger political game to 
preserve political, social and economic governability. In particular, the need to accommodate 
dominant strategic actors has shaped the way in which progressive parties interact with their 
allies in civil society, the extent to which they promote mobilisation strategies and, no less 
important, their capacity to deliver. By making concessions to certain strategic actors, such as 
powerful economic groups, parties might compromise long-lasting commitments and 
promises made to their social allies.27  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This happened to many social-democratic and labour-based parties, which had to accommodate the interests 
of the “international markets” after the 1973 crisis (Fox Piven 1991:18). Given the fact that the “position of 
capital strengthened worldwide” (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 2010:322) and the financial establishment 
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A concern with stability affects the relationship between parties in government and civil 
society organisations. This occurred, for instance, in countries that experienced democratic 
transitions, such as Spain, South Africa and Chile, where left-of-centre parties deliberately 
encouraged demobilisation once they entered executive public office (Heller 2009; Heller 
2003; Hipsher 1998; Klandermans, Roefs et al. 1998; Roberts 1998; Sinwell 2011). Roberts 
(1998:141) shows how the Chilean Socialist Party, which promoted mass mobilisation during 
the final years of the Pinochet era, downplayed mobilisation once in government for the sake 
of “elite-negotiated” social and political pacts established to “mitigate the fears of 
conservative sectors”. Concerns with stability have also been present in other contexts. 
Before the debt crisis, they shaped the type of alliance social democratic or labour-based 
parties forged with the unions, based on the fact that the latter offered “industrial peace” in 
return for certain economic policies and concrete benefits (Astudillo 2001:291).28  
The literature on social movements tells us that governments seek to limit the potentially 
disruptive effects of mobilisations through different mechanisms. Meyer (2007:126) explains 
how most governments try to make social movement activity more “routinized and 
predictable”. While some of them might suppress mobilisation by means of repression, many 
others try to integrate socially mobilised groups into established political channels or create 
institutions that give them access to the state and help process their demands, as it occurred in 
Brazil during the years of the post-democratic transition (Hipsher 1998:162-167; see Chapter 
3). The types of linkages parties establish with civil society organisations, as I argue in this 
work, can act as instruments to secure social governability.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
demanded austerity policies, many of these parties could “no longer afford to be locked into commitments” to 
labour unions or any group likely to resist market liberalisation or austerity policies (Burgess 2004:3). 
28 Something similar occurred in Latin America, were by forming strong alliances with the trade union 
movement, governing labour-based parties were able to form relatively stable political coalitions (Collier and 
Collier 1991:Ch.2) and avoid “class conflict”  (Collier 1992:17). 
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I look at three types of party linkages –programmatic, reward-based, and inter-
personal/direct. The list is obviously not exhaustive and it only reflects ideal types, which in 
the real world are mixed and blurred. In developing these linkages I emphasise the party side 
of the relationship (the main focus of my research) and their implications for progressive 
parties. This does not mean, however, that civil society organisations are passive actors.  
1.3.1 Programmatic linkages 
Parties in public office can achieve governability by sharing and promoting the agenda of 
their social allies. Programmatic linkages can be conducive to governability in at least two 
different ways: one is by fulfilling demands from civil society organisations and, as a result, 
avoiding or decreasing social contestation. Another is by forming social alliances that can be 
used to overcome the weaknesses that parties might face vis-à-vis dominant strategic actors 
(as in social counter-hegemonic governability strategies). In the literature, programmatic 
linkages exist when parties appeal for support on the basis of ideological platforms or policies 
that they commit themselves to pursue in office (Kitschelt 2000:845-3). Roberts (1998:18) 
argues that, for programmatic linkages to come into being, parties need to “adopt ideological 
positions that are reasonably consistent, coherent, and differentiated from those of their 
competitors” and that, once in office, they are willing and capable of promoting. Following 
Roberts (1998:74), programmatic linkages are important to progressive politics because they 
help parties and civil society organisations to complement each other in positive ways, 
“encourage collective rather than individualistic solutions” and “politicize inequalities”. In 
social democratic and labour parties, programmatic linkages used to be the basis of a close 
relationship between parties and trade unions, based on the perception of shared values and 
policies that political parties promised to pursue once in office (Haugsgjerd 2010:Ch.3-4).  
 
1.3.2 Reward-based linkages  
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Scholars have defined reward-based linkages as those formed when parties exchange specific 
favours with groups in civil society calculating the potential votes that they can obtain from 
specific groups (Haugsgjerd 2010:Ch.4-5). But these benefits, I argue, can also be distributed 
based on the political support they can receive once in office. Reward-based linkages are 
useful for parties because they allow them not only to maximise votes, but also to secure 
social governability. Parties often rely on these types of linkages, in order to “appease 
potential sources of opposition”, develop “a sense of legitimacy” or gain an “aura of 
respectability” within civil society (Selznick 1966:13,161,250). Reward-based linkages can 
take a wide variety of forms; the two most relevant for this study are the distribution of jobs 
and the provision of state subsidies to specific groups.29 One of the problems noticed by 
authors in relation to reward-based linkages is that instead of promoting “universal” or 
“general aims” they are usually “particularistic” and “direct”, as they provide benefits to 
specific groups or individuals, easily identifiable, and “engage in a contract-like exchange 
relationship” with them (Müller 2007:251). Scholars regard these linkages as potential 
obstacles to progressive politics because their discretionary logic promotes a “detachment 
from the broader programmatic interests of the poor” (Roberts forthcoming) or because they 
act as “mechanisms of class control” that “depoliticize social inequalities” (Kitschelt, 
Mansfeldova et al. 1999:49).30 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The allocation of state subsidies, in particular, has largely taken place under Latin American corporatist 
regimes during the twentieth century. In these regimes, labour-based parties selectively distributed financial 
subsidies to officially sanctioned trade unions (Collier and Collier 1979; Middlebrook 1995:Ch.3). In many 
cases, these types of “inducements” were introduced as part of an effort to “shape the behavior of the labor 
movement” and to exercise domination and control of social organisations (Collier and Collier 1979:969). In the 
last few decades, Latin American states have also provided funding to a large number of organisations, either in 
order to engage them in the implementation of specific programmes or in service delivery mechanisms. Like 
other authors, Collier and Handlin observe that these practices have made organisations “dependent on the state 
for a major part of their activities” (Collier and Handlin 2009:89-0). By threatening to exclude them from a 
programme or to deny them funding, the authors argue, “the state may implicitly constrain associational 
behaviour, for instance, through a tacit understanding between associations and political leaders or state officials 
that criticisms should be blunted” (Collier and Handlin 2009:89-0). 
30 The prevalence of reward-based linkages, as Lawson (2005:163) argues, weakens the transformative potential 
of the relationship between parties and civil society organisations and contributes to the maintenance of the 
existing power relations. Middlebrook (1995:Ch.3) contends that, by depending on the state for jobs or 
subsidies, civil society organisations become organisationally weak, subordinate and under the control of 
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1.3.3 Direct/Interpersonal linkages 
 
Direct/interpersonal linkages31 can either take place in the context of programmatic or 
reward-based linkages. These types of linkages, which I introduce in this study as a key 
element to illustrate the notion of a party’s socio-political field, establish an unmediated and 
informal interaction between party and social leaders based on their personal ties. When a 
party occupies public office, social leaders might be brought to government to mediate the 
relationships between the party and its allies in civil society and, often, to limit their 
potentially disruptive effects. By activating interpersonal ties, organisations in civil society 
can become beneficiaries of policy implementation and dispute budgetary resources, but also 
obtain political favours to speed up decisions or bypass institutional mechanisms.32 
Interpersonal linkages can also be used to promote mobilisation processes based on common 
programmatic motivations shared by both party and social leaders. Working through 
interpersonal linkages is not inherently harmful to progressive objectives, even if it often 
implies changes in the strategies that civil society organisations adopt. These linkages might 
relate leaders with a common history and shared values and can help to promote common 
programmatic goals. However, they can be problematic when they are used to obtain direct 
and particularistic benefits, typically reward-based.33 Furthermore, interpersonal linkages 
might divert political energy away from formal spaces of state-society interaction and weaken 
participatory institutions. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
politicians. Furthermore, he notes, instead of forming cross-class alliances around common goals and acquire 
broad support for their actions, organisations narrow their activities to very specific concerns. 
31 The notion of an inter-personal linkage is inspired by the work of Patrick Heller (2003), who develops in his 
study on the Civics in post transitional South Africa (Heller 2003:167), although not in great detail.  
32 In post-transition South Africa, for instance, the Civics decided to work through their “channels of influence” 
in a strategy by which “contentious politics” gave way to “the politics of bargaining and lobbying” based on a 
strong reliance on inter-personal relationships (Heller 2003:168). 
33 A study on mobilisation during the PT government of Marta Suplicy in Sao Paolo, for instance, shows how, 
by activating their interpersonal ties with social actors in public office, civil society organisations ended up 
participating in clientelistic networks (Teixeira and Tatagiba 2005a:53-91). 
44	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 1: BEFORE LULA  
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2. The formative phase of the PT and its socio-political field 
The emergence and formative years of the PT attracted enormous scholarly attention (Abers 
1996; Assis 1992; Bueno 1995; Burgos 1994; Davies 1997; Fernandes 1989b, 1989a; Ferreira 
2008; Garcia 2000; Guidry 2003; Harnecker 1994; Keck 1992; Martins 1997; Menenguello 
1989; Moraes and Fortes 2008; Nunes 2003; Nylen 1997b; Ozaí 1996; Petit 1992; Ribeiro 
1987; Sader 1986; Sader and Silverstein 1991; Tadeu 2002). For a number of reasons, 
ranging from its internal cohesion and discipline (Mainwaring 1994:375) to its “solid base in 
labor and social movements” (Keck 1992:3) to the fact that its creation represented a “break 
with the old left tradition” and so called “real socialism” (Sader and Silverstain 1991:15-6), 
scholars presented the PT as an “anomaly” (Keck 1992:3); an “exceptional political 
enterprise” (Sader and Silverstein 1991:3), a “sui generis” political phenomenon (Lima 
2005:44) or even as a “a new day in Brazilian politics” (Miguel 2006:123).  
Several features made the PT different from most parties in Brazil and Latin America, and 
even from social democratic or labour-based parties in Western Europe. In this chapter I 
focus on those aspects that made the party unique in its approach towards civil society. My 
intention is not to provide a full account of the elements that gave the PT a distinctive 
character and why it acquired them. It is mainly to highlight the particulars of the PT’s 
formation and the type of relationships established with social allies, largely programmatic as 
I will argue. In particular, I emphasise three features that were present in the years of the PT’s 
foundation and left indelible marks on its identity – the use of mobilisation strategies, the 
interpersonal ties established between party and social leaders, and the participatory ideology. 
Margaret Keck (1992), who authored the most influential book on the period, situated the 
emergence of the party in the context of Brazil’s democratic transition. Keck (1993:4) 
persuasively argued that in order to understand this period of party formation it is necessary 
to examine the dynamics of this transition. In this chapter I rely on her approach, but I also 
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broaden the lens by looking at the progressive socio-political field from which the PT 
emerged in the late 1970s, during the final years of the military dictatorship, showing how 
this historical context shaped the development of the entire field. 
This chapter is composed of five sections. In the first section I describe the main features that 
made the PT unique and characterise it using existing typologies for political parties. In the 
second section I study the formation of the progressive socio-political field from which the 
PT emerged, under three umbrella groups –the “new unionism”, the progressive Church and 
the organised Left.  In the third section I study the formation of the party and show how the 
positions and strategies of the entire field were shaped by the characteristics of Brazil’s 
democratic transition. A fourth section explores the way in which the PT related to civil 
society organisations in the field. Finally, I concentrate on the three elements of the PT 
identity – mobilisation, interpersonal linkages and participation – and show how they 
managed to survive over the years, even when the party occupied executive public office. 
2.1 The peculiarities of the PT  
The PT was born as a socialist party, created to channel the demands of a wide range of 
popular civil society organisations, and led by an emerging labour movement, to articulate 
their concerns into a larger political project. Since its formation during the final years of a 
long military dictatorship (1964-1985), the party was conceived as the political instrument of 
a wide variety of segments in civil society which opposed the existing political regime and 
sought to project themselves into politics (Huntington 1968, in Keck 1992; Martins 1997). 
One of the main objectives in the PT was to challenge the way in which the Brazilian state, 
“corporatist in structure” and “clientelistic in its practices” (Hipsher 1998:170), had 
historically approached both civil society organisations and citizens’ participation in public 
affairs. The PT rejected the practices of tutelage, subordination and manipulation used by 
traditional parties in Latin America and Brazil, and wanted to challenge such practices by 
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creating an organisation genuinely interested in civil society and its input, and capable of 
developing more programmatic and participatory relationships between its different groups 
(Keck 1992; Sader and Silverstein 1991). 
Formally created in February 1980, The PT represented a major change in the history of the 
Brazilian Left (Keck 1992; Miguel 2006; Sader and Silverstein 1991). In the legal political 
spectrum, the Left had traditionally been occupied by populist organisations such as the 
Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labour Party, PTB), created by Getúlio Vargas,34 the 
Partido Democrático Trabalhista (Workers’ Democratic Party, PDT) of Leonel Brizola, or by 
the Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party, PCB), only legal for a short 
period in the mid 1940s. These parties had not emerged “from below” and lacked a strong 
base in the “working class” (Keck 1992:3). In contrast, the PT was arguably constructed 
“from the bottom up” (Nylen 1997a:9), bringing to the political arena “the accent and syntax 
of the popular classes” (Miguel 2006:123).35 The innovative character of the party started 
from the characteristics of its membership, which mainly stemmed from social organisations, 
rather than from those with previous political party experience.36 According to Keck 
(1992:3), “never before had a party [in Brazil] emerged from below, with a strong working 
class base and a substantial proportion of its leadership drawn from the labour movement”. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Getúlio Vargas was president between 1930 and 1945. He first came into power through a military coup in 
1930 and was a dictator for 15 years. Between 1951 and 1954 he became president once again, but in a 
democratic election. He promoted nationalism, industrialisation and social welfare, as well as a corporatist 
labour legislation which has remained in place until the present.  
35 It is worth noting, however, that the middle classes eventually expanded within the party structure. The 
Brazilian political scientist Leôncio Martins Rodrigues (1997:306) shows how other social segments were soon 
brought into the PT, such as congress members, liberal professionals, civil servants, university academics and 
other white collar workers. As a result, when the PT celebrated its First National Congress in 1991, a large 
majority of delegates (79 percent) were from “wage-earning middle class origin and were well educated: 71 
percent had studied for a university degree”. 
36 Between 1990 and 1991, for instance, when the first survey studies on the composition of the party 
delegations in national meetings and congresses were conducted, around 80 percent of the delegates who joined 
the PT in the early 1980s said that they had participated in a social organisation before joining the party 
(Marques Novaes 1993: 218). Another survey conducted during the same period showed that only 25 percent of 
the party delegates had participated in a political party when they joined the PT (Tadeu 2002:228).  
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For these reasons, some scholars have characterised the PT as the first mass-based party in 
Brazilian history (Menenguello 1989:36; Sader and Silverstein 1991). Indeed, the PT had 
some of the elements of Duverger (1959)’s mass party type. These elements were not only 
present in the way in which the party was created, with an “extra parliamentary origin” rooted 
in social organisations (Menenguello 1989:33), but also in the characteristics it developed 
during its first decade, being a policy-seeking and a highly programmatic party, with a mass 
membership organised at the local and national levels, and mobilised not only for electoral 
campaigns, but also in between electoral periods (Menenguello 1989:33-4; Ribeiro 2008:61). 
However, the way in which the organisation was created differed in some respects from the 
type of mass-based parties that emerged in Western Europe during the 19th century. The PT 
was more than “just another a labor party” (Guidry 2003:83) because its initial support base 
went far beyond industrial labour or one specific segment of the working class. The party not 
only incorporated in its first years various categories of workers outside industrial labour, 
such as bank clerks, teachers or civil servants, but also Church-based organisations, 
traditional left-wing parties and a wide variety of segments of civil society that did not 
necessarily identify themselves with a class perspective, such as feminist groups, gay 
movements, Afro-Brazilians, human rights advocates or environmentalists (Davies 1997; 
Guidry 2003; Keck 1992; Martins 1997).37  
The PT was also different from a number of labour-based parties in that it was not constituted 
as the political arm of one sector of the labour movement, neither was it formed by the trade 
unions as organisations (Keck 1992:7). Partly as an attempt to avoid compromising “union 
autonomy” and be more democratic and participatory than other left-wing parties, a “formal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 It is not clear which group had more presence within the PT structure at the time of the party’s creation. 
However, a survey study conducted among party delegates who attended the First National Congress in 1991 
shows that leaders with a trade union background made up the largest group in the years of the party formation, 
accounting for 40.6 percent. However, other organisations, labelled under the general category of “popular 
movements” (not disaggregated in the survey) accounted for 53.4 percent and religious groups represented 34.4 
percent (interviewees were allowed to identify themselves with more than one option) (Tadeu 2002:226).  
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separation” between the party and the unions was maintained from the start, while no 
mechanisms for the collective membership of unions was established (Keck 1992:69, 184, 
185).38 The party did not affiliate associations that would automatically incorporate new 
members, as many other labour-based parties. Those who joined the PT did so “as 
individuals”, rather than as representatives of their own organisations (Keck 1992:68).39 This 
was in part because the PT sought a different approach towards civil society organisations 
than previous progressive parties in Brazil had done. Labour leaders who participated in the 
PT’s formation were critical of the history of “subordination” that had characterised the 
relationships between the labour movements and political parties (Keck 1992:184).  
The PT was different from most populist labour-based parties in Latin America, in which  the 
linkage with trade unions normally resulted in attempts to de-radicalise and manipulate, 
whilst social organisations were used as electoral “shock troops” that could mobilise votes 
and provide large-scale demonstrations of public support (Collier and Handlin 2009:84). The 
PT did not want to be like the PCB, which tried to convert the trade union movement into an 
“appendix of the party”, nor to turn social groups into its “power transmission belt” (Lima 
2005:49). Furthermore, the new party of the Brazilian Left did not want to resemble the PTB, 
created by Vargas in 1945 to mobilise union support and control the working class “from 
above” (Collier and Collier 1991:370). The relationship with the labour movement had to be 
different. “If anything, the party should be subordinate to the labor movement” and represent 
union-identified goals in the political arena (Keck 1992:185), but it should never be the other 
way round.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Another reason for this separation was that the establishment of formal relationships between parties and 
unions was prohibited by Article 521 of the labour code (Keck 1992:167). 
39 These types of mechanisms were used by the PRI in Mexico (Foweraker 1990; Middlebrook 1995), the 
Peronists in Argentina (Levitsky 2001) or, with different implications, by various European labour and social 
democratic parties (Alderman 1994; Allern, Haugsjerd et al. 2007), most notably the British Labour Party 
(Minkin 1991). 
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Beyond its mass-based type elements, I argue that in its first decade the PT also shared 
characteristics of what scholars have more recently attributed to “movement parties” 
(Gunther and Diamond 2001; Kitschelt 2006; Poguntke 2001). Indeed, the PT was “the 
mouthpiece of a range of social movements” (Poguntke 2001:7) with one foot in electoral and 
parliamentary activities and another foot in grassroots movements and social organisations 
(Frankland 1995:32). The PT's political project itself “was informed by the discourses and 
practices of the popular movement webs by which the party was traversed and with which the 
party itself was thoroughly imbricated” (Alvarez 1997:100). Like the Green Party in 
Germany, the new party of the Brazilian Left was also “a ‘promoter’ of new themes and 
issues” in which “parliamentary representation” was not necessarily considered the main goal 
(Poguntke 2001:5).40  
The strong commitment towards participation, which has been found in certain movement 
parties41 and characterised the PT and its administrations early on, made it different from 
other mass-based parties, such as social democratic or communist parties (Guidry 2003). 
These parties, as Sirianni (1983:119) tells us, made “little progress in elaborating a 
conception of democracy that could go beyond parliamentarism and statism”. The way in 
which the PT addressed redistributive issues through participatory means, so distinctive of 
the “PT way of governing” (Bittar 1992; Bittar 2003; Magalhães 1999; Mares 1997; Nonato 
2006; PT 1992) differs from the experience of mass-based parties during the Welfare State 
years, when redistribution was very often conducted in a more centralised or bureaucratic 
fashion  (Elvander 1972; Sänkiaho 1984).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 It is important to mention, however, that the PT did not have other elements that have characterized 
movement parties. It did not necessarily function as a "loose network of grassroots support” as it did establish a 
hierarchical structure. Neither was the PT “a post-materialist" organization in its orientation or behaviour, as are 
most movement parties described in the literature (Gunther and Diamond 2001). 
41 In particular, this has been the case of the “left libertarian parties”, a certain type of movement party which 
Kitschelt (1989:3) defines as parties spawned by diverse coalitions of social movements and seeking not only  
redistribution, but also “a change in the form and substance of politics to construct more participatory 
democracies”.  
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2.2 A progressive socio-political field: three umbrella groups 
In this study I characterise the formative process of the PT as the by-product of a progressive 
socio-political field created during the second half of the 1970s, in which the discourses and 
practices of the three main umbrella groups converged – the “new unionism”, the organised 
Left, and the progressive Church.42 The “new unionism”, which mainly led the formation of 
the PT, was a mass movement created from previously established trade unions, which 
became radicalised and turned into a key social and political actor (Sader and Silverstein 
1991:23). Very influential in the automobile sector in the periphery of São Paulo, its leaders 
demanded union independence from the state and employers, and challenged the Brazilian 
state corporatist trade unions inherited from the Vargas era43 to support, among other things, 
the organisation of the unions at the factory level and the participation by the rank and file, 
both of which had been legally restricted (Keck 1992). The great strikes that took place 
between 1977 and 1978 made the “new unionism” the strongest social movement, and its 
activity eventually converged with different mobilisations demanding, among other things, 
land, housing, health care and transport.  
The “new unionism” was led by a group called the auténticos (the “authentic”), in which Luiz 
Inázio Lula da Silva (Lula), leader of the Metalworkers’ Union of São Bernardo and 
Diadema, was the most influential figure. As the leader of the strongest and most important 
social movement at the time, Lula incarnated better than anyone the political identity of this 
progressive field and became a strong leader. It is worth mentioning, despite the digression, 
that the type of leadership he came to exercise in the PT field was not another form of 
personalismo, so recurrent in Latin American politics (Mainwaring 1995), in which parties 
derive their popular support from the glorification of a single leader and his exceptional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 For empirical accounts on how these umbrella groups interacted before the formation of the PT see Doimo 
(1995) and Sader (1998).  
43 For a characterisation of the corporatist model under Vargas see Collier and Collier  (1991:169-95). 
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capabilities. Lula became a strong figure in the PT field, but contrary to what Joe Foweraker 
(1990:130) argues  in his analysis of Cárdenas in Mexico, Lula did not represent a 
“redemptive myth” usually associated to classic populist leaders such as Vargas, Perón or 
Cárdenas himself.  
The progressive sector of the Catholic Church was the second umbrella group in the 
progressive field that formed the PT. Strongly inspired by Liberation Theology, this sector of 
the Church, which was “the only progressive force in the countryside of national scope” 
during the military dictatorship (Houtzager 2001:23), helped to bring together a wide range of 
civil society organisation and to mobilise significant numbers of people, especially in rural 
areas (Houtzager 2000:70). As part of the “preferential option for the poor”, proclaimed by 
the Church after the Medellin Conference in 1968, the progressive Church sponsored the 
formation of several opposition movements and promoted a new type of “mobilisation from 
‘below’” – known as basismo – that led to the formation of pastoral commissions and 
Comunidades Eclesiais the Base (Ecclesiastical Base Organisations, CEBs) (Lehmann 
1990:xii).44 Popular education initiatives, literacy programmes and the sponsoring of 
combative trade unions across the country were some of its initiatives.  
The work of Houtzager (2000:62-3) has shown how the progressive Church assumed the role 
of an “institutional host” of several organisations, providing, among other things, 
organisational resources, ideological frameworks and, no less important, financial resources. 
Indeed, the Church was in a “unique position” to secure resources from abroad, which came 
in the form of international co-operation projects that were used to support movements 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 According to some estimations, the number of CEBs in Brazil reached around 80,000, involving two million 
people (Novaes 1987:219-26, in Houtzager 2000:84). 
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directly and indirectly (Houtzager 2000:71; see also Lehman 1990:xii).45 The role of the 
Church was essential to the PT’s pluralistic character because it helped the party to acquire a 
“strong presence in a number of rural areas” and become a mass-based socialist party that 
“united workers from the city and the countryside” (Houtzager 2000:76). This capacity to 
mobilise the rural world is another distinctive feature of the PT, not present in the formation 
of most labour-based or social democratic parties elsewhere.  
The third umbrella group, the organised Left, was a vast and very diverse congregation of 
Marxists, Trotskyites, Maoists, and other small organisations spread in small groups around 
the country, which also included social democrats and ex-militants of 1960s guerrilla groups 
(Sader 1998:167-78). Some of these groups were already organised into political parties or 
had formed political parties in the past, but many others were clandestine organisations that 
were seeking for legal recognition so as to leave behind their often sectarian and marginal 
character (Sader 1998).  
It was not an easy task to reconcile the views of the different components of the organised 
Left that joined the new party, some of them representatives of the “old Left”, with the “new 
unionism” and Church based organisations. Partly because of this, when the PT was 
eventually formed it did not formulate a narrow definition of socialism (Martins 1997),46 and 
it allowed different groups in the party to form factions, which were represented at the 
different levels of the party apparatus. In order to consolidate the party leadership and 
counteract the influence of the organised Left, which brought into the party its own internal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Houtzager (2000:73) explains that Bishops mediated contact with several religious entities, mainly in 
Northern Europe, channelling “millions of dollars into Brazil’s rural and urban popular movements during the 
1980s”.  
46 Despite the lack of a precise definition of Socialism (particularly in terms of the role of the state in promoting 
economic redistribution or in the ownership of the means of production) most groups in the PT were critical of 
the model of “real Socialism” and rejected the insurrectional route to power, understanding it as a frontal attack 
on the state apparatus. Their intention was not to overthrow the existing State, nor to create a State-led society 
(Sader and Silverstein 1991:107). The mainstream position considered from the beginning that democracy (a 
broad notion of it) and socialism should be blended into a form of “democratic socialism” with which most 
factions identified (Sader and Silverstein 1991). 
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discipline and solid ideological repertoires, the trade unionist wing (with Lula as the head), 
Catholic activists and several intellectuals formed the Articulaçao dos 113 (Articulation of 
the 113) in 1983 (Ozaí 1998:88),47 which became hegemonic within the party apparatus in 
the following years (Keck 1992:114), forming what Panebianco (1988:38) calls the party’s 
“dominant coalition”.  
2.3 The PT formation in historical context 
The formation of the progressive socio-political field that led to the creation of the PT and its 
evolution in the following years can only be understood in its historical context; that is, as 
part of the larger dynamics of a democratic transition characterised as conservative and 
particularly long (Keck 1992; Skidmore 1989; Stepan 1989). The transition timidly started in 
1973, when the military authorities initiated a gradual liberalisation, the abertura (opening 
up), but according to many interpretations it only ended in 1989, with the first direct 
presidential election in three decades. Before that, presidents were elected by an Electoral 
College that was subject to political manipulation (Skidmore 1989:28). The different forms of 
collective action that emerged in the 1970s, prior to the establishment of the PT, took place 
after President Geisel (1974-1979) had gradually restored several civil and political rights 
(including free speech and free association), but maintained control of the political system 
with the intention of remaining in power at least until 1991 (Keck 1992:27). In that scenario, 
civil society became the main space for resistance against the military authorities and one of 
the main arenas in which several progressive leaders chose to act (Keck 1992:21).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Articulaçao dos113 was later known simply as Articulaçao (Articulation). Over the years it became larger in 
size and changed its name to Campo Majoritário (Majority Camp). In 2005 it was relabelled as Construindo um 
Novo Brasil (Building a New Brazil).    
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In 1979, a new military president, General Figueiredo (1978-1985), decided to open up the 
party system by allowing the creation of new political parties.48 This gave progressive leaders 
in the field an opportunity to become active in institutional politics. By creating a party, 
however, they did not intend to leave their organisations or left-wing mobilisation activities. 
Their intention was to diversify their strategies between civil and political society. For several 
years, the PT field maintained social mobilisation and remained sceptical of formal 
representative institutions. The reason for this, according to Keck (1992:33), was precisely 
the “prolonged period of uncertainty over the timing of the military’s exit from power”.49 In 
this scenario, the “main sphere of opportunity” for the PT during the greater part of the 1980s 
lay “outside, rather than within political institutions” (Keck 1992:252). Nevertheless, there is 
another reason which Keck mentions briefly and it has great importance: many leaders in the 
PT field were opposed to a conservative transition entirely negotiated by political elites 
(Keck 1992:34-5); they challenged the idea, dominant among politicians opposed to the 
military authorities (and the realm of political science), that the transition should take place in 
stages, building first a democratic regime and only afterwards discussing the democratisation 
of the state or other substantive issues. PT leaders wanted to transcend the democratic elitism 
that I referred to in the previous chapter, in order to promote their radical conceptions of 
democracy and to alter state-society relationships. For them, the transition was not only about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Unlike other military regimes in Latin America, the military authorities in Brazil did not abolish Congress and 
elections. However, they only allowed the existence of two parties: the Aliança de Renovação Nacional 
(ARENA), the pro-regime party, and the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB), the officially sanctioned 
opposition party. During the 1970s, however, the military authorities realised that this compulsory two party 
system tended to consolidate the opposition in one single bloc, which would be more difficult to defeat in 
elections. By facilitating the creation of multiple parties among the opposition, the government sought a “divide 
and conquer” strategy in order to fragment the opposition. Eventually, six new party labels were created, of 
which five survived: the Partido Democrático Social (PDS), ARENA´s new name; the Partido do Movimento 
Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), successor of the PMDB; the Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT), led by 
Leonel Brizola; the conservative Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL); the Partido Popular (PP), a conservative 
opposition party led by bankers; the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) and the PT  (Keck 1992:26; Skidmore 
1989:22).  
49 The positions and strategies that many of them adopted in those years were shaped by the characteristics of an 
“extremely gradual”, “controlled” and “ambiguous” democratic transition, which left many “open areas of 
contestation”, as Keck (1992:251) explains, such as the “lengthy uncertainty over when the first presidential 
elections would be held” (Keck 1992:29). 
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promoting formal representative democracy. In the transition they also saw an opportunity to 
promote participatory democracy and build political institutions in which they could express 
their own voices and promote their own interests.  
At least until the mid 1980s, as Keck (1992:187-9) explains, the PT clearly prioritised social 
mobilisation over participation in institutional settings. In her view, this was mainly because 
the cycle of protest was still at its peak, the transition had not yet been consolidated and the 
benefits of participating in democratic institutions were still not entirely visible. For several 
years, many leaders in the PT field acted simultaneously in the party and in the labour 
movement or alternated from one to the other (Keck 1993:168).  As Keck (1993:24) explains, 
social movements did not vanish after the creation of the PT, and many of them, particularly 
urban and rural landless movements, became even “more militant” during the 1980s. The 
energies of the PT socio-political field were mainly focused on civil society and were not 
dissipated when the party was created. Moreover, two of the most important organisations in 
the field were created after the PT had been formally established: the first was the Central 
Workers’ Union (CUT), in 1983, and then came the Landless Rural Workers’ Movement 
(MST) in 1985, also sponsored under the umbrella of the progressive Church. In the 
following years CUT became the largest labour peak organisation in the country and the MST 
one of the most visible farmer movements in Latin America.50 In 1984, the PT participated 
with CUT, the Church, and other organisations in the direct elections campaign, which aimed 
to elect a new president by direct universal suffrage. The demonstrations occurred in many 
cities, most notably in Rio de Janeiro, where the number of participants exceeded one million 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The basic MST strategy consisted of moving a cluster of families onto government-owned or unproductive 
private land (which according to the Constitution should be subject to expropriation). By occupying farms, the 
movement put pressure until land titles were given. Although the movement officially adopted a position in 
favour of pacific means, many of its actions were portrayed by the media as violent. Movement leaders claimed, 
however, that most of the violence was perpetrated against the MST by the hired guards of landowners and the 
military police. 
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(Keck 1992:220).  One year later, the PT helped to organise public rallies that successfully 
sought to establish a Constituent Assembly.  
Authors have argued that the party’s position towards institutional politics and representative 
democracy was somewhat ambiguous during this period (Bueno 1995; Compans 1993; Couto 
and Baia 2006; Keck 1992). The party was critical of formal representative institutions, but it 
participated in elections and occupied spaces in those institutions from 1982 onwards, when 
the military regime allowed direct local elections for the first time since 1965. The use of 
institutional spaces, however was often conceived instrumentally, or justified in PT 
documents as part of a strategy to support “the organisation and mobilisation of workers for 
the sake of people’s power” (Compans 1993:83).  In its 1982 electoral manifesto, where for 
the first time the party positioned itself for electoral competition, it explained that 
participating in the ballots was in order to “back social struggles”, “accumulate strength”, and 
publicise its “programme of transformations”, as much as to “conquer wider spaces” for its 
organisations (Compans 1993:79).  
When the PT occupied its first institutional spaces, however, it did not prioritise them. 
Rather, it used them to mobilise people. In Diadema, a small city on the outskirts of São 
Paulo where the party first rose to power (1983-1985),51 the city’s Director of Planning, Amir 
Khair, declared in his early days in office that the government’s priority was to “organise the 
people” for political objectives (Assis 1992:137).52 At the federal level, despite having a 
small parliamentary group the PT introduced very few legislative proposals and mostly used 
Congress as a political tribune from which it could deliver speeches and make public 
denunciations (Keck 1992:217). The party not only had little interest in political institutions, 
it also distrusted formal representative democracy. Such a position was still present in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 In 1982 the PT won two municipal governments, Diadema and Santa Quitéria do Maranhão. 
52 Kahir even said that making Diadema “an enjoyable place to live”, came as a secondary objective (Assis 
1992:137). 
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December 1985 when Lula declared during an interview, several months after the military 
regime had handed the presidency to a civilian government elected by Electoral College:  
I am trying to show that representative democracy is false. We want to fulfil the rules of 
the game, but we do not regard parliament as an end in itself, but only as a means. We 
will try to use it [representative democracy] as much as we can, but if we realize that we 
don’t achieve power through those means, I will personally assume the responsibility of 
telling the working class that we will have to pursue other strategies” (Garcia 2000:71-
72).  
The ambiguity of the PT’s stance towards formal institutions was still present during the 
Constitutional Assembly, which eventually took place in 1987 after intense pressure from 
opposition parties and civil society organisations. Although the party played an important 
role in the drafting documents and obtained important victories in the constitutional 
debates,53 it refused to endorse the final document on the grounds that the party supported 
“socialism” and rejected “the bourgeois constitution order” that the new Constitution would 
endorse (Sader and Silverstein 1991:19). The position of the PT was not simply rhetorical. 
Those PT deputies who decided to vote in favour of the new Constitution were expelled from 
the party and only readmitted years later. The slow pace of the democratic transition, in 
which leaders of the PT field were still not seeing clear advantages, shaped many of the 
radical discourses and strategies that were adopted by many of them. In the next Chapter I 
will show how these positions changed in the years that followed, when these actors 
perceived clear benefits in taking part in state institutions, but also when they were able to 
advance some of their views on participatory democracy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 During the constitutional debates, several civil society organisations, many of them from the PT field, put 
together the Pro-Popular Participation Plenary, a cross-sectoral coalition which mobilised to favour citizen 
participation in both the Constitution-writing process and the Constitution itself  (Hochstetler 1997:9). 
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2.4 Initial approach towards civil society 
Civil society organisations became from the outset a symbol of the PT identity and a defining 
feature of the party ideology. Since the beginning, leaders insisted that the PT was not born 
“ready-made” and that its programme arose “from the political practice of its social bases” 
and of “the workers” (PT 1998:70-1, in Bianchi 2001:106-16). For this reason, the lack of a 
precise definition of socialism made sense: the idea was that the party ideology would derive 
from what Bianchi and Braga (2005:106) call “empirical class action”. The aim was to 
promote social transformation by people themselves through grassroots’ participation.54 
Considered by progressive leading intellectuals at the time and many people in the field as 
“entities not contaminated by the vices of ordinary politics” (Gohn 1991:282), civil society 
organisations were central to accomplishing the party’s main goals.  
Inspired by the “schools of citizenship” that characterised the Ecclesiastical Base 
Communities, many leaders in the PT considered that the party had a pedagogical role and 
believed that their social network could “provide the means of educating workers for 
alternative forms of democratic participation” (Davies 1997:164). These forms of education 
would eventually liberate the poor from pervasive clientelistic practices and persuade them of 
the need for radical transformation. As the main contact point with the poor sectors of the 
population, many leaders in the PT thought that their social allies would give the party a 
reliable base and allow them to attract massive support among the public. PT leaders were 
aware that their main constituency relied on the interests of organised groups, but many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 In the PT foundation ceremony, Lula emphasised: “It’s time to finish with the ideological routines and self-
indulgence of those who sit at home reading Marx and Lenin. It’s time to move forward from theory to practice. 
The Workers’ Party is not the result of any theory, but of twenty-four hours of practice” (Sader and Silverstein 
1991:50). This empirical classism was also visible in the speech that Lula delivered during the First National 
Convention in 1981, when he specified: “The socialism that we want is defined by all of the people, as a 
concrete requirement of popular struggles, as a global political and economic response to all of the concrete 
aspirations that the PT might encounter. It would be very easy, sitting here comfortably in the precincts of the 
Senate of the Republic, for us to decide on one definition or another. It would be very easy and very wrong. The 
socialism that we want will not be born of a decree, neither ours, nor anyone else’s. The socialism that we want 
will be defined in the daily struggles, in the same way that we are building the PT” (PT 1998:114, in Bianchi 
and Braga 2005:1749).  
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leaders also hoped that these groups would enable the party to build support in poor regions 
where clientelistic practices were widespread (Hunter 2010:28-9). In such a context, winning 
office was not as important as having a pedagogical instrument that could spread its 
“message” to the poor (Hunter 2010:28).  
For several years the PT was seen in the entire field as a complement to the activity of civil 
society organisations. During the 1980s, the party became “the main sounding board for 
popular struggles” (Sauer 2008:10), which gave a political dimension to sector specific and 
local demands; and translated their concerns into political issues. Among the many links it 
forged, the PT became an important ally of rural trade unions (Houtzager 2000, 2001) and 
landless workers around the country (Brandord 2009). The party assisted the landless by 
publicising violence committed against them (Sader and Silverstein 1992:59), promoting 
common goals and participating in joint mobilisations (Branford 2009:526). In many regions 
MST activists campaigned in elections or ran as PT candidates. Despite the lack of official 
ties, the relationships between the party and the movement were closed from the outset, being 
largely shaped by direct and interpersonal linkages among its leaders. Alexandre Rangel, who 
was an activist in both the PT and the MST, recalls that he saw “no contradiction” in 
belonging to both organisations simply because “they walked together” (08/04/09). During 
the 1980s, he argues, “there were no divisions between the party, the social movements, the 
Church and the unions” because “we all belonged to the same groups” and “we regarded the 
party as the tool of the movements” (Rangel 08/04/09).55 Clarice dos Santos, who also 
developed her career in the MST and the PT recalls that before conducting a land occupation 
the movement always consulted party leaders informally, either to decide on the best timing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 In a similar perspective, Elvino Bohn Gass, a PT deputy from the state of Rio Grande do Sul, the state in 
which the MST was created, and another supporter of rural organisations similar to the MST, argues that the 
connection between the two organisations was so strong that every time a member of the landless movement 
organised an occupation, the Right accused the PT of being “behind it”. “And we always responded: ‘No, the PT 
is in front of it’” [tr. “O PT não está por trás, o PT está na frente”] (Bohn Gass 19/12/08). 
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or on the best way of doing it (07/04/09). Very often, party leaders gave the movement 
protection against repression. David Stival, a former party president in the state of Rio 
Grande do Sul who was strongly linked to the MST, recalls that when the military 
dictatorship was still in power, the movement camped within the State Assembly, supported 
by PT deputies, who offered them protection (Stival 17/12/08). 
The ties between the PT and CUT were even more solid. The contribution of the party to the 
creation of the central was “decisive” (García 2008:98). The auténticos, the sector of the 
labour movement which led the formation of the PT, also sponsored its formation in 1983 
(García 2008:98). CUT expanded its membership vigorously and by 1985, 15 million 
workers and 1,250 unions were affiliated to it (Keck 1992:177). Although CUT was formally 
independent from political parties, its position was always identified with that of the PT 
(García 2008:98). The strategies of both organisations were often formulated together in 
informal settings among leaders. Very often, strike decisions, with their economic and 
political implications, were debated within the party in the same way as political decisions 
adopted by the party directorate were discussed by the most influential union leaders within 
both CUT and the PT (Moroni 07/10/08). The relationships between the PT and CUT were 
always complex and not easy to define. Keck (1992:184) argues that the PT always had 
difficulty in making a “clear separation” between “union questions” and party issues. Labour 
leaders, in practice, continuously attempted to act on two different fronts. According to other 
observers, PT and CUT maintained an “umbilical relationship” (Lima 2005:178) that was 
“permanent” and “fluid” (García 2008:109). Although CUT included some unions whose 
leaders were not involved in the party or who belonged to other parties, its decision-making 
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structures were “unquestionably dominated” by unionists who were also PT members (Keck 
1992:178).56 
The PT maintained strong programmatic linkages with its social allies in the field, based on 
complementary goals and agendas. From the outset, the party incorporated the demands of 
specific social sectors in its programmes (Moraes 2004:144-64). The party became a defender 
of the right to land and embraced a comprehensive land reform as a top priority (Sader and 
Silverstein 1992:59), giving a sense of purpose to its relationship with the landless 
movements.  In 1989, when Lula first ran for president, he established a comprehensive 
agrarian reform as the main priority of his future government. In his own words, land reform 
was seen “as necessary as the air we breathe” (Campello 2012:24). The candidate  framed 
land reform in a confrontational fashion in which landowners were regarded as “enemies” 
that needed to be “defeated” (Mendes 2004:17-21), using a language that was not very 
different from the discourse of the MST. During the election, Lula spoke about the “sacred 
character” of the right to land and justified the occupation of large properties (Mendes 
2004:17-21), which was very controversial in the media.57  Likewise, the PT championed the 
expansion of workers’ rights and supported a trade union reform that would be capable of 
altering the Brazilian corporatist relationships, as CUT demanded. On several fronts, 
programmatic linkages were possible because, in the words of Roberts (2002:18), the party 
adopted positions that were “reasonably consistent”, “coherent”, and “differentiated from its 
competitors in the political system”.  
Until 1989, the discourse of both Lula and the PT was easily compatible with the positions of 
its allies in civil society and the groups that these organisations sought to represent. In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 A survey conducted during the Third National Congress of CUT in 1988 revealed that 91 percent of the 
delegates interviewed declared themselves to be PT sympathizers (Martins 1990:80).  
57 During the 1989 election, MST members, despite proclamations of political autonomy and lack of official ties 
with parties, decisively mobilized for Lula. More than 40,000 MST supporters attended campaign rallies 
organised by the PT (Branford and Rocha 2002:54, in Branford 2009:8). 
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rhetoric that Lula used in his first presidential campaign there were clear allies and 
adversaries, as Campello (2012:21) found in a study of Lula’s political discourse. As she 
observed, the most recurrent terms with which he identified allies and “friends” in 1989 were 
“steel workers”, “clerks”, “public workers”, “labor leaders”, “public servants” or workers in 
general. Conversely, the enemy was represented by the terms “bankers”, “oligopolies”, 
“sugar mill owners”, “traditional oligarchies” “the privileged”, “the powerful” “the rich” or 
“the political class”. All of these groups carried a negative connotation in Lula’s speech 
(Campello 2012:21).  
2.5 Long lasting features of the PT “genetic model” 
In his classic work on political parties, Angelo Panebianco (1988:xiii) argues that the way in 
which a political organisation is created, “the crucial political choices made by its founding 
fathers” and “the first struggles for organisational control”, will leave “indelible marks” that 
may still be visible many years after its formation. Empirical studies show, for instance, how 
the relationships which parties initially established with certain groups in society became 
legacies that placed them on historical trajectories that have been difficult to leave 
(Haugsgjerd 2010; Warner 2000).58 Among the several aspects of the PT “genetic model”, I 
highlight three of them – the continued use of mobilisation strategies, the strong interpersonal 
linkages between party and social leaders, and the belief in participatory democracy. These 
elements, I argue, shaped the PT field for several years, even after the mid 1980s when “the 
arena of political struggle gradually shifted to state institutions” (Keck 1992:24) and party 
leaders were increasingly elected for public office.  
The continued use of mobilisation strategies, the first element, was particularly important 
during the PT's first decade. Keck (1992:251) argues that by the late 1980s the party had not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 For instance, the presence or absence of an “external sponsor organization”, such as the unions in labour 
parties or the Church in Christian Democrats, are, as Panebianco states, important elements of a party’s “genetic 
model”, which continue to shape its relationship with groups in civil society and its future political behaviour 
(Panebianco 1988:51-9). 
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yet lost its “character as a movement”. The reasons for this “political anomaly”, she contends, 
resided in the relations between the PT and the character of the Brazilian democratic 
transition (Keck 1992:251) examined earlier. Despite changes in the political scene and the 
fact that in 1985 the party won its first state capital, Fortaleza (in the north-eastern state of 
Ceará), and doubled its representation in Congress (Keck 1992:23; Sader and Silverstein 
1991:85), it maintained its mobilisation strategies. When the organisation participated in the 
Constitutional Assembly in 1987, for instance, it put in place a strategy that, as Keck (1992) 
explains, combined the mobilisation of its social base with negotiations among political 
parties in institutional settings. The PT formed a coalition that opened the process of popular 
initiatives to a wide variety of organisations in the field, thereby producing 122 amendments 
and gathering more than 12 million signatories (Keck 1992:224-5).The party only started to 
work more seriously in state institutions from 1988, when it elected thirty six municipalities, 
including three state capitals (São Paulo, Porto Alegre and Victoria), six middle-sized 
industrial cities in Minas Gerais, and many small towns throughout the country (Bittar 
1992:9, in Hunter 2010:81). However, in many of these cities, as Chapter 4 will show, 
mobilisation strategies were combined with institutionalised participatory mechanisms.  
Mobilisation also played an important role during the 1989 presidential election, when Lula 
ran for president the first time, with the support of almost two million volunteers, who 
participated all over the country in decentralised local committees (Ribeiro 2008:112). 
Unexpectedly, Lula moved ahead in the second round when he received 31 million votes 
(16.5 percent of the total), an achievement that, according to some interpretations, would not 
have been possible without the mobilisation of the party’s social allies (Sader and Silverstein 
1991:142). The PT field mobilised once again in August and September 1992, when millions 
of people marched in the streets of the large Brazilian cities calling for impeachment of the 
first president to actually be directly elected, Fernando Collor (1990-1992). This campaign, 
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which went beyond the field, was successful at pushing the National Congress to vote for 
Collor’s removal from office later that year (Hochstetler 1997:8). 
The strong inter-personal linkage between party and social leaders was the other indelible 
mark. Notwithstanding the rhetorical emphasis on the “autonomy of social movements”,59 
present in the PT field and among some Brazilian intellectuals at the time, this concept does 
not necessarily express the nature of the relationship in practice. The different segments in 
the field were formally separate, but strongly interdependent in practice. At least between 
1980 and 1985, no distinction between movement and party activity existed (Keck 
1992:Ch.7) and activists were even allowed to wear two hats (Branford and Kucinski 
1995:49).60 The PT field established a relationship of this type with groups in civil society so 
that many social activists could pursue common goals and strategies with the PT, and even 
identify themselves as petistas (PT members), without necessarily having to be formally 
affiliated (Vas 10/04/08). Benedito Barbosa, a leader of the Housing Movement in São Paulo 
who has always maintained a close relationship with the party, said during our interview: 
“The PT was in our heart, so it was not necessary to sign an affiliation sheet. We were so 
closely identified…” (02/12/08).   
After the second half of the 1980s, however, the PT experienced a process of 
institutionalisation through which, following Huntington (1968)’s notion of this term, the 
organisation acquired salience and became a political project in and of itself. A number of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The notion of autonomy is used in this work not as an analytical concept, but as a discourse present in the PT 
field and among certain intellectuals. Many scholars have expressed analytical scepticism towards 
proclamations of absolute autonomy by civil society organisations vis á vis state institutions. Joe Foweraker, for 
instance, argues that social movements “do not develop in isolation from other social and political actors” and 
that their construction cannot be understood as “abstractly” separated from the political institutions (Foweraker 
1990:16). For a criticism on the usages of “autonomy” in the Brazilian context see Lavalle, Acharya and 
Houtzager (2005).  
60 In order to maintain strong linkages with civil society, the PT mandated in its first statutes that candidates 
should have a history of activism, either in unions or within social movements. Although leaders could not 
simultaneously act in executive bodies or directorates, cadres permanently alternated from one sphere to 
another, particularly in the case of the labour unions (Keck 1991:Ch.7). 
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leaders started to make their political careers within the party, where they found incentives to 
become professional politicians and to dedicate themselves more to party activities. Leaders 
could not easily jump back and forth between the party and civil society organisations, as 
they did in the initial years, particularly between the PT and the unions (Keck 1992:Ch.7). 
Most cadres started to define their own political priorities and the majority made a choice to 
make their careers either within the party or in a civil society organisation. And yet, party and 
social leaders maintained a fluid relationship that was based on direct and inter-personal 
linkages between leaders who had a common history and shared similar purposes. In Chapter 
3 I show how these linkages bound together the party and its allies in civil society in sub-
national executive public office, while in Chapter 8 I explain how these types of linkages 
were also very influential during the Lula administration, despite the fact that they became 
more reward-based than programmatic. 
The strong belief in participatory democracy,61 developed by the party in its very early years, 
became another indelible mark of the PT field. This belief went very far. During the PT 
foundation ceremony in 1980, the document Guidelines for the Drafting of an Electoral 
Manifesto stated that: “the PT position in those issues that most interest the people should be 
adopted through a deliberation process in which the grassroots of society, not just the party, 
should be listened to” (Compans 1993:73). The view that this document espoused was highly 
unusual for a political party: “The PT should not have anything that resembles a government 
programme for the time when the party gets into power” (Compans 1993:73, my emphasis). 
A discourse of civil society autonomy and the anti-state approach that was so dominant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The meaning of participation was somewhat ambiguous at the outset of the Brazilian democratic transition, as 
in the PT field. By and large, it was a concept used by activists who perceived themselves as excluded from the 
political system. As Simoes (1992:11) argues, their call for social participation was also a call for political 
recognition. Demands for participation had various connotations – from a direct relationship between population 
and government to a criticism of the representative system. Often, for the leaders involved in the first PT 
administrations elected in those years, participation was the programmatic slogan of a democratic 
administration, and also an ideological way to differentiate themselves from other political forces (Assis 
1992:Ch.2). 
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during the late 1970s nurtured what Compans (1993:115) labelled a “myth of popular self 
representation” by which many leaders believed that the formulation of alternative 
redistributive policies could arise from the direct participation of the masses in policy-making 
processes (Assis 1992; Compans 1993; Moraes 2001).  
This view was incorporated by the new party of the Brazilian Left, partly as a consequence of 
a distrust of formal institutions dominated by traditional elites, and partly as a strong critique 
of their clientelistic methods. Nylen (1995:29), who studied the first PT participatory 
experiences in municipal governments, wrote that many leaders in the party regarded popular 
participation as “a collective action strategy necessary [not only] for the political 
emancipation of repressed classes or groups, but also as the vehicle for an individual’s 
psychological emancipation”. He went on to note that some activists perceived 
“empowerment through participation” as “a profoundly life-altering experience, akin in many 
respects to a religious conversion” (Nylen 1995:29).  
The first government experience in Diadema embodied the heightened belief of some party 
leaders in participation. In 1982, when the PT ran in elections for the first time, the 
candidates refused to write a government programme, arguing that the future administration 
would rule with “the people” (Compans 1993:74)62. According to Assis (1992:96), who wrote 
the only book on this period, the party in the city only had a set of “radical principles in 
favour of popular control and redistribution”, but lacked concrete policy plans. Before the 
elections, all PT candidates running for posts in the city signed a “Letter of Commitments”, 
registered with a public notary, in which they declared that those elected would give up any 
decision-making power and transfer it to “grassroots municipal councils” which would be “de 
facto rulers and representatives” (Assis 1992:98). The commitment to participation was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Marilena Chauí, a party intellectual, showed how social leaders demanded a government program and were 
surprised by the type of leadership role that the party intended to give them (Chauí 1982:20, in Compans 
1993:72). 
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restated by Gilson Menezes, the elected mayor, a toolmaker trade union leader, when he 
reaffirmed in his early days in office that “everything” would be discussed in councils that 
would have the power to make binding decisions. As a mayor, he would only act as an 
“articulator” to “solve urgent matters”, while the city would be “managed through a 
collective” in its day to day running (Assis 1992:96).  
In the following years, the participatory strategies that the party put in place were more 
pragmatic and down to earth (Abers 1996), but participation remained a powerful idea that 
inspired many future PT administrations, even during the Lula administration. The PT at the 
sub-national level, as the introduction to this thesis mentions, would later be praised for 
creating a government model which combined “inversion of priorities” towards the poorest, 
“good governance”, and the right to participation in the implementation of public policies, the 
so called “PT way of governing” (Bittar 1992; Bittar 2003; Magalhães 1999; Mares 1997; 
Nonato 2006; PT 1992), by which the party eventually found a formula to translate into 
practice its participatory ideology and even reconcile the views that derived from the 
heterogeneous background of its members. 
Final remarks 
In this chapter I have drawn attention to some of the aspects that shaped the PT identity by 
briefly sketching how the party was created and developed during its first decade of existence 
in the context of Brazil’s democratic transition. However, my account has not focused only 
on the party. I have broadened the lens by looking at its socio-political field and the way its 
internal components related to each other. The participatory ideology, the interpersonal 
linkages and the reliance on mobilisation strategies that became part of the identity of the PT 
field are important to understand the type of social counter-hegemonic governability 
strategies that the PT put in place in several sub-national executive experiences and the way 
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in which the party related to its social allies in government, issues that I develop in the next 
chapters.  
 
In her study on the PT, Keck concludes that by the end of the 1980s the party had not yet lost 
its “character as a movement”, whilst its original goals and ends had remained “exceptionally 
strong” (Keck 1992:251). In her view, the reasons for this “anomaly” resided in the 
relationship between the PT and the “extremely gradual” and “ambiguous” character of the 
Brazilian democratic transition (Keck 1992:251). The dynamics of this transition were such, 
she contends, “that its main sphere of opportunity lay outside, rather than within political 
institutions” (Keck 1992:252). More than 10 years later, when Samuels (2004:1021) wrote 
about the transformations of the PT, he reached very different conclusions. In his view, the 
party did not resemble a social movement anymore and its main sphere of opportunities were 
no longer external to political institutions, but were situated within them. Indeed, as the 
democratic transition “consolidated”, the Brazilian state became more inclusive and brought 
new opportunities and challenges for the PT and its socio-political field. In the next chapter I 
will show how both the PT and its allies in civil society increased their presence in political 
institutions and I will consider some of its implications.  
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3. Moving towards the state: the reconfiguration of the PT field 
 
Before setting out to explore how the PT confronted the challenge of governability it is 
necessary to understand how the party and its socio-political field changed in the years of the 
post-democratic transition and throughout the 1990s. During those years, the PT field 
experienced a reconfiguration in its goals and strategies, which affected the way in which its 
different components – the party on the one hand and its social allies on the other – related to 
each other and approached the state. The literature on the transformation of the PT has mainly 
analysed the changes in the party as a result of the electoral competition (Amaral 2010b; 
Hunter 2007; Miguel 2006; Nylen 1997b; Ribeiro 2008; Samuels 2004; Singer 2009) and, to 
a lesser extent, due to its increasing control of public office (Hunter 2010; Ribeiro 2008; 
Samuels 2004), mainly the executive office at the sub-national level. In this chapter I show 
how these changes not only affected the party but also the dynamics of its socio-political 
field. 
The democratic transition and its consolidation, I will argue, had a considerable impact on 
how the most influential leaders in the PT field rationalised what was politically possible. 
Because political institutions became more inclusive, the state turned into a critical platform 
from which social and political leaders in the field sought to promote their views and 
interests. On the one hand, the dominant coalition in the party became more pragmatic. It 
incorporated strategies of incremental social change and adopted a more coherent electoral 
route to power which resulted in the endorsement of the rules and dynamics of formal 
representative democracy. On the other hand, several civil society organisations, such as 
CUT or the Housing Movement (although not others such as the MST), adopted more 
moderate practices, increasingly engaged in processes of negotiations with the state and 
deployed strategies that were less confrontational and disruptive.  
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In analysing the reconfiguration of the PT field, this chapter confirms part of what is 
theorised in the literature on political parties and party-civil society relationships, but it also 
differs from this literature important aspects. The PT trajectory does confirm, as Kirchheimer 
(1966:193) points out, that when parties adopt “catch all” electoral strategies (hence seeking 
to attract a maximum of voters beyond their original constituencies), they “modulate [their] 
relations with interest-groups in such a way so as not to discourage potential voters who 
identify themselves with other interests”. During the 1990s, as I will show, the PT dominant 
coalition, seeking to appeal to a broader electorate, adopted some discourses and strategies 
that were different from its social allies. Such differences, as I will show, were particularly 
visible in the case of organisations such as the MST which maintained disruptive practices 
and an anti-systemic rhetoric, but it also affected other organisations in the field, such as the 
Housing Movement in São Paulo. 
The PT trajectory does not confirm, however, the assumption that parties and civil society 
organisations move away from each other when the former switch from opposition to 
government (Haugsgjerd 2010:86; Maguire 1995; Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Schwartz 
2005; Taylor 1993:134). In particular, classic authors on party transformations have argued 
that when these organisations adopt electoral strategies and increasingly hold public office, 
their relationships with social allies become weaker and more intermittent (Katz and Mair 
1995:13; Kirchheimer 1966:193-9). In the PT case, this assumption is present in the work of 
Ribeiro (2008), who assumes that because the PT became a large and competitive party 
machine, and because it approached the state and became dependent on its resources, it 
moved away from civil society.  
That is not the case, I contend, because both the party and its social allies made a movement 
towards the state and still maintain close relationships. What happened, however, was that 
when the PT occupied public office, party leaders and social activists related in a different 
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way, now that the party in government was in a position to deliver jobs and public goods. As 
I will show, some of the programmatic linkages that brought together the party and its allies 
in civil society became weakened, while reward-based linkages acquired more importance. 
Unlike other authors who have written about the PT (Baiocchi and Checa 2007; Handlin and 
Collier 2011; Oliveira 2006b, 2006a; Ribeiro 2008; Ricci 2008, 2007b), in this chapter I will 
show that the party did not move away or abandon its social allies. In contrast with such 
views, I will argue that some legacies of the PT “genetic model” have given cohesion to the 
PT field until recent years: (i) the fact that civil society organisations are part of the PT 
identity; (ii) the overlapping membership that still reaches an important number of party 
members who are also social activists; and (iii) the strong interpersonal linkages between 
leaders in the political and social sphere.  
This chapter has five sections. Section 1 explores the opportunities and challenges that the 
democratic transition brought to both the party and its social allies. Section 2 will show how 
the increasing adoption of electoral strategies created a programmatic and discursive hiatus 
between the PT and some organisations in the field. Section 3 shows how reward-based 
linkages largely shaped the relationship within the field in public office. Section 4 will 
provide evidence that the PT has not abandoned its social allies. Finally, section 5 will 
explain how some legacies of the PT “genetic model” have been the basis of an ongoing 
relationship between the party and its allies in civil society. 
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3.1 The post-democratic transition and the 1990s: opportunities and challenges  
The democratic transition gave the PT the opportunity at a very early stage to participate in 
elections and occupy legislative and executive public office.  In the 1982 municipal elections, 
before control of the national executive passed into civilian hands, the party won, almost 
unexpectedly, the cities of Diadema, in the state of São Paulo, and Santa Quitéria do 
Maranhão, in the North-Eastern state of Maranhão. In 1985, it won its first state capital, 
Fortaleza, in the North-Eastern state of Ceará, and only eight years after its foundation, the 
party had thirty-six mayors, thus including six middle-sized industrial cities in Minas Gerais 
and three state capitals: Porto Alegre, Victoria and São Paulo capital city, the main centre of 
economic power in Brazil. This early presence in formal representative institutions made the 
PT very different from social democratic or labour-based parties in Western Europe, many of 
them legally excluded from participating in elections or unsure for quite some time about 
participating in such institutions (see among others Padgett and Paterson 1991; Przeworski 
1985; Przeworski and Sprague 1986).  
The fact that the new party of the Brazilian Left was in public office at such an early stage  
created what Mahoney (2000:508) calls a “self-reinforcing” path-dependent sequence. This is 
a sequence in which once "an institutional pattern” is adopted – the pattern of electoral 
competition in this case – it becomes hard to leave because its adoption provides “increasing 
benefits” (Mahoney 2000:508).  In the PT case, these benefits became evident when the party 
won the first important state capitals and, later on, when Lula passed to the second round of 
the presidential election in 1989 and eventually ended up losing by a 6 percentage points 
margin. At this stage, the rewards of electoral politics started to speak for themselves. During 
the 1990s, the presence of the party in sub-national executive public office continued to 
expand. In 1992, fifty-four city halls were already in the hands of the PT, and the party won 
new important state capitals like Belo Horizonte, Rio Branco and Goiânia. In 1996, the PT 
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acquired 115 municipalities, including Belém, and in 2000 the party had impressive results 
when it won 187 city halls, governing 18 percent of Brazil’s  population (Baiocchi 2003a:13). 
Already by the late 1980s, a number of party leaders had realised that the transition was 
delivering benefits and that they could profit from representative democratic institutions. 
After all, representative democracy was not as biased towards the elites as they had initially 
thought. The moderate sector led by Lula’s faction, which formed the party’s dominant 
coalition, started to prioritise the institutional arena more clearly by acting inside the political 
system, and gradually ceased to promote mass mobilisation strategies. Such strategies, 
however, did not disappear from the field: they still had an echo among the leftist factions – 
though sometimes more in rhetoric than in practice – and among certain social organisations 
such as the MST.  
In any case, the PT ventured into electoral politics with many of its social allies, either by 
actively engaging them in political campaigns to win votes for the PT, or by promoting social 
leaders as candidates. It was not only trade union leaders, who were constantly incorporated 
by the party in large numbers, who ran for office. To a lesser extent, leaders from the urban 
or landless movements did so as well. In Rio Grande do Sul, one of the party’s most 
important enclaves, MST members elected city councillors, congressional representatives at 
the state and national level, and even some mayors (Carter 2006; Vergara-Camus 2009:21). 
One of the elected leaders was Adão Pretto, one of the founders of the Landless Movement 
who also became one of the first PT congressional representatives in Rio Grande do Sul and 
three times was a National Congress Representative. Pretto became famous for saying that he 
had “one foot in Parliament and another foot in the streets” (02/12/08). Several activists from 
other organisations, such as feminist movements and promoters of gender issues, also ran for 
office as PT candidates (Alvarez 1994b:170-1, in Hipsher 1998:167; Macaulay 2004:105-8; 
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2003). Eventually, many social activists were hired by PT governments as aides, 
parliamentary advisors or civil servants, as I will show. 
The democratic transition not only brought social leaders the opportunity to engage in 
electoral politics, but also gave them greater access to the state. During the 1990s, several 
civil society organisations in Brazil increasingly came to pursue their goals through 
negotiations with the state. Many of them promoted their agendas through political parties 
(Baldez 2003), with a preference for the PT, and they began to work in partnership with 
government institutions and agencies (Alvarez 1997; Avritzer 2009; Cardoso 1992; Euzeneia 
2011; Feltran 2007; Friedman and Hochstetler 2002; Gohn 1997; Hipsher 1998; Hochstetler 
1997; Scherer Warren 2007). In particular, a new form of institutionalised participation 
integrated civil society into decision-making processes (Hipsher 1998:155), thereby creating 
“a permanent form of interaction” between civil society and the state (Avritzer 2009a:9).  
The input of the PT field in the constitutional drafting process, in which the party and its 
social allies actively promoted participatory democracy, resulted in the creation of several 
participatory institutions operating under the principles of participation and representation, 
such as sectoral policy councils, national conferences, city master plans or public hearings 
(Avritzer 2009a:9). Many of these institutions brought together government officials and 
representatives from civil society organisations who were responsible for social oversight for 
discussing general policy guidelines and for expressing policy preferences (Avritzer 2009; 
Gohn 2000; Melo and Rezende 2004) through a decentralised participatory system.63 From 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The decentralised participatory system that exists in Brazil mainly consists of a set of councils and 
conferences that follow the same hierarchy as the federation; they are organised at the municipal, state and 
national levels, and largely mirror the government’s sectoral organisation (Shankland 2010:48). Almost every 
ministry has a specific council and almost every municipality possesses at least one type of council, in many 
cases because their creation is a legal requirement for the distribution of federal resources. By the end of 2002, 
Brazil had more than 22,000 councils distributed across its 5,565 municipalities (Leite 2008:44). These 
institutions are often referred to in the literature as “new democratic spaces” (see among others Castello, Gurza 
Lavalle et al. 2007; Cornwall 2004). Councils and conferences are difficult to characterise as a group. Some are 
constituted by appointed members, while others allow civil society organisations to select their own candidates 
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the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, a number of such institutions were created in areas 
such as healthcare, urban policy, social assistance or environmental protection (Avritzer 
2009:8).  
The creation of participatory institutions and the way in which the state engaged civil society 
during the 1990s had important consequences, because several civil society organisations in 
the field changed their strategies significantly, adopting less disruptive forms of collective 
action, such as street protests, mass demonstrations, boycotts or sit-ins, and incorporated 
more institutionalised strategies, which took place under certain rules and procedures. Social 
mobilisation did not disappear from the stage during the 1990s, but with a few exceptions – 
such as the MST – protest actions decreased significantly. By and large, civil society 
organisations came closer to the state by “lobbying it”, negotiating with its authorities, 
“participating in its processes” and even “accepting contracts from it” (Hochstetler 
1997:170). These changes were also motivated by the fact that funding civil society 
organisations became a common practice under the neoliberal approach adopted during the 
decade, both in Brazil and Latin America. As the state was leaving many of its 
responsibilities aside, governments transferred vast amount of resources to social 
organisations with which they delivered public services.  
During the 1990s, several groups in the PT field turned into major recipients of state 
subsidies and some of them eventually became highly dependent on them (Carneiro 2006; 
Dagnino 2005; Demier 2003; Galvão 2004; Hochstetler 1997; Navarro 2006).64 Even the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to these bodies (Friedman and Hochstetler 2002:27). Some have the power to make binding decisions, while 
others have only consultative power.     
64 CUT, for instance, managed the resources of the Workers’ Assistance Fund (or Fundo de Amparo ao 
Trabalhador, FAT), a mechanism initially created by the 1988 Constitution as an unemployment security 
scheme. With these resources, the organisation promoted the creation of job agencies and put in place programs 
of professional requalification and productivity promotion, among other initiatives (Galvão 2004:232-2). FAT 
resources grew significantly during the 1990s. By 2003, when Lula assumed the presidency, around 70 percent 
of the funding received by CUT depended on this single mechanism (Demier 2003:17).  
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MST benefited from massive state resources during the 1990s.65 Despite its anti-state 
discourse, its proclamations of autonomy and the fact that it maintained land occupations and 
other forms of disruptive action, the movement engaged itself in the delivery of public 
services such as technical assistance, production and education in the settlements. As Navarro 
(2006:161) explains, MST leaders became “mediators of government policies”, such as the 
National Programme for the Invigoration of Family Agriculture (PRONAF), in great part 
aimed at the settlements. Its leaders also benefited from a privileged access and influence 
within the Institute of Colonisation and Land Reform (INCRA), and from the establishment 
of the Ministry of Agricultural Development. In 1996, the press announced, quoting INCRA 
as its main source, that the MST had a US$ 20 million budget, in great part from 
governmental sources, and that with these resources it paid the salaries of 800 professional 
militants (Folha de S. Paulo 09/03/97, in Hochstetler 1997:13). Navarro (2006:165) considers 
that the MST eventually came to derive “its main financial resources” from the state and even 
that the interruption of this funding “could compromise” the survival of the movement. 
Within the PT, the course adopted by the democratic transition process eventually led party 
leaders in the dominant coalition to believe that the expectations of the late 1970s – that a 
major political and social transformation in society could derive from the action of a wide 
network of civil society organisations that would “unite and expand” throughout the country 
to defeat the authoritarian regime – could no longer be sustained (Cardoso 1992:291). Given 
the alternatives opened by the Brazilian transition for both party and social leaders, the 
opportunities within institutional mechanisms seemed far more feasible and became more 
attractive for most leaders in the moderate sector of the PT and many of its social allies. If 
any change was foreseeable in the near future, it would take place through the institutional 
channels that were opened by the democratic transition. For the moderate sector of the PT, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 As Navarro (2006:165) explains, the MST did not receive state resources directly. It deployed a wide range of 
rural cooperatives whose leaders were closely linked to the organisation. 
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only by winning elections could the party eventually put in place its program of 
transformations. The long-term strategy of mobilising and “organising the people” was 
subordinated to the expansion of the party’s presence in public institutions, more feasible in 
the short run, with the ambitious aim of winning the presidency.66  
By making pragmatic electoral strategies and moving to the centre of the political spectrum 
as the PT did during the 1990s, the party’s dominant coalition – the main promoter of these 
changes – was not adopting a substantially different path from that of most of its social allies. 
The PT not only incorporated many civil society organisations in its own electoral dynamics, 
but many of these organisations also adopted more pragmatic and moderate strategies. As 
Samuels (2004:1008) puts it, “unions and social movements have not ‘stayed in place’ while 
the PT has ‘moved away to the center’”.  In his view, such a claim is false, because it 
assumes that these organisations have “remained rooted to self-perceived status as ‘outside 
the system’ and ‘confrontational’”, while the party became moderate and pragmatic. In the 
case of CUT, the party’s most powerful ally, the shift in strategies occurred even before it did 
in the PT. Early in the 1990s, in response to the economic recession and the neoliberal 
reforms, CUT’s dominant sector modified its approach towards the private sector and the 
government, in order to avoid massive jobs losses (Galvão 2007; Riethof 2004; Rodrigues 
1994).67 Because organising strikes and mobilising workers had become increasingly difficult 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Later on, Lula would judge it an “absurd idea” that there was no way for the Left to gain power through 
elections and he directly criticised those who supported such an idea, especially the MST, who rather than 
worrying about elections maintained the objective of “organising society” as a priority. In a documentary film 
recorded during the 2002 presidential campaign, Lula criticised the movement on the grounds that its strategy 
would only become effective in the long run and only reach a third of society. “I won't be alive in 30 years!” he 
claimed. “I want to get to power sooner”. He also said: “What am I supposed to tell Olívio Dutra when he tells 
me that he wants to be Governor? Should I ask him not to run, and to organise society for Socialism, instead?” 
(Moreira Salles 2004).  
67 Between 1989 and 1999, unemployment in Brazil leapt from 1.8 to 7.6 million. The unemployment rate 
increased from 3 to 9.6 percent of the economically active population. Four out of five jobs created during the 
1990s were in the informal sector (Oliveira 2006a:11). 
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in such a context (Riethof 2002:40),68 unions more affected by job losses concentrated on 
preserving their existing jobs rather than achieving higher salaries or expanding benefits 
(Samuels 2004:1006).  Eventually, the central decided to create partnerships between 
workers and employers in order to overcome the negative effects of the economic crisis 
(Rodrigues 1994), and began to negotiate in a “‘realistic fashion’” around specific issues 
(Galvão 2004:220). In these negotiations, CUT did not question “the essential elements of the 
government or bosses’ proposals”, and even “softened its demands to make them compatible 
with the vocabulary of the business sector” (Galvão 2004:239).69   
3.2 Prioritising electoral politics: the programmatic and discursive hiatus 
The way in which the PT decisively embraced electoral politics after the mid 1990s and 
penetrated state institutions during the decade had significant consequences for the party70 
and changed its relationship with its social allies. For several party leaders, particularly 
within Lula’s faction, it became evident that in seeking to attain their most ambitious 
electoral objectives – the pursuit of executive public office – civil society organisations did 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Given the threat of unemployment, the number of strikes decreased considerably during the 1990s: while 
more than 1 million workers participated in strike actions in 1987, only 115 thousand workers were involved in 
these types of activities in the 1990s. 
69 One of the main promoters of this strategy was Vicente Paulo da Silva, known as Vicentinho, who eventually 
chaired CUT between 1994 and 2000. Under his leadership, the organisation promoted a number of sector 
specific negotiations in which agreements between trade unions, employers and the government to maintain jobs 
in the sector in exchange for production increases and tax reductions were reached (Galvão 2004:231). 
Vicentinho was a skilful negotiator who played an important role in driving the organisation towards 
moderation.  His trajectory as trade union leader speaks for itself. As leader of the Metalworkers’ Trade Union 
of São Bernardo and Diadema, Vicentinho actively engaged in negotiation strategies with both the private sector 
and the government. In 1991, for instance, he led a delegation that travelled to the United States to convince the 
Ford company not to close down a motor factory situated in the ABC region of São Paulo  (Singer 1996). In 
March 1992, when the crisis dramatically affected the automobile sector, he participated in a sectoral chamber 
negotiation as a result of which the workers agreed to reduce their incomes, while the car industry reduced its 
prices and made a commitment guaranteeing that no job would be lost (Rodrigues 1994). 
70 Several social leaders and members of the party Left criticised the extent to which the PT prioritised electoral 
politics at the expense of social mobilisation. Benedito Barbosa, a leader of the Housing Movement in São 
Paulo, bitterly complained during our interview that the party had become “a machine to contest elections” and 
that, in pursing such an objective, “it can run over whatever steps in its way” (Barbosa 02/12/08). Tarson Núñez, 
who was a member of the faction Socialist Democracy, considers that the party eventually became “trapped in 
electoral logic”. “We are involved in electoral processes almost every year”, he explains. “When we are not 
working for a local election, we are involved in a state election; when we are not participating in a federal 
contest, we are operating an internal election to renew our executive bodies”. According to this cadre, 90 
percent of the energies of a PT activist today are “spent in achieving or reproducing existing power structures” 
(Núñez 18/12/08). 
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not provide enough votes. This was especially the case in large cities in which majorities are 
needed in order to win in a run-off (Hunter 2010; Singer 2009; Núñez 18/12/08). The alliance 
with civil society organisations was not dissolved, but PT leaders started to perceive that 
these groups were not as representative as they had expected and only embraced certain 
interests, which were not necessarily those of the whole of society which they had to reach.71 
This understanding started to mature once PT leaders participated in its first sub-national 
executive experiences. Once in office, mayors had to govern for everyone, not just for their 
social bases. This was clear, for example, in Campinas, during the administration of Jacó 
Bittar (1989-1992), and in São Paulo, with Luiza Erundina (1989-1992), both of whom were 
forced to look beyond their own bases of support and become more concerned with the 
“public interest”. Bittar, a former union leader, declared that despite the fact that he was a 
“trade unionist”, he could not “behave like one in the mayor’s office” (Azevedo 1991a, in 
Macaulay and Burton 2003:136). Likewise, Erundina a former grassroots activist of the 
Housing Movement, eventually realised that “movements constitute a minority of the 
population”, that they are not always capable of “representing more universal interests” and 
that most of them are “locally oriented, fragmented and partial” (Kowarick and Singer 
2007:36). After only one year in power, Erundina declared in an interview that she was “an 
administrator of the public interest” and she had to govern “thinking about the majority” 
(Kowarick and Singer 1997:40). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 One of the main party intellectuals within Lula’s faction, Marco Aurélio García, made the following remarks 
during a meeting in 1995 in which the PT discussed its relationship with civil society organisations: “The social 
movements that gave birth to our party are not archaeological monuments that can be now revisited (...). Many 
of them defend sector-specific interests and cannot elaborate broader policies…. [Furthermore], their 
representations have severe organisational limitations. Most of the trade unions do not reach even half of their 
professional categories, and neighbourhood associations gather very few people. Almost everywhere the 
organisations and its directions no longer represent their own social bases and just talk to themselves (…) We 
need a broader and deeper understanding of what we call ‘social movements’” (Partido dos Trabalhadores 
1995:11-2, 30-1). 
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Party leaders in the dominant coalition, and possibly beyond, gradually abandoned the 
illusion that social organisations could be their main or only contact point to communicate 
and liaise with the public. The PT needed to expand its alliances with other groups and widen 
its appeal among voters. But many party leaders also acknowledged that their social allies 
were not sufficient to reach the entire popular sector. In the Brazilian context, as noted in the 
introduction, appealing to the middle classes was not as difficult as reaching a wide sector of 
what I call the unorganised poor, who were more concerned, as Hunter (2010:33) explains, in 
“acquiring specific material benefits sooner rather than later”. According to this author, 
during the 1990s PT leaders realised that “poverty and inequality, however egregious, did not 
translate readily into support for the party” (Hunter 2010:33).  
André Singer (2009:87-90; 2000), a party intellectual who conducted survey studies at the 
time, found that these poorest voters – to whom he refers as the “sub-proletariat” (Singer 
2009:90) – had many conservative characteristics. In the 1989 presidential election, the great 
majority of them voted for Fernando Collor, the right-wing candidate who defeated Lula 
(Singer 2009:86). These voters tended to favour “order”, rejected instability, were 
particularly afraid of inflation and even showed hostility towards strikes (Singer 2009:87). A 
large proportion of the unorganised poor even favoured repressive practices against 
disruptive forms of collective action.72  Singer recently interpreted these data as showing that 
the poorest electorate in Brazil were interested in a reduction of inequality, but through a 
direct state intervention rather than through “social movements capable of destabilising the 
existing order” (Singer 2009:87). I found no evidence that party leaders made such an 
assessment during the 1990s, but it is safe to argue that exhibiting close linkages with some 
of the most radical social groups in the PT field could have created difficulties. This was the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Interestingly, the lower strata were more prone to supporting repression than the middle classes or the upper 
middle classes were. 41.6 percent of voters earning less than twice the minimum wage favoured the use of 
troops to stop strike action, as against 8.6 percent of those earning more than twenty times the minimum wage 
(USP, Cedec, Datafolha 1990, in Singer 2009:87).  
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case, in particular, when the intention was to improve the image of PT candidates among a 
vast sector of the unorganised poor, and not only among the middle classes, as happened with 
social democratic parties (Kirchheimer 1966; Przeworski 1985; Przeworski and Sprague 
1986). 
The electoral strategy adopted by the moderate sector of the PT during the 1990s, which was 
reflected in the discourse and programme of both Lula and the party (see among others 
Amaral 2003; Mendes 2004), generated after the mid 1990s a hiatus between the strategies, 
discourses and programmes of the PT and those of certain organisations in the field which 
still embraced confrontational approaches and disruptive practices, such as the MST or even 
one sector of CUT which did not adopt the moderate strategies of the dominant sector. As 
part of their centrist strategy, moderate party leaders wanted to make it clear that they were 
ready and willing to work within the institutional mechanisms and to play by the rules of 
formal representative democracy (Cardozo 04/12/07; Santos 07/05/09; Felício 28/10/08; 
Menezes 26/07/97). Many of them had become increasingly uncomfortable with the actions 
of the Landless Movement, which, as many party leaders say, had “difficulties in recognising 
the limits of the democratic process” (Berzoini 29/10/08) and the “institutional dimension” 
(Cardozo 04/12/08). The adoption of a moderate strategy made it inadvisable for PT leaders, 
especially for those more engaged in electoral strategies, to be seen to have a close 
relationship with an organisation that was clearly portrayed by the media as violent, and 
which many of them increasingly regarded as sectarian and isolated from society (Américo 
11/11/08; Cardozo 04/12/08; Ferro 02/07/09; Núñez 18/12/08). 
In some respects, the PT and the MST took opposite trajectories during the second half of the 
1990s. While the party’s dominant coalition was more seriously embracing the electoral route 
to power, the movement started to engage in more confrontational tactics, going far beyond 
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the occupation of unproductive land, where its origins lay, and it resorted to invading public 
buildings, laboratories of multinational companies, and cargo ships with genetically modified 
crops, to which the MST had become radically opposed (Navarro 2006:158-9). The PT did 
not and could not deny its relationships with the movement, which had developed strong ties, 
particularly with the party’s leftist factions. However, many PT leaders, particularly those 
running for executive public office, realised that the linkage with the MST could have 
negative electoral consequences and opted to manifest their differences publicly (Sader 
2005). Over the years, more and more petistas grew critical of the movement. I asked 79 
party leaders their opinions about the MST and 67 percent of them expressed some kind of 
criticism. Among members of Lula’s faction, “Building a New Brazil” (CNB), the percentage 
was higher than in other factions, reaching 77 percent of them.  In the centre-left faction, 
“Message to the Party” (MP), 60 percent of my interviewees expressed some type of 
criticism, whereas within Leftist Articulation, it was 40 percent (see Appendix III for details). 
Although most interviewees were careful in their words about the movement, one of the most 
outspoken, a city councillor in Porto Alegre who belongs to Lula’s faction, said: 
90 percent of the population in Porto Alegre hate the MST. I supported the movement 
when it was founded, but I don’t do that anymore (…) They are in permanent 
confrontation and that affects the PT. The movement today has a leftist direction, far too 
radical and irresponsible. They are kids in front of human battalions. That type of struggle 
makes no sense today (…) The movement only brings us a limited number of votes and it 
usually affects us because it costs us the support of the middle class and other sectors that 
identify us with their sectarianism (Sell 15/12/08).  
During the 1998 and 2002 presidential campaigns the programmatic linkages that had shaped 
the relationship between the PT and the MST since the early 1980s were largely weakened. A 
close examination of Lula’s discourse during successive electoral contests shows the way in 
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which his position on radical redistributive policies was toned down as part of a vote-
maximising strategy. In the 1998 presidential campaign the old opposition between “the 
elites” and “the people” that characterised Lula’s and the PT’s discourse was almost absent, 
while the “national bourgeoisie” was no longer portrayed as an enemy (Mendes 2005:61). 
Lula wanted to show a moderate face and replaced the old politics of confrontation with the 
politics of conciliation, negotiation and consensus. As a result, the discourse on land reform, 
which had played such an important role in the two previous presidential campaigns, was 
almost left aside. Lula did not, for example, use a single segment of the free television 
advertising time that the Brazilian electoral legislation grants to presidential candidates to 
discuss land reform or to criticise big landowners, as he had done in the past (Mendes 
2004:68-69). 
In the 2002 presidential election, Lula downplayed the old dichotomy of landowners versus 
the landless and his discourse on land reform eradicated any sign of confrontation.  In a clear 
strategy to differentiate the party from the controversial occupations of the MST, largely 
portrayed by the media as violent actions, Lula announced that he would conduct a “peaceful 
land reform” implemented on unproductive lands and strictly within the constitutional 
framework (Mendes 2004:87-89). As a candidate, Lula clearly chose the words that he would 
use during the campaign. This possibly occurred after his electoral marketer, Duda 
Mendonça, produced a survey study showing that more than two-thirds of the voters were 
opposed to a violent land reform process (Moreira Salles 2004). In 2002, every time Lula 
referred to land reform, he added terms such as “pacific”, “organized” or “well-planned” and 
disconnected the terms from any reference to “social justice or income redistribution” 
(Campello 2012:25). Lula no longer condemned all types of large rural properties. In a 
remarkable difference with the MST discourse, the candidate praised the Brazilian 
agribusiness sector for being “modern” and “productive” (Mendes 2004:88). Although the 
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movement supported Lula’s election in 2002, its participation during the campaign was not as 
enthusiastic as it had been in previous contests. In the discussion of the rural programme, for 
instance, the movement participated only marginally (Beze 03/07/09; Campos 03/07/09) and 
many of its proposals were left aside (Teixeira 07/04/09). Many leaders of the MST 
concluded that in the 2002 election neither Lula nor the PT represented their demands as 
before (Sauer 2008:14, Teixeira 07/04/09). 
3.3 Reward-based linkages in public office  
The occupation of public office altered the way in which party and social activists in the field 
earned their living, by becoming elected representatives, officials or employees in PT 
municipal administrations or legislative bodies. As table 3.1 shows, in 1990 only 22.1 percent 
of the party delegates worked for the party in public office, 7.2 percent worked for the party 
bureaucracy and 28 percent for civil society organisations (Amaral 2010:88).  In the 12 years 
that followed, this proportion was inversed. By 2001, 53.1 percent of the PT delegates served 
the party in public office (Amaral 2010:88), 9.7 percent worked for the party in central office, 
while a mere 2.1 percent earned their living from a civil society organisation (Amaral 
2010:90). 
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Table 3.1 Sources of remuneration among party delegates 1990-2001 (in percentages)  
 
 1990 1991 1997 1999 2001 
Public office 22.1 28.5 40 42 53.1 
Central office 7.2 8.6 7 6 9.7 
Civil society organisation 28.3 17.5 9 2.1 2.7 
Voluntary members 40.8 40.2 31 34 25.5 
Others 1.6 5.2 11 9 7.5              
                  Adapted from Amaral (2010:89) 
From these numbers we can induce that a story of social mobility took place in the PT field. 
The effects of that mobility have been and addressed in the party literature since Michels 
(1998:259) claimed that socialist parties become a “a new branch of employment” from 
which social leaders secured “a rise in the social scale”. Frei Betto, a priest who championed 
the formation of the Ecclesiastical Base Communities and played a key role in the creation of 
the PT, put it bluntly in 1995 when he argued, bitterly and nostalgically, that popular leaders 
had “exchanged the slums for the cabinet offices”, “the graffiti for the inaugurations” and 
“the buses for the official cars” (Partido dos Trabalhadores 1995:17). Thus, during the 1990s, 
the largest proportion of the middle level party elites, most of them from a social movement 
or a trade union background, came to depend directly on the state to secure their income and 
became professional politicians (Ribeiro 2008). Scholars argue that this had a “moderating 
effect” because it brought many radical party leaders and social activists “closer to the state” 
and gave them “economic security” (Hunter 2010:88; see also García 2000, 2008; Oliveira 
2006b).  
PT administrations, local and national congressmen directly appointed social leaders to public 
positions, often as a reward for their electoral support. An independent survey study on the 
political behaviour of PT national congressmen confirms the extent to which party leaders 
distributed jobs among these organisations, forming a relationship based on reward-based 
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linkages. When Figueira (2005:84), who put together this survey, asked PT deputies how they 
recruited their staff members, 42.5 percent responded that the nomination of a civil society 
organisation was the first criterion, while 36 percent said that “personal relationships” (many 
of which included leaders or activists of social organisations) were their first choice.73 
Furthermore, 61.7 percent of the respondents acknowledged that at least one of their aides 
was appointed after being proposed by a specific group in civil society (Figueira 2005:84). 
Coincidentally or not, an equal proportion of the PT deputies (62 percent) consider that their 
election was strongly influenced by their linkages with a specific social organisation. This 
suggests that the appointment of social leaders comes as a reward for support in electoral 
campaigns. 
The distribution of jobs among social leaders was particularly widespread in big cities with 
large bureaucracies that allowed mayors to recruit a considerable number of civil servants. 
During the Erundina administration (1989-1993), when the PT governed the city of São Paulo 
for the first time, some of the key names selected to participate in the administration were 
decided in negotiations with civil society organisations (Feltran 2007). Some trade union 
leaders, social activists and PT intellectuals strongly linked to civil society organisations were 
also appointed to public positions.74 This gave civil society organisations an opportunity to 
play a considerable role in the development of government policies. The Housing Movement, 
at the time one of the largest and strongest organisations in the city, played a major role in 
policy debates (Rodrigues 12/12/08) and was directly involved in several community self 
build initiatives (Carneiro 2006:76).75 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Among the rest, 17 percent picked “suggestions by the party” as the main criterion, while 4.2 indicated 
recommendation by a certain faction in the party (Figueira Leal 2005: 84).  
74 Eduardo Jorge, an important leader of the health movement, became Secretary for Health; Teresa Tijolo, 
linked to the Transport movements, acted as Secretary for Transport and Ermínia Maricato, an architect with 
strong ties to the Housing Movement, became head of the Secretariat for Housing. 
75 Likewise, members of the Slums-Dwellers’ Defence Movement (Movimento de Defesa do Favelado, MDF) 
discussed policy decisions and also participated in its implementation (Feltran 2007). 
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Over the years, however, the relationship between the PT and civil society organisations 
acquired a more instrumental character, as the linkages between the party in public office and 
civil society organisations became more reward-based and less programmatic. The electoral 
support that many candidates running for legislative positions received from specific civil 
society organisations did not always involve a particular commitment to the causes that such 
organisations promoted. This happened, for instance, when the PT governed São Paulo for 
the second time, with Marta Suplicy as a mayor (2000-2004). Several Housing Movement 
leaders and activists who supported her campaign occupied positions in government, working 
directly in housing issues. However, the housing sector was not a priority according to 
Carneiro (2006), who did extensive research on this subject. No community self building 
initiative or any new related policy was encouraged or developed and the average expenditure 
on the housing sector was rather low (only 2.5 percent of the city hall's budget), just slightly 
above that of the previous conservative government of Paulo Maluf (Carneiro 2006:90-93). 
This means that the fact that social leaders received jobs in government did not necessarily 
contribute to strengthening programmatic linkages. 
The growing use of reward-based linkages had deep consequences for the organisations in the 
PT field. Many of them became dependent on “direct contributions” to subsistence costs and 
“indirect contributions” by which social activists were included on the public payroll, thereby 
acquiring a permanent source of income (Carneiro 2006:80). The beneficiaries of indirect 
contributions became lideranças liberadas (liberated leaders), a term used in Brazil’s post 
transition for those social leaders appointed for a public job with little or no formal obligation 
in return. The direct and indirect contributions that social leaders could derive from their 
allies in public office became particularly important during the 1990s because the progressive 
sector of the Church had diminished in importance and with the reestablishment of civilian 
rule it had “retreated from its role as institutional host” (Houtzager 2000:62). Hence, the 
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financial resources that many social leaders and activists could obtain from public office 
through its allies in the PT (if not from other parties) became essential in order to secure their 
material survival.  
It was also for this reason that a number of social leaders became increasingly involved in 
electoral campaigns, to which they dedicated an important part of their efforts. This had 
consequences for the way in which these leaders organised collective action. Evaniza 
Rodrigues, a leader of the Housing Movement in São Paulo who later worked for the Lula 
administration, acknowledges that, “instead of concentrating their performance at the 
grassroots”, many activists “started to gravitate more around party cadres in public office”, 
and invested most of their energies in the relationship with governments (12/12/08). Many PT 
leaders have acknowledged that organisations in the field became largely dependent on the 
resources that they could obtain from the party in public office or even from other parties and 
state institutions. The PT National Secretary for Organisation, Paulo Frateschi, clearly made 
the case during our interview that the strategy of many organisations today is based on the 
specific material benefits they can obtain from politicians – on “What can we give them?”, as 
he put it (Frateschi 11/11/08). Likewise, a young cadre of the party in São Paulo notices that 
civil society organisations “come to us mainly in order to obtain resources and specific 
benefits” (Rodrigues 13/11/08).76  
Social leaders acknowledge that by participating in PT administrations, civil society 
organisations lost their capacity to criticise the authorities. A member of CONTAG who 
worked for the PT administration in Brasília argued that “when you take part in a government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Other party leaders, however, consider that distributing jobs to social leaders constitutes a “reasonable” and 
“absolutely natural” (Bemerguy 20/07/08 and Lacerda 22/07/09) political practice. If conservative parties like 
the PFL appoint businessmen when they assume government positions, one of my interviewees claimed, why 
cannot the PT bring “the workers”? (Lacerda 22/07/09). Appointing social leaders to government or state 
positions has positive effects, according to Senival Moura, a City Councillor in São Paulo, because “it provides 
shortcuts” between social organisations and the authorities and “facilitates negotiations” between the two 
(Moura 07/11/09). 
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you lose autonomy” (Beze 03/07/09). “It happened to me when I did it”, he confided. “You 
get trapped within the reasoning of the state, which has its own objectives and purposes” 
(Beze 03/07/09). For this activist, “being in a government limits your ability to criticise” 
because “you feel the need to support the person who appointed you to the job”. When 
studying the performance of the Housing Movement during the Suplicy administration, 
Carneiro (2006:93) argues that the government used political appointments to exercise 
“individual pressure” in order to discourage activists from becoming involved in collective 
actions that could “destabilise the administration”. In his view, patronage strategies as well as 
the allocation of public resources were largely implemented to “control”, “subordinate” and 
“co-opt” this and other movements (Carneiro 2006:93). 
In contrast to this view, I do not characterise the relationship between the party and its allies 
in the field in terms of co-optation, control or subordination (more in Chapter 8). As Avritzer 
(13/06/09) clearly put it during our interview, “the civil society organisations in the PT 
entourage were never as independent as they claimed to be”. After the 1990s, when the party 
started to occupy public office, he argues, “their discourse of autonomy could no longer hold” 
(Avritzer 13/06/09). And yet, Avritzer (13/06/09) argues that this does not mean that the 
party or its administrations came to “control” civil society organisations or to politically 
subordinate them by appointing some of their leaders to public office, as Carneiro (2006) and 
others have claimed. The relationship between the party and its allies in civil society, Avritzer 
(13/06/09) contends, “is not one in which the PT governments say and the social movements 
do”. Instead, he claims, “it is a relationship in which the governments and the movements talk 
to each other. Sometimes they cooperate with one another, sometimes they don’t; sometimes 
they agree, sometimes they disagree”.  
Indeed, it would be hard to argue that subordination and control characterised the relationship 
between civil society organisations and PT governments when one observes that such 
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relationships were far from harmonious. Studies on CUT and the MST show that the 
interaction with PT governments saw many conflicts. In cities like São Paulo or Brasília, the 
PT faced severe financial restrictions and could not deliver many of the demands made by 
CUT-affiliated trade unions (Lima 2005; see also Macaulay and Burton 2003:146-49). 
Likewise, in places such as Rio Grande do Sul, the MST had many contentions with the PT 
administration led by Olívio Dutra (1999-2003), because it failed to settle the promised 
number of families on expropriated land (Ros 2007) (to be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4). If while in opposition the PT was in a more comfortable position to make radical 
programmatic commitments and managed to incorporate the concerns of its social allies, in 
government this task was far more difficult. Reward-based linkages, as I will argue in 
Chapters 4 and 7, were one of the strategies by which the party in public office 
accommodated the interests of civil society organisations in order to keep disruptive 
mobilisation at low or manageable levels, but it was not a strategy by which it could 
dominate, subordinate or control its allies in the field.  
3.4 Abandoning social allies?  
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the perception that the PT distanced itself 
from civil society is not expressed only by scholars and public intellectuals. Since the early 
1990s, the leftist factions in the party had started to argue that by prioritising the electoral 
route to power, the party was leaving “social struggles” (Freire 2002:55-7) to one side. 
Indeed, during most of the 1990s, the main discourse of the PT Left was that these “social 
struggles” should be prioritised before institutional politics (Freire 2002:55-7). Even until 
recently, the perception that the PT distanced itself from civil society organisations has been 
part of a revisited discourse.77 During the interviews conducted for this study, the idea that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 During the Third National Congress, held in 2007, for instance, party delegates noted that their “dialogue with 
social and popular movements [had] lost significant vigour” (Partido dos Trabalhadores 2007:3) and they 
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the party moved away from its social allies was widespread among both party and social 
leaders, including almost three-quarter of my interviewees and all of the main leaders of the 
party Left that I spoke to. I asked 85 party and social leaders whether the PT had moved away 
from civil society organisations. 73 percent of them answered affirmatively. All of the leaders 
from Left Articulation and 80 percent of the centre-left faction “Message to the Party” (MP) 
shared this opinion. Even within Lula’s faction, Building a New Brazil (CNB), 55 percent of 
my interviewees also considered that the party had moved away from its social allies (see 
Appendix III for details). 
Nevertheless, the evidence that I provide below, based on survey studies and my own 
empirical findings, suggest that the PT still maintains close relationships with social leaders 
and civil society organisations, it is largely influential in some of the most important groups 
in civil society, and party leaders in public office (both in the legislative and in the executive 
branch) have frequent interaction with social leaders. Firstly, there are elements suggesting 
that party delegates did not leave their organisations as a result of their growing immersion in 
public office. Survey studies conducted during party congresses and national meetings by the 
main party’s think tank, the Fundação Perseu Abramo between 1997 and 2007, show that 
almost two-thirds of the middle level elites have maintained some kind of “participation” (a 
participation that was not defined in specific terms in the survey), in at least one civil society 
organisation between 1997 and 2007.78 As Amaral (2010:91) suggests, middle level elites 
within the party have maintained a “double activity” by which they simultaneously play a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
regarded the increasing distance from the party’s social roots as one of the reasons for the political crisis that the 
PT experienced in 2005, which had involved serious allegations of corruption (see Chapter 5). 
78 The Fundação Perseu Abramo conducted survey studies in four consecutive party meetings which show the 
extent to which party delegates claim to “participate” in social organisations. The percentages were high in each 
survey (70 percent in 1997, 69 percent in 2001, 72 percent in 2006 and 71 percent in 2007) (Amaral 2010:93). 
In my view, these data has a limited usefulness, not only because they do not say anything about the nature of 
that participation, but also because in the PT, leaders are expected to participate in a civil society organisation. 
Their answers, therefore, might be biased. 
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role in civil society and in public office.79 Unlike what Ribeiro (2008) argues, despite the fact 
that party leaders became closer to state institutions, this did not result in them dissociating 
themselves from civil society.  
Secondly, there is evidence that elected leaders have maintained constant interaction with 
groups in civil society. A survey study of PT congressional representatives (called 
Deputados)80 shows that 62 percent of them acknowledged that their election was largely 
made possible by their linkages with a specific social movement (Figueira 2005:83). The 
study also found that the average PT representative in Congress dedicates half of his or her 
time (52 percent) to interacting with  their electoral bases (Figueira 2005:114), which are 
mainly civil society organisations. PT congressional representatives interviewed for this 
study confirmed that they have an ongoing relationship with groups in civil society, receiving 
their leaders for all sorts of purposes on a continual basis, particularly within the Left and 
Centre-left factions (Fier 03/12/08; Lopes 03/12/08; Pretto 02/12/08; Suplicy 07/04/08).  For 
instance, Florisvaldo Fier, a member of the PT Left, claims that he gives civil society 
organisations such as the MST “institutional and political support” (Fier 03/12/08). He 
arranges public hearings, intervenes in conflicts with the authorities, mediates in episodes of 
rural violence or introduces legislative proposals in the interest of such organisations.  
Thirdly, for some of the largest and most important civil society organisations in Brazil the 
PT is still the main reference within party politics. The sources I consulted within 
organisations like CUT, CONTAG and the Housing Movement confirm that the PT is, by and 
large, their main entry point to the political system as well as the first party to which the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Based on this data, Amaral (2010:91) found that states with the highest percentage of party delegates who 
perform in public office do not necessarily correlate to states with the lowest level of participation in civil 
society organisations. 
80 The survey was conducted among 47 PT congressional representatives elected for the 1999-2002 term (80 
percent of all PT representatives were interviewed).  
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majority of its members are affiliated or which they vote for.81 In the case of the MST, an 
important albeit indeterminate number of leaders officially left the party during the 1990s and 
in the early months of the Lula administration. However, the PT is still influential at the 
grassroots level, as some of its leaders have acknowledged (Rangel 08/04/09; Santos 
07/05/09).  
Last but not least, quantitative data shows that the party has continued to recruit social 
activists. The great majority of the party delegates who joined the PT after its formative years 
were still overwhelmingly from civil society or, more precisely, claimed to participate in a 
specific organisation when they became affiliated to the party. In 2007, the Fundação Perseu 
Abramo asked delegates who became PT members at five different moments in the PT 
history whether they had participated in a civil society organisation at the time they formally 
joined the party. As Amaral (2010:95) reported in his work, the percentages were never 
below the initial threshold, remaining always above 80 percent on all five occasions (1980-
1982, 81.4 percent; 1983-1989, 84.3 percent; 1990-1994, 87.0 percent; 1990-1995, 80.3 
percent; 2001-2007, 82.9 percent). The numbers seem to confirm that the PT never ceased to 
incorporate into its structure cadres with a civil society background.  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 This diagnosis was made by a large number of social leaders or activists interviewed for this study; in CUT: 
Celestino (16/12/09), Henrique (15/04/09) and Lisboa (21/10/20); in CONTAG: Campos (03/07/09), Santos 
(03/07/09) and Zeke (03/07/09); in the Housing Movement: Fernandes de Oliveira (07/01/09), Gonzales 
(11/11/08) and Gomes França (13/11/08). Within the PT this information was confirmed by Renato Simões 
(04/11/08), PT Secretary for Popular Movements; José Dirceu (07/01/09), former PT president; and Valter 
Pomar (30/09/08), leader of Left Articulation. Unfortunately, there are no statistical data on the number of PT 
members and sympathisers within specific organisations vis-à-vis other parties. 
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3.5 Legacies of the “genetic model” 
I argue that the relationship between the PT and its social allies cannot be understood without 
considering three legacies of its “genetic model”, which make up the PT field: (i) the extent 
to which the relationships with civil society organisations are part of the PT identity; (ii) the 
overlapping membership of an important number of party leaders who are also social 
activists; and (iii) the strong-interpersonal linkages between leaders in the political and social 
spheres.  
In relation to the first legacy, Chapter 2 explains that since the PT’s creation, civil society 
organisations have constituted a symbol of a political identity. Because of this, having a 
relationship with them gave party leaders credibility in the eyes of its supporters. Despite the 
discursive and programmatic gap developed during the 1990s, many leaders interviewed for 
this work still regard civil society organisations as component that gives meaning to the PT’s 
existence. Within the party Left, many cadres strongly identify with civil society 
organisations. Deputado Adão Pretto, the MST leader who developed his political career 
within the PT, regards himself as “a legislator of the social movements” (02/12/08); while 
Deputado Fier  considers his own seat in Congress to be “an instrument of social movements’ 
struggles” (03/12/08). But the importance of civil society organisations is also praised among 
moderate cadres, who also value groups in civil society. Glauco Piai, The Secretary for 
Organisation in São Paulo, strongly claims that “the day on which the party ceases to value 
social movements and popular mobilisations it will no longer be the PT” (05/11/08).82 Paulo 
Frateschi, Secretary for Organisation at the national level, regards civil society organisations 
as the party’s raison d'être, one in which history also plays a very important role:  “We were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 It is interesting to note that both Frateschi and Piai criticised civil society organisations in the field during our 
interviews. Such criticisms were not, however, detrimental to their views on the importance of civil society 
organisation for the PT’s identity. 
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born together and we grew up together”, he argues, “we would be dead if we left them” 
(11/11/08).  
The second legacy that binds the PT socio-political field is the large space for interaction 
between the party and civil society organisations in which membership overlaps, identities 
are blurred and political priorities are not always clearly established. Although most social 
leaders put their own organisations first, many of them simultaneously regard themselves as 
social activists and PT members.83 Several social leaders do not make a clear distinction 
between party politics and the politics of their own organisations. Neither do they formulate 
such a distinction in their day-to-day political endeavours, nor in their long-term political 
objectives. Evaniza Rodrigues, a member of the Executive Committee of the Popular 
Housing Movement in São Paulo, explained: “I cannot differentiate between the party and the 
movement. To me they have different roles and one cannot substitute the other. A movement 
without a political vision will always have a very limited role” (Rodrigues 12/12/08). Another 
leader of the Housing Movement, Carlos Roberto de Oliveira (07/04/09), went much further:  
Some people try to separate what belongs to the movement from what belongs to the 
party. I don’t agree with that kind of thing. I am a whole person, and so I see politics as a 
whole too. I defend the positions of the party and those of the social movement. Some 
guys say that they just belong to the movement and they don’t mix that with party 
politics. I think they are simply lying to themselves. I am a PT activist and I defend a 
project for Brazil. I don’t think that you are going to solve the problems of the working 
class by solving the housing issue. My struggle is larger. It is for the transformation of 
society as a whole.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 A study on the role of social movements during the Suplicy administration in São Paulo showed that many 
social leaders who worked with the government (or for the government) had an identity conflict: they felt 
themselves to be members of a social organisation, members of the party and, if not members of the 
government, at least its defenders (Teixeira and Tatagiba 2005a). 
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Multiple identities can also be found in the intersection between the MST and the PT, in spite 
of the hiatus between the two organisations described earlier. A PT parliamentary advisor 
who was promoted by the movement to work for the PT members in Congress, said “I 
consider myself a cadre of the movement and a cadre of the party without distinction” 
(Fernandes 01/04/09). Others, despite being more identified with the MST, also consider 
themselves party cadres. Many of them, in fact, have occupied important positions in PT 
administrations. A good example among my interviewees is Clarice dos Santos, who 
developed her political career simultaneously in the PT and the MST. Dos Santos became 
Director of the National Programme for Education and Land Reform at the Institute for 
Colonisation and Land Reform (INCRA) under the Lula government (see Chapter 8).   
The third legacy is the strong interpersonal linkage between party and social leaders, which 
informally connects the party and civil society organisations. In many cases, cadres acting in 
the social and political spheres, either in public or central office, develop relationships of 
cooperation and mutual understanding based on common political trajectories, shared goals 
and values, and even on the fact that they face similar political adversaries. Because PT 
leaders and social activists have been “partners in the same struggles”, as many of them 
claim, they are also “comrades” more willing to understand each other in difficult 
circumstances, regardless of whether social leaders are still PT-affiliated members.  
Interpersonal linkages, however, are not always based on shared goals and principles. In 
some cases, party and social leaders are no longer bound by programmatic linkages and have 
a rather instrumental relationship based on specific benefits that they can obtain from each 
other. In many sub-national PT administrations, interpersonal linkages were one of the main 
criteria to recruit social activists. In other cases, they became a mechanism to bypass 
institutional mechanisms, which were often slow and complicated, in order to obtain public 
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goods (Kowarick and Singer 1997:40; Teixeira and Tatagiba 2005a:91-2).84 Sometimes by 
activating their personal networks – by simply making a phone call, for instance – social 
activists could have easy access to their friends and colleagues in government in order to get 
things done.85  
Final remarks 
In this chapter I have shown how the PT socio-political field changed during the years of the 
post-democratic transition and throughout the 1990s. The transition provided the PT field 
with unexpected opportunities that encouraged a change of strategies and discourses. The 
strategies of mass mobilisation that gave a sense of unlimited possibilities to promote 
progressive politics during the late 1970s and part of the 1980s lost ground among many 
groups in the field.  Instead, state institutions became a privileged platform from which both 
the party and civil society organisations would seek to achieve their goals. Many groups in 
the field, as a result, adopted strategies of incremental social change and switched from a 
clearly anti-systemic approach to one that would pursue many of its objectives within the 
political system. In doing so, however, the PT did not abandon civil society organisations, 
because both the party and its social allies followed a similar trajectory.    
In the previous pages I have offered some evidence that neither the PT nor its social allies in 
the field are coherent homogeneous actors. In the former case, the shift towards a moderate 
and pragmatic strategy was mainly promoted by Lula’s faction, which controlled the party’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Participants in these processes characterised these relationships as new forms of “leftist clientelism”, which 
include the use of direct and privileged contact with specific sectors of the administration by social leaders in 
order to bypass existing institutional mechanisms (Kowarick and Singer 1997:40). Kowarick and Singer point 
out that the problem with these types of mechanisms is that the pressure to satisfy the specific interests of social 
movements prevails over the general social interest and without a concern for its more general consequences. 
Other authors have argued, however, that clientelism is a concept that does not capture the complexity of these 
relationships (Cardoso 1992:297). 
85 A study on social movements during the Suplicy administration in São Paulo showed how these types of 
strategies were widely used by social leaders to obtain benefits from their allies in government (Teixeira and 
Tatagiba 2005a). Several activists interviewed for that study considered that, if certain officials were “sensitive” 
to their demands and they could easily have access to them, it was reasonable to make use of their connections, 
especially when other options were not as effective (Teixeira and Tatagiba 2005a:91-3). 
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dominant coalition. In the latter case, I have shown how despite the fact that most civil 
society organisations adopted more moderate practices, some of them maintained or even 
increased their disruptive actions. In the latter case, I have mainly relied on the conspicuous 
example of the MST. It is interesting to note, however, that despite the variety of strategies, 
the movement towards the state did affect the socio-political field as a whole. It stands out as 
a paradox that even the MST – one of the most radical groups in the field – became a major 
beneficiary of state resources, promoted candidates for Congress, and even employed many 
of its cadres in state institutions.   
This chapter has shown that the electoral strategies of the PT and its increasing occupation of 
public office did not result in the party’s abandoning of civil society organisations. However, 
it did create some difficulties in maintaining programmatic linkages. In contrast, reward-
based linkages became increasingly important in public office, shaping the relationship 
between the party and its allies in the field. As a result, the party in public office and its allies 
in civil society came to use each other more tactically and less strategically. In 2003, when 
Lula came to occupy the Presidency, these types of linkages were a very common practice in 
the PT field and, as Chapter 8 will show, became an instrument for securing social 
governability.  
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4. Social and elite-centred strategies at work: The PT in sub-national executive office 
 
Students of the PT have acknowledged that the experience of governing at the sub-national 
level constituted one of the driving forces in the transformation of the Brazilian Workers’ 
Party (Hunter 2010; Samuels 2004). From municipal administrations mainly, party leaders 
drew a number of political lessons. In this chapter I concentrate on the learning process of 
governability and their implications for the changing strategies of PT administrations from 
the early 1980s, when the party formed its first administrations, up until Lula assumed 
national executive public office in 2002. Most of the literature that explores PT municipal 
administrations focuses mainly on their participatory innovations, especially the Participatory 
Budget (Abers 1996; Baiocchi 2003a; Macaulay 1996; Nylen 2000, 1997b, 1997a; Schneider 
and Goldfrank 2002; Sousa 2002). Here I use this literature and draw on additional sources to 
explain how many of these innovations were also an element of the PT governability strategy. 
It is my view in this thesis that the participatory strategies developed by the party at the sub-
national level not only resulted from the ideological convictions of its leaders, but were also 
part of a larger and more complex political game that helped a number of administrations to 
build political support, accommodate interests and, more importantly, help overcome the 
party’s minority status in legislative assemblies. 
The two main governability strategies outlined in Chapter 1, the elite-centred and the social 
counter-hegemonic, were present in PT governments. Counter-hegemonic strategies, which 
sought to rely on civil society and use mobilisation and participatory democracy as 
alternative sources of power, were particularly influential since the earliest PT 
administrations. The implementation of these strategies, however, was neither easy nor 
always successful. The earliest municipal governments, expecting to rely exclusively on the 
mobilisation of the PT social base, faced dissapointment, conflicts on many fronts and 
political gridlock. Conversely, administrations which combined mobilisation with 
101	  
	  
participatory strategies bearing certain characteristics, as observed in Porto Alegre, were able 
to reduce confrontation, while simultaneously managing to circumvent and neutralise 
political opposition in the legislative branch. In any case, the experience of the PT at the sub-
national executive level was mixed. Notwithstanding the importance of social counter-
hegemonic strategies, elite-centred strategies, which favour top negotiations with dominant 
strategic actors, also took place. As I will show, towards the late 1990s, as the party put 
electoral politics centre stage, the elite model became stronger in certain cities, with the 
notable case of São Paulo, where conservative methods of top-down party elite agreements 
across partisan lines became more common. 
In this chapter I look at four strategic actors that were particularly important at the local level: 
two within the PT socio-political field, factions and civil society organisations; and two 
outside that field, business groups and political parties (also referred to in this work as 
dominant strategic actors). In dealing with actors inside the field, from the earliest PT 
administrations on, distributing jobs among members of the main factions and social leaders 
proved useful. In dealing with actors outside the field, governability required negotiation and 
compromise. Given the nature of the Brazilian political system, in which the party that holds 
the executive hardly ever wins a majority in legislative assemblies, the relationship with 
political parties became one of the most serious challenges. Due to its importance, the current 
chapter is mostly focused on this dimension of political governability.  
Two main sections make up this chapter. Section 1 explains the importance of four types of 
strategic actors, the consequences that they had for different administrations and the 
strategies used to accommodate their interests. This section goes on to make the case that 
parties in the legislative branch are key elements in constructing governability at the local 
level. Section 2 explores this issue in greater detail, by looking at the implications of the two 
main governability strategies adopted by the PT in government. Examples of the social 
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counter-hegemonic strategy are the administration of Luiza Erundina in São Paulo (1989-
1992) and the four consecutive PT administrations in Porto Alegre, between 1989 and 2004. 
Finally, I examine the administration of Marta Suplicy in São Paulo (2000-2004) as an 
example of an elite-centred strategy. In looking at the participatory experiences put in place 
by these governments I concentrate on the Participatory Budget. This was not the only 
participatory instrument deployed by PT administrations, but it was its most important 
innovation. No other participatory mechanism has been so clearly associated with the PT. 
4.1 A new window of opportunity and the need to deal with strategic actors 
The Constitution Brazil adopted in 1988 gave greater political, administrative and financial 
autonomy to sub-national governments. The new legal framework transferred significant 
resources to municipalities and states; conferred on them the right to institute and collect 
taxes and gave them wide discretion to make public expenditure decisions (Baiocchi 2003b, 
2003a; Rodrigues 2006; Souza 2005).86 This process mostly affected municipalities, which 
became the main beneficiaries of federal transfers and almost doubled the resources under 
their control in the years that followed the adoption of the new Constitution (Alfonso and 
Araújo 2008:38, in Souza 2005:110).87 With these resources, municipal governments had to 
organise and deliver public services such as health, transportation and basic education, as 
well as to cooperate with the federal and state governments in the provision of social policies. 
The municipal responsibilities, however, were defined in a rather general way, giving mayors 
(particularly in large cities where they could command more resources) a certain discretion 
and opportunities to innovate.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 The main source of local tax revenue for state governments became the Tax over the Circulation of Goods and 
Services (Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços, ICMS). Municipalities levied the Property Tax 
on Urban Land and Homeownership (Imposto sobre a Propriedade Predial e Territorial Urbana, IPTU). 
87 Between 1998 and 2008, the resources under the control of municipal governments increased by 197 percent 
(Alfonso and Araújo 2008:38, in Souza 2005:110).  
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In parallel, the Constitution instituted for the first time in Brazilian history the principle of 
semi-direct and participatory democracy, while giving local governments the freedom to 
institutionalise channels of direct popular participation in public affairs (Baiocchi 2003b:10; 
Ramos 2004:113). Specific legal provisions for participatory mechanisms were allowed for 
the development of social programmes, calling for the input of institutions of participatory 
governance such as sectoral policy councils and national conferences organised at all three 
levels, as advanced in the previous chapter. Other innovative democratic experiments resulted 
from the participatory democracy envisaged by the 1988 Constitution, such as city master 
plans, public hearings and negotiation roundtables. Participatory budgeting mechanisms also 
drew inspiration from the new constitutional framework.88  
The combination of decentralisation and incentives to participation that were present in the 
new legal framework created a window of opportunity for the PT. It gave its municipal 
administrations a fruitful and concrete political space in which they could prove their 
capacity to govern, become players within the political system and simultaneously innovate 
in policy making processes. In the promotion of participatory mechanisms several PT 
governments made a significant step forward, going beyond the creation of sectoral policy 
councils, which became widespread after 1998.89 Unlike these bodies, which mostly 
represented organised citizens in specific policy arenas, the participatory budgeting 
introduced by the PT was a particularly innovative mechanism opened to all citizens and 
effective at allocating and redistributing public resources (Carvalho 1998; Ramos 2004:307). 
The policies of the PT at the local level aimed at the so called “inversion of priorities”, a key 
element of what was termed the “PT way of governing”, by which the party’s administrations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 For a comprehensive overview of the different participatory instruments created after the 1988 Constitution 
see Avritzer (2009). 
89 According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), by the end of 2002 Brazil had more 
than 22,000 councils distributed within its 5,565 municipalities. Most of them were in the area of health (5,426), 
social assistance (5,178) and the rights of children and adolescents (4,306) (Leite 2008:117). In many cases, the 
creation of these bodies became a legal requirement for the distribution of federal resources. 
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intended to favour the poor and improve the quality of social services (Couto 2000; Hunter 
2010; Macaulay 1996; Schneider and Goldfrank 2002). By increasing social expenditure, 
improving tax collection and making it more progressive, the inversion of priorities was 
meant to have a redistributive effect.90  
Despite the opportunities opened by the new legal framework, party leaders soon learnt that 
their own chances of success in government were limited by the balance of forces among 
strategic actors, which they needed to engage. Indeed, PT administrations could not ignore 
the interests of groups with sufficient power to influence political processes, either by their 
willingness to cooperate or by potentially deciding to boycott the party and its initiatives in 
the executive branch. Chapter 1 explains that strategic actors control specific power resources 
that can range from the power to influence ideas or propagate information that discredit 
elected authorities, to creating institutional gridlocks, political instability or social unrest.  
PT administrations had to deal with and accommodate the interests of a wide range of groups. 
Here I analyse two types of actors that were particularly relevant to generating minimum 
conditions for governability: on the one hand, strategic actors within the party’s socio-
political field, such as factions and civil society organisations. On the other hand, I look at 
dominant strategic actors or actors outside the field, such as business groups and political 
parties represented in the legislative branch. Examples drawn from different PT 
administrations show that the way in which PT governments accommodated the interests of 
these groups was essential to relative success in policy making processes, including the 
participatory innovations and the attempted inversion of priorities.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 There is no strong evidence that this was always the case. By and large, there are no sufficient studies 
confirming that participation in PT administrations or in other cases has had significant redistributive effects. 
Only some academic works provide empirical evidence in this regard (Gaventa 2006, in Baiocchi, Heller et al. 
2006; Gaventa and Barrett 2010; Marquetti 2003; Navarro 1998).   
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4.1.1 Strategic actors within the PT field: factions and social allies 
Since the first PT municipal administrations, party factions proved to be a strategic actor for 
governability given their capacity to support the policies of the administration or to create 
obstacles to them. These factions could undermine the government in the eyes of public 
opinion by criticising PT administrations publically or even by promoting disruptive forms of 
collective action, especially strikes. Mayors such as Gilson Menezes in Diadema (1982-
1985), Luiza Erundina in São Paulo (1989-1992), and even Vítor Buaiz as governor of 
Espírito Santo (1995-1998), faced high levels of conflicts with intra-party groups in control 
of the PT municipal and state directorates (Assis 1992; Kowarick and Singer 1997; Melo 
2007:11; Macaulay and Burton 2003; Macaulay 1996; Oliveira 2008). Many of these 
conflicts were ideological and largely attributed to the PT’s plural origins, but many more 
took place because these administrations failed to accommodate the different factions in 
proportion to their representatives in PT directorates. 
 
 
In Diadema in the early 1980s, for instance, the mayor was a member of Lula’s moderate 
group, Articulação, the faction that formed the party’s dominant coalition at the national 
level. In this city, however, the PT Municipal Directorate was in the hands of far leftist 
factions like Convergência Socialista (Socialist Convergence, CS), Causa Operária (Labour 
Cause, CO), and other groups on the party Left like the Trotskyite Democracia Socialista 
(Socialist Democracy, DS). Despite the fact that these groups supported Menezes’s candidacy 
within the party, once in government the new mayor failed to reward them (Assis 1992:Ch.3). 
The pattern was similar in São Paulo, under the Erundina administration because her 
government also failed to include figures from the most influential intra-party groups in the 
apparatus.91 During her four years in government, Erundina had bitter arguments with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Not surprisingly, Erundina was persistently criticised for being too administrative (Melo 2007:11) and for 
accommodating herself to the “machinery of bourgeois government” (PT São Paulo Municipal Directorate 
1990, in Kowarick and Singer 1997:202). 
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local party leadership, who even supported strike actions against her government (Kowarick 
and Singer 1997; Macaulay 1996).92 
Eventually, it became a standard practice in several PT administrations to reward leaders 
from the most representative factions with administrative positions. This first became 
common in the southern city of Porto Alegre, where the party governed for four consecutive 
terms (1989-2004), adopting a “principle of proportionality” in all decision making-structures 
(Abers 2000:58). Other PT administrations used similar strategies, which in practice meant 
that municipal departments and government secretaries were staffed with members of 
different factions independent of their expertise or experience (Baiocchi 2005:33). When the 
PT regained power in São Paulo in 2000, the lessons of proportionality had been assimilated. 
Suplicy and her pragmatic political strategists understood that distributing jobs among 
different intra-party groups was a key element to secure governability. 93 
Within the PT field, civil society organisations were another strategic actor for governability, 
given their capacity to affect the delivery of essential public services or to generate social 
unrest. Many of these organisations not only defended their own interests but also intended to 
obtain extra benefits once their allies came into power. As Macaulay and Burton (2003) 
explain, one of the main sources of problems for PT governments was public sector workers, 
a strong union lobby that benefits from a large share of the public budget in salaries and other 
employment benefits in Brazil. As a general rule, once in office, the party had to act as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Something similar occurred in Diadema, where faction leaders who opposed the mayor and controlled the PT 
Municipal Directorate supported the CUT-affiliated public-sector workers in a strike against the government, 
and even put posters on the streets accusing the mayor of “acting like a patron” and “betraying the PT” (Assis 
1992:115). 
93 As Suplicy said during our interview, one of the lessons that she had learnt from previous PT administrations 
was precisely that “governing with all factions” was necessary to avoid the internal conflicts that had previously 
undermined the Erundina as well as other PT administrations (09/01/09). Couto, who has written about the two 
PT administrations in São Paulo, argues that the ability of the Suplicy government to avoid intra-party conflicts 
of the kind experienced by her PT predecessor was one of the reasons for her “greater success” (Couto 2003:87-
8). Unlike the earliest PT administrations, Suplicy managed to form a majority in the City Assembly and 
simultaneously have PT representatives on her side. 
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patron in the labour relationship, putting authorities in an uncomfortable position with its own 
allies (Macaulay and Burton 2003:135). In São Paulo, for instance, the Erundina 
administration confronted numerous strikes by, among others, the CUT-affiliated Bus Drivers 
Union, which in May 1992 caused a total shutdown of the public transportation system for 
nine days (Macaulay 1996:223).  
In the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, 90,000 members of the Teachers’ Union 
(CPERS), one of the largest trade unions in the state, went on strike against the PT 
administration in 2000. Teachers demanded a 190 percent pay rise, whilst the government of 
Olívio Dutra, citing serious financial constraints, offered 10 percent (Goldrank and Schneider 
2003:162). Whereas the previous teachers’ strike against a PMDB administration in 1997 
only lasted 12 days, this one extended to 32 days (Folha de S. Paulo 04/04/00), severely 
affecting the administration, the public image of the PT in the state and the attempts of the 
party to elect another governor in 2002.94  
As it occurred with intra-party groups, the distribution of jobs to social leaders also helped PT 
administrations contain disruptive practices. These types of strategies became widespread 
during the 1990s when the PT established reward-based linkages with a number of groups in 
civil society, as Chapter 3 shows. During the Suplicy administration, numerous social leaders 
from large organisations, mainly the Housing Movement, were appointed to office (Carneiro 
2006:93; Teixeira 2005b:52; Whitaker 2008:11). Unlike during Erundina’s government, 
when the Housing Movement occupied the Secretariat of Housing several times, these forms 
of collective action hardly ever took place during Suplicy’s tenure (Carneiro 2006). In fact, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Another source of conflict for the Dutra administration in Rio Grande do Sul was the MST. The relationship 
between the party in public office and this organisation deteriorated after the third year, due to the slow pace of 
land reform. Dutra had committed himself during the electoral campaign to settling 10,000 families, but by the 
third year he had distributed land to less than a third of that number. Although the government tended to use 
negotiation rather than force in dealing with this organisation, when a group of its activists occupied the Institute 
of Colonisation and Land Reform (INCRA) in September 2000, the military police, under state government 
orders, forced them off the property (Goldfrank and Schneider 2003:163). 
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the Housing Movement did not even demonstrate outside the Secretariat of Housing, as they 
so frequently had done during previous administrations. According to Carneiro (2006:94), 
“the government and the social movement almost came to a truce” during this period.  
4.1.2 Dominant strategic actors: large economic groups and political parties 
Outside the PT socio-political field, in the realm of the dominant strategic actors, the PT 
faced some of the greatest challenges to construct governability. In dealing with powerful 
economic groups in the business sector, party leaders in public office learned from their early 
experiences that they could not deny or ignore their interests. A certain level of compromise 
with economic groups was necessary to maintain private investment. After his experience as 
Secretary for Planning in the city of São Paulo (1989-1992), Paul Singer concluded:  
The left in the municipal executive power may and should (due to its class commitments) 
prioritise popular interests. However, it can only do this if it counts on the collaboration 
of the dominant classes, whose interest, albeit not being prioritised cannot be either 
denied or ignored. Both the accumulation and permanence of private investment is in the 
best interest of popular sectors (Singer 1996:39). 
In spite of the fact that PT administrations acknowledged the importance of promoting 
private investment, many of its leaders opposed what they regarded as illegitimate privileges, 
such as multimillion-real fiscal exceptions or concessions granted to the private sector that 
provided poor public services. While some administrations adopted a line of negotiation and 
compromise, others assumed a more confrontational strategy. Erundina, for instance, was 
forced to negotiate with the private sector in order to improve the provision of public 
services, most importantly transportation, arguably the most demanded service in the 
sprawling city. Her government intended to change the terms in which transport services 
were provided in São Paulo, where concessionaries were making large profits and provided 
poor services (Macaulay 1996:218; Singer 1996) 
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Erundina intended to municipalise the bus companies and provide a fully subsidised service, 
funded by increasing the tax on urban property (IPTU) by around 600 percent overall 
(Macaulay 1996:218). The authorities claimed that this tax increase would have a 
redistributive effect because the most valuable buildings in the city were usually owned by 
big companies or by the wealthiest people, and these would pay the largest share of the IPTU 
(Singer 1996:142). Despite the support of public opinion,95 in February 1990 the plans were 
rejected in the City Assembly, where according to Singer (1996:155) organisations of the 
private sector probably lobbied opposition parties against the initiative. Only in May 1991, 
when the government was in its third year, was a bill passed after intense negotiations with 
business groups and city councillors (Kowarick and Singer 1997). The Erundina 
administration realised that it could not ignore the interests of the concessionaries and made 
“major concessions” to big bus companies (Macaulay 1996:217-9). Eventually, the 
government managed to increase this tax by 125 percent, far less than the original proposal.  
Particularly complicated was the relationship between PT administrations and the private 
sector at the state level, where governments in Brazil have larger responsibilities for 
economic investment, services and infrastructure than their municipal counterparts (Macaulay 
and Burton 2003:135). In Rio Grande do Sul the relationship with multinational corporations 
was a major challenge. In fact, when Dutra announced his intention to renegotiate the 
multimillion-real fiscal incentives that previous administrations had signed with automobile 
manufacturers to operate in the state, Ford changed its plans to set up a new plant. Although 
the government made attempts to negotiate, which were successful in the case of General 
Motors, the lack of experience in dealing with multinational corporations96 resulted in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 In December 1990 the Instituto Toledo & Associados conducted a survey, requested by the City Hall, which 
reflected that 65.3 percent of the interviewees supported the government proposal, notwithstanding the fact that 
82.4 percent knew that it involved increasing the IPTU (Singer 1997:146). 
96 This lack of experience was fully acknowledged by Flavio Koutzi (12/06/11), Home Affairs Secretary during 
the Dutra administration, during our interview. 
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company’s move to the northern state of Bahia, where a conservative government offered 
better conditions. The opposition in the State Assembly and local business organisations 
bitterly criticised Dutra’s government, arguing that the failure to negotiate a deal with Ford 
cost 200,000 jobs.97   
The uneasy relationship between the PT administration and powerful economic groups in Rio 
Grande do Sul had serious consequences in the state and also beyond. Also for this reasons, 
the PT eventually failed to retain the state government. In the 2002 election the five most 
important business organisations in Rio Grande do Sul, representing industry, agriculture and 
trade, actively promoted a vote against the PT (Folha de S. Paulo 30/09/02). Paulo Feijó, 
president of FEDERASUL, the Federation of Business Associations of Rio Grande do Sul, 
even declared: “The PT hates the business sector. They want to impose socialism, which has 
been abolished even in Russia. If Lula wins, we will become another Venezuela or another 
Cuba” (Folha de S. Paulo 30/09/02).  This was not the position of the Brazilian business 
sector towards Lula as a whole in 2002, as I will show in Chapter 6. However, the attitude 
that some business groups in Rio Grande do Sul took against both Lula and the PT during the 
election is indicative of the extent to which Dutra’s government alienated a dominant 
strategic actor.98  
By far the most important governability challenge for PT administrations derived from the 
constraints of being a minority government and the need to deal with opposition parties and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 The PT government in Rio Grande do Sul also squared off against Monsanto Corporation and its attempts to 
expand production of genetically modified soybeans in the state (Goldrank and Schneider 2003:162). The 
administration argued that Rio Grande should be “free of genetically modified crops” (Folha de S. Paulo 
14/07/99) and Dutra even spoke against the “Monsanto dictatorship” (Folha de S. Paulo 13/07/99). The 
language surely pleased the party’s allies in the MST, but it terrorised the business sector.  
98 In any case, other PT administrations established more fluid relationships with the business sector, 
particularly those in which members of Lula’s faction, Campo Majoritário, were hegemonic. One of them was 
Antonio Palocci, mayor of Ribeirão Preto (1993-1996/2001-2002), a medium-sized Brazilian city in the state of 
São Paulo. Palocci, who later became Lula’s Finance Minister, completed one of the first privatisations of the 
1990s (the municipal telephone company), and was particularly known for his “market friendly” approach (more 
in Chapter 6). 
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their representatives in municipal and state assemblies. These constraints were particularly 
serious because the Brazilian party system is highly fragmented due to its open-list 
proportional representation in the legislatures. As a result, the party that wins executive 
office, either for president, governor or mayor, rarely achieves a majority in legislatures 
(Mainwaring 1999). From the municipal administration in Diadema, in the 1980s, to the 
government of Suplicy in São Paulo in the 2000s, to the administration of Olívio Dutra in the 
state of Rio Grande do Sul, the PT and its electoral coalition members, traditionally small 
left-of-centre parties like the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), the Communist Party of 
Brazil (PCdoB), or the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), invariably obtained less than the 
required number of parliamentary seats to form a simple majority (above the 50 percent 
threshold). As table 4.1 shows, even when PT candidates performed well in two electoral 
rounds,99 like Suplicy or Dutra, the party and its electoral allies had minority status in the 
legislature.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 The second round in municipal election in Brazil, which takes place when no candidate reaches more than 50 
percent of the valid votes, was formally instituted in 1992 for municipalities with more than 200,000 voters. 
Before this reform, PT candidates were able to become mayors with simple majorities, as occurred in Diadema 
and São Paulo in the early 1980s.   
112	  
	  
 
Table 4.1: Electoral results in 5 municipal and state government elections 
 
 
 Municipal level State level 
City/state 
 Diadema 
 
São Paulo 
 I 
 
São Paulo  
II 
Porto 
Alegre 
 
Espírito  
Santo 
 
 
Rio Grande  
do Sul 
 
Year of election 1981 1988 1999 1988 1994 1998 
Head Gilson Menezes 
Luiza 
Erundina 
Marta 
Suplicy 
Olívio 
Dutra 
Vítor 
Buaiz 
Olívio 
Dutra 
Results First 
ballot 27.8% 29.8% 38.13% 34.00% 35.02% 46.26% 
Results Second 
ballot -- -- 58.81% -- 50.93% 50.78% 
Legislative 
Seats obtained 
by PT electoral 
coalition 
 
PT………..6 
 
PT……....16  
PCB……..1 
PCdoB…..1 
PDT..........1 
 
 
PT………16 
PCdoB.......3 
PSB……...2 
 
PT………..9 
PCB……...1 
PSB……...1 
 
PT………..4 
PCdoB...…1 
PSB...........1 
 
PT……....11 
PCdoB...…1 
Subtotal  6 19 21 11 6 12 
Legislative 
Seats obtained 
by other parties 
 
PMDB…...5 
PTB……...5 
PSD……...1 
 
PMDB…...9 
PDS……...8 
PSDB…....5 
PTB…..... 5 
PFL…..….4  
PL…..…...3 
 
 
 
 
 
PSDB……8 
PPB……...6 
PMDB…...6 
PTB……...3 
PL………..3 
PRONA….2 
PPS………2 
PDT……...2 
PSD……...2 
PFL………2 
 
 
PMDB…...5 
PDS……...4 
PFL………1 
PL………..1 
PDT…….11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PDT……...4 
PFL………2 
PL………..1 
PMN……..1 
PMDB…...4 
PSDB……4 
PTB……...4 
PPB……...4 
 
 
 
PPB…….14 
PMDB….10 
PTB…….10 
PSDB……1 
PFL……....1 
PDT……...7 
 
 
 
 
Subtotal 11 34 34 22 24 43 
Total number of  
legislative seats 17 53 55 33 30 55 
 
Developed by the author, based on Correio do Povo (06/10/97, 26/10/97); Couto (2003); Oliveira (2008:227); 
Fiorilo (2006:28); Folha de S. Paulo (26/10/97); Goldfrank and Schneider (2003); Macaulay and Burton (2003); 
Assis (1992:90-3).  
In Erundina’s São Paulo, the PT and its electoral allies only won 19 city legislature seats, 
while six opposition parties held 34. Eight years later, when the PT returned to office, the 
balance of forces was not much different. Despite the fact that Suplicy performed very well in 
the election, reaching one of the best results among all PT mayors elected in 2000, her 
electoral coalition only won 21 of 55 legislature seats, and the opposition gained a clear 
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majority. In Dutra’s Porto Alegre the situation was somewhat different because conservative 
parties were less dominant and the Workers’ Democratic Party (PDT) often supported 
government initiatives. Still, the PT and its allies only held 11 seats. When Dutra became 
state governor 10 years later, the PT was in an even weaker position, with only 12 of 55 seats. 
In the next section I will analyse the different ways in which PT administrations dealt with 
their minority status in the legislative branch. 
4.2 Strategies to secure governability  
Despite the fact that the legislative branch in Brazil is not particularly strong vis-à-vis the 
executive branch, without more than 50 percent of the seats in state and municipal assemblies 
(two-thirds in the case of constitutional amandments) mayors and governors might face great 
difficulties in passing legislation, approving annual budgets, creating new taxes or increasing 
the existing ones.100 As in the national level, in the sub-national sphere such majorities are 
usually formed through legislative alliances, made either before the elections, during the 
elections (after the first round) or once in government (Nunes 2009:65). At the municipal 
level, as at all three levels, it is the exchange of favours between the executive and the 
legislative branches – rather than programmatic agreements – that mostly allows 
governments to pass their initiatives (Gurgel 2009:111; Lopes 2000:305). It is mainly through 
the distribution of jobs in government, or by means of pork-barrelling (which is sometimes 
more important) that executives manage to achieve legislative success at the sub-national 
level (Gurgel 2009:111; Nunes 2009:65).101 Scholars argue that the practices by which 
Brazilian political elites exchange particularistic favours for votes in the legislative branch, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 In contrast to the number of studies on executive-legislative relationships at the national level (see Chapter 
6), few studies have explored the municipal sphere (Castro 1998; Gurgel 2009; Lopes 2000; Santos 2001) or the 
state level (Abrucio 1998; Avelar and Cintra 2007; Limas and Ricci 2010; Nunes 2009; Pereira, Power et al. 
2011).  
101 A survey study conducted between 2007 and 2008 among parliamentary elites in 12 states shows that while 
33 percent of the interviewees consider that negotiating jobs in the administration is the most effective strategy 
for executives to secure legislative support, 45 percent believe negotiating parliamentary earmarks with parties 
and their deputies is better (Nunes 2009:65). 
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known as fisiologismo in the country’s political idiom, are so deeply embedded that 
executives reluctant to deploy them might not only face difficulties in passing their bills, but 
might also have to face parliamentary or judicial investigations organised against them 
(Amorim 1994:18).  
Several PT administrations were reluctant to engage in top-down elite agreements that are 
traditionally made in Brazil by exchanging votes for government jobs or monetary benefits – 
the typical elite-centred strategy. The PT strongly opposed these practices since its creation, 
particularly when they involved the formation of alliances with parties beyond the Left, and 
was critical of pork-barrelling.102 In the name of opposing traditional politics, many PT 
leaders sought to promote social counter-hegemonic strategies by which their administrations 
could eventually put pressure extra institutional pressure on representative institutions. These 
strategies, as I advanced in Chapter 1, had three main varieties: mobilisation for reform (or 
counter mobilisation), the strategy by which the PT sought to put pressure on the legislative 
branch by mobilising its social base mainly; defensive mobilisation, the strategy by which the 
PT mobilised social support in order to defend itself from any potential parliamentary or 
judiciary investigations, avoid crisis and secure its own survival in power, and broad-based 
participation, the strategy by which the party sought to put pressure on representative 
institutions but through more institutionalised mechanisms. PT administrations combined 
these strategies in different ways. The Erundina administration made attempts to promote 
mobilisation for reform and participation, which largely failed, but instigated defensive 
mobilisation with better results. The PT administrations in Porto Alegre found a successful 
formula which combined mobilisation for reform with institutionalised broad-based 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 In 1997, for instance, Lula told an interviewer: “The Brazilian parliament works as a stock market. The truth 
is that respectable, serious and ideologically committed people are the minority there. Unfortunately, our 
Congress is a business bureau (tr. um balcão de negócios). Every time there is an important vote taking place, 
you can see what happens:  the president has to see how much is necessary to get the votes he needs” (Veja 
13/05/09). 
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participation. A third case will show, however, that not all PT administrations were 
committed to the counter-hegemonic strategies. Towards the late 1990s the elite-centred 
strategy became more influential as the PT emphasised electoral strategies and prioritised 
winning the 2002 presidential election. My third example, the Suplicy administration in São 
Paulo will demonstrate that. 
4.2.1 Counter-mobilisation under Erundina: the failed strategy  
Scholars have explored the permanent conflicts that the Erundina administration faced on 
multiple fronts, within and outside the PT field, as well as the reluctance of the former mayor 
to form alliances in the City Assembly where her party lacked a majority (Couto 1995; 
Kowarick and Singer 1997; Macaulay 1996). Here I show that this was a revelatory 
experience for the PT: influential leaders learnt that party administrations could not govern in 
isolation; they needed to avoid the risk of legislative paralysis that could frustrate their 
initiatives as much as the perceptions of public opinion or their own electoral ambitions. 
During the Erundina administration, I argue, many PT leaders perceived that the attempt to 
put in place a social counter-hegemonic governability strategy by means of social 
mobilisation proved to be more difficult than originally expected.   
From Erundina’s first taking power, her government tried to negotiate with other parties, but 
came out against the formation of any type of government coalition (Couto 1995:6).103 Her 
cabinet, mostly dominated by PT members, intellectuals, or figures associated with social 
movements, not only excluded representatives of other parties outside the electoral coalition, 
but also failed to incorporate her own allies. Even left or left-of-centre parties that supported 
Erundina’s candidacy, such as the PCdoB or the PDT, were not awarded cabinet seats despite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Before her term formally began, when a journalist questioned the mayor elect about the possibility of 
forming a party coalition, she responded: “No, this is out of the question. We plan on inviting other forces that 
may collaborate with us, but we are not planning to form a coalition with formal commitments” (Couto 1995: 
6). 
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having supported the government in the City Assembly from the outset.104 In fact, the PT at 
the time had not discussed how to deal with the legislative branch. Party leaders had a general 
expectation that its governments could surmount any lack of strength in legislatures and other 
institutional settings by counting on their social base. In concrete terms, however, they never 
explained how they would pass legislation without a majority in legislative assemblies, 
perhaps because they underestimated their importance, while at the same time overestimating 
the attributions of the executive branch. In São Paulo, for instance, when the PT Municipal 
Directorate discussed the issue before the election of Erundina in 1988, the conclusion was 
that “a permanent absolute majority in the chamber is not essential for the PT to develop its 
activities in the executive and legislative branches” (Couto 1995:202-3). Whenever important 
issues would require a vote in the Municipal Chamber, the party expected to promote 
“popular amendments” by which “social pressure will be able to force case specific alliances” 
that, according to the party, would help pass their initiatives (Couto 1995:202).  
It was difficult, however, to put such pressure on city councillors. The administration could 
not take for granted the capacity of civil society organisations in the PT field to mobilise 
meaningful support in favour of its initiatives. Shortly after being elected, the party faced a 
strong reaction from opposition parties. During Erundina’s term, the opposition initiated 
more than 100 actions against her administration in the law courts (Macaulay 1996:225), in 
great part because her government refused to distribute pork and undertake the bargaining 
typical of Brazilian politics. The most serious attack came from the Municipal Audit Office 
(TCM), internally dominated by conservative politicians (Macaulay 1996:225-6). The TCM 
rejected the city accounts on “mere technicalities” (Macaulay 1996:226) and sought to 
promote the mayors’ impeachment. This move, however, was widely interpreted as a political 
vendetta and was finally overturned in the Municipal Chamber, in great part because a large 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Only one representative of the PCB was appointed in a rather marginal position: Director of the Funerary 
Services (Couto 1995). 
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sector of the public opinion, including social organisations, intellectuals, artists, and even 
some businessmen and politicians from opposition parties publicly endorsed the mayor.  
Contrary to their expectations, mobilisation proved ineffective in neutralising the implacable 
opposition. By and large, social organisations were focused on their own concerns, rather 
than on broader political issues, and hardly ever engaged in mobilisation to endorse key 
government initiatives. In 1990, for instance, when Erundina tried to increase the IPTU on 
large industries to fund a “zero tariff” policy of free public transport in the city, the 
government’s attempt to mobilise support had no result. The mayor’s big gamble was that 
social movements and the population at large would act to back this redistributive measure 
and put pressure on the members of the Municipal Chamber. However, this was not the case 
(Macaulay 1996:218). In fact, as two party intellectuals later observed, the “zero tariff” 
proposal never spawned street demonstrations of support or any other large mobilisation in its 
favour. The government was unable to defeat the opposition and eventually abandoned its 
proposal (Kowarick and Singer 1997:38). 
Mobilisation influenced a vote in the City Assembly only once in Erundina’s term, when this 
body had to decide whether it would admit an impeachment investigation in 1991. This 
episode of defensive mobilisations took place on 25 September, when Erundina called for a 
massive demonstration outside the City Assembly. Many social organisations ranging from 
the CUT to the Housing Movement and the MST were present to support the mayor, both 
outside the chamber and within the internal galleries. Eventually, in October, the Assembly 
voted against the impeachment by 41 votes to 9.105 Despite the fact that defensive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Despite the fact that social organisations did mobilise to support the elected government, it is not possible to 
determine if it was the pressure from these organisations that determined the vote of the city councillors or other 
factors such as the support that the mayor received from a wide range of sectors. According to Erundina’s press 
office, more than 500 relevant public figures endorsed the mayor in a supra-party meeting and signed a petition 
against the impeachment. The list of supporters included senators from the PMDB and the PSDB, members of 
the Federation of Industries from the State of São Paulo (FIESP) and 37 representatives of the business sector 
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mobilisation played a role at this critical point, mobilisation for reform was not fruitful under 
Erundina because it did not alter the votes of the legislative branch to actually support 
government initiatives.  
Another type of social counter-hegemonic strategy, the promotion of participatory 
mechanisms, did not produce successful results during the Erundina administration, as 
different studies show (Compans 1993; Couto 1995; Kowarick and Singer 1997; Macaulay 
1996). Although the government attempted to create a participatory mechanism to discuss the 
public budget, and several assemblies and meetings to set up priorities were conducted, the 
process eventually generated too many expectations which the government was unable to 
fulfil and the meetings never attracted a significant number of participants (Compans 
1993).106 In fact, Erundina, who had strongly campaigned for participatory institutions with 
power to make binding decisions, limited the scope of the Participatory Budget to a simple 
consultative mechanism after her second year in office (Compans 1993; Pires 2006). By and 
large, the participatory mechanisms implemented in her administration were not strong 
enough and lacked the legitimacy to put pressure on city councillors, who could easily ignore 
the outcomes. The priorities that citizens established in these settings were significantly 
modified when the budget went to the City Hall for approval, “causing popular movements to 
claim that PT had broken its promises” (Macaulay 1996:222). The case of Porto Alegre was 
different, as I show in the next subsection. 
The first PT government in São Paulo had some positive redistributive effects. Despite not 
fulfilling the original expectations, the agreements that the administration eventually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Assesoria de Imprensa do Gabinete da Prefeita Luiza Erundina 1992). Many of the signatories opposed the 
impeachment because they saw it as an illegitimate move against a democratically elected government.  
106 Kowarick and Singer argue that participatory initiatives not only were confronted with the need to give rapid 
and efficient results, but initiatives to promote participation soon resulted in “paralysing, long and rhetorical 
assemblies that never came to an end” (Kowarick and Singer 1997:35). Other scholars argue that the 
government lacked sufficient interest, creating no adequate administrative structure to support a participatory 
process (Pires 2006:26-9), and the demands were constantly over the budget capacity (Couto 1995).  
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negotiated with the opposition allowed a moderate increase in tax revenue, and social 
expenditure was much higher than in previous years, reaching 48 percent of the budget 
(Kowarick and Singer 1997:37), while some improvements were seen in health, education 
and housing (Kowarick and Singer 1997:37; Macaulay 1996:217). Nevertheless, in 1992, 
when a new municipal election took place, the PT lost the city of São Paulo and did not 
regain it until 2000. If electoral defeats produce deep changes in the strategies and discourses 
of political parties, as Panebianco (1988) holds, it is not difficult to understand why the PT in 
São Paulo was such a different party when governing for a second time. Surveys conducted in 
1992 revealed that São Paulo electors evaluated the services of the City Hall positively, but 
Erundina and her party negatively, presumably “due to an anti press campaign” (Macaulay 
1996:226-7). The conflicts that the first PT administration in São Paulo established with 
strategic actors in multiple fronts might have been one of the reasons.   
Party cadres who experienced the first PT administration in São Paulo learnt that the PT 
could not expect to govern alone if its leaders wanted to avoid political gridlock. The most 
recurrent self-criticism of those who participated in the Erundina administration was the 
government’s failure to assemble a legislative coalition. Shortly after the end of her term, the 
former mayor affirmed: “My biggest error as mayor was not putting together a coalition right 
away on the first day in government” (Couto 1995:6). During our interview, she also 
acknowledged: “One of the main self-criticisms that I make is over the type of relationship 
that my government established with the Municipal Chamber. Notwithstanding that we were 
a minority, we could have had a more intelligent relationship with the legislative branch” 
(Erundina 14/11/09). José Eduardo Martins Cardozo, who was at the time Home Affairs 
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Secretary, said during our interview: “We were too narrowed-minded and did not value 
alliances. We were naïve, messianic and too ideological” (Martins Cardozo 04/12/08).107  
4.2.2 Participation and mobilisation: Porto Alegre and the PT way of governing 
The PT in Porto Alegre, in power for 16 years, adopted a social-counter hegemonic 
governability strategy that combined mobilisation of its social base with broad-based 
participatory mechanisms. This counter-hegemonic strategy was successful for two main 
reasons: firstly, because the PT was able to overcome its limitations within formal 
institutions, when it was in a minority position as with many other administrations. In doing 
so, instead of exchanging legislative support for government jobs or allocating budgetary 
resources by means of pork-barrelling, like most Brazilian parties in government, the 
participatory strategy put in place helped build support for a redistributive programme. 
Secondly, because the party in public office found creative ways to accommodate the 
interests of its organised social base and ordinary citizens – most notably the unorganised 
poor – and simultaneously received support from the middle classes and even some business 
groups. Many scholars have mentioned these elements in the vast literature that explores 
participatory budgets in Porto Alegre.108 In this section, rather than writing from the point of 
view of participation, the emphasis is placed on governability.   
Like other PT administrations, when Olívio Dutra was elected mayor of Porto Alegre in 
1988, the party expected to mobilise its social base to overcome its weakness in institutional 
settings. As occurred with most PT governments at that time, when the party came to power, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Suplicy, who did not participate in politics at the time, but was elected mayor of São Paulo almost one 
decade later opined: “I think Erundina’s administration had wonderful ideas, but few of them were implemented 
due to the political inability of the party and the mayor herself. She was far too radical, unable to perceive that it 
is necessary to give in a negotiation and bargain politically. Erundina could not pass one single project in the 
Chamber! Not even one!” (Suplicy 09/01/09). 
108 It is not the intention of this chapter to explain in any detail the way in which Participatory Budget worked in 
Porto Alegre, an issue widely studied in the literature. Among others see Abers (2000); Avritzer (Avritzer 
2002); Baiocchi (2005); Fung and Wright (2003); Navarro (Navarro 2005, 2003, 1998); Sousa (1998); Wampler 
and Avritzer (2004). 
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it lacked a clear participatory model in mind, and only embraced a set of ideological and 
general notions of participation (Navarro 2005). In tune with the PT agenda of the 1980s, the 
Dutra administration attempted to create “popular councils” in which “the workers” would 
make decisions such as budgetary allocations. Nevertheless, after the first few years in power, 
party leaders in public office realised that they could not count exclusively on the support of 
the PT’s organised social base, whose competing demands would not be easily met with the 
limited resources of municipal governments (Abers 1996; Baiocchi 2003b; Moraes 2001). 
The PT in Porto Alegre, dominated by leftist factions in alliance with moderate groups, 
realised that the participatory strategy needed to be more inclusive and to process different 
claims from a wide range of civil society organisations. By allowing widespread participation 
among groups with different interests, both the organised and the less organised, compromise 
and negotiation could take place, while the dominance of the latter could diminish (Hunter 
2010:96). After intense disputes between social organisations, party leaders and 
neighbourhood associations, which had a longstanding associative tradition in the city, it was 
finally agreed that participation would not only include previously organised sectors (“the 
workers”), but, in contrast to São Paulo, would also appeal to a wide range of groups and 
social classes, including common citizens with no prior political or social participation.109  
Scholars have argued that the participatory budgeting process only started to work in the last 
year of the first PT administration in the city, after the government was able to pass a decisive 
municipal fiscal reform. This reform added to the redistribution of federal resources and 
allowed the city of Porto Alegre to enjoy the advantages of the Brazilian decentralisation 
process (Fedozi 2000; Marquetti 2003; Melo 2007; Navarro 2005; Sousa 1998:447) 
addressed in the first section of this chapter. This reform, which proved essential to the PB’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 The participants would meet in open, public assemblies to establish budgetary priorities in a process of 
negotiation and deliberation organised in two stages: a participatory stage, in which participation is direct, and a 
representative stage, in which participation takes place through the election of delegates and/or councillors (for 
more details see Avritzer 2009:Ch.5). 
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success, increased the IPTU and made it more progressive. As a result, this tax over urban 
land and homeownership, which only amounted in 1990 to 5.8 percent of the municipal 
revenue, reached 13.8 percent in 1992 and around 18 percent by the late 1990s (Sousa 
1998:477).110  
The way in which this reform was achieved in the City Assembly is in itself a good example 
of a successful social counter-hegemonic governability strategy. Despite the PT not having a 
majority in Porto Alegre, both the executive and the party directorate promoted a “massive 
mobilisation of the popular classes” to put pressure on the rightist and centrist legislators who 
were initially reluctant to raise taxes (Sousa 1998:477). The tax reform was also possible 
because conservative parties were not as strong in the city as they were at the state level and 
an influential centrist party with 11 councillors, the PDT, supported this and other PT 
initiatives. Unlike other cities governed by the PT, where similar tax reforms proved 
impossible or were limited in scope, the government in Porto Alegre was able to secure 
sufficient resources to allocate to investment in infrastructure projects111 and all of these 
resources were subject to the participatory budgeting process. This had positive effects 
because it made concrete impacts on people’s lives and attracted further involvement in the 
participatory process as a whole, which only increased over the years.  
Strictly speaking, the approval of the budget is a legal prerogative of the City Assembly. The 
mayor submits a budget proposal that the legislative is free to approve, change or even reject. 
However, as Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1998:467) observed, because the executive’s 
proposal was “sanctioned by the participatory budgeting institutions” it became “a fait 
accompli for the legislative body” because of the “political risk” that deputies perceived in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 In addition to this, the government managed to update a number of tariffs on municipal services and made 
surveillance of tax and tariff payments more effective (Sousa 1998:477). 
111 Expenditure control, combined with a municipal fiscal reform, and larger federal and state transfers allowed 
by the 1988 Constitution allowed the PT government in Porto Alegre to increase investment percentage of the 
budget to 10 percent in 1990, 16.3 percent in 1991, and 17 percent in 1992 (Sousa 1998:477) 
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“voting against the “will of the citizens and the communities”. Indeed, by the time the annual 
budget was sent to the Municipal Chamber for approval, city councillors did not find it easy 
to oppose because a strong popular pressure, mostly exercised by neighbourhood leaders, 
accompanied the whole process. Every year, when the budget was discussed and voted on in 
the city assembly, PB representatives were physically present, observing from the galleries. 
This had a powerful effect, even on conservative opposition parties (Hahn 2002).  
PB is particularly interesting mechanism because it did not undermine formal representative 
democracy, nor did it infringe the formal separation of powers between the executive and the 
legislative branch. It did help, however, to circumvent and “neutralize” a source of opposition 
in the Municipal Chamber that could be used to block its initiatives, by “stamping the budget 
with popular approval” (Schneider and Goldfrank 2002:14).112 Although legislatures in Brazil 
have never deliberated substantially on the formulation of the budget,113 they do influence its 
execution (Sousa 1998:502). Legislators do have a margin of manoeuvre to introduce 
modifications (or earmarks) on the budget in order to allocate specific resources that are 
usually addressed to their own constituencies in a clientelistic fashion. Moreover, during the 
budget cycle legislators tend to negotiate the liberation of those funds with the executive in 
exchange for supporting its initiatives – the pork-barrelling to which I referred above.  
The introduction of PB in Porto Alegre changed these practices profoundly, by weakening the 
“old ways of doing politics” (Sousa 1998:502) and counteracting one of the main sources of 
power for the political elites. On the one hand, citizens came to rely on participatory 
institutions to satisfy their demands, rather than looking to their legislative representatives to 
activate clientelistic mechanisms (Fedozi 1997; Ramos 2004:262). On the other hand, once 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 See also (2009); Doctor (2007); Pinto (2004); Ramos (2004:262-6). 
113 According to some observers, given the budgeting technique traditional in Brazil, the legislative branch has 
always played a marginal role in formulation. Because the budget is not required to indicate concrete works to 
be carried out, the executive at all three levels of government has always had “ample leeway in budget 
execution” (Sousa 1998:502).  
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the budgetary proposal arrived in the City Assembly for approval, it had already been 
legitimated by a sizeable citizens’ participation. In that context, approval became a simple 
formality (Sousa 1998:502-5). In fact, the number of modifications (or earmarks) introduced 
by city councillors to the budget bill decreased significantly with PB (Hahn 2002). Ramos 
(2003:262-3) explains that this was in great part because legislators did not want to act 
against a participatory process that enjoyed great social acceptance, as they feared the 
electoral consequences. According to this author, who did a cross case study on participatory 
budgeting experiences, PB’s capacity to intimidate legislators from opposition parties in 
Porto Alegre derived largely from the robustness of the whole process and the fact that in this 
city, unlike elsewhere, 100 percent of the budget allocated to investment, which increased 
significantly under PT governments, was discussed at PB assemblies (Ramos 2005:262-3).   
PB in Porto Alegre was particularly important to a party looking for alternative solutions to 
secure governability, while facing electoral pressures to broaden its constituency beyond the 
party’s social base. PT leaders in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, most of them 
particularly enthusiastic about PB, argued during our interviews that this instrument allowed 
the party to broaden its “dialogue towards the middle class and other sectors” in Porto Alegre 
and enable it to move beyond organised groups in the PT field (Pestana 17/12/08). Studies 
show, on the one hand, that a wide diversity of groups participated in the process, ranging 
from community movements to members of trade unions and even business sector 
representatives114 and, on the other hand, that an important proportion of ordinary citizens 
engaged. Surveys show that by the late 1990s between 30 and 40 percent of participants in 
PB assemblies belonged to no specific organised group (Cidade 1999, in Ramos 2004:242).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 In 1994, according to municipal data, a total of 1,011 people attended the PB plenaries: 11.5 percent were 
from the trade union movement, 14.3 percent business interests, 20 percent community movements, 35 percent 
other institutions of civil society and state, 14.4 percent individuals without organisational affiliation, and only 
0.7 percent representatives of political parties (Sousa 1998:480).  
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This participatory instrument also helped the party reach many of the unorganised poor, as 
the PT had been unable to do in previous years. Survey studies show that some of the poorest 
citizens participated in the process with great intensity.115 Abers (2003) found that not only 
did the poorest areas of the city took part in PB assemblies, but impoverished areas with little 
prior history of civil organisation and previously dominated by clientelistic-neighbourhood 
politics, engaged with even greater intensity. By giving unorganised sectors a chance to 
participate and negotiate their demands, PB enabled the PT in Porto Alegre to gather support 
from a sector of the population that was difficult to mobilise electorally and did not 
necessarily agree with the party in the past. Interestingly, PB also became acceptable for the 
middle classes, many of which, without necessarily participating, looked on approvingly at a 
process that seemed to promote transparency, accountability and “good governance” at a time 
when corruption had become a major political issue in Brazil, particularly after Collor’s 
impeachment (Abers 2003; Schneider and Goldfrank 2002:202).116 Moreover, PB in itself 
was not opposed by powerful economic groups. In fact, large construction companies even 
supported the instrument because they directly benefited from the massive and unprecedented 
investment in public works seen during these years (Abers 2003; 1996:39).117  
According to different authors, PB had a positive electoral impact in Porto Alegre (Abers 
2003; Filomena 2006; Hahn 2002; Sousa 1998:464). In 1988 the Popular Front, the coalition 
of left parties led by the PT, won the mayoral election by only 34.3 percent of the vote and by 
40.8 percent in 1992. After 1996, once the PB had been consolidated, it took 56 percent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 In 1999, for instance, 56 percent of those who participated in PB assemblies earned less than four minimum 
wages and only 21 percent received more than eight (Cidade 1999; in Ramos 2004:305). In 1999 a minimum 
wage in Brazil was approximately US$100. 
116 Major national scandals were taking place while the PT in Porto Alegre was creating Participatory Budget. 
The most important corruption allegations forced the impeachment of President Fernando Collor in 1992. 
Mobilisations and huge street demonstrations took place throughout the country. Like other scholars, Hunter 
argues that the wave of popular optimism about eliminating corruption certainly benefited the PT administration 
(Hunter 2010:97). 
117 According to Abers (2003), support from construction companies might also account for PT governments’ 
ability to put pressure on the city assemblies to approve property tax increases.  
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(Sousa 1998:464), while in 2000, Tarso Genro was elected mayor with 63.51 percent 
(Correio do Povo 30/10/2000). This made Porto Alegre one of the main electoral bastions of 
the Workers’ Party.118 The success of PB, and the promise to implement it at the state level, 
helped the PT to win the governor’s race in Rio Grande do Sul in 1998, with Olívio Dutra as 
its candidate (Goldfrank and Schneider 2003; Schneider and Goldfrank 2002). In the capital 
city, almost 80 percent voted for Dutra (Correio do Povo 30/10/2000). This was not only 
evidence of the PB’s electoral success, but also a clear indication that multiple strata of 
society, not just the working class or organised sectors, were enthusiastic about the “PT way 
of governing” in Porto Alegre.119  
PB in Porto Alegre became an international reference point and many Brazilian cities 
incorporated some type of participatory budgeting mechanism. The number of cities adopting 
this instrument  increased from 36 in 1996 to 140 in 2003, and to 170 in 2004, according to 
estimations compiled by Rikek (2003, in Avritzer 2006:623; Pires 2006:14-5). By 2004, most 
PT governments had implemented participatory budgeting mechanisms (Wampler 2007), 
including large and important state capitals such as São Paulo, Bello Horizonte and Recife. 
Even other parties came to adopt the model, although none of them in the same proportion.120 
The way this instrument was implemented had different characteristics and did not always 
reach the same scope. Porto Alegre was one of the few cases in which the resources related to 
investment that were discussed in the PB process amounted to 100 percent.121 Nevertheless in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 The improvement in the electoral performance of the PT even allowed the party to become less marginal in 
the City Assembly. From only 11 seats between 1989 and 1992 (Table 4.1), it counted on 14 councillors in 1996 
(13 from PT, 1 from PPS) (Sousa 1998:502).  
119 Studies, however, have not controlled for other possible explanations of the electoral success in Porto Alegre 
and the state of Rio Grande do Sul. 
120 Among the cities that had adopted PB by 2003, 73 were governed by the PT and 33 by other left-wing 
parties. 84 percent of the total PB experiences were in the south and south-east regions. Only 5 percent of these 
cities had more than one million inhabitants, the majority had less than 100,000 (Rizek 2003, in Pires 2006:15).  
121 In Bello Horizonte it was 50 percent (Hernández 2005:40); in São Paulo, between 62 and 63 percent 
(Hernández 2005:40); in Belém, between 30 and 40 percent (Ramos 2004:251). In Medianeira, Paraná, it was 
100 percent – one of the few cases like Porto Alegre (Ramos 2004:251). 
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many other cities it became a legitimate and influential instrument that councillors could not 
ignore (Hernández 2005:40; Ramos 2004:251). 
4.2.3 São Paulo under Suplicy: moving towards an elite-centred strategy  
The governability strategy under Marty Suplicy prioritised elite alliances across party lines 
over popular mobilisation or participatory politics, moving the PT as a whole closer to 
mainstream Brazilian parties. When Suplicy was elected mayor in 2000, the PT was a very 
different organisation than in 1988, the year in which Erundina won the City Hall by a very 
small margin. In Chapter 3 I discuss how the party as a national organisation became more of 
a vote seeking machine towards the late 1990s. Authors have argued that, because of electoral 
motivations, alliances were playing a more important role, particularly among PT members 
running for sub-national executive public office (Hunter 2010:Ch.4; Ottman 2009). This 
emphasis on alliances, as Hunter (2010:86) explains, resulted in great part from new electoral 
legislation passed in 1992, which established a runoff after the first round in municipal 
elections. This provision, she maintains, encouraged the formation of electoral alliances with 
non-ideological or centrist parties in order to secure victories in runoffs. Such a practice 
derived from the practical calculations made by party leaders. In the 1996 municipal election, 
the PT only won two of the eleven races that involved a second round. After examining the 
results carefully, party leaders found that by broadening their alliances they could easily have 
won in the second round in several cities (Hunter 2010:99). 
This change of strategy was visible in the mayoral race of 2000. In the same election that 
made Suplicy mayor, party candidates running for capital cities such as Rio Branco (Acre) or 
Macapá (Amapá) incorporated support form centre-right organisations such as the Liberal 
Party (PL) or even the ultra-nationalist Party for the Reconstruction of National Order 
(PRONA). In São Paulo, however, the PT did not go this far during the contest. Its electoral 
alliance was with only two left-of-centre parties – the PCdoB and PSB. Nevertheless, in 
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government the party eventually approached conservative parties. The case of Sao Paulo 
illustrates clearly that this shift in the alliance strategies of the PT was not motivated only by 
electoral concerns, as authors have emphasised. As in many other transformations 
experienced by the party, governability was also a powerful driving force.  
After 1998, as the PT concentrated its energies more directly on winning the presidency, the 
enthusiasm around social counter-hegemonic governability strategies started to lose 
momentum among influential moderate leaders within the PT who had become dominant in 
São Paulo. In 1999 José Dirceu, who was president of the party from 1995 to 2002,  
provocatively argued that the “PT way of governing” was “outdated” (Dirceu 1999:18). 
Although he acknowledged the importance of its most characteristic features –participation, 
transparency, redistribution– he also explained that the party was facing a new challenge and 
PT local authorities needed to “keep in mind the national situation” and search for new allies 
among political parties (Dirceu 1999:23-5). Dirceu’s statement formally inaugurated a new 
phase in the life of the PT. Indeed, by the early 2000s, when Suplicy was elected in São 
Paulo, moderate party leaders were convinced that PT administrations would have to pay a 
certain price to promote alliances and avoid gridlock.122  
With the 2002 presidential election in mind, the PT selected a candidate for São Paulo that 
could be palatable to the middle classes and the elites, mainly in order to meet the 
conservative profile of the Paulista electorate which differs from that of Porto Alegre. 
Strongly influenced by Lula’s faction at the national level, the party opted for someone with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 This view was later made explicit by the PT Secretary of Institutional Affairs, Jorge Bittar (2003:24): “In the 
relationship with parliament, it is always desirable to build a majority in order to create a more favourable 
environment to government actions. The problem, however, is how to create such a majority without disfiguring 
the essential aspects of its government programme and losing the values that are central to the PT way of 
governing (...) The PT experience shows that the construction of majorities is often difficult due to the political 
and cultural practices of traditional Brazilian parties, such as fisiologismo. However, we have also found that 
executives who only rule with the support of a minority in parliament face such great obstacles in governability 
that, very often, they end up having difficulties in implementing transformative actions that depend on 
parliamentary decisions”.  
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no working class background, almost a complete outsider: a psychologist known publicly for 
hosting a controversial national TV show on sexuality.123 Concerned with the presidential 
election, party leaders knew that the Suplicy administration would be at the centre of media 
attention. The Erundina experience and its permanent conflicts with dominant strategic actors 
and among PT factions could not be repeated.   
After the election, one of the PT’s main concerns was the mayor’s relationship with the City 
Assembly. The party had 21 out of 55 seats (see Table 4.1), while the government needed at 
least 28 votes to pass legislation. “It was very clear to me”, Suplicy told me during our 
interview, “that without support in the chamber I could not pass one single law” (09/01/09). 
In order to secure that support, the PT government opted to exchange votes for patronage 
appointments with almost all sorts of political parties. This traditional approach to 
governability came to be understood in the following years as “the gathering of political 
support across party lines” (Ottman 2009:71). From the outset, Suplicy’s main power broker, 
Rui Falcão, attempted to approach city councillors from other parties, intending to negotiate a 
plural cabinet in the form of a coalition government. Achieving this, however, was not 
possible because some PT city councillors, particularly on the party Left, expressed serious 
objections, and because the different factions demanded a large share in government 
portfolios. Seeking to avoid paralysing conflicts with intra-party groups, the mayor did not 
contradict these groups and offered cabinet seats to their main representatives. Despite these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Married to Senator Eduardo Suplicy, a well respected PT congressional representative, Marty Suplicy entered 
politics in 1994 as a congressional representative. Due to her upper class background, she was portrayed in the 
media as the “PT Chanel” or the “PT Light”. During our interview, she explained the reasons why the party first 
selected her as a candidate: “Many citizens in São Paulo who did not approve of the PT did approve of me (…) 
They would look at me and offer me a smile. Instead, I would talk to them about Lula and the PT. I was known 
among women, and the middle classes liked me because I did not come from the working class”. During our 
interview, Suplicy praised her own lack of a specific ideology. When I questioned her over this particular point 
she joked: “I’m going to imitate Lula when he said that he was a metal worker and not a Socialist… well, I am a 
Psychologist!” (laughs). Later she became more serious, adding: “I am motivated by social justice. If I joined 
the PT it was to combat injustices. I don’t care if that is Socialism, Democratic Socialism or Social Democracy. 
I don’t need a label for my commitment” (Suplicy 09/01/09). 
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constraints, she was careful to form a government that would not be regarded as entirely 
Petista (Fiorilo 2006:105-9) and included some members from other parties or with no 
partisan affiliation.124  
The Suplicy administration did not distribute cabinet seats to form a coalition government. 
Instead it gave out jobs at lower bureaucratic levels, and that eventually allowed the 
government to pass most of its initiatives. Suplicy also promoted a decentralisation process 
by which her government created 31 sub-municipalities to replace the old administrative 
structures of the city. This measure, conceived as a democratic achievement, allowed the 
administration to obtain votes in exchange for the newly created positions. The government 
negotiated the appointment of sub-mayors with seven different parties,125 including 
politicians from previous administrations, some of them “ultra-conservatives” (Ottman 
2009:73). Although the strategy made many PT and social leaders uncomfortable, it yielded 
results: the Suplicy administration passed more than 75 percent of its bills during its four year 
term (Fiorilo 2006:160). The bargaining with other parties, however, involved not only 
appointments, but also a discretionary distribution of budgetary resources and the liberation 
of parliamentary earmarks to specific allies in the Municipal Chamber. The comfortable 
majority that the PT administration achieved in the legislative branch came at a price: the 
party eventually cultivated practices of patronage and pork-barrelling not unlike those to 
which it had long been ideologically and ethically opposed (Menenguello 2003, in Ottman 
2009:73; Teixeira and Tatagiba 2005a). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 In doing so, she included members of its two electoral allies (PCdoB and PSB), technocrats who did not 
belong to any political party and even government officials who had participated in the administration of 
president José Sarney (1985-1990).  
125 These parties were the PL, PMDB, PDT, PTB, PSB, PPS and PCdoB. 
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Suplicy ruled out any possible counter-mobilisation strategy to put pressure on the legislative 
branch.126 In São Paulo, the most influential leaders of the party were either opposed or 
sceptical of the extent to which it could be successful.127 Participation, the other element by 
which a social counter-hegemonic governability strategy was promoted in some PT 
governments, was not prioritised by the Suplicy administration. Suplicy did create a 
Participatory Budget, but it never became a central part of her government.128 PB in São 
Paulo did not acquire a high profile in the planning process or within the administrative 
structure (Pires 2006) and was made subordinate to other welfare policies (such as the 
minimum-income cash-transfer programme or the unified centres of education) that were 
more important for the administration. Studies show that these policies were successful at 
tackling extreme poverty in the city and promoted redistribution, but did not involve citizen 
participation (Houtzager 2008; Houtzager and Dowbor 2010), and were managed in a rather 
“technocratic” fashion (Ottman 2009:70). Interestingly, PB assemblies atracted a large 
number of participants129 and were enthusiastically supported by social organisations 
(Teixeira and Tatagiba 2005a). However, no relevant public works resulted from their 
decisions (Carneiro 2006; Pires 2006) and, unlike in cities such as Porto Alegre, Recife or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Activists from the Housing Movement interviewed by Carneiro report that even when their organisations 
explicitly offered party leaders in public office in São Paulo demonstrations outside the Chamber in order to 
promote specific reforms in both their interests, such as higher budget allocations for popular housing or other 
social services, the administration refused this option (Carneiro 2006:116). 
127 José Américo, Secretary of Communications at the time, later president of the PT in the city of São Paulo, 
argues: “The idea of a governability supported on social movements is completely utopian. Social movements 
are not strong enough to sustain a government. Their strength is only regional or sector specific and their 
agendas are very often organised around short term objectives. People cannot remain mobilised for ever” 
(11/11/08). Antonio Donato, head of sub-municipalities during the Suplicy administration, claimed that a 
strategy of this type “is only possible in revolutionary situations”, while “social movements are not active all the 
time, as was demonstrated during the Erundina administration” (12/11/08). 
128 One indication of the low priority that the Suplicy administration accorded to the PB process as a whole is 
the fact that the mayor never chaired its most important meetings, as it used to occur in Porto Alegre. When I 
asked Rui Falcão, Home Affairs Secretary at the time, why the mayor failed to appear at those gatherings, he 
answered that “the mayor had to take care of the whole city” (Falcão 11/12/08). This answer suggests that PB 
was not relevant to the government and it was regarded as a sector specific, marginal initiative. 
129 The municipal administration estimates that 34,000 people participated in the first budgeting experience in 
2001, then 55,000 and 80,000 in the subsequent two years (Lavalle, Acharya and Houtzager 2005, 953). 
According to the Participatory Budget Coordination (COP) in São Paulo, between 2001 and 2004, a total of 
250,000 people participated in 1,680 assemblies (Pires 2006, 49).  
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Belo Horizonte, São Paulo’s PB was mostly limited to previously organised sectors, failing to 
reach the unorganised poor in the periphery.  
By and large, the mayor and her inner circle lacked a strong commitment to participatory 
democracy.130 PB in the city did not have real decision-making power. In the way officials 
understood participation, conclusions reached in those arenas were only suggestions exerting 
no power of compulsion over the government. The policy in relation to resolutions made in 
participatory spaces was one of “pick and choose” in which the administration would have 
the prerogative at all times to decide if their implementation was desirable (Carneiro 
2006:100). Without the legitimacy that PB acquired in other cities, the final budgetary 
decisions in São Paulo were always in the hands of the city councillors (Teixeira and 
Tatagiba 2005a) who negotiated allocations in the traditional Brazilian way of doing politics. 
A study conducted by the Polis Institute, which gathered the views of social activists 
regarding the administration, found great disappointment with PB under Suplicy. In general, 
activists thought that the government manipulated participatory arenas and used them to 
legitimise decisions previously made in closed spaces (Teixeira and Tatagiba 2005a). The 
study concluded that although Suplicy’s government established dialogue with and listened to 
social organisations, it failed to back up participatory mechanisms as other PT 
administrations had.  
High ranking officials who served in the second PT administration in São Paulo argue that 
the size of the city, with 10.4 million inhabitants in 2000 (more than the population in most 
Brazilian states), made PB implementation more difficult than in municipalities such as Porto 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 I found many examples of this during the interviews conducted for this study. For instance, when I asked 
Arselino Tatto, a leader of one of the most influential factions of the PT in the city of São Paulo and an ally of 
Suplicy, his opinions on participatory democracy, he said: “That’s a mess (tr. isso é uma bagunça). People’s 
participation takes place through their elected governments” (12/11/08). Likewise, José Donato, manager of the 
city’s local transport services and head of sub-municipalities during the Suplicy administration, thinks that 
councils or assemblies with power to make binding decisions constitute a form of “leftist populism” that is 
“used to manipulate the masses” (12/11/08). 
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Alegre (Donato 12/11/08; Falcão 11/12/08; Piai 05/11/08; Suplicy 09/01/09). By the time 
Lula became President of Brazil, moderate sectors seemed to believe that the size of the 
polity imposes limitations for PB (Belchior 06/07/09; Dulci 10/12/08). Indeed, the experience 
of implementing PB at the state level was limited. In 1995 the administration of Vítor Buaiz 
in Espírito Santo briefly made an attempt, but abandoned it within a year (Macaulay and 
Burton 2003). Only in Rio Grande do Sul, under Dutra, was PB maintained for a whole 
government term. Despite the lack of sufficient studies on this experience,131 the evidence 
suggests that this instrument was not particularly successful.132  
One could argue that what was possible in a capital city with 1.3 million inhabitants (Porto 
Alegre in the 1980s) was not easy to achieve in the wider state with a population of more than 
10.1 million (2000 census), such as Rio Grande do Sul or a city as populated as São Paulo. 
This might sound obvious to some observers, but it was not evident to the PT. Many party 
leaders in Rio Grande do Sul, particularly those placed in the party Left, considered that the 
PB process at the state level was a successful experience (Núñez 18/12/08; Pestana 17/12/08; 
Sousa 19/12/08). Arno Agustín, Finance Secretary in Porto Alegre and Rio Grande do Sul 
and latter Secretary to the Treasury during the second Lula administration, even argued that 
PB at the state level was a “great success, which demonstrated that the instrument could be 
implemented at in the national sphere” (20/10/10). Even Lula’s government programme 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 For an account of Participatory Budget in the state of Rio Grande do Sul see Schneider and Goldfrank 
(2002), Goldfrank and Schneider (2003) and Feres (2002). 
132 At the state level the PT was unable to make PB a pillar of a social counter-hegemonic strategy. The 
opposition, which was much stronger at the state level than in Porto Alegre, boycotted the participatory process 
from the beginning, fearing that the PT could use this instrument to remain in power for a very long time 
(Schneider and Goldfrank 2002). In the Judiciary, it was able to secure an injunction banning the use of public 
resources to organise anything related to the PB for almost one year. Furthermore, municipal governments led 
by other opposition parties opposed the state-wide PB and the Dutra administration did little to negotiate its 
implementation with them. Without their support, which affected the relationships with their parties in the State 
Legislative Assembly, the government could not consolidate a PB, despite civil society organisations in the 
party field enthusiastically supporting the process. Eventually, the opposition in the State Assembly blocked an 
essential tax reform by which the government intended to implement progressive tax increases on goods and 
services. This reform was important to secure resources for a state government which inherited an 
unmanageably high public debt. Without these resources, not only was the government’s margin of manoeuvre 
reduced, but the resources subject to a participatory process were also limited. 
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contemplated the creation of a participatory budgeting mechanism at the national level, a 
story that I relate in chapter 7.  
Final remarks 
Throughout the 1990s PT national leaders became aware of the challenges that local 
administrations experienced to achieve governability. Many of them increasingly understood 
the importance of forming legislative alliances in municipal chambers and state assemblies. 
However, they were unwilling to adopt practices by which mainstream Brazilian parties 
establish those alliances –that is by exchanging votes for political favours and budgetary 
resources. At least until 1998, when Lula and the PT at the national level started to prioritise 
legislative alliances with centrist and conservative parties, influential leaders in central office 
expected that governability strategies could follow a social counter-hegemonic model, 
different from mainstream Brazilian politics. Under the influence of the PT “genetic model”, 
these leaders envisaged social mobilisation and politics of participation as the main pillars of 
this model. 
By the time Lula assumed national executive public office, the PT had not resolved its own 
debate on governability and it had not necessarily found a replicable successful formula for 
its innovative counter-hegemonic governability approach. As I have shown in this chapter, 
mobilising the party’s social base alone proved to be insufficient to counter-balance a 
minority status in the legislative branch, as was clear under Erundina. Promoting broad-based 
participatory strategies, as in Porto Alegre, seemed to be more effective in putting pressure on 
the legislative branch and passing some government initiatives. This became possible, 
however, under specific circumstances that were not present in all cases: on one side, the 
political commitment to promote a strong, inclusive, legitimate and broad-based participatory 
process such as PB that covered all of the resources allocated to investment; on the other side, 
the lack of a strong conservative opposition and the existence of centre-left allies like the 
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PDT willing to support the administration. Other factors not extensively analysed here might 
have played a role, such as the strong associative tradition in the city or the size of the polity. 
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5. Political governability under Lula: The elite-centred perspective in ascendancy 
The governability dilemma contributed a great deal to the transformation of the Brazilian 
Workers’ Party and shaped its behaviour in profound ways since the party occupied sub-
national executive public office. This has been neglected in existing accounts on the 
transformation of the PT, even when the Lula administration is studied. Most scholars 
emphasise the way in which Lula altered his discourse as part of an electorally maximising 
strategy. In their works, they mainly pay attention to how Lula moderated his programme in 
his fourth attempt to become president, and professionalised his electoral strategy even 
further than in previous electoral contests (Hunter 2010:136-40; Miguel 2006; Panizza 2004; 
Samuels 2004:1000). In this chapter I argue that the changes that occurred during the 
electoral campaign took place because Lula and his inner circle were creating conditions to 
enable them eventually to govern, and so they were not only concerned with putting in place 
a successful electoral strategy.  
Once Lula had assumed the Presidency, I contend, governability became an even more 
important issue, which altered the discourses and strategies of the party in public and central 
office. PT scholars have not acknowledged this because even their accounts of the party in 
power emphasise electability. When Hunter examines the experience of the PT in the national 
executive, for instance, she regards the developments of the Lula administration as “a 
continuation of the same process” that the party experienced during the 1990s (Hunter 
2011:307). I argue that the experience of the PT in national government was far more than 
simply the continuation of a process that started in previous years, and which drove the party 
towards moderation and pragmatism. Rather, it was a process with its own rationale and 
motivations.  
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The political dimension of governability during the Lula years is the main focus of this 
chapter. Scholars who study the Brazilian political system have explained how the Lula 
administration faced a major challenge because, despite the massive number of votes 
received in the 2002 presidential election, the PT was in a very weak position in the 
legislative branch (Amorim 2007; Grijó 2007; Pereira, Power, and Raile 2011; Power 2009; 
Renno 2009; Santos and Grijó 2010). Many scholars have explained that in  the context of a 
hybrid political system defined as “coalition presidentialism” (Abranches 1988), Brazilian 
presidents need to engage in intensive negotiations with political parties in order to secure 
legislative majorities and avoid gridlock (Abranches 1988; Amorim 1994; Figueiredo and 
Limongi 2000). When analysing governability under Lula, scholars have adopted a similar 
approach (Amorim 2007; Pereira, Power, and Raile 2011; Power 2009). These authors have, 
however, failed to address the whole spectrum of governability strategies that the PT put in 
place at the sub-national level and that went beyond the traditional elite bargains of Brazilian 
politics described in previous pages.  
One cannot assume tout court, as some of the literature on the Brazilian political system does 
when it looks at the Lula administration, that a party with the PT tradition was expected to 
construct governability in the national executive just like other Brazilian parties when they 
govern. Empirical evidence shows that when progressive parties are in a minority position or 
act in multi-party alliances they tend to make stronger appeals to their social allies in order to 
build broader bases of support (and they do this less when they enjoy comfortable legislative 
majorities) (Heller 2009; Hipsher 1998; Kriesi and Koopmans 1995; Roberts 1998). During 
the two Lula administrations, the PT had the lowest number of congressional representatives 
of any other progressive party in government in Latin America at the time.133 Scholars have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Other presidents from left-wing or left-of-centre parties in Latin America who were Lula's contemporaries 
had significant congressional support. For instance, Hugo Chávez conquered 44.3 percent of the Upper Chamber 
in 2000 and 68.3 percent in 2005; Evo Morales controlled 55.3 percent of the Lower House when first elected in 
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not yet tried to explain why, despite such a scenario, the party in government did not seek 
greater support among its social allies to promote counter-hegemonic governability strategies. 
These types of strategies, as Chapter 1 explains, can take at least three forms: mobilisation for 
reform (or counter-mobilisation), defensive mobilisation and broad-based participation. In 
this chapter I mainly look at the first two, while participation is analysed in Chapter 7.  
In the following pages I show how the PT in the national executive – Lula and his inner 
circle, in particular – adopted an elite-centred strategy similar to other Brazilian parties. This 
strategy, however, was not coherent from the beginning and it took place in three different 
stages. The first was during the electoral campaign, when Lula’s inner circle started laying 
the foundations for governability should they win. By taking an anticipatory response to face 
the future challenges of public office, Lula’s campaign team started to accommodate the 
interests of dominant strategic actors in an elite-centred fashion. His discourse, however, also 
appealed to the mobilisation of civil society in order to support the PT project. The second 
stage took place once he was in office, between January 2003 and June 2005, when the PT 
put in place a hybrid governability strategy. I argue that it was a hybrid strategy because it 
was neither counter-hegemonic nor elite-centred in the classic Brazilian way. Despite the fact 
that the party made bargains with political elites to secure congressional support, it put itself 
in an artificial hegemonic position in government and it did not share power with different 
parties in proportion to their share of congressional seats. Finally, the third stage took place 
after June 2005, when the initial arrangements led to a political crisis that revealed the failure 
of the governability strategy which had been put in place. As a consequence of this crisis, PT 
leaders adopted an elite-centred strategy similar to most Brazilian parties. This strategy 
became even stronger during the second Lula administration.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2005; Michelle Bachelet had 53.3 percent in 2006; Tabaré Vázquez 52.5 percent in 2004, while Nestor Kirchner 
eventually reached 51.5 percent in 2003. For an overview of parliamentary bases of support among Latin 
American presidents, see Jiménez (2007). 
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This chapter relies on party documents, with the intention of highlighting the contrasts 
between the official positions of the party in central office with those of Lula’s inner circle, 
but it also relies on a number of interviews with key informants who played a central role in 
setting up the PT governability strategy at the national level.  It is organised into three main 
sections, looking at each of the three stages referred to above.  
5.1 The first stage: the PT en route to the Presidency  
In 2002, Lula presented an electoral manifesto that appealed for a “new social contract”  
between the government, business and workers to resume economic growth and promote an 
“alternative development model” (Coligação Lula Presidente 2002a:1,2,25,31,39).  It was a 
social democratic programme (although PT leaders have always rejected such a label) 
because the future administration would respect the existing legislation and institutional 
mechanisms, but it would also promote deep structural reforms of a political, economic and 
social nature. Lula’s manifesto not only included some short mid-term objectives that his 
administration eventually delivered with positive results, such as the revalorisation of the 
minimum wage (Coligação Lula Presidente 2002a:25, see Chapter 9) or the expansion of 
compensatory social policies for the poor (Coligação Lula Presidente 2002a:41-44). It also 
included several legal reforms, most of which were never accomplished. As part of a strategy 
to improve income distribution, for instance, the core of the programme included a 
progressive income tax reform, the creation of new contributions on patrimony and 
inheritance; urban reform, and the acceleration of constitutionally mandated land reform. The 
document also encompassed labour reform to alter the corporatist system inherited from the 
Vargas era (Coligação Lula Presidente 2002a:22-3, see Chapter 9); political reform; and even 
the creation of a Participatory Budget at the national level, but with adaptations (Coligação 
Lula Presidente 2002a:2, see Chapter 7). 
141	  
	  
Before Lula came into office, the experience of democratically elected left-wing parties in 
national governments was limited in Latin America, and not always successful in securing 
governability. The Chilean case of Salvador Allende (1970-1973) was an important reference 
for the PT. Its leaders did not want to revisit an experience of political and social instability, 
that ended tragically in a military coup. At least since 1989, when Lula first ran for President, 
the Sixth PT National Conference asserted that “the rich experience of the Allende 
Government provides a historical framework that needs to be studied in order to incorporate 
its lessons and avoid repeating any similar outcome”  (Partido dos Trabalhadores 2004:345). 
From this experience, many in the party learned that dominant strategic actors in the political 
and economic sphere could cause the failure of a progressive government. They had also 
learnt that winning the presidency was not the same as “fully conquering political power”, as 
PT delegates wrote in their 1989 resolution (Partido dos Trabalhadores 2004:345). The PT 
field, however, did not share a single vision on how to approach these strategic actors. Some 
groups supported a counter-hegemonic approach, inspired by the “PT way of governing” 
while others were more inclined to accommodate the interests of the most influential elites. It 
is not easy to draw a precise line because the two strategies, the social counter-hegemonic 
and the elite-centred, coexisted in contradictory ways among PT leaders and even within 
certain individuals. By and large, the social strategy was more influential in the party Left, 
within factions such as Left Articulation and Socialist Democracy, the latter of which formed 
“Message to the Party” in 2005.  It was also present among party leaders with no experience 
in public office who had mainly developed their careers within the party bureaucracy. In 
addition, the social counter-hegemonic strategy had strong support among the leaders of civil 
society organisations such as the MST and the Housing Movement, but at this stage was less 
strong in CUT’s dominant sector. Leaders who took part in PT municipal administrations in 
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which participatory instruments were stronger and particularly successful, such as Porto 
Alegre, were also enthusiastic defenders. 
The elite-centred strategy, in contrast, had more followers in the heterogeneous Campo 
Majoritário (Lula’s faction, later known as “Building a New Brazil”), which formed the 
party’s dominant coalition. Its supporters were some of the keenest office-seeking cadres, 
who had mostly developed their careers in sub-national executive public office, governing 
large and complex cities in which they became accustomed to negotiating with a wide range 
of groups and actors. The main defenders of this strategy were inside Lula’s inner circle. 
Support for this strategy was also strong among PT members who became professionals in 
public office either as technocrats, civil servants or political advisors. Many trade union 
leaders from the private sector, who had engaged in negotiations with business 
representatives and the state during the 1990s, also tended to sympathise with the elite-
centred perspective. 
The influence of the supporters of a counter-hegemonic strategy was clear in the resolution 
that the party passed in December 2001 in its 12th National Conference. In contrast, the 
manifesto for election that Lula presented to the voters, mainly drafted by his inner circle or 
members of his faction,134 had a stronger elite-centred approach. These two documents 
differed in their positions towards dominant strategic actors and the institutions under the 
control of these actors. On the political side, the party document was critical of a 
“conservative political system” in which decisions result from the “exchange of favours” 
conducted in a “top-down” fashion and excluding “the participation of the people” (Partido 
dos Trabalhadores 2004:598). In this context, the document valued the PT participatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Lula’s government programme presented in 2001 was mostly drafted by members of his faction, Campo 
Majoritário. Only two representatives of the party Left participated in the ad hoc committee, composed of 22 
members. Interviews conducted for this study among members of Lula’s inner circle confirmed that certain 
documents used in the campaign, most notably the “Letter to the Brazilian People”, were elaborated by very 
small groups in Lula’s entourage (anonymous source). 
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experience, not only as part of an effort to democratise the state, but also as a deliberate 
strategy to “dispute hegemony” (Partido dos Trabalhadores 2004:598) in the Gramscian 
perspective that had influenced party documents since the late 1980s (Burgos 1994:Ch.3). 
Such an approach was not contemplated in Lula’s campaign manifesto, in which the 
emphasis was placed on the promotion of inclusive negotiations and “great national 
agreements” in which all sectors, including large business groups, opposition parties and 
other dominant strategic actors, would participate (Coligação Lula Presidente 2002a:2). 
The social counter-hegemonic strategy in the PT did not seek an overthrow of the “dominant 
bloc”, neither did it entail an attempt to suppress adversaries nor to promote “anti-
institutional confrontational strategies” such as those attributed to Chávez (Valencia 2005:81) 
and Morales (Larson, Madrid et al. 2008:7). As Chapter 1 explains, the PT did not propose an 
assault on the privileged or a serious challenge to their interests by means of a massive 
programme of expropriations, factory take-overs or anything of that kind. The attempt was 
not to confront strategic actors directly, but to neutralise their influence through radical 
democracy, mass mobilisation and broad-based social participation. In 1987, for instance, the 
PT regarded the dispute of hegemony as a process of “accumulating forces” that would 
combine “mass struggle” with the occupation of institutional spaces. In its First National 
Congress, which took place in 1991, the party had established that disputing hegemony meant 
“constructing an enormous social movement in favour of deep political, economic and social 
reforms” (PT 1991:46-7, in Burgos 1994:122-5). Social counter-hegemonic strategies had 
been contemplated by the PT since Lula first ran for the presidency in 1989. In the document 
Guidelines for the Drafting of an Electoral Manifesto discussed before the campaign, party 
delegates established that despite the limitations imposed by the dominant elites, not only was 
mobilisation a “key element in the balance of forces”, but also all their chances of success 
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would rely “on the perspective of promoting workers’ mobilisation on a gigantic scale” 
(Partido dos Trabalhadores 2004:346). 
Influenced by these ideas, the defenders of a social counter-hegemonic strategy, knowing like 
everyone else that the PT would not easily achieve a majority in Congress, calculated that 
popular pressure would be able to modify the balance of forces and help to pass progressive 
reforms. This strategy was spelt out by the Twelfth National Conference in the following 
way:  
[O]nce we succeed in the first and the second round [of the presidential election in 2002] 
we will need to build a wide social and political base capable of putting into practice the 
programme of transformations defended in the elections. We have to guarantee both 
governability and the fulfilment of our programme (…) Our programmatic objectives can 
only be fulfilled with an intense mobilisation of society. The articulation between popular 
struggles and the institutions is decisive in this new historical period” (Partido dos 
Trabalhadores 2004:588-9).  
The position that the party officially adopted in its 2002 conference was not well received by 
Lula’s entourage. In particular, campaign strategists rejected the recurrent language of 
“ruptures”, used in the document, and which they regarded as “associated with revolutionary 
or violent change” (Garcia 10/04/09). In the opinion of a Lula advisor, the PT resolution did 
not address “the crucial issues that were at stake in the 2002 election” and it “blocked the 
relationship with the middle classes and the business sector” (Ant 06/07/09).135 The defenders 
of the elite-centred perspective emphasised alliances and negotiations with both the economic 
status quo and a broader range of political parties. The Minister for Social Development, 
Patrus Ananias, pointed out: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 An anonymous interviewee said that Lula was personally disturbed when he read this document and was 
convinced that its message was not a platform on which he could win the election. 
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You cannot rule a country alone. You need to establish a dialogue and negotiations. In 
the past, great [left-wing government] experiences failed because they lacked such 
understanding: it happened in Chile with Salvador Allende136 and it also happened here 
in Brazil with Jõao Goulart. The government that wants to generate transformation must 
search for allies. The political and economic forces surrounding us do exist. We did not 
win a revolution… but even when you do, you always have to negotiate unless you 
want to exterminate anyone who thinks differently… (Ananias 16/07/09). 
Lula’s electoral manifesto in 2002 emphasised the need to negotiate the main reforms and 
policies it contemplated with a wide range of groups and actors. This approach characterised 
his campaign from the start. Political strategists presented Lula as an “aggregator” of multiple 
interests and as the “great negotiator” that the country needed in order to seat every relevant 
actor around a negotiation table (Miguel 2006:133). Lula approached the business sector in a 
way he had not done before, and reassured its representatives that their fundamental interests 
would not be at risk. For the first time in a PT national campaign, the party incorporated in its 
electoral coalition a centre-right political organisation, the Liberal Party (PL), and appointed 
its main leader, José Alencar, a businessman from the textile sector, as candidate to the Vice 
Presidency.137 The general strategy proved electorally effective. Scholars have argued that 
key to Lula’s triumph was not only the result of the professionalisation of his communication 
strategy, and the way in which his “unpalatable aggressive image” was replaced by a 
“conciliatory and docile” one (see also Hunter 2010:136-40; Miguel 2006:132; Samuels 
2004:1000), but also a result of his capacity to gather support among prominent members of 
the traditional elite and the business class that endorsed his candidacy (Hunter 2010:138-9; 
Miguel 2006; Panizza 2004:467).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Allende lacked a majority in Congress and failed to form a coalition with the Christian Democrats despite the 
fact that he was elected with their votes in the Electoral College. In 1970 Allende’s Unidad Popular only 
received 36 percent in the ballots. 
137 According to Ribeiro (2008:117), many of the PT members in the PT National Directorate were reluctant to 
appoint Alencar. However, Lula exerted enormous pressure, even threatening to withdraw his own candidacy.   
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Despite the importance of these elements, I argue that the transformation of Lula’s discourse 
during the campaign was not only part of an electoral strategy. It also anticipated a 
governability strategy. The clearest signal of that strategy was the “Letter to the Brazilian 
People” (Partido dos Trabalhadores 2004:1421-31), drafted by a small group of leaders 
within Lula’s entourage and published in June 2002.138 In this document Lula made a clear 
departure from the positions adopted by the PT in central office, clearly influenced by the 
supporters of a counter-hegemonic strategy. In the context of a delicate economic situation, 
which I explore in more detail in the next chapter, Lula used this letter to generate trust and 
avoid a crisis that would jeopardise his future government. By doing so, he reassured the 
financial sector that their fundamental interests would not be at risk.  
In retrospect, the letter can be read as a manifesto for governability, but as one constructed 
through agreements among strategic actors.  From the very first line, the document not only 
spoke about the need to “pacify” the country and promote “stability”, but also highlighted the 
interests of promoting changes based on alliances and negotiations (Partido dos 
Trabalhadores 2004:1428-31). Interestingly, the letter failed to mention what the role of civil 
society would be in the future Lula administration. Instead, attention was largely put on the 
economy. Not everyone in the PT field, however, understood the implications of the letter. 
Many social leaders at the time considered that it was simply an electoral move. Only later 
did they perceive that both its content and its spirit were there to be followed.  
5.2 The second stage: Leaving counter- mobilisation aside  
It was not entirely clear what type of governability strategy Lula intended to put in place 
when he assumed the Presidency in January 2003. The uncertainty persisted because the 2002 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Contrary to the participatory and democratic tradition of the PT, in which everything was always discussed 
until consensus was reached, it is revealing that the discussion of the “Letter to the Brazilian People” only took 
place within Lula’s inner circle and became a fait acompli shortly afterwards. One of the most visible leaders of 
the faction Socialist Democracy stated: “The letter was imposed on the party. Despite the fact that it was 
accepted by the National Directorate, it was presented in public by Lula one week before. When we received it 
we were told that we had to approve it because it had already been presented to the public” (Soriano, 31/10/08). 
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election gave Lula a massive number of votes, revealing him to be a highly popular leader, 
but it left the PT in a very weak position in Congress. In the second round of the 2002 
presidential election, the former metalworker received 53 million votes (61 percent of the 
total),139 the highest record in a Brazilian presidential election. The position of the PT, 
however, was weak in both legislative chambers: it had 17.7 percent of the seats in the Lower 
House and 17.3 percent in the Senate. The party in government had to relate to a chamber of 
513 congressional representatives, in which only 91 were petistas, and a Senate of 81 
members where it only held 14 seats. With the parties that officially supported Lula during 
the first and second rounds of the presidential campaign140 the PT had 42.7 percent of the 
votes in the Lower Chamber and 37 percent in the Senate (Couto and Baia 2006:10), an 
insufficient majority to pass legislation. Centre-right and right-wing parties controlled at least 
328 seats. The strongest parties represented in the Lower House of Congress after the PT 
were the main three parties that supported the Cardoso administration – the Liberal Front 
Party (PFL), the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) and the Party of the Brazilian 
Democratic Movement (PMDB) (Pereira, Power, and Raile 2011:44-5). 
This balance of forces made a number of party and social leaders believe that a counter- 
mobilisation strategy could eventually be put in place, at least in order to promote certain 
reforms.  The idea was not to avoid negotiating with other parties in Congress, but to build 
social support in order to negotiate with these parties from a position of strength. Members of 
the party Left were the most enthusiastic supporters of such a strategy, but even some leaders 
within Lula’s entourage sympathised with the idea.141 Social leaders in particular wanted to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Already in the first round, Lula obtained 46.52 percent of the vote, well above his closest rival, José Serra, 
who received 23.27 percent of the votes.  
140 These parties were the Workers´ Democratic Party (PDT), the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB), the Liberal 
Party (PL), the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), the Popular Socialist Party (PPS), the Brazilian Communist 
Party (PC do B), the Green Party (PV) and the National Mobilisation Party (PMN). 
141 Some leaders in Lula’s group supported a strategy of this type. Shortly after winning the first round of the 
2002 presidential election, for instance, when it was evident that the PT would be in a marginal position in 
Congress, Frei Betto, a close friend of Lula and later his advisor in the Presidency, wrote: “If Lula is actually 
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see Lula and the PT “putting social movements in the streets” in order to encourage 
legislative reforms according to common interests (Gonzales 11/11/08; Rangel 08/04/09; 
Rodrigues 12/12/08; Santos 07/05/09). Some of them favoured using the charisma and 
popularity of the President to instigate “citizens’ mass mobilisation in public campaigns”.  
In the party Left, leaders were particularly convinced that counter-mobilisation was a 
precondition to promote a progressive government. Walter Pomar, one of the most visible 
figures of the faction Left Articulation (AE), defends this strategy on the grounds that “it is 
impossible to generate transformation only by institutional means. An external pressure and a 
certain subversive strategy are necessary”. In his view, “the PT has to respect institutions, but 
it also has to oppose them. If we only ‘respect them’, as some claim, there will be no 
transformation” (Pomar 08/04/09). Another member of Left Articulation who requested 
anonymity made a similar point, but in a metaphorical way: “Lula should put pressure on 
Congress and then negotiate. We have to smash the windows of Parliament. When legislators 
have pressure upon them they get scared and vote”.  
The most influential party leaders in public office, however, even rejected social leaders 
when they suggested their use in one way or another. Two members of the National 
Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG) confided that in private meetings with PT 
congressional representatives they were systematically turned down whenever they offered to 
engage in mobilisation strategies to promote common agendas. This occurred, for instance, 
when they visited the speaker of the Lower House, Deputado Arnildo Chinaglia, and 
suggested demonstrating outside Congress to support a reform of the rural pension system. 
The activists were said to be disillusioned when Chinaglia apparently told them: “There is no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
elected [in the second round] the conditions for governability will only be possible with a permanent 
mobilisation of society” (Betto 2007:29). These observations were written in Frei Betto’s personal diary, which 
was eventually published as a book after he left the government, disillusioned. 
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point in going and shouting outside Congress. That does not solve anything. If you think that 
is going to alter the votes you are simply deluded” (Borba and Cleia 03/04/08). 
During the interviews conducted for this study I found that counter-mobilisation or 
mobilisation for reform was only supported in strong terms by leaders in the party Left and 
social activists in the PT field. These leaders considered that putting pressure on parliament is 
a legitimate and desirable alternative. 80 percent of my interviewees in Left Articulation (AE) 
and 72 percent in “Message to the Party” (MP) endorsed this strategy.  However, only 23 
percent of the interviewees within Lula’s faction, “Building a New Brazil”, supported this 
approach.142 Within this faction, a number of leaders consider that the role of the PT is no 
longer to promote mobilisation, but mainly to act in institutional settings within the political 
system. For them, the centre of political action is in government, and no longer in the 
streets.143  
I found that the main detractors of a counter-mobilisation strategy were inside the “hard 
nucleus” of the party in government. The first and most important reason for its scepticism – 
and most probably the main reason why this strategy was not implemented – was a fear of 
political and social instability. Many leaders were afraid that confronting formal 
representative institutions could have resulted in a takeover or a coup promoted by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 These answers were obtained after asking 92 party members in different factions if mobilisation could be 
used to put pressure on the legislative branch (see Appendix III for further details). 
143 This was clear in an interview with the PT National Secretary for Mobilisation and a member of Lula’s 
faction, Marinete Merss, with the statutory responsibility of promoting mobilisation campaigns. During our 
conversation I asked why the PT Executive Commission failed to promote mobilisation during the Lula years. 
She answered: “When we arrived in government we assumed the agenda of many social movements because we 
were many of those movements or we were inserted within them (…) Today we are in the position to make 
public policies (…) Our role in society is not just to mobilise, it is to govern Brazil (…) I do not feel any 
nostalgia for the old PT. I think being in government is wonderful. It is by implementing public policies that you 
can change people’s lives. The party exists to achieve power. Our route is institutional (…) We made the PT and 
disputed elections to win and to conduct a democratic and popular government. This is what we are doing. I do 
not feel nostalgia for my time as a trade union leader when I had to struggle for 57 days because the government 
simply would not receive us” (Merss 10/12/08). 
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conservative sectors (Cury 02/12/08; Dirceu 07/01/09; Pereira 04/04/09).144 Alberto Cury 
(02/12/08), a government official responsible for the liaison between the presidential office 
and civil society organisations, observed: “We did not want to install a government of crisis, 
because the conservative sectors would have immediately acted against us. The power of the 
Right in this country is immense”. Cury emphasises that the PT opted to “avoid a government 
of confrontation”, and instead create one of “negotiation and compromise among different 
sectors for the sake of a national development project”.145 The PT Left did not observe the 
risks that those in the “hard nucleus” did. For the leftist leaders, counter-mobilisation was not 
attempted because Lula was “scared of seeing the people in the streets” (Hipólito 03/05/09). 
The same characterisation of Lula’s “aversion to conflict”, made by Perry Anderson (2011:7) 
in a recent article, is considered by leaders in the party Left as the reason why such a strategy 
was not used, and for Pomar (08/04/08), the president was “an extremely conservative and 
cautious guy” who “did not want any risk”.  
In the view of the “hard nucleus” of the party in government, however, previous Latin 
American experiences suggested that instigating mobilisation can be a risky bet. Party leaders 
argue that Lula was different from Chávez or Morales, who tried to mobilise their social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Once again, the Allende experience, in which social polarisation eventually resulted in a military coup, is 
vivid in this regard. In his Weavers of Revolution, Peter Winn contends that a “revolution from below”, which 
escaped from the control of the Allende administrations, not only undermined his attempts to make alliances, 
but also turned the political centre against him, intensifying class conflict and political polarisation. According 
to this author, it was precisely this “revolution from below” and the decisions that the Allende administration 
took as a result, what led many representatives of the elites to think that only a military government could 
reverse the radical steps taken and secure their own interests (Winn 1986:227-35). 
145 Some in Lula’s inner circle and his faction in the party also justified their opposition to a strategy of counter 
mobilisation for reasons of principle. For many, putting pressure on parliament would be incompatible with the 
rules and spirit of formal representative democracy. José López Feijóo, a trade union leader from the 
metalworkers’ sector with a strong relationship with Lula, went as far as indicating that “Brazil would be close to 
a dictatorship if we pretended to subordinate the legislative or judiciary branches by strengthening the Executive 
vis-á-vis the Legislative through mass mobilisation” (Feijóo 16/12/09). Clara Ant, Lula’s deputy chief of Staff 
explained that such an option “would lead us to destroy everything we have done to consolidate Brazilian 
democracy” (Ant 26/11/08). 
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bases so as to put pressure on strategic actors and formal representative institutions.146 Unlike 
some members of the party Left or social activists who explicitly expressed sympathy for the 
strategies of these governments (Santos 07/05/09; Pretto 02/12/08; Rodrigues 12/12/08), the 
defenders of an elite-centred perspective, not all of them within Lula’s inner circle, regarded 
them with strong suspicion. One of these defenders was Rui Falcão, leader of one of the most 
influential factions in the city of São Paulo, who acknowledged that mobilisation can play a 
role “in times of rupture, or during periods of political, social and economic crisis”. However, 
he warned that this could be problematic because “neither Evo nor Chávez are free from 
eventual coups d'état attempts” (Falcão 11/12/08).147  
There is another reason why counter-hegemonic mobilisation might have not been attempted: 
many social leaders were dubious about the strength of civil society organisations in Brazil to 
support it in practical terms. Even some members of Lula’s inner circle (who argued during 
the interviews that they were not opposed in principle to a strategy of this type) considered 
that Brazilian “social movements” lack sufficient “strength” to put pressure on the legislative 
branch (Carvalho, 10/04/09; García, 10/04/09).148 In the Centre-Left of the party, José 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 The Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), for instance, which lacked a majority in the Senate when Morales 
was first elected in 2005, combined the use of institutional channels and street demonstrations to approve 
several laws, such as the extension of agrarian reform; a pension that senior citizens receive monthly from the 
revenue from hydrocarbons or the referendums related to the approval of a Constitution project (Córdova 
2011:165; Larson et al. 2008:5).  
147 Members of Lula’s entourage observed that in countries such as Bolivia and Venezuela the opposition does 
not always respect formal institutions and also engages in mobilisations strategies. In their view, this is not 
necessarily the case of the “the factual power” of the Brazilian establishment, which is more prone to respect the 
rules of representative democracy and act within institutional mechanisms (Ant 26/11/08, 03/12/08; Dirceu 
07/01/09). For these reasons Dirceu argues that “Brazil is not a country in which a problem of governability can 
be solved through popular pressure” (Dirceu 07/01/09). 
148 Lula’s Chief of Staff, Gilberto Carvalho, known for his proximity to many of these organisations, made the 
following point: “I am not sure whether the type of mobilisations that we have achieved in Brazil would be 
sufficient to support and put pressures on Congress (…) [as] in a structured representative democracy like ours it 
is not reasonable to expect that the people will remain permanently mobilised on the streets (...). There are no 
social organisations capable of constantly coming to Brasilia to put pressure on Congress. Those episodes only 
take place in specific historical moments. It would be idealistic to expect the opposite” (Carvalho 10/04/09). 
Marco Aurélio García, one of the most important party intellectuals within Lula’s faction, and his special 
advisor, argued: “I think there is a wrong assessment about the state of social movements in Brazil. The 
movements in 2002 were very different from what we had in the 1980s. Ten years of neo-liberalism had an 
extremely demoralising effect upon them. Therefore, we should not expect these organisations to have a 
potential that they do not have, nor that their actions could have an impact capable of generating changes in the 
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Eduardo Martins Cardozo, PT General-Secretary during the Lula years and member of 
“Message to the Party”, argues that it would be “naïve” to expect to be able to construct 
governability with civil society organisations. Cardozo, who was Home Affairs Secretary 
under Erundina, recalls that such a strategy was attempted during that administration, but 
failed. In order to be successful, he argues, “social movements should have “an influence” 
that they “do not have in reality” (Martins 04/12/08). Even in the party Left, some leaders 
acknowledge that civil society organisations could not easily alter the balance of forces in 
parliament (Lopes 13/12/08; Rodrigues 13/11/08). A congressional representative from Left 
Articulation, Iriny Lopes, argues that “social movements are not hegemonic in our society 
and do not articulate properly even among themselves”. In her view, these organisations are 
not at their peak” and would not mobilise to sustain a country of the size of Brazil” (Lopes 
13/12/08).  
These views suggest that, regardless of the fears of political and social stability, the odds of 
putting in place a successful counter-mobilisation strategy were limited. At least a strategy of 
this type could not rely exclusively on the potential of the PT social base to promote mass 
mobilisation in the form of street protests or large demonstrations. Strategies of disruptive 
action, as Chapter 3 explains, were largely left aside during the post-democratic transition 
years and could not easily be readopted. However, the PT at the sub-national level had 
developed other types of counter-hegemonic governability strategies that my interviewees 
failed to mention, such as the promotion of broad-based participatory mechanisms. In some 
cases these initiatives proved useful for circumventing or neutralising legislative opposition 
and building an alternative democratic legitimacy. In the next chapter I will analyse the 
characteristics of Lula’s participatory agenda and why it did not serve to achieve similar 
objectives.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Brazilian political system. I would like to affirm the opposite, but unfortunately it is not possible” (García 
10/04/09).  
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5.2.2 Using a hybrid strategy to deal with the Brazilian political system 
Scholars explain that in the highly fragmented multiparty system (in which the election of 
Congress is made from an open list and on a proportional basis) it is almost impossible for 
any president to achieve a legislative majority (Amorim 1994; Figueiredo and Limongi 2001; 
Power 2009:26). They note that in order to pass reforms, presidents are forced to form large 
coalitions and engage in a permanent bargaining process with other political forces. Under 
the Brazilian political system of “coalition presidentialism”, executives are only capable of 
passing legislation by forming large coalitions, similarly to European prime ministers in 
multiparty systems. Amorim (1994:18), for example, suggests that the institutional 
characteristics of the Brazilian system are so decisive in orientating the formation of cabinets 
that any executive reluctant to negotiate ministerial jobs with other political parties might 
face serious difficulties, not only to pass legislation, but also to defend itself from eventual 
parliamentary investigations.  
One of the problems of “coalition presidentialism” that other scholars have noticed is that the 
formation of multi-partisan cabinets in Brazil is “an insufficient strategy to guarantee 
legislative success” (Power 2009:27). Because the system is characterised by numerous 
“weakly disciplined parties” (Ames 2000:160), patronage-based agreements between national 
party organisations are not always enough to secure the votes of all their members in 
Congress. Brazilian presidents also need to engage in pork-barrelling strategies to secure 
support among their allies in Congress (Pereira, Power, and Raile 2011:38). Because in Brazil 
the executive has discretionary authority to choose which individual amendments introduced 
by legislators in the annual budget will eventually be executed and disbursed by the 
government (Alston and Mueller 2006:90; Pereira, Power, and Raile 2011:37-9), the release 
of budgetary resources is used as “political currency” in exchange for votes (Alston and 
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Mueller 2006:87). In sum, both the distribution of jobs and the use of pork are important 
elements of what Raile, Pereira, and Power (2010) define as the “executive toolbox”. 
The paradoxes of the Brazilian political system were there from the beginning of the 
democratic transition, when the military authorities sought to create a fragmented multi-party 
system in order to divide the opposition, as mentioned in Chapter 2. When the PT assumed 
national executive public office, however, party leaders experienced the constraints of this 
system as never before, particularly because the conditions to secure governability are far 
more complex at the national level. In the national executive the PT had to deal not only with 
more political parties, but also with powerful actors such as state governors, who are very 
influential in Brazilian politics. When Lula assumed the Presidency in 2003, the PT only 
elected four out of 26 state governors. These actors play an important political role in national 
politics. Authors have noticed, for instance, that it is vital for Brazilian presidents to 
accommodate the interests of governors when they deal with the National Congress, 
particularly because the governors shape the behaviour of congressional representatives, who 
depend on them for electoral purposes (see among others Avelar and Cintra 2007:74; 
Cheibub, Figueiredo et al. 2009; Samuels 2000).  
In dealing with its minority status in the legislative branch, as a number of scholars have 
argued, the PT failed in its first few years to perform adequately under the most common 
practices of the Brazilian system of “coalition presidentialism” (Amorim 2007; Couto and 
Baia 2006; Pereira, Power, and Raile 2011; Raile, Pereira, and Power 2010). As Pereira, 
Power, and Raile (2011:47) explain, rather than applying the “executive toolbox”, the Lula 
administration created a vote-buying mechanism by which the PT sought to pass key 
legislation. This vote-buying mechanism is what eventually resulted in a corruption scandal 
called the mensalão (big monthly payment). The mensalão was not a traditional corruption 
mechanism used by government officials for personal enrichment. It was a mechanism by 
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which the PT administration sought to secure legislative support in order to pass key 
legislation in Congress.  
Studies show that the political crisis generated by this scandal was the consequence of the 
initial arrangements, when Lula failed to give cabinet posts to allies and to distribute 
sufficient pork-barrel among them (despite the fact that his party was in a minority position in 
Congress) (Amorim 2007; Pereira, Power, and Raile 2011; Power 2009).149 Instead of 
negotiating a cabinet with the political elites represented in Congress, as previous Brazilian 
presidents had done, Lula initially appointed 16 out of 29 ministers from the PT (55 percent 
of all the seats) and eight non-partisan members (28 percent), which did not help to secure 
congressional support.150  
The PT had long considered that legislative alliances should be based on policy and 
programmes rather than on the non-transparent exchange of particularistic favours 
traditionally used in Brazilian politics, such as pork-barrelling. However, the party faced a 
difficult dilemma in 2003. In contrast to various sub-national executive experiences, in which 
alliances with left and centrist parties had allowed it to pass legislation, the PT at the national 
level had to widen the scope of its alliances much further, in great part because the centre of 
the political spectrum was occupied by the PSDB. The formation of alliances was a divisive 
issue within the party. On the one hand, many sectors in the party bureaucracy, especially the 
party Left, resisted allying with forces that could compromise their agenda or alienate their 
social base. On the other hand, the party in government knew that without sufficient allies in 
Congress its hands would be severely tied and little could be done. In this context, they 
considered two main options to secure parliamentary support: either to make an alliance with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Pereira, Power and Raille (2010:48) found that, during its first year in office, when the government had to 
pass important reforms, about 89 percent of the pork disbursed in 2003 went to non-coalition parties, with about 
34 percent of the total going to parties in the opposition governed by PSDB or PFL. 
150 The latter, despite being useful for accommodating some dominant strategic actors such as the business 
sector, did not help to directly secure congressional support (Couto and Baia 2006:12). 
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one of the largest parties represented in Congress or to make ad hoc alliances with small 
parties.  
Because old rivalries between the PT and the PSDB (in the presidency between 1995 and 
2002) made an alliance between these two parties unthinkable,151 the first option left only the 
PMDB, the second largest party represented in the lower chamber, as a potential ally. Such an 
alternative could have given the government a stable and more or less reliable parliamentary 
base of support, but it also meant putting the PT in a weaker position in the state apparatus. 
According to Couto and Baia (2006:33), many petistas believed that by making an alliance 
with weaker parties the PT could “preserve the hegemonic position in government”. 
Furthermore, Lula could not offer sufficient jobs to PMDB members or to other parties 
because he faced pressure to accommodate PT leaders from the main factions and from his 
own intra-party group (Couto and Baia 2006; Pereira, Power, and Raile 2011:45-6).  
Accommodating PT factions in government, I contend, was important because the Lula 
government did not want to repeat the “paralysing conflicts” between the party in public 
office and the party in central office which characterised many of the PT sub-national 
governments (Dirceu 07/01/09).  José Dirceu, Chief of the Civil House152 (2003-2005) and 
one of the most influential figures in government, explained during our interview that the 
relationship with the party and its different factions was regarded as one of the main elements 
needed to secure governability.153 By distributing jobs among their main leaders, PT 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 These rivalries largely stemmed from the personal animosity between Cardoso and Lula (anonymous source), 
but also because these two parties had their main electoral bases in the state of São Paulo. I gathered testimonies 
from Dirceu and Cardoso in this regard. According to Dirceu (07/01/09), “different world views and visions 
about the role of the state” have made an alliance between these two parties unviable. Cardoso (07/04/10) gave 
another answer: “Essentially, it has been a question of power: who has control. Ideological differences are only 
a justification. When Lula won the presidency in 2001 I was expecting a more flexible attitude towards us. 
However, his party and Lula himself decided that we were the electoral enemy”. 
152 The Chief of the Civil House of the Presidency is the equivalent to a Home Office Minister for all the 
domestic functions of the national government to which other ministers in government report. 
153 When I asked Dirceu how governability was understood within the “hard nucleus” of the party in 
government, he considered five main elements: Firstly, that it was necessary to avoid “paralysing conflicts” 
between the party in office and the party bureaucracy which damaged the party at the municipal and state levels. 
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administrations had found an effective formula to avoid factional disputes and appease 
potential sources of opposition (see Chapter 4). Guaranteeing the support of PT factions was 
important to prevent opposition to Lula’s economic policy, as Pereira, Power, and Raile 
(2010:42) observed.  Lula was aware that the party Left opposed the strategy by which he 
was seeking to accommodate the interests of dominant strategic actors, particularly the 
business and financial sectors, which was key to securing economic governability.  
In the first year in office, Dirceu and other leaders tried to form a legislative coalition with 
the PMDB, but Lula ruled that option out, according to press reports (Folha de S. Paulo 
22/12/09). Observers have suggested that his rejection was for ideological reasons. That is, 
because forming an alliance with the main party tolerated under the dictatorship, and a key 
ally of the Cardoso administration, was not easy to justify to PT supporters (Couto and Baia 
2006:12). Furthermore, the PMDB is a political organisation known for its opportunism, its 
clientelistic practices and the corruptness of its leaders. The reasons, however, were not 
merely ideological. After all, Lula formed specific alliances with eight smaller parties in his 
first years in office, in which he included three conservative and opportunistic forces whose 
reputations are possibly no better than that of the PMDB, namely the Popular Party (PP), the 
Brazilian Republican Party (PRB) and the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB).154 The problem was 
that the support of these organisations was not sufficient for constitutional amendments to be 
passed. The government coalition was only able to achieve 318 votes in the Lower Chamber 
(around 60 percent of the house), and not a majority in the Senate (Pereira, Power, and Raile 
2011:47). To make matters more complicated, these parties did not receive cabinet positions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Secondly, it was assumed that the formation of legislative alliances was inevitable in order to pass bills in 
Congress that were of interest to the executive, given the fact that the PT lacked a majority in Congress. Thirdly, 
it was important to secure the support of the PT social base, mainly as part of a social governability strategy. 
Fourthly, as part of the wide range of interests that the party needed to accommodate, the business sector was 
particularly important. Lastly, the macro-economic stability had to be maintained (see main epigraph). 
154 The other parties in the coalition were the PSB, PDT, PPS, PCdoB and PV. 
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Short of votes, the government decided to buy them among a group of congressional 
representatives.  
The mensalão scandal was eventually revealed in June 2005, when Roberto Jefferson, 
chairman of the PTB, accused the PT treasurer, Delúbio Soares, who was associated with 
José Dirceu, of paying a monthly bribe of R$ 30,000 (US$ 13,000) to several 
parliamentarians. When opposition parties proposed Lula’s impeachment, it became crystal 
clear that the governability strategy which the PT administration had initially put in place had 
failed. 
5.2.3 The 2005 political crisis: instigating a defensive mobilisation 
Although the “hard nucleus” of the party in government ruled out a proactive form of 
mobilisation, it did deploy a strategy of defensive mobilisation when the opposition 
threatened to impeach Lula in 2005, similar to what occurred when Erundina faced the same 
threat in 1991, as I mentioned in the previous chapter. The defenders of an elite-centred 
strategy, who were initially reluctant to use mobilisation to put pressure on parliament, 
decided to encourage a defensive strategy at a critical point in time, when they considered 
that it could contribute to the survival of the PT in government. Studies on governability 
during the Lula administration have neglected the fact that, at this specific moment of Lula’s 
presidency, the social allies in the PT field played an important role in putting pressure on 
strategic actors in the legislative branch. For a number of reasons the impeachment did not 
take place; one of them was the mobilisation that the party instigated against its promoters.  
In 2005, in the middle of the political crisis generated by the mensalão scandal, the political 
climate in Congress became increasingly polarised. On one occasion, for instance, the 
president of the PFL, Jorge Bornhausen, declared in a meeting with businessmen that he was 
happy that these scandals had erupted because “we are going to get rid of the PT race for at 
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least 30 years” (Folha de S. Paulo 28/09/06). When the possibility of impeachment appeared 
on the horizon, Lula immediately presented it as an attempt by the Brazilian elites to 
overthrow his government and went to seek support from his social base (Folha de S. Paulo 
07/08/05, 17/08/05). In late June, more than 40 organisations, including the national leaders 
of CUT, MST, the National Student’s Organisation (UNE), the Brazilian Association of 
NGOs (ABONG), gender and black movements, among others, published a statement in 
which they accused Brazilian elites and the mass media of “launching a campaign to 
demoralise both the government and the president in order to undermine his administration or 
to overthrow him” (Coordenação dos Movimentos Sociais 2006:57).  However, in spite of the 
fact that they urged an investigation of the scandals and criticised certain policies of the Lula 
administration, especially its economic policy, the signatories expressed an emphatic position 
against “any attempt to destabilise the government” (Coordenação dos Movimentos Sociais 
2006:58).  
In the following months, many organisations issued their own public statements and 
organised protests. According to press sources, such protests never reached more than 10,000 
participants (Folha de S. Paulo 26/08/05). However, trade union leaders threatened larger 
street demonstrations and massive strikes. José Antonio Lópes Feijóo, President of the ABC 
Metalworkers’ Trade Union, echoed the president in asserting that the impeachment was “an 
attempt by the elites to attack the social conquests of the workers”, while Jõao Felício, from 
CUT, made an unprecedented threat: “If they want to go for impeachment, the country will 
become uncontrollable” (Folha de S. Paulo 12/11/05). The positions against the 
impeachment were clearly dominant among civil society organisations, even beyond those in 
the PT field. The Folha de São Paulo (14/08/05) interviewed 57 leaders of civil society and 
found that only 13 of them were in favour. 
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Eventually, leaders from seven different parties concluded that the necessary “political 
environment” to initiate an impeachment investigation did not exist, while conservative 
senators declared that it could generate “social instability” as well as its promoters being 
accused of “attempting a coup” (Folha de S. Paulo 16/08/05). Opposition leaders from the 
PFL and PSDB also expressed concerns about the potential consequences of impeaching a 
highly popular president (Folha de S. Paulo 22/07/05).155 The impression of high government 
officials interviewed for this study was that because Lula had “most of the social movements 
on his side”, the leaders of the opposition were fearful of their reactions (Dirceu 07/01/08; 
Dulci 10/12/08). A similar view is shared by representatives of civil society (De Oliveira 
07/04/09; Moroni 03/07/09). José Antonio Moroni, one of the national coordinators of the 
Brazilian Association of NGO’s (ABONG), put it bluntly: “Lula just needed to snap his 
fingers for the people to go out and defend him on the streets” (Moroni 03/07/09). 
It is difficult to determine how important PT social allies were in halting Lula’s 
impeachment. The political, economic and social dimensions of governability do not exist 
separately from each other, as I argue in Chapter 1. Other factors played a role in alleviating 
political tensions and solving the crisis. The fact that the opposition was supportive of Lula’s 
economic policy was also important. By the time the political crisis erupted, the government 
had gained the confidence of the financial sector, which was not particularly interested in 
impeaching the president. On the political side, the opposition parties that promoted the 
impeachment needed the support of at least two-thirds of the Lower House for their petition 
to be accepted, which was not easy to achieve.156 Eventually, the mensalão crisis was solved 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Taso Jeraissati, president of the PSDB, acknowledged later during an interview that despite the fact that they 
knew that legal grounds for an impeachment did exist, the opposition desisted because of the strong popular 
support for Lula (Veja 16/11/05). 
156 Opposition parties considered that they had a good chance of winning the 2006 presidential election, 
calculating that the magnitude of the scandal would severely damage Lula’s image and his attempt to be re-
elected. 
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in institutional settings and through negotiations between parties (Folha de S. Paulo 
03/11/05).  
In April 2006, when a special joint congressional committee presented its final report, Lula 
was released from direct responsibility. However, the committee clarified that 18 Lower 
House representatives had received illegal payments through a bribery scheme and several 
high-ranking government officials and members of the party in central office were accused of 
operating the scheme (Pereira, Power, and Raile 2011:33-5).  
The role that civil society organisations in the PT field played during the crisis shows two 
main things: first, that although the defenders of an elite-centred strategy were reluctant to 
use a proactive mobilisation for reform, they did regard defensive mobilisation as a viable 
strategy. Second, civil society organisations might have not been strong enough, or might 
have been incapable or even unwilling to put pressure on Congress in order to pass 
progressive reforms. However, PT social allies were determined to defend the field. This 
provides additional evidence that the PT and its social base are much closer than most 
observers have argued.157 An activist of the Housing Movement put it in the clearest terms: 
“We could not allow the Right to destroy the dream of an entire generation” (De Oliveira 
07/04/09). 
 
 
 
 
5.3 The third stage: Brazilian politics as usual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157  See Chapters 3, 8 and 9 to find more on party-civil society relationships.  
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The PT adopted an elite-centred strategy similar to other Brazilian parties as a direct 
consequence of the mensalão. In this final section I will show that the 2005 political crisis not 
only had an immediate effect on the “hard nucleus” of the party in government, but also on 
the party in central office, including leaders of the party Left. Lula and his inner circle 
understood that it was important to form a solid majority in Congress, based on stronger 
alliances with large parties. In order to secure that support, therefore, they decided to 
incorporate the same strategies by which previous Brazilian presidents had gathered 
congressional support, that is, by allocating more cabinet seats and other jobs in the 
administrative apparatus and by increasing the use of discretionary budgetary powers. Lula’s 
Chief of Staff, Gilberto Carvalho (10/04/09), explained that by sharing power with large 
parties, the government could avoid being constantly blackmailed by small parties and could 
therefore build a more stable alliance.  
In his second government, Lula appointed several ministers from other parties, but 
particularly from the PMDB, which became one of his most important political allies.158 The 
president also made more use of pork, which increased in an unprecedented fashion. To give 
a simple indicator: when the PT took public office in 2003, every congressional 
representative was entitled to introduce amendments to the budget for up to 2 million Reals 
(US$ 583,090 at the time). The values of these amendments increased significantly after the 
political crisis, growing from R$ 3.5 million (US$1.3 million) in 2005 to R$ 12 million (US$ 
7 million) by 2010. During the Cardoso years, in contrast, parliamentary amendments never 
reached 2 million Reais per congressional representative (Jornal do Senado 04/10/10).  
Lula fully justified his elite-centred strategy and the practices it entailed, during an interview: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 In his second government, Lula only appointed 18 ministers from the PT. The PMDB, which was now the 
first minority in Congress (with 89 representatives), received six cabinet positions: Mines and Energy, Defence, 
Agriculture, Communications, National Integration, and Health. Nine other parties were also brought into the 
government.  
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No-one who wins an election in this country, regardless of whether he is the most 
Shiite159 or the most conservative guy, will be able to form a government outside our 
political reality. Between what you want to do and what you can actually do there is a 
difference as big as the Atlantic Ocean (…).  In the future, anyone who wins the 
Presidency will have to do the same kind of deals [that we do] because that's the way the 
Brazilian political spectrum works (…). If Jesus Christ came down here and Judas had the 
votes he needed, no matter which party they each came from: Jesus would have to call on 
Judas to form a coalition (Folha de S. Paulo 22/10/09). 
The Lula government eventually received the support of a dozen parties and almost two 
thirds of the Lower House.160 The endorsement of key allies such as the PMDB and the PP 
was secured by jobs and monetary resources that its leaders obtained through pork-barrelling. 
However, the fact that some of the parties in the coalition endorsed the economic policy put 
in place by the administration facilitated the alliance with conservative parties (Simões 
04/11/08). The elite-centred strategy proved “efficient”: the Lula administration obtained 
high rates of “legislative success”, achieving 76 percent during their second term in office, a 
record high in the history of the New Republic (Santana and Rodrigues 2009:7-8). The 
government coalition lacked programmatic consistency, however, and did not allow the PT to 
promote its progressive agenda in key areas of Lula’s electoral manifesto that I mentioned in 
Section 1 above.  
In eight years the PT was not able to pass substantive changes to the tax system. On two 
occasions, in April 2003 and March 2008, the administration and the party lost initiatives 
proposing the creation of taxes on inheritances and private donations (Folha de S. Paulo 
30/04/03) and the establishment of a tax on great fortunes (Contribuição Social sobre as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 In the slang of Brazilian politics, someone on the far-left is considered a “Shiite”. 
160 The parties supporting the government were PT, PMDB, PRB, PCdoB, PSB, PP, PR (Party of the 
Republic), PTB, PV, PDT, PAN and PSC (Social Christian Party). The opposition consisted of four parties 
PSDB, DEM (former PFL), PPS and PSOL.  
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Grandes Fortunas) that would have taxed patrimonies progressively.161  In August 2008 the 
administration also failed to negotiate a political reform aimed at reducing the fragmentation 
of the party system, promoting party discipline, limiting the use of private money in 
presidential campaigns and diminishing corrupt practices (Verlaine and Queiroz 18/10/10). 
This reform was frustrated, because at least four PT allies (PTB, PSB, PR and PP) threatened 
to leave the government coalition and blocked all negotiations (Folha de S. Paulo 
25/05/09).162 Pomar (30/09/08), one of the main leaders of Left Articulation, argues that the 
reason why this political reform did not take place was because the PT was “blackmailed” by 
its allies in parliament. He saw this as a paradox, because “these were the same types of 
parties that generated the 2005 political crisis, a crisis that had its origins in the lack of 
political reform”. 
Renato Simões, a member of the PT National Executive Committee, and a representative of 
the PT Left, bitterly complained about the governability strategy put in place by Lula:  
(…) These allies only vote for what is basic for the administration, but they do not 
support more important measures that have more of a social content. What we have is not 
a parliamentary coalition with a programme to which other parties adhere. There is only 
an endorsing by other parties of the functioning of the neoliberal model, rather than a 
political programme on which other parties are always obliged to vote according to the 
government orientation (Simões, 04/11/08). 
In its Third National Congress in 2007, the PT officially acknowledged that the 2005 political 
crisis was a consequence of the party’s failure to prioritise political reform (Partido dos 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 In fact, the government even lost an existing tax collected from operations in the banking system, the 
Provisional Contribution over Financial Movements (CMPF), which was intended for use on social 
programmes, when 16 out of 20 senators from the PMDB voted against the government. This caused a R$ 40 
billion (some US$ 22 billion) budgetary hole in funds that the government had promised to allocate to social 
policies and infrastructure projects (Amorim and Coelho 2008:88). 
162 The governability strategy had other implications for the PT progressive agenda that I analyse in Chapter 9, 
in areas such as land reform. 
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Trabalhadores 2007:28). Members of the party Left argue that the main mistake was “trying 
to govern within the existing rules without changing them” (Rosetto 24/06/09; Pomar 
08/04/09). A similar assessment was made by José Genoino, President of the PT until the 
mensalão scandal, when he was forced to step down: 
One of our first mistakes was to enter the system without changing the way it works. We 
should have promoted a greater change in the [political] system to avoid being almost 
completely swallowed up by that system. We should have promoted an institutional 
reform, altered the forms of representation, and switched [both] the electoral system and 
the party system. That is why we were so affected by the 2005 political crisis (...). 
Nobody became rich within the PT; no-one made a great fortune or became part of the 
dominant class. The PT’s undertakings were part of the procedures embodied in the 
nature of our own political system. We should have changed all those rules from 2003 
and the PT should have put pressure for this to happen early in 2003 (Genoino 08/12/08). 
Many PT leaders, however, regret the consequences of the governability strategy put in place. 
Congressman Fernando Ferro (02/07/09) asserted: “We became hostages of an archaic 
political model that we were unable to change because we were too concerned with stability 
and governability”. In his view, “The pragmatism of governability limited our capacity to 
promote political struggles and generate the necessary social tensions”. Even members of 
Lula’s inner circle were frustrated with the governability strategy that they promoted because 
it led the party to adopt the very same practices that it had criticised from its creation. Lula’s 
Chief of Staff, Gilberto Carvalho, made the following assessment:   
We should be self-critical about the governability strategy that we adopted. Our 
government could not innovate in its relationship with Congress. The physiological 
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relationships163 that characterised previous administrations survived and continued within 
our government. We could not eliminate the very bad practice of “give and take” which is 
so typical of Brazilian politics. This rationale is one by which congressional 
representatives vote for certain projects as long as they have access to specific benefits. 
Most of our allies only gave us support in exchange for something else. It was important 
to open the government up to these parties during the second Lula administration because 
this forced them to commit themselves and vote with us in Congress without becoming 
involved in any undesirable practices. But despite all this, the behaviour of our allies did 
not change completely (Carvalho 10/04/09). 
Despite all these criticisms, the fact is that the elite-centred strategy gained more supporters 
within the party in central office as a result of the governing experience and the 2005 political 
crisis. In its Third National Congress in 2007, the PT officially endorsed an alliance with the 
PMDB, arguing that it was a mistake not to have had one from the start (Partido dos 
Trabalhadores 2007:49,107). From that Congress onwards, the most important factions in the 
party, with the exception of Left Articulation, came to support alliances beyond left-wing 
parties (Amaral 2010b:181). Amaral (2010a: 165-72) found that during the course of a 
decade, PT factions significantly modified their position towards electoral alliances. In 2001, 
two important factions, Socialist Democracy and Left Articulation, as well as two small 
factions, which altogether received 35.4 percent of the party delegates, only supported 
alliances with progressive parties. By 2009, only Left Articulation and three marginal 
factions maintained this position, which represented a mere 13.9 percent of the delegates 
(Amaral 2010a: 165-72). One of the survey studies conducted in 2007 by the party’s main 
think tank, the Fundação Perseu Abramo, found that 61 percent of the party delegates 
endorsed an alliance with the PMDB for the upcoming presidential election in 2010. Ten 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 As Chapter 4 explains, in Brazilian politics, a physiological relationship is one in which politicians support 
government initiatives in exchange for favours, with no programmatic or ideological coherence. 
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years earlier, in 1997, only 15 percent of the delegates had supported such an alternative 
(Amaral 2010c:116-7). These studies show that the governability dilemma has acted as an 
important driver of change in the Brazilian Workers’ Party and suggests that the elite-centred 
perspective, initially weaker within the party in central office, did become stronger as a result 
of the government’s experience and the 2005 political crisis.  
Final remarks 
This chapter has made the case that the governability dilemma affects the performance of 
parties in public office and it is a powerful reason why progressive parties alter their 
strategies and discourses when they occupy the executive. My work has also broadened 
existing debates on political governability in Brazil, by contemplating the role that civil 
society has (or might have) in supporting governability strategies. In the previous pages I 
looked at two types of social counter-hegemonic strategies: mobilisation for reform and 
defensive mobilisation. I argued that the former did not take place under Lula, mainly 
because the most influential leaders in government regarded it as a source of political and 
social instability, but also because many other leaders considered that civil society 
organisations were not strong enough to alter the balance of forces in Congress. Interestingly, 
defensive mobilisation did play a role, as it had in previous PT government experiences. This 
shows that progressive parties can count on an extra institutional base of support that they 
might deploy to counteract the power of dominant strategic actors and secure their survival in 
power.  
During its first two and a half years in office, the PT government resisted using the same 
strategies as previous Brazilian presidents to pass its initiatives in Congress. The hybrid 
strategy that it adopted was, however contradictory and damaging to its own reputation and 
led to a political crisis. It was a hybrid strategy that had the worst of both worlds because it 
sought to accommodate the interests of the political elites, but it deployed corrupt practices as 
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a means for being hegemonic in government (needless to say, a hegemony in which civil 
society played no major role). After the 2005 political crisis, the PT and many of its factions 
called for political reform capable of changing the rules of the game and its constraining 
character. After the mensalão crisis, such a reform could have probably gathered social 
support, at a time in which corruption was a sensitive issue in the public opinion. However, 
no significant steps were taken in such a direction. Rather than engaging actively in the 
promotion of a political reform, Lula and his inner circle decided to act strictly within the 
institutional limits, keep within the unwritten rules of the political system and incorporate the 
practices of other parties. 
The adoption of an elite-centred governability strategy cannot be attributed to the failure of 
counter-mobilisation, however, because such a possibility was never really attempted. Yet in 
Chapter 1 I argued that social mobilisation is not the only way in which a proactive counter-
hegemonic strategy can be put in place. Broad-based participation in institutionalised settings 
is another. In cities such as Porto Alegre, it was the combination of mobilisation within and 
outside the PT field with the promotion of inclusive and robust participatory mechanisms that 
made social counter-hegemonic governability strategies successful. At the national level, the 
party in public office did promote several participatory instruments. These initiatives will be 
analysed in Chapter 7.  
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6. From the “Lula Monster” to an icon of the “responsible Left” 
This chapter examines how Lula’s inner circle and the hard nucleus of the party in 
government approached the relationship with the financial establishment as part of a strategy 
to secure economic governability. Scholars, public intellectuals in Brazil, and even some 
social and political leaders in the PT field, suggest that an ideological shift towards neoliberal 
positions took place during the first Lula administration (see among others Antunes 2006; 
Oliveira 2006b; Paula 2005; Tavaloro and Tavaloro 2007, Stédile 06/09/07; Simões 04/11/08; 
Tavares, Sader et al. 2004)164, or even earlier, during the 2002 presidential campaign 
(Campello 2012, 2008, 2007; Campello and Zucco 2008). In this chapter I contend that rather 
than a switch to neoliberalism (which only took place among certain groups in the PT), the 
continuation of the macro-economic policies implemented by the Cardoso administration was 
mainly a pragmatic response to accommodate the interests of the financial establishment, 
particularly foreign investment banks and holders of Brazilian bonds. These dominant 
strategic actors, with sufficient power to generate capital flight and destabilise the main 
macro-economic variables, were seen by the party in public office – and Lula’s inner circle in 
particular – as essential to secure governability.  
Scholars who examine Lula’s economic policy largely concentrate on economic and financial 
aspects (Amann and Baer 2006; Arestis and Saad Filho 2007; Barbosa 2008; Barbosa and 
Pereira 2010; Filgueiras and Gonçalves 2007; Martínez 2003; Santiso 2006, 2004; Wiesner 
2008), but here I emphasise the political motivations behind the economic policy decisions 
adopted, as part of a strategy to secure governability. Studying economic policy decisions in 
this fashion poses some epistemological challenges. In Chapter 1 I argued that governability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Rather than characterising Lula’s economic policy as “neoliberal”, a number of PT leaders in different 
factions  only associated this term with the monetary policy, which they condemned (among others, Dirceu 
07/01/09; Felício 28/10/08; Frateschi 11/11/08; Merss 10/12/08; Santos 03/07/09; Pomar 08/04/09; Vargas 
02/12/08). By relying on this distinction some of them were probably trying not to criticise the economic policy 
of the Lula administration as a whole, but only the Brazilian Central Bank, which was led by a former President 
of the BankBoston and member of the PSDB, Henrique Mireilles.   
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is often used to justify all sorts of regimes and policies and it is rooted in a conservative 
tradition. In order to avoid this problem I distinguish between governability as an analytical 
tool and governability as a discourse. In economic terms, the analytical dimension of 
governability that I use here seeks to explain the role of “the markets” in a capitalist economy 
and the restrictions that they impose on governments. As an analytical tool, economic 
governability mostly focuses on the way in which a party in government accommodates the 
interests of dominant strategic actors capable of influencing a country’s economic 
performance.  
This is different from the discourses of economic governability. In particular, international 
financial institutions have propagated a discourse in which certain economic policies are 
perceived as key to the “good functioning” of the economy and the state, such as reducing 
public spending to a minimum, privatising public utilities and enterprises or maintaining 
inflation under strict control (Tomassini 1993). In this chapter I will show that some groups 
in Lula’s economic team did defend some of these positions during the first Lula 
administration. However, there is no evidence that such groups were dominant in the PT 
(certainly not among my interviewees) and, in any case, their ideological shift was not the 
main driving force in the adoption of a conservative economic policy.   
The economic policy trajectory under Lula, as with political governability, took place in three 
different stages, which I study in the different sections of this chapter: a first stage during the 
2002 presidential election, in which the PT dealt with the anticipated reactions of the 
financial sector; a second stage during the first three years in power, when the new 
government sought to conquer the confidence of the financial markets, and a third stage 
between late 2005 and the end of the second term, in which the administration relaxed the 
most orthodox aspects of the economic policy initially put in place. In the first stage, during 
the campaign, Lula and his inner circle had their first real contact with a sector with which 
171	  
	  
they had had little or no relationship at the sub-national level and which was sceptical of a 
left-wing government. In the context of a vulnerable macro-economic situation, characterised 
by a high level of public indebtedness, this sector imposed conditions on the PT even before 
it took public office. In the second stage, Lula and his new economic team applied economic 
orthodoxy with greater conservatism than during the Cardoso years and negotiated the 
appointment of key positions in the economic team with representatives of the financial 
establishment. Finally, the third stage took place after the economy had stabilised, which was 
once the Lula government had proved its fiscal discipline credentials, and when the PT in 
public office gained some margins for manoeuvre. While still a strategic actor, the financial 
establishment was no longer playing the role of a “veto player” and the Lula administration 
was able to deal with this actor from a stronger position. The favourable international context 
during this period allowed the government to accumulate significant foreign reserves and 
therefore it became less dependent on the mood of the financial sector.  
6.1 The first stage: anticipating reactions from the financial establishment 
By the time Lula assumed the presidency, fears of a radical government that would directly 
antagonise business interests had been largely dissipated. During the 2002 presidential 
campaign, Lula did not face major opposition in the business world. In fact, he received 
support from various industrialists, and some 500 of its representatives endorsed his 
campaign (Milenio Diario 10/10/02). Even large rural producers in the agro-business 
industry, some of them sceptical of Lula’s historical positions on land reform, supported his 
candidacy.165 A good indicator of the extent to which the PT candidate had approached 
business interests in 2002 is the fact that Lula received massive private donations, which 
allowed him to outspend all other candidates, including his main competitor, José Serra 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 One of them, Antonio Russo, second in the hierarchy of the Brazilian Association of Beef Industry Exports 
announced that the sector would be “surprised by Lula” (Mendes 2004:88). Another representative of agro-
business, José Carlos Burilai, argued that Lula was a candidate capable of bringing “peace to the countryside” 
(Mendes 2004: 89). 
172	  
	  
(PSDB).166 The nomination of José Alencar, a businessman from the textile sector, as the 
vice-presidential candidate was an important message that signalled Lula’s intention to forge 
an alliance with the industrial sector. Many of his alliances with these groups were 
maintained in office, when the new president incorporated outstanding personalities from the 
Brazilian establishment, such as Luiz Fernando Furlan, a representative of the agro-
alimentary sector who became the Minister for Development, Foreign Trade and Industry, 
and Roberto Rodrigues, president of the Brazilian association of Agri-business, who became 
Minister for Agriculture. 
These alliances were partly possible because since the 1994 presidential campaign, Lula had 
made a clear distinction between businessmen who invest in productive activities as opposed 
to those who speculate (Mendes 2004:48-9). Nevertheless, Lula had always assumed a 
critical approach towards the “financial elite”, “the bankers” or the “international 
speculators”, whom he still portrayed in very negative terms in the 1998 presidential 
campaign (Mendes 2004:61). In his fourth attempt to become president, Lula and his inner 
circle adopted a different language as part of their elite-centred approach. However, many of 
the PT historical positions towards dominant strategic actors such as the financial 
establishment were still influential. The resolution that party delegates passed in the Twelfth  
National Conference, held in December 2001, was grounded on the idea that certain 
“ruptures” with the existing order were “necessary” in order to construct a new economic 
model away from neoliberalism (Partido dos Trabalhadores 2004:598). The document was 
openly hostile towards the financial establishment. In one of its passages, for instance, 
delegates warned that “the big rentiers and speculators” would be “directly affected by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 The records of the Superior Electoral Court show that the PT candidate spent nearly R$40 million (US$16 
million) compared to Serra’s R$ 35 million (US$14 million). However, journalists have suggested that Lula 
raised R$ 200 million (US$ 80 million) in off-the-books donations (Attuch 2006:16, in Goldfrank and Wampler 
2008:246).  In the 1994 and 1998 presidential campaigns the PT declared contributions that were almost twenty-
fold smaller than the PSDB (Samuels 2001:31). 
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redistributive policies [of the new government]”, they would “not benefit from the new social 
contract” and would even be “penalised’ (Partido dos Trabalhadores 2004:613, my 
emphasis). Although the PT no longer favoured a debt moratorium (as it had done in previous 
years), the document did establish that the agreements Brazil had made with the IMF needed 
to be “denounced” and the international debt should be “audited” before payment continued 
(Partido dos Trabalhadores 2004:593). The establishment of mechanisms to control capital 
inflows, including a Tobin tax over speculative revenues, was also contemplated (Partido dos 
Trabalhadores 2004:579). 
The previous chapter showed how the elite-centred governability strategy that Lula advanced 
during the campaign departed in several aspects from the counter-hegemonic tradition that 
oriented the positions of the PT at the time. In no other area was Lula’s departure from the PT 
position so evident as in the economy. In his electoral manifesto, and more clearly in his  
“Letter to the Brazilian People”, the candidate made evident his differences with the PT, 
emphasising that his government would not employ capital controls, and would respect 
existing contracts, pay the external debt as planned and maintain important elements of 
Cardoso’s macro-economic policy (Coligação Lula Presidente 2002a:11; Partido dos 
Trabalhadores 2004:1428-31). This switch in Lula’s discourse and strategy was part of an 
anticipated governability strategy. I argue that it took place because Lula’s inner circle 
understood that the relationship with the financial sector was essential for maintaining macro-
economic stability in the context of an economy largely dependent on foreign capital.  
In 2002 Brazil had reached one of the highest levels of public indebtedness in recent years, 
above the psychological threshold of the 50 percent GDP ratio; it had faced the contagion of 
the Asian and Russian crisis, accumulated successive current account deficits and faced 
several speculative attacks (Kaufman 2011:107; Santiso 2004:4). This put the PT in a 
particularly vulnerable position vis-à-vis financial capital. The Plano Real (Real Plan) 
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implemented by Fernando Henrique Cardoso in July 1994 had successfully brought inflation 
under control, through a series of conservative fiscal and monetary policies that restricted 
public expenditure and raised interest rates. Many of these measures, which were celebrated 
by the financial establishment, had been bitterly criticised by both Lula and the PT. 
Nevertheless, Lula and his inner circle in particular had also learned that the Brazilian 
electorate valued economic stability, particularly given the traumatic experience of hyper-
inflation during the 1980s and early 1990s (Barbosa 2008:213). Singer, a PT intellectual 
quoted in earlier chapters, acknowledges that “the Real [stabilisation plan] won over the 
popular electorate”, particularly the poorest sectors directly affected by hyper-inflation in the 
past (Singer 2009:97). Party leaders in Lula’s inner circle had understood that having 
underestimated this plan, as Lula did during the 1994 presidential election, proved to have a 
negative electoral impact. This was particularly the case because during the campaign the PT 
criticised the Real Plan, but did not offer a feasible alternative (Amaral 2003:122). 
Eventually, despite the fact that Lula was the frontrunner in that election, his failure to 
“appreciate the popular appeal of the Real stabilisation plan” made it easy for Cardoso to 
present his main rival as “a threat to the new economic order” (Panizza 2004:472).  
In Lula’s 2002 electoral strategy, the importance of economic stability was not in question. 
At this stage, however, Lula’s team was not driven solely by electoral concerns. The intention 
was to calm down the markets, having perceived that if the economic situation deteriorated it 
would be “hard to govern” (Arbix 06/11/08).167 Glauco Arbix (06/11/08), who advised Lula’s 
campaign, revealed that in several meetings with his advisors Lula stressed that under high 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 A similar remark was made by Marco Aurélio García, Lula’s special advisor for International Affairs, when 
he explained in an interview that only by resolving the “macro-economic imbalances” would the PT be able to 
govern. Otherwise it would fall into a catastrophic scenario in which “inflation would soon increase to 10 
percent per month, then 20 percent, and then we would be forced down the same tragic path of hyper-inflation 
that the Brazilian economy has taken in the past” (interview with Marco Aurélio García, in Wainwright and 
Branford 2005:28). 
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inflation “the entire Brazilian people” would turn against his government and the legitimacy 
of the new administration would be jeopardised. For these reasons, leaders within Lula’s 
entourage realised that an economic crisis would create severe difficulties not only for the 
economy, but also for the maintenance of social and political stability in the country 
(Almeida 03/04/09Teixeira 2005b). During our interview, Dirceu (07/01/09) went as far as 
saying that “if the economic crisis [in 2002] had deepened, Lula would not have lasted even 
one year in power” (see main epigraph). 
For Lula’s inner circle it became clear that accommodating the interests of the financial 
sector was key to securing economic governability. They perceived that the financial 
establishment, as a dominant strategic actor, was potentially capable of undermining the 
country’s macro-economic indices, either by means of capital flight, or by launching 
speculative attacks on the Real or by simply downgrading Brazil’s bonds in credit rating 
agencies. For these reasons, governability in Lula’s economic team meant trust (Appy 
08/04/09; Bittencourt 20/10/10; Palocci 2007). “Confidence” was regarded as an essential 
element “when dealing with the large capital owners”, as Bernardo Appy, the Deputy 
Minister of Finance during the first Lula administration, pointed out (08/04/08). “The risk of 
not creating confidence among the markets is too high”, he stated, because “a crisis of 
confidence can result in losing control over inflation, exchange rates and all the macro-
economic indicators” (Appy 08/04/08). Another senior official in the Ministry of Finance, 
Gilson Bittencourt, put it in these terms: “Governability is trust because if you have a 
financial sector saying that the government is bankrupt; it can eventually generate a state of 
bankruptcy, even if this was not actually true” (Bittencourt 20/10/10). 
As part of a strategy to make his candidacy more palatable to the financial sector, Lula 
distanced himself from traditional PT economists who had given him advice, and brought 
supporters of conservative economic positions into his team. As someone who was usually 
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advised by traditional PT economists, Lula could not easily generate trust in the financial 
establishment. His main economic advisors at the time were strongly emphatic about the need 
to promote the internal market, but were not particularly concerned with macro-economic 
objectives (Arbix 06/11/08; Barbosa 20/07/09). Nelson Barbosa, the Secretary for Economic 
Policy under the second Lula administration, argues that these economists did not seem to 
have a viable strategy for providing the assurances that the financial sector needed. These 
economists, he explains, “had a development model in mind, but not a macro-economy 
stabilisation plan to balance the external accounts. Their proposal was [only] radicalisation 
and confrontation”. 
6.1.2 Dealing with uncertainty 
The uncertainty of foreign investors became crystal clear during the 2002 presidential 
election. When the surveys showed that José Serra, the candidate of the governing PSDB and 
main guarantor of the continuity of the Real Plan, was unlikely to win the election, the 
financial markets launched a new speculative attack over the Real. The Brazilian currency 
depreciated from being equivalent to US$ 2.31 in January 2002 to US$ 3.89 in September 
that year, one month before the election. During the course of a year there was a capital flight 
of more than US$19 billion, while the country’s risk increased from 963 points to 1,636 
(Barbosa and Pereira 2010:1-2). In contrast, during the Russian crisis the index did not reach 
1,100 points (Campello 2007:2). 
Scholars show that it was the prospect of a Lula government, rather than the overall situation 
of the Brazilian economy, that caused the greatest financial turbulence during that year 
(Campello and Zucco 2008:21; Martínez 2003) Despite their concerns about indebtedness 
and the high deficit, foreign investors had expressed positive views about the prospects of the 
Brazilian economy and even considered the country as an example of a “successful emerging 
economy (Campello 2012:8). Although Brazil had faced a speculative attack after the 1998 
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Russian financial crisis and eventually devalued in 1999 (Santiso 2004: 4), the economy had 
been slowly recovering. Shortly after the Argentinian financial crisis in December 2001, the 
markets praised Brazil’s “sound economic conditions”, which had not suffered from 
contagion (Campello 2012:8). In March, even the President of the Central Bank, Armínio 
Fraga, was elected “Man of the Year” by the Latin Finance Magazine, and was later referred 
to by Newsweek as “the nerd who saved Brazil” (in Campello 2012:8-9).  
Authors show how all of this changed when international investors realised that their 
preferred candidate was not going to win the presidential election (Campello and Zucco 
2008:22; Santiso 2004). Given the pro-debt moratorium position that the PT had historically 
adopted and Brazil’s low level of reserves, “the markets” became sceptical about the future 
Brazilian government’s ability and Lula’s willingness to pay its debts (Campello and Zucco 
2008:21-4). In the weeks that followed, investment banks such as Santander, Merrill Lynch 
and ABN-AMRO started to publish negative financial reports in which they publicised the 
contents of PT documents, and all of a sudden Morgan Stanley downgraded Brazilian bonds 
(Goldfrank and Wampler 2008:259; Santiso 2004:18).168 In May that year, five months 
before the election, BCP Securities published a report by a financial analyst, entitled “Da 
Lula Monster”, which described how “a sense of panic” had emerged among economic 
agents (Molano 2002, in Santiso 2004:259). One month later, George Soros declared in an 
interview: “Brazil is condemned to elect José Serra or to sink into chaos as soon as an 
eventual Lula administration begins” (Folha de São Paulo 8/06/02, in Barbosa 2008:194).169  
The “Letter to the Brazilian People”, presented in June 2002, was insufficient to placate fears. 
According to Campello (2012:10), who interviewed several representatives of the financial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Goldman Sachs developed a mathematical model, the Lulameter, designed to rate the likelihood of Lula’s 
victory by monitoring the behaviour of prices in the currency markets (Campello 2012:10). 
169 In The Accidental President of Brazil, Cardoso’s autobiography, the former president recalls that the 
possibility of a Lula presidency simply “terrified investors just as much as it had before” in his previous 
attempts to win the presidency (Cardoso 2006:273-4). In his view, this was because “[m]any on Wall Street 
feared that, if elected, Lula would lead Brazil down a radical path” (Cardoso 2006:273-4). 
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sector, “the markets broadly ignored the document” which was not even mentioned in the 
influential financial reports by the Economist Intelligence Unit. In July, one month after the 
publication of the letter, Standard and Poor’s downgraded Brazilian sovereign bonds, 
“allegedly based on concerns about rising public debt, the worsening of [the] domestic debt 
profile and heightened market concerns about political uncertainties” (S&P 2002, in 
Campello 2012:10).  
The speculation on the Real only stopped one month before the election, in September 2002, 
when the IMF approved a new US$ 30 billion loan to Brazil to be paid out by the end of the 
following year, while the World Bank announced its intention to lend the country US$ 7 
billion (Campello 2007:25). All four major candidates for president – most crucially Lula –  
were called as signatories (Cardoso 2006:273-4). The IMF imposed its conditions: the new 
president would honour the agreement’s targets for a budget surplus of 3.75 percent 
(dedicated to repaying the debt). Once the agreement was signed, the Fund declared that 
Brazil was “on a solid long-term policy trend which strongly deserves the support of the 
international community” (Cardoso 2006:274-5). The massive rescue package was not aimed 
solely at restoring confidence among foreign investors. As Campello (2007:25) argues, it also 
had the clear purpose of “binding the incoming administration to maintaining the status quo 
in economic policies”. Likewise, Nelson Barbosa, a PT economist who became the Secretary 
for Economic Policy in the second Lula administration, wrote that the intention of the 
investors was very clear: they were trying to “veto pre-emptively any possible heterodox 
economic action” that Lula might eventually take after being elected (Barbosa 2008:193-4).  
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6.2 The second stage: reinforcing Cardoso’s economic orthodoxy  
Despite the efforts made during the electoral year, the macro-economic instability remained 
fragile and the uncertainty had not been dispelled by the time Lula assumed the presidency. 
During his first year in office, Lula diverted most of his political capital to gaining the 
confidence and support of the financial sector. This sector was regarded as a problem in his 
inner circle, yet was also perceived as part of the solution to the governability dilemmas of 
the party in public office. To a certain extent, maintaining a good relationship with such a 
prominent strategic actor was like buying health insurance. Partially, it was seen as helpful to 
secure not only economic but also political and social dimensions of governability. The 
strategy was two-fold: on the one hand, it could position the new president better with respect 
to the Brazilian conservative establishment, which was opposed to him for reasons of class, 
ideology and history (despite the alliances with some segments of the business community) 
and, on the other hand, it could help to reduce potential confrontations with those who 
represented its interests in Congress, where the PT was particularly weak.  
 
Lula anticipated that many of his policies would be criticised by his allies in the PT socio-
political field, mainly within the party Left, but he also knew that his own faction would 
support him and that his allies in civil society would not mobilise against them. Singer 
(2009:97-8) argues that by handling the economy “with the prudence of a housewife” (an 
expression that Lula frequently used), the PT administration could also establish a connection 
with the poorest sectors that Singer refers to as the “sub-proletariat”, who are particularly 
vulnerable to hyper-inflation. Lula and his team were aware that, without macro-economic 
stability (and low inflation in particular), its cash transfer programmes would have no 
significant impact on alleviating extreme poverty (Arbix 06/11/08). 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, some party and social leaders in the PT field had imagined that 
the “Letter to the Brazilian People” was only a tactical electoral strategy to reduce economic 
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instability in the context of the presidential election and avoid antagonising the establishment. 
They were surprised, however, when Lula re-endorsed the commitments made in the letter 
and fiscal orthodoxy became one of the main hallmarks of his government. To begin with, the 
president formed a conservative economic team which partly negotiated with both the 
national and the international markets. The appointment of Henrique Mireilles, a former 
president of the BankBoston and member of Cardoso’s PSDB, as head of the Central Bank 
was a key decision.170 As Minister of Finance Lula appointed Antonio Palocci, a PT member 
and one of Lula’s closest political allies, who had cultivated fluid relationships with the 
private sector during the previous years and with bankers during the campaign (Carneiro 
14/04/09). As a former mayor of Ribeirão Preto (1993-1996/2001-2002), a medium-sized 
Brazilian city in the state of São Paulo, Palocci completed one of the first privatisations of the 
1990s, that of the municipal telephone company, and became widely known as “a deficit 
hawk” and a “strict fiscal conservative”  (Kaufman 2011:108, 109), as I briefly mentioned in 
Chapter 4.  
Within the Finance Ministry, Palocci formed a team of “good technicians with a modern 
vision of the economy”, as he personally called the technocrats he appointed to the most 
important jobs, when referring to them later in his memoirs (Palocci 2007:57). Palocci also 
placed, in two key positions, fiscally conservative economists who did not endorse PT 
economic positions and who had even had open disagreements with the party in the past 
(Palocci 2007:55).171 Interestingly, various PSDB members or sympathisers from that party, 
who had relations with the financial establishment, also worked for the Ministry. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 In addition to this, some advisors to the previous president, Armínio Fraga, were kept on as directors of the 
Central Bank.  
171 Joaquim Levy and Marcos Lisboa were appointed as Secretary to the Treasury and Secretary for Economic 
Policy respectively. Ricardo Carneiro, one of the traditional PT economists, affirms that some of the most 
important positions in the Ministry of Finance resulted from recommendations made by the International 
Monetary Fund, while the Central Bank was “completely handed over”  to the banking sector (Carneiro 
14/04/09). 
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Notwithstanding the wide powers that Brazilian executives have to appoint officials at the 
first and second levels of the administration, very few petistas received jobs during the first 
period. Having a “technical team” was perceived as essential in order to provide the 
confidence that the financial sector required, as Bernardo Appy, Deputy Minister of Finance 
at the time, asserted during our interview (08/04/09).  
As an initial measure, the Central Bank increased interest rates from 25 to 26.5 percent in 
February 2003, reaching the highest levels in the region (Kaufman 2011:109), as part of a 
strategy to achieve a “fast disinflation” (Barbosa 2008:212). In order to send a “clear 
message” to the financial sector about the strength of its commitment to fiscal orthodoxy, the 
Lula government established a 4.25 percent primary surplus goal (Barbosa and Pereira 
2010:3),172 far above the 3.75 required by the IMF in the agreements signed before the 
presidential election. In order to reach this target, the federal government had to reduce public 
investment from 1.1 percent  of the GDP to 0.3 percent in its first year (Barbosa and Pereira 
2010:3), and to limit the possibilities of substantial minimum wage increases that had been 
promised during the campaign, at least until the final years of the first administration.  
During that first year, the government also promoted two important reforms in Congress that 
were aimed in great part at creating a “market-friendly” environment. In April, it passed a 
reform that cleared the way for Central Bank autonomy, a decision that was widely 
celebrated on Wall Street, and which helped to set the value of the Brazilian bonds at the 
levels prior to early 2002 (Santiso 2004:32). In August, it passed another reform, which 
modified the pension funds system (in similar terms to those previously proposed by 
Cardoso, and which the PT had opposed in the past) and tore down some of the rights 
acquired by the workers in the public sector. This reform, which alienated PT supporters (see 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Even higher levels were established for the two subsequent years. The primary surplus reached 4.59 percent 
in 2004 and 4.83 percent in 2005. 
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further in Chapter 9), was emphatically pushed by the Lula government, which argued that it 
would help to solve the public deficit and free up funds for the government's social 
programmes (Pereira, Power and Raile 2011:43).173  
Eventually, despite the success in reducing inflation, which even in the first year went down 
from 12.3 percent  to 9.3 percent, eventually reaching 5.7 percent in 2005,174 the economy 
officially entered a “technical recession”, with two consecutive terms of no growth (Barbosa 
and Pereira 2010:3). In the years that followed, notwithstanding the fact that Brazilian 
exports started to increase significantly, economic growth was mediocre. Indeed, during the 
whole term it only increased an average of 2.9 percent (Figueiras and Gonçalves 2007:69). 
This was higher than the 2.3 percent of the two presidential terms of Cardoso, but far below 
the 4.9 percent world average during the same period (Figueiras and Gonçalves 2007:74).175  
The financial sector was one of the main winners during Lula’s first administration. “The 
high real interest rates”, as Barbosa wrote, “meant high net interest payments by the Brazilian 
government to the rich” (Barbosa 2008:195).176 Economists estimate that 80 percent of the 
public debt in the country is in the hands of some 20,000 people who receive the lion's share 
of US$120 billion annual payments of the public debt. This is ten times more than the US$6-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 To highlight the connections between the economic and the political dimensions of governability it is 
interesting to note that these two reforms received ample legislative support in the Lower House, including from 
opposition parties such as the PFL and the PSDB. The reform that cleared the way for the autonomy of the 
Central Bank received 442 votes, while the pension reform was passed with 357 votes. 
174 On average, inflation was 6.9 percent during Lula’s first term, below the 9.1 of the two Cardoso 
administrations (Magalhães 2010:11). 
175 In 2006, during the last year of the first Lula government, unemployment was 16.58 percent, below the levels 
of the first Cardoso administration (DIEESE 2006, in Magalhães 2010). Between 1995 and 1997, 
unemployment was 13.15, 14.96 and 15.71 percent respectively. In 2004 it was 18.81 percent and in 2005, 
17.02.  
176 According to Barbosa (2008:194) the Lula administration was characterised by an “unusual economic 
arrangement” in which  the main beneficiaries in fact included “the extremely rich”, most of whom represent the 
financial establishment, “and the very poor”, who benefited from the cash transfer programme Bolsa Família 
and other policies of the Lula administration such as the minimum wage increases (see Chapter 9). Survey 
studies on the income distribution in Brazil show that despite the fact that the income of the poorest sectors of 
the population increased significantly, the richest 1 percent still own the same amount as the poorest 50 percent 
(Barros, De Carvalho, and Franco 2006:123). Despite some improvements during the Lula administration, 
Brazil is still one of the 10 most unequal countries in the world. 
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9 billion distributed to 11 million beneficiaries of the cash transfer programme Bolsa Família 
(Anderson 2011:5; Singer 2010b:2). The earnings of the three largest banks in the country, 
which control almost 80 percent of the financial market, increased almost five-fold between 
the time of Cardoso and Lula’s first term in office, according to reports by a Brazilian 
consultancy firm (Duarte and Alvarez 2010). By the end of 2010, one of these banks, 
Bradesco, had made one of the highest profits in its history (O Globo 2011).177  
Numerous analyses emphasise the similarities between the macroeconomic policies of the 
Cardoso and the Lula administrations (Amann and Baer 2006; Amaral, Kingstone, and 
Krieckhaus 2010; Filgueiras and Gonçalves 2007). In fact, a number of left-wing public 
intellectuals in Brazil rated the Lula administration as “a third term of President Cardoso” or 
even as “‘leftism’ without a Leftist project”.178 I contend that the PT did not make an 
ideological shift towards neoliberal positions, despite the fact that influential figures in the 
economic team assumed positions of that nature, and others experienced what seems to be an 
ideological conversion.179 Some groups in Lula’s first economic team did adopt what I 
characterise as a discourse of economic governability in which the macro-economic policy 
decisions adopted were seen as essential for the adequate functioning of the economy. For 
instance, Appy (08/04/09), who defines himself as a “technician with a modern vision of the 
economy” and a “non-active PT member”, argued that “having low inflation, a manageable 
public debt, fiscal stability and balance in the external accounts does not mean having a 
particular ideology”. In his view, these elements are “the minimum necessary to have an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 On more than one occasion Lula acknowledged how the wealthiest people made large profits under his 
administration.  In 2009, he declared: “I govern the rich, too. I am sure that they are quite satisfied because they 
have made a lot of money under my government” (Valor Econômico 17/09/09, in Loualt 2011:5). In a speech 
delivered in Minas Gerais in 2010 he also confessed: “it is the wealthy who have made the most money under 
my government” (Loualt 2011:5). 
178 “Leftism without a leftist project” is the title of an article published by Tavaloro and Tavaloro (2007). 
179 This argument is put forward by Valter Pomar, leader of Left Articulation in his PhD thesis (Pomar 
2007:187), apropos former Trotskyites cadres such as Antonio Palocci or Glauco Arbix, who assumed liberal 
positions during the 1990s.   
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economy that works properly and a government capable of ruling” (Appy 08/04/09, my 
emphasis).180  
These types of discourses, however, are not dominant in the PT and its field. Lula’s economic 
policy was in fact criticised both by social allies (Coordenação dos Movimentos Sociais 
2006) and by most of the factions in central office. In 2005, for instance, when the party held 
internal elections six out of seven candidates running for party president seriously condemned 
the macro-economic policy of the previous years. Even the candidate who represented Lula’s 
faction, “Building a New Brazil”, requested that some of its most orthodox aspects, such as 
inflation targets, be relaxed and public investment be increased (Folha de S. Paulo 17/09/05). 
Among 70 interviewees, 63 percent of them expressed criticisms of the economic policy in 
general (40 percent of them) or of the monetary policy in particular (23 percent). Even within 
Lula’s faction, 55 percent of the interviewees criticised the economic policy.181  
6.3 The third stage: acquiring margins for manoeuvre 
By 2005 the economic governability challenge had changed. Under “very favourable 
international conditions” (Kaufman 2011:95), the government was able to accumulate 
significant foreign reserves. These reserves increased from US$ 37.8 billion in 2002 to US$ 
54.4 billion in 2005, when Brazil reached the level of reserves it had prior to the Asian crisis 
in 1997, and reduced public debt to 37 percent of the GDP (Filgueiras and Gonçalves 
2007:105-8), far below the 50 percent threshold when Lula first took office. As a result, the 
Lula government’s dependence on the moods of the financial sector and its vulnerability to 
capital flight was greatly reduced. The international circumstances contributed a great deal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 In his autobiography, Palocci (2007:37) expressed a similar view, when he wrote that fiscal balance should 
be "a normal commitment of any respectable government which does not want to go through an easy populist 
adventure in order to face its economic problems". 
181 24 percent of them criticised the economic policy as a whole, and 31 percent the monetary policy. In Left 
Articulation and the centre left faction “Message to the Party”, criticisms against the economic policy were 
expressed by 86 and 77 percent of the interviewees respectively (see Appendix III for further details). 
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because Brazil, like other countries in South America, benefited from a boom in commodity 
prices for most of its exports, which according to some estimations grew almost 80 percent 
between 2003 and 2006 (Filgueiras and Gonçalves 2007:105). These economic conditions, 
which were initiated in 2003 and remained until the 2008 financial crisis, “eased the 
constraints associated with dependence on volatile flows of external capital” in several 
countries, including Brazil (Kaufman 2011:110). 
 
In this context, the Lula administration continued accumulating foreign reserves until it 
reached the considerable level of US$ 207 billion by the end of 2008. According to PT 
economists, the accumulation of these reserves put the government in a stronger position to 
face eventual speculation against the Real and even helped to prevent another exchange rate 
crisis like the one that took place during the second Cardoso administration (Magalhães 
20/10/10; Barbosa and Pereira 2010).  In 2005, the Lula government repaid its total debt to 
the IMF.  JP Morgan eventually reassessed the Brazilian country risk, bringing it down from 
1,800 points in 2002 to 397 points in 2005 and further down to 259 in the following year. On 
average, the first Lula administration received a better rating (507 points) than the eight years 
of the Cardoso administration (888 points).  
Brazil eventually received “investment grading” from important credit rating agencies such 
as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. For Lula’s economic team, the investment grading was 
“the cherry on the cake”, the culmination of a process of building relations with the financial 
sector as well as an explicit recognition that the government had been able to build 
confidence and gain the support of the financial establishment, as members of Lula’s 
economic team acknowledge (Agustín 20/10/10; Barbosa and Pereira de Souza 2019, 29; 
Bittencourt 20/10/10). By the time Lula ran for the re-election in 2006, he was no longer a 
“monster”, but an icon of Latin America’s “responsible left”, one that according to The 
Economist (08/31/06), “pursues the twin goals of growth and equality within the confines of a 
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responsible economic policy”, as it expressed two months before the election. His election in 
2006 did not produce any kind of reaction in financial markets (Campello 2006:15). It would 
be hard to expect something different, given the depth of the fiscal adjustment undertaken 
during the first three years of the Lula administration, the nature of its “market-friendly” 
reforms, and also the significant profits that investment banks made under his administration. 
Having achieved the support of the financial sector, and using the opportunities that the 
“commodity boom” provided to “relax macroeconomic discipline” (Kaufman 2011:110), the 
PT government decided to make some changes. In March 2006, Guido Mantega, leading a 
pro-developmentalist team with neo-Keynesian positions, headed the Ministry of Finance and 
those with some of the most liberal positions lost their influence within the government. 
Primary surplus targets were reduced in order to free up public expenditure and the 
administration started to invest significantly in large infrastructure projects. The minimum 
wage began to increase and continued increasing over the years, while cash transfer 
programmes such as Bolsa Família reached a larger number of beneficiaries. In the years that 
followed, the Central Bank gradually brought interest rates down, eventually reaching 11.25 
percent (Exame 21/07/10). This was still high, but significantly lower than the 26.5 percent 
they had reached in early 2003. To foster economic growth, in January 2007 Lula launched 
the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC), a public-private multi-million-Real 
infrastructure initiative that targeted more than R$ 500 billion (around US$ 250 billion) for 
the construction of roads, ports, railways, waterways, sanitation, electricity, housing, urban 
transport, and energy supplies. The launching of this programme was largely celebrated by 
the party in central office.182 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 In its Third National Congress in 2007, the PT celebrated this programme as one capable of “overcoming 
economic conservatism” by “placing the state in the role of a growth inducer” (Partido dos Trabalhadores 
2007:16). 
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Certainly, important aspects of economic policy did not change: the fiscal balance was 
maintained, and the government still gave a special treatment to the financial sector. 
Notwithstanding the importance of Bolsa Família, the expenditure that this programme 
represented in 2006 was only the equivalent of 2 percent of the interest rates that the 
Brazilian government paid on its debt the previous year (Zucco 2006:15).  Lula and his inner 
circle, however, may have realised eventually that the international economic context and the 
margins of manoeuvre that it gave allowed them to simultaneously carry out a pro-poor 
policy agenda and maintain the financial markets on their side. Indeed, the favourable 
economic context made possible a socio-economic and political arrangement from which 
those at the top and those at the bottom of the social scale could benefit from (Barbosa 2008). 
Eventually, both groups managed to expand their income under Lula.183  
Final remarks 
I have argued in this chapter that the economic orthodoxy that characterised the first years of 
the PT in national public office was more of a pragmatic strategy to secure governability, 
understood in its elite-centred perspective, and less of an ideological shift towards 
neoliberalism in the PT. The analytical approach used in the previous pages aimed to explain 
how initial economic policy decisions were largely shaped by a strategy to accommodate the 
interests of dominant strategic actors with sufficient power to generate an economic crisis. It 
was this assessment, made within Lula’s inner circle, which mainly motivated the 
continuation of Cardoso’s macro-economic policy, and even its initial reinforcement in the 
first years of the Lula administration. This does not mean, however, that the PT was immune 
to ideological conversion. I have explained that some groups promoted a conservative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Barros, de Carvalho and Franco (2006:123) found that between only 2003 and 2006 the income of the 
poorest 10 percent increased seven-fold, mainly due to Bolsa Família and the minimum wage increases. In 
contrast, they claim that the income of the richest 10 percent of the population increased by 1.1 percent per 
capita. However, as anticipated in the introduction to this thesis, Brazil does not have reliable statistics on the 
income of the wealthiest sectors. In the case of the financial sector, studies suggest that between 2005 and 2008 
this sector made the highest profits in its history (Barbosa and Pereira de Souza 2010:18-9).  
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discourse of economic governability in which certain policies were perceived as key to the 
“good functioning” of the economy and the state. I argued, however, that these types of views 
were neither dominant in the PT field, nor the main driving force in the adoption of a 
conservative economic policy. 
The previous pages have shown how governability strategies can be fashioned even before 
parties occupy public office, during electoral periods, encouraging transformations in the 
discourses and strategies of political parties or in some groups within parties. In the PT case, 
it is clear that such transformations mainly affected Lula’s inner circle and other defenders of 
the elite-centred strategy. In retrospect, it seems that the Lula administration exaggerated its 
economic orthodoxy by going beyond the commitments made with the IMF during the 
election or by maintaining restrictive measures long after the economy had stabilised. What 
strikes one as a great paradox is that a progressive party in office not only has to maintain a 
macro-economic policy that it has long opposed, but also that it has to exaggerate some of its 
elements even further than a previous conservative government. One may ask whether that is 
the price that the Left needs to pay in order to prove its fiscal discipline credentials and gain 
the confidence of international markets. The defenders of the social counter-hegemonic 
strategy, which proposed alternatives in the political realm, did not seem to have an answer to 
such a challenge in the economic sphere.   
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7. Participation without counter-hegemony 
Scholars, together with public intellectuals in Brazil and representatives of civil society, 
argue that the Lula administration was not particularly innovative in promoting meaningful 
and broad-based participatory processes, especially when compared to PT sub-national 
government experiences (Baiocchi and Checa 2007; Couto 2009; Feres 2010; Grzybowski 
2004; Hochstetler and Friedman 2008; Hunter 2010; Leite 2008; Moroni 2009; Ricci 2008: 
53-82; 2007a; Samuels 2008). The Lula administration, however, did make some important 
efforts to include civil society and listen to its representatives. Nevertheless, participation as a 
political agenda at the national level was embedded in a larger and more complex political 
game than existing studies have acknowledged. In this chapter, I contend that participation 
during the Lula years was caught between electoral politics and governability strategies, 
which shaped both the implementation and scope of participatory initiatives.  
The existing literature has failed to observe that during the first year of the Lula 
administration, some party groups in public office favoured a social counter-hegemonic 
governability strategy in which participatory democracy, a founding characteristic of the PT 
ideology embedded in its “genetic model”, would play a central role in key policy arenas 
such as poverty reduction and hunger eradication, as well as the planning and budgeting 
processes. By examining these contentious areas, this chapter aims to explore how and why 
participation lost momentum at the national level, as influential leaders, mainly within Lula's 
inner circle, allowed the elite-centred perspective of governability to prevail. By 
concentrating most of their energies on reaching agreements with dominant strategic actors 
and forming a stable alliance in Congress, the PT at the national level relegated the 
participation agenda to the sidelines. Unlike local government experiences, participation was 
not at the centre of government action and had no role in the most important policy arenas, 
particularly those that Lula’s inner circle regarded as strategic. As scholars argue, 
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participation was also limited in scope because no structures with meaningful decision-
making power were created (Couto 2009; Leite 2008:Ch.4; Moroni 2009). Elements of this 
sort, present in many PT local government experiences, were among the key elements with 
which the party promoted the counter-hegemonic strategies that were central to its 
progressive agenda. 
Scholars have found that electoral pressures can frustrate the scope of participatory 
experiences at the local level (see among others Houtzager 2008; Houtzager and Dowbor 
2010; Schönleitner 2006).184 Adding to the existing evidence, this chapter shows how at the 
national level the PT administration was reluctant to share power with civil society in two of 
its most important policy arenas: its main social programme, Bolsa Família (Family Grant), 
and its largest infrastructure investment plan, the Programa de Aceleracão do Crecimento 
(Growth Acceleration Programme, PAC).185  In both cases, the need to produce quick results 
in order to maximise vote- and office-seeking strategies hindered attempts to promote 
participation. Rather, Lula and his inner circle opted for policies which would score 
immediate marks with the poorest sectors or impact on public opinion. In these strategic 
areas, participation was seen as an obstacle to efficient and effective government action. The 
“hard nucleus” of the party in government eventually decided that the implementation of its 
strategic policies would be more effective if they were centrally planned, under managerial 
and technocratic rationales that prioritised state action over the engagement of civil society. 
In addition to this, I will argue that the characteristics of Lula’s leadership – the way in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Houtzager (2008:56-8) showed, for instance, how the government of Marta Suplicy in Sao Paulo 
implemented a Minimum-Income Guarantee Programme, the immediate precursor to Bolsa Família, which was 
mostly government-led and in which civil society had no significant participation. This author observed that the 
electoral cycle forced politicians to implement programmes capable of producing “significant benefits” within a 
two-year period in order to produce visible results towards the third year. Houtzager and Dowbor (2010) also 
studied how participatory institutions had little or no role in the Health sector during the Suplicy administration, 
partly because of the need to opt for policies that would have greater electoral appeal and generate immediate 
impacts among the lower middle class.  
185 According to a presidential advisor, these were the two main areas that President Lula himself regarded as 
“strategic” for his government (Belchior 06/07/09). 
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he came to be regarded as the representative of the poor and the excluded – made 
participatory instruments less necessary, in the minds of several party leaders and social 
activists.  Lula was, after all, “one of them”. 
This chapter therefore tells two stories: firstly, how and why the attempts to promote 
participation in the first year of the Lula administration fell by the wayside; and secondly, the 
profound transition at the national level from participatory budgeting to the technocratic 
Growth Acceleration Programme. After a first section in which I briefly argue that the Lula 
administration did not made significant innovations in terms of participation I examine, in the 
second section participation in the social policy arena, and look at a trajectory that started 
with the Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) programme in 2002 and concluded with the establishment 
of the conditional cash transfer programme Bolsa Família. I focus in particular on the 
creation of participatory management committees, initially established as a mechanism of 
citizen control over Fome Zero, and look at the reasons behind their early dismantlement 
when Bolsa Família was created. In the third section I trace the paradigmatic change by 
which the PT in public office, after first casting aside its political commitment to democratise 
the national budget through participatory budgeting, surrendered to the technocratic rationale 
guiding the Growth Acceleration Programme. I also look at the way in which the government 
engaged in a consultative process to set long-term government priorities for the first term and 
explain the reasons for its discontinuation when PAC emerged.   
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7.1 Participation without innovation 
Some scholars and social activists recognise that the Lula government made important efforts 
to include civil society, by listening to its representatives and their claims (Hochstetler 2010; 
Pogrebinschi 2011; Pogrebinschi and Santos 2010; Teixeira 2005b).186 Most studies on 
participation during the Lula administration, however, tend to be critical. Baiocchi and Checa 
(2007:413) argue, for instance, that the most distinctive element of the national PT 
administration was not its economic pragmatism and transition to the ideological centre, but 
what they called “the abandonment” of the party’s “creative forms of empowered popular 
participation”. Others highlight the absence of innovation in participatory institutions and 
their lack of meaningful influence (Couto 2009; Moroni 2009; Souza 2008). In the PT, 
particularly within the party Left, many leaders were frustrated with the lack of progress by 
the Lula government in promoting meaningful participation. In interviews with 93 party 
leaders, I asked whether they believed the Lula administration made progress in this area. 33 
percent stated that the government made no progress and 22 that it only made relative 
progress (usually when compared to previous governments). Of the eight members in the 
faction Left Articulation (AE) interviewed, 6 of them (75 percent) held this opinion, as well 
as 60 percent of the 20 leaders from “Message to the Party” (MP). Only in Lula’s centrist 
faction, “Building a New Brazil” (CNB), did a significant number of leaders make a positive 
assessment of the participatory mechanisms during the administration (63 percent of the 38 
interviewees). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 In July 2004, for instance, during a seminar organised by the Polis Institute, one of the most influential 
Brazilian think tanks in the area of participation, representatives of civil society acknowledged this explicitly. 
Ana Cristina Barros, an environmentalist and a member of the Brazilian Association of NGOs (ABONG), a 
large network of progressive organisations, said that despite the shortcomings, government officers were 
becoming more ready to listen, and she asserted that “crowds of people” were participating in all kinds of 
workshops, seminars and meetings throughout the country (Teixeira 2005b:72-3).  
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The PT administration did create several institutions of participatory governance, expanding 
significantly the number of sectoral policy councils and national conferences (Leite 2008: 
Ch.4; Pogrebinschi and Santos 2010:75). During the course of two terms, the Lula 
government created 13 councils and held 73 national conferences which, according to official 
figures, “mobilised” more than five million people at the municipal, local and national level 
(Presidência da República 2010:7). A government-sponsored study on the role of national 
conferences shows how civil society organisations were able to define several policy agendas 
in fields ranging from oral health, sports, youth and adolescents to others like minority rights, 
social assistance and the environment, which seem to have influenced new legislation 
(Pogrebinschi and Santos 2010:53-82). However, according to observers, participatory 
initiatives were more impressive for their quantity rather than their quality (Grzybowski 
2004; Leite 2008; Moroni 2009). These schemes, not particularly new, were part of the 
decentralised participatory system created after the enactment of the new Constitution in 
1988, as explained in Chapter 3.  
Despite officials flagging up these initiatives as evidence of their commitment to 
participatory democracy (Almeida 03/04/09, Dulci 10/12/08), and some scholars presenting 
them as “true democratic policies” that represented Lula’s “participatory method of 
government” (Pogrebinschi 2011:5), national conferences and sectoral policy councils were 
part of the same effort which had oriented participatory policies in Brazil over the two 
previous decades. Undoubtedly, many of these institutions were important conquests of 
Brazilian civil society. These institutions did contribute to state democratisation and some of 
them gave voice to previously excluded minority groups (Pogrebinschi 2011:9; Shankland 
and Cornwall 2008). However, councils and conferences also present a number of 
limitations.187 These structures, as Shankland (2010:49) notes, are not “elements of a radical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Councils and conferences are varied and widespread throughout Brazil, and it is not possible to generalise. 
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alternative”. When Lula assumed office, they were already part of “the country’s democratic 
fabric” (Shankland 2010:49). By putting these institutions and processes at the centre of its 
participatory agenda, the Lula administration failed to meet the high standards of citizens’ 
engagement promoted by the PT. Most importantly, it ruled out the possibility of 
implementing a social counter-hegemonic governability strategy of the kind implemented in 
cities such as Porto Alegre.  
Although Lula’s inner circle and the dominant sector of the PT did not contemplate a radical 
counter-mobilisation strategy in 2002, many analysts did expect that the party in government 
would rely on broad-based participatory mechanisms to mitigate, at least in part, its minority 
status in the legislative branch. Participatory instruments, however, did not play this role at 
the national level. In contrast to several PT sub-national experiences, where participation 
helped to circumvent or neutralise opposition in the legislative branch (Couto 2009; Doctor 
2007; Pinto 2004; Ramos 2004:262-6; Schneider and Goldfrank 2002; Sousa 2002), no 
participatory instrument served this purpose at the national level. For instance, in the overall 
legislation enacted between 1998 and 2009, only 7.2 percent was convergent with the 
deliberations of national conferences (Pogrebinschi 2011:18). This is very different from 
processes such as the Participatory Budget, in which the annual budget was almost 
unchanged by legislators when it reached the floor for approval, as Chapter 4 explains. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
However, the literature shows that these institutions have limited capacity to exercise influence, either because 
they lack formal decision-making power or simply because they depend on the will of high-ranking officials to 
put in place their recommendations. Some authors argue that if government officials wished to follow a different 
course from that established within participatory spaces, their views would eventually prevail (Couto 2009). 
Others claim that councils and conferences have many political limitations because budgetary decisions are 
hardly ever discussed within them and they never touch upon key issues such as the macro-economic policy 
(Teixeira 2005b).  Furthermore, other scholars say that these institutions do not always ensure accountability, 
nor do they secure pro-poor spending (Arretche 2003; Coelho, Araújo et al. 2002), and they have not been able 
to alter historical power relations at the local level (Silva and Marques 2004).  Another type of criticism is that 
conselhos and conferências are state-controlled in many cases because the government selects the names of their 
representatives, appoints chairs and often establishes the agenda (Couto 2009; Moroni 2009). According to 
Caccia (2005), most councils and conferences only provide an appearance of participation. The same organised 
groups participate in these spaces and ordinary citizens have little chance of inclusion. 
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Some PT members in central and public office did try to craft and implement alternative 
counter-hegemonic participatory models, but with limited success. In its first year, the 
government launched two important initiatives that were eventually discontinued. Firstly 
there was the capillary participatory system of management committees for the Zero Hunger 
programme. These committees constituted a form of delegated power that would give civil 
society and ordinary citizens a fundamental role in managing Lula’s most important social 
policy at the time. Secondly, a consultative mechanism to define government priorities and 
long-term investments was established. In the following sections I examine these experiments 
and the reasons for their lack of success.  
7.2. Fome Zero management committees: A short-lived experiment in “citizen power”188 
The Fome Zero management committees shaped during the first year of the Lula 
administration remain largely unexplored in the literature.189 It is worth looking at this 
experience because it represents one of the most significant attempts of the PT government to 
create an alternative mechanism of “citizen power” beyond the existing decentralised 
participatory system previously established in Brazil. It is interesting to note that for some of 
the leaders who were involved in this initiative, the management committees could have 
eventually led into “the federal version of the PT's Participatory Budget” (Betto 2007:428). 
The proposed structure was intended to give society a majority of seats on the committees 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 In this chapter I draw on the conceptual framework of Sherry Arnstein (1969) and her “ladder of 
participation”, which distinguishes between forms of “manipulation” in which participation is a mere illusion or 
a simple pretence; strategies of “tokenism” in which citizens take part in institutions with a voice, but lack any 
type of power within them; and “citizen power”, which involves forms of participation that grant real decision-
making power to the have-nots. In forms of “citizen power” such as the ones analysed in this section, citizens 
and government officials establish a partnership by which they “share planning and decision-making 
responsibilities” (Arnstein 1969:9). According to Arnstein (1969:10), a superior form of citizen power takes 
place when citizens are granted delegated power by which they acquire “dominant decision-making authority 
over a particular plan or programme”. Such a form of power takes place through institutions in which citizens 
have a clear majority of seats and “genuine specified powers” (Arnstein 1969:11).  
189 The only exceptions are a handful of academic studies conducted by some actors who were involved in the 
creation of such committees during the first year of the Lula administration (see Balsadi, Del Grossi et al. 2004; 
Takagi 2006), as well as memoirs written by other actors who were involved in the process (see Betto 2007; 
Poletto 2005). 
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and decision-making authority to both manage and control Lula’s Fome Zero. Although those 
who led this adventure were eventually defeated, their story shows how electoral politics, an 
elite-centred perspective of governability and the nature of Lula’s leadership shaped and 
limited participation during his administration.  
In the months leading up to the 2002 presidential election, the Citizenship Institute, a think 
tank created by Lula after the 1998 election to formulate specific policies outside the 
constraints of the party structure, discussed with experts and civil society organisations a food 
security programme, Fome Zero, which established a comprehensive set of 25 policies to 
address extreme poverty, hunger and malnutrition (Instituto Cidadania 2001).190 From the 
outset, the project was expected to attract massive popular support and confer a leading role 
on civil society. Before the Fome Zero was officially launched in October 2001, Lula and his 
group discussed it with several NGOs, social movements, trade union confederations and 
academic experts (Instituto Cidadania 2001:5).191 Having established that hunger eradication 
and poverty alleviation would be a top priority, one of Lula’s first decisions as president was 
to create a new Ministry of Food Security and Hunger Eradication, responsible, among other 
things, for promoting social participation around the Fome Zero programme. In addition, 
Lula appointed two special advisors attached to the presidential office and gave them 
responsibilities to create a mobilisation support network – the Liberation Theology priest, 
Frei Betto, and one of the founders of the World Social Forum, Oded Grajew. These 
decisions signalled the intention of the new administration to give civil society a key role in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 The initiative, which targeted 9.3 million families earning less than US$1 per day, half of whom were in the 
impoverished Northeast, aimed at combining “emergency policies” of social assistance, such as income transfer 
programmes or popular restaurants, with others seeking the promotion of structural change such as income 
redistribution, job creation or land reform (Instituto Cidadania 2001).    
191 The emphasis that the project gave to the role of civil society was explained by Lula in the preface of the 
Zero Hunger project: “The objective of eradicating hunger and securing the right to food cannot be only a 
government task, even if all the sectoral institutions at the federal, state and municipal level are efficiently 
articulated. It is essential to involve the organised civil society in the struggle: trades unions, popular 
organisations, NGOs, universities, schools, all the different churches and business associations –all of them are 
summoned to participate (Instituto Cidadania 2001:5). 
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one of the most publicised programmes of the new government.   
From the beginning, Fome Zero generated intense polemics and was at the centre of media 
attention. Government officials lacked a unified vision on how to implement the programme 
and differed in their views on the role that civil society should play at the local level. Three 
main groups influenced the debate – I call them the autonomists, the civil society watchdogs 
and the municipalists. The positions of these groups were influenced by the two main 
governability perspectives that were present in the PT at the time. The autonomists and the 
civil society watchdogs to a lesser extent were on the counter-hegemonic side, while the 
municipalists were on the elite-centred side. The autonomists were the group led by Frei 
Betto, who expected civil society to play the most significant role in the programme, both in 
selecting beneficiaries at the local level and in exercising social oversight. For this group, 
who wanted civil society to act in a self-organising fashion, the success of the programme 
depended on a massive mobilisation.  
The group of civil society watchdogs was based within the Ministry of Food Security and had 
the main responsibility for the operation of Fome Zero. They distrusted municipal 
governments because of their well-known corrupt and clientelistic practices.192 In order to 
avoid them, they intended to put in place a strong mechanism of social oversight over 
municipalities. This group shared some of the aims of the autonomists but was less driven by 
mobilisation and more interested in the efficiency and transparency of the programme. Both 
of these groups were counter-hegemonic in the sense that they distrusted the local political 
elites and wanted to oppose them or at least establish a counter-balance to their practices. 
However, whereas the autonomists defended a hard counter-hegemonic strategy, the civil 
society watchdogs had a softer counter-hegemonic approach.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Officials contemplated information from the National Audit Office (TCU), which show that as much as 70 
percent of the municipal governments in Brazil have corruption problems (quoted in Betto 2007:444). 
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At the other end, with an elite-centred influence, was the group of the municipalists,193 who 
demanded a greater role for state institutions at the local level and was sceptical of giving 
civil society major responsibilities in the execution of a public programme. This group was 
concerned with accommodating the interests of local political elites. Given the fact that the 
PT had only elected 186 out of 5,565 municipalities and that many mayors control deputados 
at the national level, accommodating the interests of the mayors by giving them a role in 
Lula’s main government programme was part of a strategy to form alliances with other 
parties and eventually secure a parliamentary base of support. The three groups established a 
political dispute during the first two years of the Lula administration, with autonomists and 
civil society watchdogs more or less united on one side and municipalists on the other. As I 
will show, it was the municipalists who eventually prevailed.  
One of the initial components of Fome Zero was the implementation of a cash transfer 
programme by which a smartcard (the cartão alimentação) was distributed to the poorest 
families and topped up on a monthly basis for them to purchase food. In order to put the 
programme in place, the government needed to create a registry of potential beneficiaries and 
update information gathered by the previous administration. Because such a task had been 
performed by municipal governments in the past (often based on political considerations), 
officials in the Ministry for Food Security did not trust the existing lists of beneficiaries and 
sought to compile new ones or revise the existing ones without the involvement of the 
municipalities. These officials wanted to prevent both corrupt practices and the electoral use 
of the programme. In their view, these problems could be avoided by transferring resources 
directly from the federal government to a bank account which only the beneficiaries could 
access. However, if the mayors were able to manipulate the selection processes the risks of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 This characterisation was made by Takagi (2006:163-4) in her doctoral thesis on the implementation of the 
food security policy during the Lula administration. Takagi worked for the Ministry for Food Security between 
2003 and 2004. 
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misallocation would be much higher.  
By establishing Fome Zero management committees, those within the Ministry of Food 
Security who were advocating for a civil society watchdog role sought to put in place a local 
level social oversight institution, which would also become the programme’s “operational 
arm” (Balsadi, Del Grossi, and Takagi 2004:83). Unlike the constitutionally mandated 
sectoral policy councils, in which civil society and government are equally represented, 
officials in the ministry decided that these spaces should be controlled by two-thirds of 
citizens or representatives of civil society organisations and only one-third of local 
government officials. The committees were responsible for finding inconsistencies within the 
list of beneficiaries; they could suggest the inclusion of new families and eventually demand 
the exclusion of those who no longer required benefits. These tasks were particularly 
important in the North-East, the poorest and most unequal region in Brazil, where local 
institutions are weak and practices of corruption and clientelism particularly widespread.194 In 
order to avoid such problems, the ministry decided that the money would only be handed to 
those municipalities in which management committees had been formed. This decision was 
not free from controversy, as bureaucrats and party officials, many of them municipalists, 
claimed it would slow down the implementation of the programme.195  
The expected role of the committees, however, was even more ambitious for the autonomists. 
In particular, this group considered that the committees would help the programme evolve 
from the initial phase, mostly based on cash transfer distribution, to one capable of 
implementing deep structural changes. In May 2003, in the first interview with Frei Betto, he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 A former official who worked for the Ministry of Food Security stated anonymously that the administration 
was extremely worried about potential accusations of corruption that could jeopardise the programme in terms 
of public opinion. 
195 Others also disagreed on the grounds that fundamental rights, such as the right to food and the right to a 
minimum income “cannot be conditioned to the process of organisation of civil society, no matter how 
legitimate or necessary it might be” (Ananias 16/07/09). 
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explained how his team envisaged committees playing a role in the creation of a “social 
inclusion network” to tackle the “structural causes” of hunger, poverty and malnourishment 
(Gordillo and Gómez 2005:156-7).196 Following the principles of the Ecclesiastical Base 
Communities, the autonomists saw the committees as having a strong component of 
“citizens’ education” (Gordillo and Gómez 2005:155) and expected them to play a political 
role. During the first year of the Lula government, members of these committees received 
training to “elaborate local development plans”, “stimulate discussions about problems in the 
communities” and even to promote “public actions among civil society” (Balsadi, Del Grossi, 
and Takagi 2004:84). Did the autonomists have a counter-hegemonic strategy in mind? Did 
they intend to create a parallel structure to the local powers? Some party and social leaders 
suggest this was probably the case. Requesting anonymity, a representative of civil society 
offered this interpretation: 
Frei Betto wanted to implement a model inspired by the Cuban Committees for the 
Defence of the Revolution or the Bolivarian circles in Venezuela, organised in each 
neighbourhood within each municipality. He wanted to create a base of power opposed 
to the representative power of Brazilian municipalities. Following this approach, 
decisions for social policy would cease to be made by local politicians and would be 
handled instead by popular organisations (my emphasis).  
A representative of the municipalists who advised Lula at the time, Miriam Belchior, made 
this assessment: 
Behind the creation of those committees was a soviet-type approach that wanted to decide 
everything about everything (…) The model was too rigid and could easily have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 A set of food security agents would not only help the beneficiaries of the programme to improve their diets, 
he explained, but would also spend money on food and purchase products at the local level in order to promote 
the dynamism of regional economies. The committees would also encourage families to generate their own 
income, develop initiatives of small-scale and community agricultural production, encourage illiterate citizens to 
participate in literacy programmes and urge the unemployed to participate in training courses (Gordillo and 
Gómez 2005:156-7).   
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manipulated by certain groups without allowing the participation of other sectors. In 
certain places, for instance, the Catholic Church could have dominated those spaces 
entirely for its own purposes (Belchior 06/07/09). 
Former officials from the Ministry of Food Security counted 2,285 committees officially 
formed during the first year of the Lula administration, and claimed that the process 
mobilised 20,000 volunteers all over the country (Balsadi, Del Grossi and Takagi 
2004:85).197 In his memoirs, Frei Betto described public assemblies with more than 300 
participants and up to 1,000 in more than 560 municipalities, with considerable activity in the 
North-East (Betto 2007:107). Despite the lack of formal evaluation, the limited available 
evidence suggests that an incipient but strong mechanism of social oversight was slowly 
emerging. Former officials of the Ministry for Food Security argue that, due to the action of 
the volunteers who participated in the management committees, many causes of wrongdoings 
were exposed.198  The question arises, therefore, as to why the administration abruptly 
decided to abort these efforts despite the apparent achievements 
7.2.1 Bolsa Família: Leaving participation aside 
The electoral logic can generate obstacles to participation and can shape the scope of 
participatory mechanisms. A governing party that wants to win elections and remain in office 
will not always be willing to share power with civil society or lose control over policies 
which might have strong electoral impacts. In this section I argue that electoral pressures 
started to dominate the food security policy agenda towards the end of the first year of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 The estimates are subject to different interpretations. Another official who worked for the Ministry for Food 
Security, requesting anonymity, acknowledged that there were no more than 1,500 committees that actually 
functioned. The municipalists made even lower estimates. Adriana Aranha, Chief of Staff to the Minister for 
Social Development, maintained that only 500 committees worked in reality (07/07/09). 
198 An academic study conducted in three states of North-East Brazil between July and August 2003 showed 
that, despite operational problems in many committees, not only were they promoting transparency and 
accountability, but they were also helpful in reaching the most needy within their municipalities, in making the 
beneficiaries spend the money on food and in achieving other objectives of the programme (Ortega 2003, in 
Takagi 2006).  Even the National Court of Audit (TCU) praised the committees for being important elements in 
preventing corrupt practices (TCU 2004, in Betto 2007:117). 
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Lula administration. This altered the nature of Lula’s main social policy, which adopted the 
new brand of Bolsa Família, becoming a key platform for Lula’s re-election in 2006. 199 The 
literature identifies more generally the electoral consequences of Bolsa Família (Bohn 2011; 
Hunter and Power 2007; Licio, Rennó et al. 2009; Zucco 2006). Here I look more specifically 
at its implications for participation in the programme.  
The original form in which Fome Zero was conceived changed significantly towards the end 
of 2003, when Lula’s inner circle perceived that its most important social policy innovation 
was not showing results as rapidly as the electoral cycle required. The PT faced important 
municipal elections in 2004 and needed to consolidate itself in power to be ready for Lula’s 
re-election in 2006. Soon, following World Bank prescriptions, the government decided to 
unify a series of federal government cash transfer programmes created during previous 
administrations, with the cartão alimentação that the Lula government created in 2003. The 
result of this unification was Bolsa Família. Along with this change, the administration 
decided that the recently created Ministry for Food Security and Hunger Eradication would 
be abolished, and its functions subsumed into a new Ministry for Social Development. To 
take charge of this new area, Lula appointed Patrus Ananias, a former mayor of Belo 
Horizonte, who came to represent the interest and views of the municipalists (in spite of the 
fact that he was an activist in the progressive Church and even promoted a Participatory 
Budget when he was mayor). Lula was anxious to see the programme functioning at full 
speed and set his new minister a tight deadline: to reach around 11 million beneficiary 
families before the presidential election. As the Lula administration had only reached 3.5 
million families with its cartão de alimentação, the challenge to Ananias and his team was 
considerable. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Ironically, the name of the new programme was suggested, according to Frei Betto (2007), by Duda 
Mendonça, the same marketer who worked for Lula’s victorious presidential election in 2002.  
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A radical modification in the composition and attributes of the committees accompanied 
these changes. Lula eventually decided that the municipal government, rather than civil 
society, should assume the main role in the implementation of the programme at the local 
level. Most of the management committees’ functions were transferred to the municipalities, 
including expanding the lists of beneficiaries of Bolsa Família, acquiring a critical political 
tool as a result. The committees formally remained as institutions for social oversight of the 
new programme; however, their role was weakened because the number of civil society 
representatives was reduced. As with most sectoral policy councils in Brazil, from then on 
they had an equal number of government and civil society representatives. To make matters 
worse, mayors were given the freedom to determine which type of social oversight 
mechanisms they wished to put in place in their municipalities.200  
Ananias prioritised the relationships with municipal governments over civil society. In 
December 2004, Frei Betto decided to leave the government, possibly because he realised 
that his agenda would not move forward. In the following years, the Bolsa Família 
programme spread around the country, with civil society playing only a marginal role. The 
committees created during the first year were not formally abolished, but only some of them 
remained active. Despite the overwhelming call by the National Conference on Food 
Security, in March 2004, to maintain committees controlled by civil society (and also to 
create new committees elected in popular assemblies) (Consea 2004, in Takagi 2006:115), 
the government ignored this appeal.201  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 In May 2005, the ministry decided that mayors could opt, on a case-specific basis, for their preferred type of 
social oversight structure. All that was required was that in order to adhere to the programme, municipalities 
needed to put in place some kind of social oversight mechanism. They had to follow a set of loose guidelines 
(such as intersectoriality and equal representation of civil society and government officials), but they were free 
to decide, for instance, who would belong to the committees and how long each member would hold their 
position (Ministério de Desenvolvimento Social e Combate a Fome 2005).  
201 Those who favoured this decision argue that since most councils in Brazil are integrated by an equal number 
of representatives from government and civil society, there was no reason to make the Bolsa Família 
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Existing scholarly evidence shows that participation in Bolsa Família was weak. Hevia 
(2009), who conducted comparative studies on social oversight institutions in different cash 
transfer programmes in Latin America found that the way in which Bolsa Família operates 
does not allow space for civil society, nor does it contemplate forms by which beneficiaries 
can engage in the programme and hold authorities to account. Even some of the main civil 
servants and party leaders directly involved in this programme recognised that the role of 
civil society was marginal (Ananias 16/07/09; Mesquita 02/07/09; Aranha 07/07/09). Their 
most common justification was the pressures which they faced to massively expand the 
number of beneficiaries and the speed with which they had to put Bolsa Família in place 
(Aranha 07/07/09; Menezes 26/07/09; Mesquita 02/07/09).  
Those leading the implementation of the cash transfer programme emphasised the importance 
of a government-led programme, rather than one in which civil society would act as a 
mediator. This was justified as being part of the state's responsibilities to guarantee basic 
rights, as explained by Ananias: 
We are interested in social participation, but in our view the responsibility for securing 
rights rests with the state (…) Hunger cannot wait. Immediate and energetic action is 
needed, therefore state action (…) As a citizen and as a Christian I believe in 
mobilisation and social organisation, but when you assume a public job you have to work 
with deadlines and goals, and respond effectively to the demands and needs of the people 
(Ananias 16/07/09, my emphasis). 
This emphasis on state action was also present in the discourse of the Secretary for Food 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
committees different (Ananias 16/07/09; Fonseca 07/09/07; Mesquita 02/07/09). For them, control by civil 
society was not necessarily a guarantee that politically biased decisions or wrongdoings would not take place. 
“We cannot think that the state is evil and society is full of saints”, claimed Ananias (16/07/09). “It is very 
childish to say that civil society is free of all bad things and the government is inherently evil”, was the 
argument of Adriana Aranha (07/07/09), his chief of staff.  A civil servant from the Ministry for Social 
Development asked: “Who guarantees that civil society organisations do not have political objectives and would 
not develop a list of beneficiaries based on political criteria?” 
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Security, Crispim Moreira: 
Our emphasis is on the state and its capacity to manage a massive social policy on a legal 
and institutional basis. You need the state to manage a R$22 billion budget to spend on a 
programme like this. Fully institutionalised structures with procedures set in decrees and 
laws are necessary. This is our view and this has been our task… We are not in charge of 
the ‘ministry of the popular power [the people power]’.202 Can you imagine what that 
would be like?  (…) Bolsa Família is a rights-based programme. All Brazilians with a 
low income have a right to benefit from it. Period. There is a right to a minimum income. 
You don’t need to engage in a political struggle, to be entitled to a right. ( …) The 
committees no longer decide whose names are included in the registry because the criteria 
are set in law (Moreira 03/04/09, my emphasis).     
It is interesting to note how according to these views, efficiency and effectiveness are 
synonymous with “state actions”, rather than being attributes of civil society. Such a stance 
contrast with the social governability strategy that the PT largely promoted at the sub-
national level. More in tune with the elite-centred approach that emphasises the role of the 
state over civil society, participation is seen as something that can generate obstacles rather 
than facilitate solutions. Although it would be hard to disagree with the view that 
fundamental rights should be guaranteed by the state, the way this is used by the two officials 
seems more like a justification. Participation in Bolsa Família was not weak because the 
government wanted to emphasise the role of the state as the main guarantor of the right to 
food or a minimum income. If the management committees were ignored or left aside it was 
mostly because the administration wanted to retain control over a social policy that was a key 
plank of the PT’s electoral strategy. Indeed, electoral pressures determined the characteristics 
and pace of implementation of Bolsa Família. Clarice dos Santos, an activist of the MST who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Tr: “Nos não encabeçamos a secretaria do poder popular”. The interviewee was possibly using an irony about 
the names that some ministries receive in Venezuela, such as Minister of the Popular Power for Labour or 
Ministry of the Popular Power for Communal Economy.  
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worked for INCRA, put it bluntly: “Bolsa Família responded to the most immediate political 
need to re-elect Lula”. In her view, “organising the people or promoting participatory 
mechanisms would have taken more time and effort” (Santos 07/05/09). It is clear that the 
president wanted to see results much earlier. 
Finally, it should be said that governability also played a significant role in removing 
meaningful participatory mechanisms from Lula’s main social policy. Not only did the 
counter-hegemonic characteristics of the management committees cause suspicion among the 
defenders of the elite-centred perspective, but the government also needed to accommodate 
the interests of those opposition parties who became allies in Congress and who also wanted 
to have a role in Bolsa Família. This was suggested by Frei Betto in his memoirs, where he 
explained how granting more power to the municipal governments was part of a strategy of 
the Lula government to broaden its political alliances before the 2004 municipal elections 
(Betto 2007:249).  
7.3. From the participatory budgeting promise to the PAC’s technocratic rationale 
The trajectory of the PT participatory agenda at the national level is paradoxical. Not only did 
the party fail to use participatory instruments in the planning and budgeting processes at the 
national level as promised, but it also adopted a technocratic rationale in which decisions on 
its most important infrastructure programme, the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC), 
were mostly made by experts and bureaucrats. In order to show this trajectory, I start with the 
promises made to include Participatory Budget (PB) at the national level, which were quickly 
left aside; and I then move on to explore how Lula’s inner circle did not even promote a 
meaningful debate on democratising the budgeting process once in office. Possibly as a 
palliative remedy, the administration organised a national consultation process to legitimise 
its plan, the Plano Plurianual: “Um Brasil para Todos” [“Pluriannual Plan: one Brazil for 
all”] 2004-2007”. Although this process was regarded by civil society organisations as a first 
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step towards democratising the planning process, it went no further after the Lula 
administration launched the PAC.  
I argue that both the governability dilemma and electoral motivations shaped this trajectory, 
by forcing participation to take a back seat to what was perceived by Lula's inner circle as a 
more pressing issue: economic and political governability. However, even when the economy 
and national politics stabilised, participation in the planning process was not introduced, as 
the administration concentrated on infrastructure projects,  motivated by electoral concerns 
and the interests of dominant strategic actors.  
7.3.1 Leaving the Participatory Budget behind  
When Lula assumed office, participatory budgeting mechanisms had already spread across 
several municipalities,203 with some particularly successful cases. At the state level, however, 
the experience was limited to one single case in which PB lasted for a whole government 
term – the Olívio Dutra administration in Rio Grande do Sul (1999-2002).204 From its Second 
National Congress in 1999 onwards, the PT envisaged scaling up participatory budgeting 
mechanisms from the local level to the national sphere (Partido dos Trabalhadores 2004:692-
17). The idea of a federal PB was revisited by the party in its Third National Congress in 
2001 (Partido dos Trabalhadores 2004:1657), and was incorporated into the first pages of 
Lula’s electoral manifesto in 2002 (Coligação Lula Presidente 2002a:3).  
Given the enormous size of the Brazilian territory and its population, a federal PB was 
obviously not an easy promise to deliver. Yet the intention was never to automatically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 In Chapter 4 I offer estimations on the number of cities that adopted PB in Brazil. By 2003, around 140 cities 
may have adopted this instrument.  
204 In contrast to the vast amount of literature that explores participatory budgeting mechanisms at the municipal 
level, particularly in Porto Alegre (see Chapter 4 for references), only a few studies look at PB at the state level 
during the government of Olívio Dutra (Feres 2005, 2002; Oliveira 2004; Schneider and Goldfrank 2002). These 
studies usually point out that at the state level, participatory budgeting proved feasible, but worked differently 
from municipal PBs, particularly because they drew more on organised groups and less on the participation of 
ordinary citizens, and also on fewer assemblies (see Chapter 5). 
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implement this instrument at the national sphere, but to adapt it to the Brazilian federal 
structure, as it was made explicit in the 2001 and 2002 documents (Coligação Lula Presidente 
2002a:3; Partido dos Trabalhadores 2004:1657). In any case, this was rather complicated 
because a wide range of actors influenced the deliberation of the public budget at the federal 
level. Whereas in the municipal sphere, a mayor may only face opposition from one 
institutional actor, namely the legislative assembly, national presidents face various 
intermediate levels, such as mayors and state governments. Some PT officials claim that a 
federal PB could only work with the support of city mayors and state governors (Alves 
03/12/08), which is probably the case given the influence they have over the National 
Congress, particularly governors. Despite the difficulties, it was reasonable to expect, given 
the history of the PT and the commitments made, that a creative mechanism to democratise 
the federal public budget would eventually be discussed. This was not the case, however, as 
those with influence either kept it off the table, thinking that it would not work at the national 
level. 
Party leaders had mixed opinions on the extent to which PB was feasible beyond the 
municipal sphere. Leaders of the party Left, particularly those who had participated in the 
Dutra administration in Rio Grande do Sul, thought that PB had potential at the state level 
(Agustín 20/10/10; Rosetto 24/07/09; Sousa 19/12/08), while many in Lula’s inner circle 
disagreed (Belchior 06/07/09; Dirceu 07/10/09; Dulci 10/12/08). Luiz Dulci, who was the  
main authority responsible for the promotion of participatory mechanisms, argued that the 
municipal model based on assemblies and citizens’ individual participation, had practically 
failed at the state level, and therefore was even less feasible in the national sphere (Dulci 
10/12/08). During the interviews conducted for this study, it emerged that most of the leftist 
groups within the PT supported the creation of a federal PB, while leaders in Lula’s faction 
were reluctant or sceptical. I asked 70 party leaders from the three main factions in the party 
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whether they thought a federal PB was a good idea. Within Lula’s faction, “Building a New 
Brazil” (CNB), only 35 percent said they did think so, while among the “Message to the 
Party” (MP), which includes several leaders who played key roles in PT administrations in 
Rio Grande do Sul, 88 percent were in favour. 
Despite the scepticism within Lula’s faction and among his inner circle, PB was included in 
the electoral manifesto in 2002, possibly because it was not easy to leave aside a banner that 
was strongly identified with the PT. What mainly stands out, however, is that there was no 
discussion about scaling up participatory budgeting or even on alternatives to democratise the 
formulation of the annual budget. Neither the party in central office, nor the party in 
government, discussed the question. Only an isolated group within Socialist Democracy 
(DS), arguably the most enthusiastic promoter of participation within the party, formally 
proposed a federal PB based on a synthesis of previous municipal and state experiences and 
the incorporation of new technologies.205 For Ubiratan de Souza, who was in charge of the 
implementation of PB in Rio Grande do Sul, a federal PB was promising because it would 
have a considerably greater impact than in the sub-national sphere (19/12/08). The proposal, 
however, did not reach government circles.206  
High ranking party leaders in government acknowledged that initiatives to democratise the 
budget were relegated because more important political issues took priority (Ananias 
16/07/09; Dirceu 07/01/09; Genro 31/04/09). Such issues were clearly related to the elite-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Their suggestion was to launch a federal participatory budget that would guarantee broad-based participation 
and grant decision-making power to both civil society organisations and citizens. Participation would take place 
in public assemblies organised by groups in civil society within all Brazilian municipalities, and priorities would 
be systematised by using software (Democracia Socialista 2003; Souza 2003). 
206 According to Pedro Pontual, an associate of the Polis Institute, the main resistance to the discussion came 
from Lula’s economic team, who dismissed PB as a “mere form of assembly-ism” (Pontual 17/10/08). Critical 
voices inside the PT suggested that a federal PB was not possible simply because “the government refused to 
share power with the people” (Zimmerman 03/12/08) or lacked interest in the idea (Sousa 19/12/08). The former 
Deputy Governor of Rio Grande do Sul and Minister for Rural Development during the first Lula 
administration, Miguel Rosetto, argues that the administration  made “a conservative choice ” (Rosetto 
24/07/09). 
210	  
	  
centred strategy to secure governability. José Dirceu, Chief of the Presidential Civil House 
between 2003 and 2005, justified the reasons in our interview:  
It was a choice. If the government had decided to promote more participation or more 
mobilisation, it could certainly have achieved better results. However, when the PT took 
office, the priority was to solve the economic crisis, take hold of the state apparatus and 
achieve a majority in the Legislature… You cannot do everything at the same time. You 
have to know what your priorities are (Dirceu 07/01/09). 
Interestingly, even Tarso Genro, one of the main champions of participatory budgeting as 
Mayor of Porto Alegre (1993-1997/ 2000-2001) put forward a similar argument. In his view, 
the democratisation of the public budget was not promoted at the federal level, because the 
administration had “urgent matters to solve”. His explanation is that when the PT took office 
in 2003, “we had a country in bankruptcy; high inflation, stratospheric interest rates, 
unfavourable trade balance and lack of foreign reserves” (Genro 31/04/09). Clearly, within 
the elite-centred perspective of governability that the Lula administration adopted, macro-
economic stability and the formation of a stable parliamentary alliance determined the order 
of priorities in a wide range of areas, including participation. 
7.3.2 Participation by consultation:207 Lula’s first Pluriannual Plan  
The Lula administration found a way to incorporate the demands for democratisation in the 
planning process by promoting a national consultation to define the Pluriannual Plan (2004-
2007). The Pluriannual Plan in Brazil is a legal instrument by which the federal executive, 
with congressional approval, establishes its priorities for a whole government term, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Following Arnstein (1969)’s conceptual framework on participation, in this section participation by 
consultation is understood as a process in which people’s opinions are taken into account through mechanisms 
such as attitude surveys, neighbourhood meetings or public hearings. Authors have argued that one of the 
problems with this type of participation is that in most cases it does not concede any share in decision-making 
and it offers no assurance that citizens’ concerns and ideas will be taken into account (Arnstein 1969; Pretty 
1995).  
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specifying the general objectives, the main programmes to be implemented and the specific 
goals.208 Scholars, as well as activists who took part in the consultation, wrote that the 
process lacked meaningful influence, and was mostly government-controlled (Delgado and 
Limonic 2004:18; Feres 2010; IBASE 2005; Moroni 2009; Ricci 2007a). Here, I suggest that 
the way in which this process was organised was part of a governability strategy to include a 
wide range of strategic actors for governability and at the same time create a sense of social 
ownership to legitimise Lula’s government. The outcome of this process was eventually 
influenced by the same governability dilemma that affected different policy arenas of the 
Lula administration. 
The consultation over the Pluriannual Plan was organised by the General Secretariat of the 
Presidency and the Ministry for Planning, and supported at the local level by civil society 
organisations. The process did not attempt to reach ordinary citizens because carrying out 
such a task, as one of its main organisers explained, would have taken “entire football fields” 
(Dulci 10/12/08). It was an inclusive process, however, because a wide range of organisations 
participated, ranging from members of rural and urban workers’ organisations, to business 
associations and religious congregations, to gender groups, gay rights movements and 
academic organisations. According to official figures, 2,170 organisations participated. 
Between May and June 2003, a series of one-day public hearings took place in each of the 26 
state capitals and the Federal District, totalling 4,700 participants from all over the country 
(Dulci 2003:20; Ministério do Planejamento 2003).209 A 700-page document was eventually 
presented to the president in a public ceremony and two weeks later, the Pluriannual Plan 
2004-2007 was sent to Congress for approval.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 The Pluriannual Plan is put together by the Ministry of Planning, based on the inputs of the different 
departments, and it must be completed before the end of the first year of a new government. In theory, this 
document most be taken into account when the public budget is formulated every year, although in practice, this 
is not usually the case. For this reason, the importance of this instrument is limited.  
209 The meetings started with a presentation on the general contents of the government’s proposal and, during 
the afternoon, participants worked in thematic groups. By the end of the day, the groups made suggestions for 
amendments to the government document to be incorporated in the final draft (Ricci 2008). 
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Observers and participants had many complaints about the process. They argued that the 
government had the final say in the selection of participants,210 and set and controlled the 
agenda as well as the modalities of the hearings (Delgado and Limonic 2004; Moroni 2009; 
Ricci 2008). Although the presidency reported that the consultation resulted in various 
alterations of the government’s first draft (Dulci 2003:20-2), participants from civil society 
did not have a similar impression. After the whole process was concluded, 33 social networks 
and forums – which included ABONG and Inter-Redes, among others – contended that the 
participatory process of consultation was not adequately incorporated into the final version of 
the plan. According to Inter-Redes, the government only included secondary issues that could 
help to improve the main strategic orientations that inspired the PPA, but nothing capable of 
changing the logic of its policies (Inter-Redes 2004, in Moroni 2009:19-0). 
The final version was severely modified (Baiocchi and Checa 2007:420), not only by the 
executive, but also by the legislative branch. Unlike PB at the local level, where the budget 
acquired sufficient legitimacy and robustness to be endorsed by the legislative branch, when 
the Pluriannual Plan went to Congress, the opinions of civil society were ignored by federal 
legislators. The elite-centred governability strategy that led the PT government to become a 
partner with dominant strategic actors conditioned and limited the scope of the participatory 
process. The final document sought to accommodate the interests of particularly powerful 
groups. Authors have argued that the plan was largely subordinated to macro-economic 
objectives (Delgado and Limonic 2004; Inter-Redes 2004) which were part of the strategy by 
which the Lula administration sought to accommodate the interests of the financial sector and 
secure its support, as I explained in the previous chapter. Baiocchi and Checa (2007:420) 
argue that the final government plan “mystified ‘technical decisions’ such as interest rates or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 In fact, a peculiar selection process was used: civil society organisations were allowed to suggest names, but 
the General-Secretary of the Presidency made the final decision following undefined criteria (Moroni 2009; 
Ricci 2008). 
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budgetary priorities as the executive realm of government technocrats”.  
Despite the fact that a government plan had never been discussed in such a participatory 
fashion, key figures in Lula’s economic team could not escape the idea that certain economic 
decisions should be exempt from participation, particularly when they play an important role 
to secure governability. When I asked the Deputy Minister for Finance, Bernardo Appy, why 
some people argue that participation did not influence the economic arena during the Lula 
administration, he answered:  
I don’t know what they mean exactly by participation. We are dealing with technical 
problems here. A macro-economy is either balanced or unbalanced. When you deal 
with economic issues you handle things that are not clear to the general public. They 
wouldn’t know how to manage interest rates in order to keep inflation down or how to 
balance external accounts. It is difficult to have direct participation in these sorts of 
things (Appy 08/04/09). 
Despite the criticisms, the consultation over the 2004-2007 Pluriannual Plan was not 
considered a bad starting point. Both government officials and civil society representatives 
argued at the time that it represented a step towards democratising the planning process. 
Some even emphasised that it was the first time that a government development plan had 
been opened to social input (Delgado and Limonic 2004; Dulci 2003; Ministério do 
Planejamento 2003; Toni 2006). For some, it even held up the prospect of creating a 
participatory process on national investment priorities (Baiocchi and Checa 2007). Many 
others expected that Lula's second term would see an improved consultation, but this was not 
the case. Although Lula campaigned for re-election in 2007 on a commitment to “expand and 
deepen” this experience (Coligação a Força do Povo 2006:26), his government did not fulfil 
this promise.  No consultation on the second Pluriannual Plan (2008-2011) took place. The 
official argument for this is that the second plan would incorporate resolutions and 
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recommendations from sectoral policy councils and national conferences in order to profit 
from the existing instruments (Presidência da República 2007). Nonetheless, the second plan 
only incorporated the inputs from these institutions in very exceptional cases. Neither the first 
nor the second Pluriannual Plan incorporated these resolutions, as a former advisor to the 
presidency acknowledged (Toni 02/04/09). 
By the beginning of his second term, Lula was more secure in power and no longer needed to 
promote a consultative process to create a sense of social ownership and legitimacy for his 
government plan. The president had gained the confidence of strategic actors outside the PT 
and his policies proved palatable to the business and financial sectors. The economy was 
already growing above 4 percent, and the effects of the government’s social policy had 
produced visible effects, reducing extreme poverty by between 17 and 40 percent between 
2003 and 2005 (Soares and Herculano 2010:47). After August 2006, Lula’s approval rating 
started to climb, reaching more than 50 percent in 2007. Lula had a developmentalist plan to 
promote economic growth, based on large infrastructure projects through public-private 
partnerships. Such a plan was presented as ready-made and did not require consultations of 
any kind. 
7.3.3 PAC: The urgencies of economic growth and the technocratic rationale 
The incipient participatory innovations that the Lula administration promoted in its first 
Pluriannual Plan vanished with the emergence of the Growth Acceleration Programme 
(PAC), launched in 2007. As a top priority of his second term, the whole state machinery 
concentrated on the promotion of large-scale infrastructure public works in areas such as 
energy, highways, railways, airports, urbanisation, housing and sanitation. The programme 
had no specific participatory mechanism attached and mostly assumed a technocratic 
rationale in which, as I advanced in Chapter 1, the “common good” seemed to be objectively 
identified by a group of experts based on their knowledge and their capacity to “get things 
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done”. Electoral considerations, coupled with the need to secure governability and the nature 
of Lula’s leadership, largely explained this lack of participation.  
Lula’s second term started with the investment projects “ready and organised”, as a civil 
servant from the Ministry of Planning explained (Almeida 03/04/09). PAC mostly functioned 
within a managerial approach in which the government established a set of centrally 
monitored goals and created mechanisms to secure the allocation of massive resources during 
the time of economic bonanza. Determined to make “a big step forward in Brazilian 
infrastructure projects” (Belchior 06/07/09), the Lula administration did not want any 
obstacles that could delay completion of the works. In many cases (as civil servants 
explained), rather than starting new projects, the administration preferred to finish those 
under way (Almeida 03/04/09; Schmidt 03/12/09). This was a reasonable approach, but there 
was also an electoral motivation behind it: by including projects started in previous 
administrations, the government could take the credit for their completion and make the PAC 
seem much more robust and ambitious in the eyes of public opinion.  
Government officials found it difficult to reconcile the organisational approach that led to the 
creation of the PAC with the initial participatory arrangements discussed in the previous 
section. The administration wanted to promote economic growth and time was precious.211 
Perhaps for that reason, the emphasis of the programme, as government sources 
acknowledge, was mostly on “efficiency and competence” (Belchior 06/07/09; Schmidt 
03/12/09). Miriam Belchior, one of the main PAC strategists, recounted the following: 
The PAC was conceived after the 2006 presidential election as a result of the 
president’s obsession with guaranteeing economic growth during his second term in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Many officials argue that the urgency to launch the PAC was one of the reasons why no participatory process 
was put in place (Almeida 03/04/09; Belchior 06/07/09; Dulci 10/12/08). For instance, a civil servant in the 
Ministry for Planning (who is also a PT member), argued that it could take between two and three years to 
discuss such a complex programme in a participatory fashion (Almeida 03/04/09). 
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office. In fact, the programme was designed in three months, between October 2006 
and January 2007, when the new term officially started (…).  This programme 
represented a vision of how to make the country grow. It was innovative in terms of 
management, but not in terms of participation. There was no consultation: not even the 
governors were consulted, still less the mayors (...).  I think that the programme could 
have been more participatory, but the president decided to get things done quickly 
(Belchior 06/07/09, my emphasis).   
There is no evidence that the administration contemplated alternative ways of discussing the 
contents of the PAC in a participatory fashion, during the entire second term. Even high-
ranking government officials acknowledge the lack of participatory mechanisms within this 
important programme (Almeida 03/04/09; Belchior 06/07/09, Dulci 10/12/08). The idea that 
participatory processes take time and can generate delays, which often precludes politicians 
from promoting meaningful participation (Teixeira and Tatagiba 2005a), was a commonly 
held view among many of the PT leaders at the national level. Like Bolsa Família, the PAC 
became immersed in the electoral strategy of both Lula and the PT. Monitored from the Civil 
House of the Presidency (the equivalent of a ministry of the interior), the programme became 
part of the strategy to promote the candidacy of Dilma Rousseff, the Minister of the Civil 
House who was appointed in 2005 and Lula’s handpicked candidate for president in 2011. 
Clearly, the PT in government and Lula’s inner circle wanted not only to inaugurate public 
works at high speed, but also to publicise them on a grand scale. 
The governability strategy adopted by the PT did not generate incentives to promote 
participation around the PAC. To a large extent, the government negotiated the allocation of 
resources for infrastructure projects with powerful strategic actors such as state governors and 
big construction companies, with little or no input from civil society. This strategy might 
have helped to secure congressional support, because PAC resources were largely distributed 
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among state governors from allied parties. Since big construction companies became the 
main beneficiaries of PAC projects,212 the PT could receive crucial support from the private 
sector. In fact, many of the companies who benefited became important funders of the PT and 
its allies in Congress and gave generous support to Dilma’s presidential campaign in 2010.213  
Interestingly, a number of civil society organisations and minority groups which the PT 
sought to represent from the time of its creation, such as environmentalists or indigenous 
movements, actively opposed the construction of large PAC infrastructure projects. Many of 
these project have a strong environmental and social impact, such as the transposition of the 
River São Francisco, the construction of the BR 38 (an 877 km highway from Manaus to 
Porto Velho which crosses one of the best preserved areas of the Amazon), or the 
construction of the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam, which will – according to the Socio-
environmental Institute – dry up 100 kilometres of the River Xingú in the Legal Amazon 
(Carneiro and Braga 2009:14; Carvalho 2006). Lula and his administration strongly defended 
these projects (El Comercio 8/11/12; Peripecias 29/11/06). Now that the president had learnt 
what needed to be done in order to make the country grow, as he claimed towards the end of 
his first term, he strongly criticised the groups that opposed large infrastructure projects, even 
dismissing them as “obstacles to Brazil’s development” (Peripecias 29/11/06). 
The administration did not put in place a participatory process around the PAC, not even a 
merely token one. Possibly this was because there were no major incentives for doing so. In 
his second term in office, Lula not only became the most popular president since Getúlio 
Vargas and Juscelino Kubitschek, but he also came to be regarded among many in Brazil and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 According to the NGO Contas Abertas (Open Accounts), most of the PAC was concentrated on 3 large 
infrastructure companies when it was first launched in 2007 (Diario do Nordeste 27/06/08).  
213 Press reports based on information from the National Audit Office showed that the PT received the largest 
donations from among PAC contractors during the first electoral round of the 2010 presidential election. The 
party received R$ 70.5 billion (approximately US$ 41.47 billion). The PT National Directorate alone received 
R$ 18.7 billion (some US$11 billion) (O Estado de S. Paulo 13/11/10a; 13/11/10b). Approximately 25 percent 
of all donations that Dilma received came from PAC beneficiaries such as Camargo Corrêa, OAS and Queiróz 
Galvão (O Estado de S. Paulo 13/11/10b).  
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the PT as “the representative of the poor and the excluded”, to use the words of one of the 
main leaders of Socialist Democracy, Joaquín Soriano (31/10/08). Party members recognise 
that Lula’s leadership style and his direct and unmediated relationship with the poor was 
another reason why the participatory agenda did not acquire significant dynamism during 
those years (Soriano 31/10/08; Tatto 12/11/08). One of Lula’s presidential advisors, Oded 
Grajew, also argued that because there was “a strong assumption that with Lula as President 
everything would be solved”, promoting participation too seriously would have meant 
“questioning his legitimacy” as a leader (Wainwright and Branford 2005:38). 
Final remarks 
In this chapter I have shown how electoral pressures and the elite-centred governability 
strategy adopted by the PT in national executive public office limited the scope and depth of 
the participatory mechanisms put in place during the first year of the Lula administration. It is 
not easy to determine which of these two factors played the most important role. The 
trajectory from a national PB promise to the PAC, with its technocratic rationale, shows that 
the need to accommodate the interests of dominant strategic actors for governability 
precluded party leaders from discussing a meaningful process to democratise the public 
budget and frustrated the first consultation to define the priorities of the Lula administration. 
However, electoral pressures also played a role in making the government opt for policies 
capable of generating immediate impact and a larger electoral appeal, particularly among the 
poorest, as was the case of the Bolsa Família programme. Within this context, participation 
was regarded as something that could slow down the implementation of the most important 
government policies. 
The adoption of a conservative, elite-centred governability strategy, however, might have 
been a more powerful reason. Ultimately, as Chapter 4 showed, electoral pressures were also 
influential at the local level, but many PT administrations found ways to promote 
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participation and simultaneously perform successfully in elections. It is not evident that 
participatory policies could have rendered similar electoral dividends at the national level (at 
least not in the short run), given the time that participatory processes take to consolidate. It is 
clear, however, that the strong suspicion with which the defenders of an elite-centred strategy 
regarded counter-hegemonic participatory institutions, such as the Fome Zero management 
committees, was a strong deterrent to any possible attempts at innovation. Indeed, the 
governability strategy adopted by Lula’s inner circle became a supra-rationale that shaped the 
substance, character and scope of participatory initiatives and limited its progressive potential 
at the national level.  
A secondary factor contemplated in this chapter was the nature of Lula’s leadership, and how 
it drove energies away from participatory processes. Indeed, Lula’s leadership had important 
implications for the transformative project of the PT because the party in public office would 
no longer rely on the input of civil society as much as on those who had been elected and 
who would govern in its name and in the name of the whole society. All these elements had 
important implications for the PT’s transformative project because the Workers’ Party left 
aside during the Lula administration one of the most powerful and original ideas that inspired 
its creation: the need to organise the poor and transform society as a whole, without seeking 
state power as the only source of transformation. 
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8. Dealing with social allies  
The prevalent idea in the literature is that political parties move away from their allies in civil 
society when they enter government. The experience of the PT in public office shows that 
this is not always the case. Rather than a movement away from civil society, I argue, it is the 
nature of the relationship which mainly changes when a party shifts from opposition to 
government. Similar to the sub-national executive experiences of the PT analysed earlier, the 
Lula administration developed fluid relations with groups in civil society, and maintained 
close ties with them. However, the PT's form of engagement with its allies in the socio-
political field suffered several transformations when the party took possession of a large part 
of the state machinery. Reward-based linkages, mainly established through the distribution of 
jobs and state subsidies, acquired greater relevance, very often shaped by direct or inter-
personal relationships between party and social leaders in the PT field. The change of scale 
from municipal to national public office exacerbated some of these trends, which were 
already visible at the local level. In addition, Lula’s strong leadership over the PT socio-
political field came to play an unprecedented role. 
 
In this Chapter I argue that these bases for the party’s engagement with civil society 
organisations – the strong leadership exercised by Lula over the PT field, the distribution of 
jobs in the state apparatus, the allocation of massive state subsidies and the existence of direct 
and interpersonal linkages between party and social leaders – all contributed to secure social 
governability by appeasing sources of opposition or by providing a greater sense of 
legitimacy among civil society. By accommodating the interests of the PT social base in 
government, I argue, the party in public office managed to secure support from an important 
sector of civil society and maintain contestation at low or manageable levels. However, the 
PT in national public office did not only distribute selective incentives, such as jobs or state 
subsidies. As far as it could, it also provided collective incentives by seeking to promote 
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common agendas with its social allies. In this study I do not depart from the common  
assumption, present among students of the PT, party intellectuals, and even leaders in the PT 
socio-political field, that the distribution of jobs among social leaders automatically results in 
their co-optation, as some have suggested in the case of the Lula administration (Barbosa 
02/12/08; Moroni 07/07/09; Escobar 2008:Ch.3; Galvão 2007; García 2008; Oliveira 2006b; 
Ricci 2007b). Moreover, I do not assume that state funding necessarily generates domination, 
subordination or control, features that some scholars have found through their research 
(Collier and Collier 1979; Lavalle, Acharya, and Houtzager 2005; Middlebrook 1995; 
Roberts 2002). My work argues for a more nuanced understanding of party-civil society 
relationships in the PT case, by showing the mixed evidence from the two terms of the Lula 
administration. That is, one in which both reward-based and programmatic linkages played 
important roles. Because of their different natures, I analyse them in separate chapters, 
exploring the former in the current chapter and the latter in the following one.  
 
When looking at the relationship between the Lula administration and civil society 
organisations, this thesis concentrates mainly on one side of this relationship – the party in 
public office. My attempt is not to elaborate on the behaviour of the different social groups in 
the PT field, but only to analyse common tendencies in the type of linkages that the party in 
the national executive established with some of the most influential organisations in the PT 
field such as CUT; the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST); the National Confederation of 
Rural Workers (CONTAG); or the Housing Movement. Given the complexity and diversity 
of Brazilian civil society, my findings do not necessarily apply to all organisations in the 
same way. The account that I offer here only constitutes the first seeds of a more ambitious 
research agenda on the relationship that progressive parties in government establish towards 
their allies in civil society. In the case of the Lula administration, there has been no in-depth 
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study that has explored them extensively.214 The existing case studies, focused on specific 
organisations,215 have tended to neglect the perspective of the party in public office and how 
these relationships were shaped by the governability strategy. 
 
The current chapter is divided in five sections. The first section frames the debate of social 
governability. Section 2 characterises the Lula administration as a government of permanent 
negotiation with civil society organisations. Section 3 studies the nature of Lula’s leadership 
and the way it shaped the relationship between the party in public office and civil society 
organisations in the PT field. Section 4 looks at the two main types of reward-based linkages 
established between the party in public office and its social allies, namely job distribution and 
allocation of state subsidies. The final section explores the direct/interpersonal linkages as 
elements by which the party in public office, deliberately or not, limited disruptive forms of 
collective action and kept contestation at low or manageable levels.  
 
8.1 The ends and the means of social governability  
The literature on party-movement relations suggests that parties in government tend to prefer 
“more standardized” and “non-threatening forms of collective action” (Hipsher 1998:157) 
and are likely to seek to reduce the “potential disruptive effects” of social movement activity 
(Meyer 2007:126). Some parties in public office might mobilise their own social bases to 
support specific policies, create a counter-hegemonic power with which they can confront 
dominant strategic actors, or even require assistance from social organisations to defend 
themselves from political attacks. Nevertheless, parties in power will discourage collective 
action against their own policies. The PT has been no different in this sense. During my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 A paper written by Hochstetler (2004) is a valuable first approximation, but it only covers the first years of 
the Lula government and more emphasis is given to civil society organisations than to the party in public office. 
215 In the case of CUT, several studies examine its behaviour during the two Lula administrations (Alvarenga 
2008; Druck 2006; Galvão 2007; Reiner and Melleiro 2007), while only a few explore the relationship between 
CUT and the Lula administration from the party side (Escobar 2008; García 2008:Ch.3; Leyendeker 2004). 
Something similar has occurred with studies on the Landless Movement during the Lula administration 
(Branford 2009; Meszaros 2009; Sauer 2008; Vergara-Camus 2009). 
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interviews with PT leaders, a city councillor with historical ties to social organisations put it 
bluntly: “A government that is questioned every day becomes too unstable and compromises 
its own project”, he said. “No government can cope with a situation in which it is 
permanently attacked” (Camilo 16/11/10). This approach, it is interesting to see, was 
internalised by some of the PT allies in civil society. Two members of CONTAG, for 
instance, made the following point:  
 
When you are in opposition you are not responsible for governability. Your actions are 
done in order to erode the existing government. When the government that you helped to 
elect is in power you maintain pressure with responsibility. You try not to break the 
governance process, you need to be careful not to support the accusations that the Right 
[wing] is making about your allies and you have to constantly measure your reactions 
without giving force to the opposition. This is something that limits you” (Borba and 
Cleia 03/04/08).  
 
Another important consideration is that parties in public office are not likely to promote 
mobilisation processes that might escape their control. In the PT case, given the difficulties 
that democratically elected left-wing parties had faced in the past when dealing with their 
allies in civil society, the need to avoid a mobilisation process that could go out of control 
was a particularly relevant aspect. The Chilean case under Salvador Allende (1970-1973), as 
in other aspects that I examine in this thesis, was revealing. One of the main sources of 
political instability in that country, as Winn (Winn 1986:6-7) notices, was a “revolution from 
below” in which a group of actors with “relative autonomy” took the revolutionary process 
into “their own hands”. This group came to influence the “pace, direction and outcome” of 
the process to a point where it became “unclear” who was deciding “its strategy and tactics” 
(Winn 1986:141). As this author shows, it was the radical mass mobilisation of certain groups 
what forced Allende to modify his original “carefully controlled and phased strategy for 
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socialism from above” (Winn 1986: 6) and his plans to conduct a “delicately balanced 
strategy of economic and political change” were frustrated (Winn 1986: 140), leading to an 
unmanageable confrontation with dominant strategic actors which eventually resulted in the 
1973 military coup.  
 
The reality in Brazil in 2003 was different from the 1970s’ Chile in several aspects. No 
revolutionary programme was on the PT agenda and no movement represented “a serious 
challenge to the political system”, as Campello and Zucco (2008:7) observed. However, the 
Chilean experience and those of other Latin American countries suggested that over-
radicalised or too undisciplined social groups are never good allies. This concern was clearly 
seen in the PT national administration from the outset. Not coincidentally, what Lula mainly 
asked his supporters for in his inaugural speech on 1st January 2003 was “patience”, while he 
made an appeal to “keep our many legitimate social concerns under control so that they can 
be addressed at the right pace and in the right moment” (Folha de S. Paulo 01/01/03). 
Allende’s failure had been a warning about the potential risks of lacking a clear “hierarchy of 
command” and possibly showed how one of the main obstacles to securing social 
governability derived from the existence of different “centres of authority” competing for 
ascendancy and leadership (Winn 1986:7, 141). In Lula’s Brazil such a risk was avoided 
because a clear leadership managed to modulate the tactics and the strategies. It was the party 
in government, and Lula in particular, who set the pace and the modalities of the process.  
 
Parties use a wide range of strategies to promote more “routinized and predictable” forms of 
mobilisation (Meyer 2007:126) and to limit their potentially disruptive effects. Some 
governments simply repress mobilisation, while others try to integrate social organisations 
into established political channels, as the experience of post-democratic Brazil confirms. In 
the case of the Lula government, there is a consensus among scholars, PT members and 
social leaders that his government did not resort to repressive practices (Avritzer 13/07/10; 
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Belchior 06/07/09; Hochstetler and Friedman 2008; Santos 2011; Sauer 2008).216 Rather, the 
administration put in place an unprecedented “open-doors” policy towards civil society 
organisations, allowing dialogue and negotiation to become common practice.217 Brazilian 
political scientists such as Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos and Leonardo Avritzer have 
emphasised that the Lula administration was the first since 1964 in which no-one lost their 
lives for mobilising against the federal government (Carta Capital 20/01/11; Avritzer 
13/06/10).218 This important fact supports the idea that the PT in national public office was 
able to manage social conflict successfully, not least by accommodating the interests of key 
strategic actors in civil society in a way that limited disruptive actions.  
 
From the very start, Lula incorporated social organisations into various institutionalised and 
non-institutionalised mechanisms. These mechanisms included institutions of participatory 
governance such as sectoral policy councils and national conferences, as explained in the 
previous chapter. A practice of negotiation with a wide array of social organisations was the 
hallmark of the PT national administration. Many of these negotiations took place in formally 
established or newly created ad hoc institutional mechanisms, while many others happened 
spontaneously in private and non-institutional settings. The presidential palace of Planalto 
was symbolically opened to the visits of social leaders, who were not regular guests in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Some highlight the fact that the Cardoso administration cannot show a similar achievement since his first 
term was initiated differently. In 1995 Cardoso faced a strike by several organisations of public employees, 
which was regarded as a threat to the government's economic policy. The president managed to secure a court 
decision that outlawed the strike, which was being conducted the petroleum refinery workers, and the army 
occupied the refineries, presumably with the intention of intimidating other segments of the union movement 
(Hall 2009: 154). Likewise, the approach of the Cardoso government towards violence in the countryside was 
part of a “national security issue”, in which the administration used police solutions to the occupations 
(Hochstetler 1997:13). 
217 Social leaders noticed the difference between the Cardoso and Lula administrations. Arthur Henrique, elected 
as CUT leader in 2006, recalled: “We were coming from the experience of a government that did not listen to 
us, did not receive us and called the police to solve trade union problems. Lula changed all this radically. Many 
negotiation spaces were opened in matters such as minimum wage, small-scale agriculture and education, and 
we were invited to negotiate in these spaces” (Henrique 15/04/09). 
218 Even in the case of the MST, one of the most radical organisations in the PT field, the fact that the 
organisation increased the number of occupations of land and public buildings from the first year of the Lula 
administration, did not result in the violent clashes with national security forces that had been so common in 
previous years (Hochstetler 2004:13). It is worth noting, however, that incidents of rural violence involving 
assassinations, despite not involving national security forces, are still common in many Brazilian states 
(Ministério de Desenvolvimento Agrario 2008).  
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past and who came to meet senior officials (and sometimes the president himself) more 
frequently. The different forms of engagement by which the party in public office related to 
civil society organisations – the nature of Lula’s leadership, reward-based linkages, 
direct/interpersonal linkages, as well as the willingness to honour certain programmatic 
linkages – facilitated compromise, and eventually social actors refrained from considering 
more radical disruptive forms of collective action. 
 
8.2 Lula’s leadership and the power of a symbolic identity  
In one of the few studies on the relationship between the Lula administration and civil society 
organisations as a whole, written after only the first year in office, Hochstetler (2004:10) 
suggested that the most significant addition to the PT’s procedural repertoire at the national 
level was the “heavy use it has made of Lula as an individual and as the representative of 
national government” in its dealings with civil society organisations.  Here I explore this in 
greater detail and offer additional evidence, arguing that Lula’s strong leadership was largely 
based on the symbolic identification that certain groups had towards his personal 
background.219  I contend that this had an impact on the government’s capacity to secure 
social governability, despite the fact that this intention was not necessarily explicit.  
Lula’s strong leadership historically represented a unifying authority among the different 
factions of the party and he exercised an informal leadership among other segments of the PT 
field, most notably union leaders, who strongly identified themselves with his trajectory. 
From the beginning of Lula’s first term, the government relied heavily on his personal history 
as a north-easterner born into poverty, on his legacy as a former trade union leader, and on 
his moral authority among civil society organisations and PT allies. Lula was well aware of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 Despite Lula’s strong charisma, I do not use the term “charismatic linkage” used by other authors (Kitschelt, 
Mansfeldova, and Markowski 1999:47) to characterise these relationships. This is because, by definition, these 
types of linkages are established between a leader and unorganised groups and lack “significant mediations” 
(Madsen and Snow 1991:5).  
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this. In a famous documentary recorded during the 2002 electoral campaign, Entreatos, he 
could be heard informally speaking with his colleagues describing himself as “the only 
politician in Brazil of a national stature”, and emphasising: “I have come this far because I 
have a movement supporting me: a major portion of the Catholic Church backs me, a major 
portion of the students, the PT, CUT (...) No Brazilian political leader ever had the 
constituency I have” (Moreira Sales 2004). 
For many in the PT socio-political field, “Lula was turned into an icon, and idol, a symbol of 
our desires for transformation” (Rangel 08/04/09), as an MST leader self-critically recalls. 
These elements influenced the interaction between the administration and civil society 
organisations and were often exploited by the former to gather political support for its 
policies and reforms, and to diminish sources of opposition and anti-government reactions. In 
June 2003 Lula attended CUT’s Eighth National Congress and used his authority and 
persuasive power as a leader and as head of state to support not only the government 
objectives but also his governability strategy among CUT unionists. The labour congress took 
place at a time when the Lula administration had put in place a macro-economic policy that 
frustrated the aspirations of progressive social organisations. It also took place shortly after 
the government had introduced a bill to reform the social security pension system,220 a 
decision that directly affected the interests of the public sector trade unions, most of them 
affiliated to CUT, and by far the largest constituency of this organisation.221  At this critical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 The reform, which both CUT and the PT had opposed during the Cardoso administration, equated the rights 
of public sector unions to those of the private sector; allowed the creation of private funds and deprived public 
sector workers of previously gained benefits, such as fiscal exceptions among state workers’ pensions or the so-
called aposentadoria integral (the right to obtain a pension based on the highest salary earned and the number of 
years worked, rather than on a fixed retirement age). The reform was meant to tackle the fiscal deficit and 
change a system that was considered extremely costly. Analysts have observed, however, that it was also part of 
a second generation of reforms prescribed by the World Bank and promoted by financial institutions worldwide 
(Escobar 2008; Galvão 2007; Sader 2005). Accommodating the interests of this sector, as I explain in Chapter 6, 
was a key element of Lula’s governability strategy. 
221 In 2003, when CUT’s Eighth National Congress took place, 40 percent of its delegates represented unions in 
the public sector. In contrast, the industrial sector only represented 16 percent of the organisation (Folha de S. 
Paulo 02/05/04).   
228	  
	  
moment, Lula addressed the CUT audience and emphasised his strong identification with the 
Central. In his speech, he presented himself as CUT’s founding father and spoke to its 
members in a paternal fashion, as someone who knows what is best for the audience and best 
for the country. Between jokes, the president told unionists that they were all members of a 
common family222 and he explained the need for certain policies and reforms. Nevertheless, 
Lula also made promises. He told them: “this companheiro metalúrgico from the North-east 
and from Pernambuco, who arrived at the Presidency of the Republic because of you and 
your responsibility, will not forget his historical commitments” (Estado de S. Paulo 
04/06/03). He received a standing ovation. Yet the president also received boos from a group 
of radical union leaders who opposed the controversial aspects of the government policies. 
The master of improvisation, Lula told the dissidents: “You know that I do not mind boos. To 
me boos are as important as applauses. Some people used to boo me because I intended to 
create the PT. Some people even booed me because I wanted to create CUT…” (Estado de S. 
Paulo 04/06/03). 
During his first months in office, Lula held several meetings with representatives of the 
labour, indigenous, anti-poverty, religious, and women’s movements, giving their agendas 
prominence, praising “their work” and expressing “sympathy for their aims”, while 
simultaneously asking for support and, no less important, for their “patience” (Hochstetler 
2004:10). In many of these meetings, as in most of his speeches, Lula reminded his audience 
of his humble origins and proudly spoke of his social background.223  Initially, the president 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 “(…) Every time I participate in a CUT Congress”, he began by saying, “I feel as if I was at home talking to 
my wife and my sons, I feel as if I was in my house among companheiros” (Estado de S. Paulo 04/06/03). 
223 This practice, which resembled those of charismatic leaders, was not used in order to present himself as a 
messianic agent of “massive social change” (Ansell and Fish 1999:288). Instead, he assumed a more 
“representational role” similar to a “quasi-charismatic” phenomenon which, according to Ansell and Fish, takes 
place in parties with strong internal ideological divisions, such as the PT, in which the leader of the triumphant 
group emerges as a quasi-charismatic figure. Examples of quasi-charismatic parties include Britain’s 
Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher and the U.S. Republican Party under Ronald Reagan. In the late 
1970s, neither of those parties were divided deeply along territorial lines but both possessed a clear division 
between moderate and far-Right-wing tendencies (Ansell and Fish 1999:293). 
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also relied on this personal leadership to relate to the MST, to appease that organisation and 
buy time. Lula and his inner circle were reluctant to conduct the type of land reform that the 
movement demanded – that is, one characterised by massive expropriations of unproductive 
land. Once in office, the government prevaricated for several months, arguing that they had to 
put the house in order (Bradford 2009:530). Only after the MST had initiated a national 
campaign of land occupations did Lula receive a delegation of members from the 
movement’s National Directorate. During the meeting, the president assured his visitors that 
land reform was not only a “historical commitment” that he had long embraced, but also a 
“measure of justice”, and he promised a “peaceful” (Folha de S. Paulo 03/06/03), but 
nonetheless “massive land reform” (Betto 2007:148). For a brief moment the cameras 
registered that the President wore a red MST cap, with the inscription “Land reform: For a 
Brazil without latifundio”. Lula’s words and actions seemed to seduce the attendants. Clearly 
excited, the intellectual guide and most visible figure of the MST, Jõao Pedro Stédile, told the 
press: “Land reform is like a football match and the government plays on our side. We will 
beat the landowners 5-0” (Folha de S. Paulo 03/07/03). Another leader of the MST, Gilmar 
Mauro, claimed: “Lula represents a great hope (…) There is no doubt that he is going to 
undertake land reform” (Folha de S. Paulo 03/07/03). In the next chapter I will show how 
and why land reform eventually made little progress during the Lula years.  
CUT and other union leaders were particularly influenced by Lula’s leadership. For them, the 
election of a former metalworker had a “strong symbolic character” and it was seen as the 
“culmination of a historical process”, as CUT’s president from 2006 emphasised during my 
interview with him (Henrique 15/04/09). This symbolic character was so important that 
among certain union leaders the president benefitted from unquestioning support. One of 
them was CUT’s Vice President, José Antonio Lópes Feijóo, who belongs to the ABC 
Metalworker’s Trade Union, the same one in which Lula initiated his trajectory as a union 
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leader. Lópes Feijóo went as far as saying: “Even if the government had performed very 
poorly, it still would have been [an] incredibly important [government] because we were able 
to elect a president as a result of 30 years of struggle” (Feijóo 16/12/09). His words show the 
tremendous importance which Lula’s leadership had, and the president could sometimes 
count on something close to a blank cheque for support.  
Lula’s informal leadership, coupled with the strong influence the PT always had over CUT, 
was used to orientate the succession of the Central’s presidency, during its Eighth Congress 
in 2003. Since 1999, the labour peak organisation had been led by João Felício, head of the 
schoolteachers’ union, whose leadership was strongly associated with the public sector 
workers, more combative than unions associated with the private sector at the time. The party 
in government and its supporters opposed his re-election as CUT president, most likely 
because his union base was reluctant to support the reform of the pension fund system, which 
mainly affected Felício’s union base. CUT had a tradition of re-electing its presidents, but 
this time they opted for a candidate supported by Lula: Luiz Marinho.224  According to press 
reports, Marinho was handpicked by Lula and benefited from his endorsement (Correio 
Braziliense 29/01/03; in Leyendeker 2004: LXXVII; Folha de S. Paulo 08/06/03, 
06/07/03).225  Given the inclination of Lula and his government to engage in negotiations 
with civil society organisations, CUT members who supported Marinho argued that his 
experience as a skilful negotiator made him the most suitable candidate for the job (Feijóo 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Luiz Marinho was the leader of the ABC Metalworkers’ Trade Union, in which Lula began his career as a 
social activist. Marinho was elected president of CUT in June 2003 with 1,950 votes: by 74.6 percent of all the 
delegates (Folha de S. Paulo 08/06/03).  
225 This version was corroborated by scholars and members of CUT’s National Executive Commission 
interviewed for this study (Celestino 16/12/09; Galvão 2007; Morães 16/12/09; Moroni 07/07/09; Oliveira 
2006). CUT leaders from the Metalworkers’ sector who supported Marinho’s candidacy, however, deny Lula’s 
involvement in the process, arguing that the organisation had always been “autonomous” from governments 
(Feijóo 16/12/09; Severo 15/12/09). 
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16/12/09).226  Those who supported Felício, in contrast, claim that the former schoolteacher 
intended to adopt a more critical and independent position towards the government (Celestino 
16/12/09).  
Under Marinho’s leadership, CUT did not automatically assume a pro-government position. 
However, it intended to mediate between its grassroots and the government. In the reform of 
the pension fund system, for instance, the organisation did not give full support to public 
sector unions, despite the importance of this category within CUT. In principle, the Central 
did not oppose the reform as a whole, but tried to negotiate with the administration in order to 
soften some of its most sensitive aspects (Folha de S. Paulo 18/07/03; Galvão 2007:3-4). 
Public sector unions, however, took a hard line, formally requesting that the bill be 
withdrawn from Congress and eventually voting for a general strike (Folha de S. Paulo 
17/06/03, 27/06/03). CUT leadership was initially reluctant to support the strike and refused 
to sign a petition requesting the bill’s withdrawal (Folha de S. Paulo 11/06/03, 17/06/03, 
06/07/03).227 Eventually, the Central had no option but to support the strike, although it never 
organised any strong resistance against the government’s proposal (Galvão 2007:4). The 
reform was passed in Congress without major changes (Folha de S. Paulo 06/08/03).  
Lula da Silva did not assert an incontestable leadership among social organisations of a “cult 
of personality” type. However, the combination between his leadership over the PT socio-
political field and his role as chief of the Executive branch and head of state, promoted 
asymmetrical relationships that were reinforced by other types of linkages, as I will show. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 When Marinho was elected as CUT’s new president, he no longer led a highly mobilised or a politically 
strong organisation (Oliveira 2006). However, he had played a key role in promoting sector specific agreements 
(Feijóo 16/12/09). Marinho epitomised the so-called “propositive trade unionism”, which emerged during the 
1990s, promoting bargaining processes with both the business sector and the government (Galvão 2004:238), as 
explained in Chapter 3. 
227 The reform of the pension funds system was not the only occasion in which CUT failed to support strike 
actions of a particular CUT affiliated sector. In 2004, the organisation made “all possible attempts” to avoid a 
strike decided by the public sector bank workers, most likely because it could affect the municipal elections that 
were to take place that same year (García 2008:144). In 2006 something similar happened in the context of the 
2006 presidential election (Galvão 2007:4).  
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This leadership did not necessarily act as an element of control, but it did help to diminish or 
neutralise potential sources of opposition in civil society and to reduce the scope of 
contentious forms of collective action. The strategy did not necessarily have the same effects 
in different segments of the PT field, either because not all social groups shared the same 
type of historical identity with Lula’s persona or because not all of them did as well under his 
administration. Lula’s leadership was more effective among union leaders, particularly 
among labour confederations in the industrial sector, in which he started his career as a social 
leader. The case of the MST is interesting because despite the fact that the national leadership 
eventually criticised the economic policy adopted and the slow pace on land reform, it 
avoided criticisms of the government as a whole, and even less of Lula. Possibly this was 
because the president had become increasingly popular among the MST grassroots and the 
inhabitants of the settlements had benefited from pro-poor government policies that were 
clearly associated with his leadership. MST leaders were well aware of this (Rangel 08/04/09; 
Santos 07/05/09). The way in which Lula’s leadership affected specific segments in civil 
society, however, needs further research. 
8.3 Reward-based linkages I: handing out jobs  
Studies on the PT and the Lula administration have not paid sufficient attention to the effects 
of reward-based linkages established through the distribution of jobs. Beyond general 
criticisms of co-optation, the implications of the inclusion of several social activists and trade 
union leaders in government have remained largely unexplored,228 and are virtually absent in 
case studies on the MST during the Lula years. Here I look at some of these implications and 
how this strategy helped to secure social governability by making several social leaders part 
of the administration. In the literature of social movements, the allocation of jobs in 
government, understood as patronage, tends to be regarded in negative terms, as part of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Hochstetler (2004:11) is one of the only scholars who addressed the issue, although she did not explore it in 
depth. 
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strategy used to co-opt social organisations or their most influential leaders (Blondel 2002; 
Morlino 1998; Selznick 1966). In Brazil, some scholars and public intellectuals, social 
activists and members of the PT Left, as well as the mass media, suggested during the Lula 
years that the inclusion of civil society in government was part of a deliberate process of co-
optation (Barbosa 02/12/08; Galvão 2007; Garcia 2008; Moroni 07/07/09; Oliveira 2006; 
Ricci 2007b), particularly observed in the case of CUT, but also in other organisations such 
as the Housing Movement. If co-optation is understood as a process by which an individual 
or a group leaves its concerns aside or “sells out”, as the term is most commonly understood, 
this research did not find strong evidence, at least not in a way that can be generalised to the 
whole spectrum of civil society organisations.  
 
As Hochstetler (2004:11) noticed, the party in government at the national level reproduced 
the recruitment practice put in place by the PT in its local administrations and analysed in 
previous chapters. There was a significant change of scale, however, given the fact that in 
Brazil the Executive branch has discretionary power to recruit up to 47,000 bureaucrats 
within line ministries, government agencies and state foundations (Souza 2009b). At the 
highest levels, several positions were occupied by leaders of social organisations, cadres 
strongly associated with them, or former leaders who had made political careers within the 
PT.229 A survey study on the social composition of the Brazilian state apparatus since the 
administration of José Sarney shows the extent to which the Lula government modified the 
profile of the government elite. Among the highest officials of the first Lula administration, 
from directorate level upwards,230 the survey showed that 46 percent belonged to a social 
movement, 42.8 percent were members of a trade union, while 10.6 percent participated in 
the leadership of a labour peak confederation (Souza 2009a:43-4).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 It is not always easy to draw a clear line between those who are still social leaders or active members of a 
social organisation although they have mostly followed political careers.    
230 In the Brazilian public administration the highest levels are the upper level directions (or Direções de 
Asesoramento Superiores, DAS), level 5 and 6; and the special posts (or Cargos de Natureza Especial, NES).  
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Leaders from many organisations in the PT field were invited to participate in government on 
a sector-specific basis in which the distribution of quotas became standard practice. Among 
others, many leaders of the Housing Movement, or intellectuals identified with their 
demands, were appointed to the newly created Ministry of Cities;231 associates of the 
National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG) occupied several positions in 
the Ministry of Rural Development,232 while MST negotiated positions in INCRA and its 
offices in several states, in spite of the fact that most MST leaders deny an involvement in the 
administrative apparatus. 233 One of these appointees was Clarice dos Santos, a key 
interviewee for this study. Clarice developed her political career simultaneously in the MST 
and the PT in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, and participated at leadership level in both 
organisations. In 2005 she received support from the MST to become Director of the National 
Programme of Education and Land Reform (PRONERA) at INCRA. 
 
Unlike most organisations, CUT-affiliated trade union leaders or former leaders were 
rewarded with jobs throughout the administrative apparatus.234 In his first administration, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 According to Evaniza Rodrigues (12/12/08), a member of the executive committee of the National Union of 
Popular Housing (UNMP) who became Under Secretary of Urban Policy, at least ten leaders of the Housing 
Movement became government officials in the first Lula administration.   
232 CONTAG negotiated the appointment of at least three important Secretaries in the Ministry of Rural 
Development: Technical Assistance, Rural Credit and Territorial Reorganisation (Bradford 2009). 
233 MST leaders offer different versions about their involvement in government. In general, its main leaders tend 
to deny that they negotiated positions in the Lula administration. In 2007, when I interviewed João Pedro 
Stédile, he said: “The MST and the social movements have no participation in the government whatsoever. On 
the contrary, we behave with total autonomy. The only difference is that today we have more friends occupying 
public office, people who might pick up a phone call from us, which did not happen before” (Stédile 06/11/07). 
One and a half years later, Alexandre Rangel said: “Officially, the MST did not appoint anyone in the federal 
government. The movement was consulted on certain occasions, but that’s different. We have resisted making 
such kinds of appointments, which CONTAG does, because we want to remain independent” (Rangel 08/04/09). 
However, when I asked Clarice dos Santos whether the appointment of many cadres to INCRA “who 
sympathise with the MST” was part of negotiation with the government, she gave a straight forward answer: 
“Yes, I was never involved in those talks, but I know they took place. All social movements made these sorts of 
negotiations” (Santos 07/04/09). 
234 The high number of trade union leaders in comparison with other organisations should not be entirely 
surprising. Despite the fact that union leaders were not the only social group represented in the party (among 
middle level elites 28 percent of the PT delegates belonged to a social organisation in 2001, according to Ribeiro 
(2008:155), many of them were particularly influential within the party and had already achieved  successful 
political careers. In contrast to other social organisations, unions were a particularly powerful actor in the 
National Congress. In 2002, for instance, 74 union leaders were elected as national deputies, while 40 of them 
were PT members. To offer a contrasting example, the PT rural caucus in the Chamber of Deputies, which 
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Lula appointed 12 union leaders as ministers – about one third of the cabinet positions (Souza 
2009b). Between 2003 and 2007, the Ministry of Labour was consecutively occupied by three 
members of CUT: in 2003, by Jacques Wagner, from the oil sector trade union; between 2004 
and 2005 by Ricardo Berzoini, a leader of the bank sector trade union who remained active 
until the late 1990s, and finally, by Luiz Marinho.235  Union leaders or former union members 
also occupied between 50 and 60 senior positions at the level of Secretaries and thousands of 
second and third level jobs (Jornal do Brasil 15/09/03, in Hochstetler 2004:11). According to 
Francisco de Oliveira (Oliveira 2003, in 2005:1251), a sociologist and former PT intellectual, 
neither President Vargas nor Jõao Goulart appointed so many trade unionists when in power. 
Despite the fact that some observers have pointed this out in negative terms, it is undeniable 
that the incorporation of leaders of a popular origin who did not have meaningful access to 
the administration in the past had great importance.236  
 
The inclusion of social activists and trade union leaders in government, regarded as a natural 
phenomenon by many interviewees (Bemerguy 20/07/09; Felício 28/10/08; Lacerda 
22/07/09),237 did have consequences. The labour peak organisation had difficulties in 
maintaining its independence to criticise and put pressure on the government, particularly 
during Lula’s first years in office, as many of its members acknowledged (Celestino 
16/12/09; Henrique 15/04/09; Nespolo 16/12/08). Members of CUT’s Secretariat wondered 
whether this situation created “an identity crisis” in which “even those cadres who were not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
gathers together legislators linked with popular rural organisations, only had 16 members. Given the fact that the 
main battles to achieve governability were taking place in Congress, the high number of trade union leaders in 
government compared to other organisations makes sense. 
235 Marinho had no previous experience in public office or in the party bureaucracy. After leading CUT for two 
years, he came to government in 2005 to become the Minister for Labour. Two years later, he became the 
Minister for Social Security. 
236 The number of trade union leaders in government is impressive if one considers that the union membership 
rate in Brazil is only 14.5 percent and, during the Lula administration only 5 percent of the high ranking officials 
were part of a business organisation (Souza 2009b, 2009a).  
237 Jõao Felício (28/10/08) argued, for instance: “It is natural for the PT to appoint cadres from its own social 
base in government positions in the same way as the PSDB or the DEM, during the Cardoso administration, 
appointed businessmen to public office. Besides, those who participate in the administration do it as individuals, 
not as representatives of the trade union movement. CUT has never abandoned the principle of autonomy”. 
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properly in the administration considered themselves as being the government” (Celestino 
16/12/09, my emphasis). “People were very confused about what was the government, what 
was the party and what was the union”, CUT’s president, Arthur Henrique, recalls.  
 
This study could not find sufficient evidence confirming cases of co-optation during the Lula 
administration. In any case, the experience offers contrasting examples. In some situations, 
organisations were successful in using government spaces to promote their own agendas;238 
in others, former social leaders promoted policies or reforms that were opposed by the 
organisations in which they used to participate.239  Interestingly, some civil society leaders 
argued that, despite the fact that having cadres in government created constraints, it also gave 
them the capacity to make direct demands on their colleagues who were occupying 
administrative jobs and to hold them more accountable.240 Further research conducted on a 
case-specific basis needs to be done, however, in order to have a general view of potential 
cases of co-optation through the distribution of jobs. In this study, where the main focus is on 
the party side of the relationship, it was not possible to achieve that task.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 For instance, CUT leaders, former and present, who became Ministers for Labour were able to promote 
minimum wage increases that benefited various categories of workers, in negotiations with different labour peak 
organisations (see Chapter 9). Likewise, housing activists in the Ministry of Cities articulated various demands 
that had been on their agendas for several years. The creation of a ministry capable of articulating housing 
issues, as it occurred, was in itself one of these demands (Rodrigues 12/12/09).  
239 The case of CUT offers two examples. Ricardo Berzoini, as Minister for Social Security, promoted the 
reform of the pension fund’s system, while Luiz Marinho, as Minister for Labour, promoted legislation that 
limited the right to strike among public sector workers, opposed by the labour peak organisation. 
240 Members of CONTAG offered the example of Eugênio Peixoto, an activist from their organisation who was 
appointed in Lula’s first term as Secretary of Territorial Reorganisation in the Ministry of Rural Development. 
CONTAG associates considered that his work had been unsatisfactory and asked Lula for a replacement (Borba 
and Cleia 03/04/08). 
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8.4 Reward-based linkages II: state subsidies  
The allocation of massive state subsidies to civil society organisations and its implications 
during the Lula administration are understudied. While students of the PT paid little attention 
to this issue, case studies on specific organisations, most notably the MST (Branford 2009; 
Meszaros 2009; Sauer 2008; Vergara-Camus 2009) have failed to address this important 
issue. Here I argue that the government’s willingness to distribute an unprecedented amount 
of resources helped to secure social governability, by engaging these groups in intensive 
negotiations with the state or collaborative efforts with the government rather than engaging 
in disruptive forms of collective actions. Without necessarily been co-opted, civil society 
organisations in the PT field tactically used these resources, sometimes to benefit their 
constituencies and maintain the support of their grassroots, sometimes to solve practical 
needs and secure their own material survival. This had consequences, however, because 
organisations in the PT field concentrated most of their time in specific negotiations to obtain 
concrete benefits from their allies in public office that did not necessarily change the rules of 
the game but drove energies away from substantive policy discussions.  
 
The massive allocation of state resources to civil society organisations, a hallmark of the Lula 
administration at a time of economic bonanza, included both the distribution of particularistic 
benefits to specific groups, and the distribution of resources to benefit their constituencies in 
more general ways.241 The government provided generous funding to civil society 
organisations from the start (Hochstetler 2008:48; Soriano 04/11/08), probably more than any 
previous Brazilian administration. Reliable aggregated figures are not available, in great part 
because state funding to social groups has historically lacked transparency in Brazil (Heck 
01/04/09; Moroni 07/07/09; Soriano 04/11/08). According to press sources, in 2003 alone, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 It is not always easy to draw a line between general and particularistic benefits, in part because they 
sometimes overlap. While some state subsidies are the bases of reward-based linkages, others might have more 
programmatic features.  
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civil society organisations received R$ 1.3 billion (US$ 433,333) from the federal 
government (O Globo 03/05/04, in Hochstetler 2008: 48), although this figure was not 
disaggregated.  
 
The administration used very different strategies to allocate public resources among different 
types of social organisations, not only including those in the PT socio-political field.242  Large 
sums were transferred to rural cooperatives and NGOs associated with the MST to provide 
technical assistance, training courses or the like. This policy was initiated by previous 
administrations during the 1990s, as I explained in Chapter 3, but was taken much further by 
the Lula administration. An inquiry carried out by the NGO Contas Abertas (Open Accounts) 
found that between 2003 and 2009 the government provided R$ 152 million to 43 
cooperatives (Folha de S. Paulo 27/02/09, 29/03/09). According to the mass media, usually 
biased against the MST, the main leaders of these organisations were associated with the 
Landless Movement (Veja 02/09/06; Folha de S. Paulo 27/02/09, 29/03/09).243  
 
An indirect type of subsidy derived from the expansion of rural credit for small-scale farmers 
managed by the Ministry of Rural Development, which benefited the members of many rural 
organisations such as CONTAG, the Movement of Small Farmers (MPA) or the MST. The 
National Programme for the Invigoration of Family Agriculture (PRONAF) alone expanded 
from R$2.4 billion in 2001/2002 to 13 billion in 2008 (Branford 2009:538). The expansion of 
this programme was important in promoting small-scale agriculture and alleviating poverty. 
However, it also promoted reward-based linkages. Although the resources of PRONAF were 
directly channelled to its beneficiaries, it is known for instance that the MST charges its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 State-owned companies, for instance, were an important source of funding. Press reports show that the area 
of Communications in Petrobras, the state-owned oil company, had a R$ 1 billion annual budget that it could 
manage with considerable autonomy. Part of these funds may have benefited social organisations, among other 
actors (Estado de S. Paulo 31/05/09).   
243 MST leaders such as João Pedro Stédile persistently denied that the organisation used any kind of state 
resources to conduct land occupations (Jornal do Brasil 20/10/09). Other leaders even deny that the movement 
receives state resources. According to one of them, “only entities or technicians linked to the movement receive 
money from the government” (Martines 07/07/09). 
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members a portion (usually 3-5 percent) of the credit they receive from the government 
(Harnecker 2003). For these types of reasons observers argue that PRONAF became an 
important source of funding for organisations such as the MST because it eventually provided 
“the means to command further occupations” (Mueller and Mueller 2006:29).  
 
There is no substantive evidence that social organisations ceased to mobilise because they 
received state resources.244 Some organisations even scaled up some forms of protest, 
calculating that there was a government willing to negotiate with them and an opportunity to 
advance their goals.245 By allocating unprecedented state resources, however, the government 
encouraged more moderate mobilisation strategies and modified the way in which many 
organisations related to the executive branch. CONTAG, for instance, maintained its two 
most important national campaigns, the annual Grito da Terra (Cry of the Land), in which 
thousand small rural farmers annually demonstrated against the government and the Marcha 
das Margaridas, which gathered women farmers from all over the country. Notwithstanding, 
these forms of collective action lost their anti-government rhetoric and became occasions on 
which leaders of the main rural federations in CONTAG negotiated the allocation of 
resources with politicians in different ministries (Schmidt 03/12/09). Important demands 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 By and large, civil society organisations experienced different phases in their positions towards the Lula 
administration. The MST shifted from an initial moment in which it characterised the government as an “ally” 
(Gordillo and Gómez 2005:214), to one in which it considered that the administration as a whole was not 
necessarily on its side, and came to criticise specific sectors, policies and institutions. CUT leaders, although 
they never ceased to regard the government as their ally, after the second term realised that they had to put a 
certain amount of pressure on the administration and made some criticisms, in part to avoid alienating their own 
social base (Campos 16/12/09; Celestino 16/12/09; Henrique 15/04/09). 
245 During the Lula administration, for instance, the average of land occupations was 1.2 per day, above the 0.7 
percent of occupations during the two Cardoso administrations. According to the Ministry of Rural 
Development, the total number of land occupations conducted by all rural organisations in the country was 
relatively low during the final two years of the Cardoso administration: 158 in 2001 and 103 in the electoral year 
of 2002.  In 2003 and 2004, however they escalated to 222 and 327 respectively. It is considered that the MST 
was responsible for more than 50 percent of all these occupations (Ministério de Desenvolvimento Agrario 
2008:2). Among the unions, particularly from 2007 when the economy started to grow, the number of strikes 
which had reached very low levels in the late 1990s (only 50 strikes took place in 1998 and 46 in 1999), reached 
316 in 2007 and 411 in 2008 (DIEESE 2008:3; 2007:4; Riethof 2004:39). Certain categories in CUT such as the 
bank sector workers, the electricity sector and, in general, public sector unions, conducted strikes every year 
(Henrique 15/04/09). 
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were fulfilled in these negotiations, such as the credit for small farmers (Santos 03/07/09), 
which expanded even beyond the original expectations.246  
 
The MST also experienced the effects of state subsidies, despite the fact that the organisation 
continued promoting land occupations. This chapter cannot capture in detail the complexities 
of the relationship between this organisation and the Lula government. Suffice it to mention 
that during most of the first year the movement generally supported the government, but 
gradually became less enthusiastic, presumably due to the lack of progress in land reform and 
the conservative economic policy (Hochstetler 2004, 2010; Branford 2009). By the time Lula 
started his second term, the leadership of the MST had adopted a more incendiary rhetoric to 
the extent of arguing that land reform could only take place under Socialism (Martines 
07/07/09).247 Despite this, the allocation of massive state resources shaped the relationship 
with the government and kept confrontations at a manageable level. To a great extent, this 
was also because the organisation became more dependent than ever before on state resources 
for its own survival. Paul Singer, who was Secretary of Fair Trade during the Lula 
administration, put it bluntly: “the MST cannot break [its relationships] with the 
administration because 500,000 people depend on credit from the Ministry of Rural 
Development” (16/04/09).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 Manoel dos Santos (03/07/09), president of CONTAG for 11 years (1997-2009), said “We did not cease to 
mobilise during this government. What happened was that an important part of our demands have been covered. 
We could not, for instance, take to the streets and say “this is a government that does not provide credit”. 
However, we still take to the streets to request the liberation of resources or to demand land reform. We 
certainly mobilise less than with Fernando Henrique Cardoso because the demand for credit has been satisfied in 
this administration”. 
247 Officials in Lula’s inner circle consider that the MST has developed its own political objectives and no 
longer constitutes a social movement. Some of them argue that the MST behaves today like a political party 
(Ant 26/11/08; Dirceu 07/01/09; García 10/04/09). Clara Ant, a close advisor to the president, says: “I have 
great respect for the MST, but they are not a social movement, they are a political party (…) They don’t hold the 
legal status of a party, but clearly behave as one. They pronounce on all sort of topics and have an agenda 
typical of a political party” (Ant 26/11/08). Similarly, José Dirceu (07/01/09) argues: “The MST not only fights 
for land reform, it is more involved in party struggles than in working in the settlements”. Even some MST 
cadres acknowledge that theirs is not just a social movement, but a “political organisation” which has an agenda 
beyond land reform related issues (Santos 03/07/09).  
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The criticisms of the MST towards the Lula administration were always carefully weighted. 
The Landless Movement behaved pragmatically, as a party member in Porto Alegre said, 
“knowing to what extent they could criticise” (Fisher 15/12/08).248 When discussing the 
effects of public funding on the organisation, Clarice dos Santos (07/05/09) argued that the 
MST hardly ever criticised Lula. It condemned certain figures in government, such as the 
Minister for Agriculture or the President of the Central Bank, or it spoke against certain 
policies, but not against the administration as a whole, even less against the President. In 
2005, for instance, when it was clear that land reform was not making progress, the MST 
leadership organised a large protest to show strength and apply pressure. During these events, 
Stédile made it clear that “the march [was] not against the Brazilian government, but for 
agrarian reform and change in economic policy” (Baiocchi and Checa 2007:422).  
 
Clarice Dos Santos, Director of the National Programme for Education and Land Reform 
(PRONERA), a programme which expanded its budget from R$13 to R$70 billion during the 
Lula administration, acknowledged that, in a context in which land reform was not making 
much progress, the resources that the MST obtained during the Lula administration were 
pragmatically used to keep the organisation alive and helped to deliver “concrete benefits to 
its followers”. In her view, “credit, technical assistance and other policies that benefited the 
settlements” are not only “necessary”, but they also “help to acknowledge the role played by 
the MST and maintain its social base” (Santos 07/05/09).249  Some leaders of the MST, such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 The pragmatism of the MST was visible in actions of the following type: By the end of 2004 the movement 
ceased to participate in the large majority of the sectoral policy councils to which it was initially invited by the 
Lula administration. Leaders of the movement justify this decision on the grounds that “they were instruments 
not for state transformation, but for maintaining the capitalist logic” (Rangel 08/04/09). Interestingly, despite the 
organisation having adopted a policy of non-participation in these types of institutions, it eventually agreed to 
integrate the council of the Territorios da Cidadania (Territories of Citizenship), a government programme 
created in 2008 to allocate targeted resources in the 60 poorest regions of the country. The MST decided to 
participate in this programme, as one of its cadres acknowledged, because by doing so it could have access to 
those resources (Rangel 08/04/09). 
249 Santos (07/04/09) reflected during our interview on some of the effects that state subsidies had on the 
organisation: “The amount of public resources [that the movement received] did diminish anti-government 
reactions. We cannot deny that this government made progress in implementing policies that benefited small 
farmers (…) This is a contradiction, with positive and negative effects (…) But the movement also uses this to 
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as Gilmar Mauro, from its National Coordination, argue that state subsidies had a 
domesticating effect. “The head thinks where the feet stand”, he emphasised (07/07/09). 
Other leaders in both the movement and the PT, however, consider the allocation of state 
resources to be a “natural” phenomenon, even a measure of redistributive justice, in a country 
where lobby groups in the business sector have received high subsidies and fiscal exemptions 
for many years (Ferro 02/07/09; Stédile, interviewed by Jornal do Brasil 20/10/09).  
 
The policies of the Lula administration made civil society organisations in the PT field even 
more dependent on state resources than during the years of the post-democratic transition. 
This led them to gravitate more towards the state to obtain benefits and satisfy practical 
interests. According to some interpretations, the massive state resources that these 
organisations received under Lula took them further away from both their own grassroots and 
society in general.250 The relationship between the party in public office and its allies in civil 
society became more instrumental from both sides and less programmatic in content. Rather 
than discussing policies, programmes or projects, it was mostly about bargaining for 
resources. Manoel dos Santos, president of CONTAG, complains for instance that rural 
organisations never came to discuss a “development project for the rural world” capable of 
“articulating consistent actions to promote land reform and develop the existing land 
settlements”. In his opinion, the Lula administration was only different from previous 
governments in this regard because it allocated a large amount of resources in the rural areas. 
However, “the main problem for small scale agriculture is in the planning, management and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
continue with its struggle for land reform. The MST could not just carry on with the land reform issue. It needs 
to provide concrete achievements and combine strategies; sometimes it needs to be more pragmatic (…) The 
movement could not survive just by having a radical strategy”. 
250 Jorge Camilo, a city councillor in the North-eastern state of Paraíba, who initiated his trajectory as a 
progressive lawyer representing trade unions and other organisations, complained: “Social movements today 
spend most of their energies in the relationship with the government and very little in society. They no longer 
form popular assemblies or promote any initiative that invites civil society to participate in larger public 
discussions” (16/11/10).  
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execution of policies”. CONTAG´s president regrets: “Sadly, we never discussed [with this 
government] the agricultural model that we wanted to implement” (Santos 03/07/09).251 
 
8.4 Direct and inter-personal linkages: complicity and mutual understanding  
In Chapter 1, I introduced the concept of direct and inter-personal linkages as a contribution 
to the literature on party – civil society relationships. These types of linkages establish an 
unmediated and informal interaction between party and social leaders based on their personal 
connections.252 After examining some of its implications for PT sub-national government 
experiences (see Chapter 4), here I look at its implications at the national level. Just as they 
did at the local level, direct and inter-personal linkages played an important role in relating 
the PT in public office with its social bases in the field. These linkages were in most cases 
simultaneously direct and inter-personal because they entailed a frequent and unmediated 
interaction between social leaders and high ranking government officials (some of them 
social leaders themselves), largely based on friendship or connections forged along the years. 
By activating these types of linkages, social organisations could lobby the administration and 
bargain with it in order to obtain public goods or shape certain policies. In doing so, they 
were not inventing a particularly new form of interaction between society and the state. In a 
country like Brazil, where personal connections (“who you know”) are the dominant currency 
in most social transactions, as the Brazilian anthropologist Roberto DaMatta (1991:8) has 
observed, the popular organisations of the PT field simply incorporated a strategy that the 
elites have long used to obtain advantages from the authorities. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 This had serious consequences, as dos Santos (03/07/09) also argued, because “the Lula administration did 
not have and did not manage to articulate a development policy for small-scale family agriculture. It only had a 
programme to deliver credit”. A similar vision was shared by some high-ranking officials in government. One of 
them said anonymously: “Lula did not alter land reform related policies. He only delivered the INCRA structure 
to social movements. What was done was the continuation of the policies of the previous administration, only 
with more money”.  
252 A similar concept was used by Heller in his study on the relationship between the ANC and the Civics 
movement in South Africa, referred to by the author as “inter-personal connections” (Heller 2003:168).  
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Direct and inter-personal linkages were a double weapon. On the one hand, they facilitated 
formal and informal negotiations at the federal level and gave social organisations further 
access to the state. Important officials revealed that the meetings between high ranking 
officials and social leaders were constant, despite not being always publicly announced 
(Ananias 16/07/09; Cassel 04/12/08; Singer 02/07/09).253  On the other hand, these types of 
linkages promoted relationships that were not always transparent, participatory or democratic. 
Social activists argue that important decisions were taken “at the highest levels” based on the 
“proximity of personal relationships” between the main social leaders and high ranking 
government officials (Borba and Cleia 03/04/08). In many cases the grassroots were not 
consulted and knew little about the agreements made. Direct and inter-personal linkages, 
which worked in two ways, created complicity, expectations of mutual understanding and 
acceptance of the logic under which the government had to operate. The president of CUT, 
Arthur Henrique, argued that one of the problems during the first two years of the Lula 
administration was that “those who were in government, because we were friends, thought 
that we had to understand their difficulties and help them solve the most immediate issues” 
(Henrique 15/04/09). In addition, the fact that social leaders had their acquaintances or allies 
in the administration made them less inclined to public criticism,254 and more prone to 
offering each other political support.  
 
Direct and inter-personal linkages were particularly useful for the PT in public office because 
they helped to persuade some of the closest PT allies in civil society to internalise concerns 
with governability, to which social leaders were not directly exposed, and to support the 
strategy to make it possible. It was often as a result of private talks that leaders understood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 With the MST, for instance, the government had very frequent interaction, despite the fact that negotiations 
did not always take place in institutionalised spaces. Lula’s second Minister for Rural Development, Guilherme 
Cassel (04/12/08), acknowledged that his office had a “direct interlocution” with the movement.  
254 A very common justification for not criticising the government was that such an action could give more 
power to the right (or “fazer o jogo a direita”, as it is often known) (Santos 07/04/09; Henrique 15/04/09).  
245	  
	  
that they had to “measure” their actions and maintain what they called “pressure with 
responsibility” (Borba and Cleia 03/04/08), since assuming certain positions or promoting 
radical actions would support the opposition or undermine the government (Borba and Cleia 
03/04/08; Feijóo 06/12/09). To a certain extent, these linkages were also helpful in promoting 
discipline. Leaders mentioned anonymously, for instance, how they received “gentle phone 
calls” from their allies in government, which included appeals for moderation whenever they 
conducted actions that could be considered radical (anonymous source). Many social leaders 
realised that their position as members of the PT field created limitations, but there was also a 
trade-off, knowing that they had a privileged relationship with the administration that was 
advantageous in terms of giving them access to the state. Two members of CONTAG 
reflected as follows:  
 
[Having your allies in office is always a limitation] However, if you need to demand 
something from those government figures that you have appointed in government or from 
those leaders with whom you have had a partnership for a long time, your demands are 
even stronger because they are your allies. If they don’t react properly to your criticism 
they can have serious problems. Precisely because you have had such a strong 
partnership, you also have the freedom to make personal criticisms (Borba and Cleia 
03/04/08). 
 
Direct and inter-personal linkages had two more important consequences: Firstly, they 
brought civil society organisations closer to the party in public office and made them less 
interested in the party in central office, thus weakening programmatic and participatory 
linkages within the party structure. PT members who led setoriais, spaces in which PT 
members who took part in certain movements discussed and promoted public policies, 
explained during our interviews how these institutions, in which social leaders had a more 
enthusiastic participation in the past, lost dynamism as bodies of policy formulation. Many 
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social leaders, occupied as they were with their relations with the administration, ceased to 
attend meetings or sent leaders of secondary importance (Gonçalves and Guareto 02/12/08). 
Secondly, direct/inter-personal linkages, as in previous PT local government experiences, 
diverted energies away from participatory policies, as it made party leaders in public office 
and social actors lose interest in institutions of participatory governance, as I showed in 
previous chapters. In some cases, these institutions were not regarded as particularly 
necessary, given that leaders could obtain benefits, either particularistic or general, through 
their inter-personal relationships.255  
 
Final remarks 
I have looked at four elements that helped the Lula administration to construct social 
governability: the strong leadership exercised by Lula over the PT field; the distribution of 
jobs in the state apparatus; the allocation of massive state subsidies; and the existence of 
direct and inter-personal linkages between party and social leaders. There is another factor, 
however, that contributed to social governability and which I analyse in the next chapter: the 
willingness of the party in public office to maintain its programmatic linkages with its allies 
in civil society, although conditioned by the balance of forces among strategic actors. The 
combination of all these features managed to produce a certain arrangement that allowed the 
PT in public office to maintain the political support of its social base, generated a reasonable 
level of social stability, maintained disruptive collective actions at manageable levels and 
decreased the level of criticisms against the administration.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 For instance, in the rural sector no participatory mechanism was institutionalised to deliberate over land 
reform related issues during the Lula administration. According to an advisor to the Minister for Rural 
Development, who spoke anonymously, this was not because the administration was reluctant to institutionalise 
such a mechanism, but because no actor posed such a demand. This absence, however, did not concern PT 
members in the ministry either. After all, as the same advisor said, “we are dealing with people with whom we 
have shared political activism all our lives”.  
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In this work I have not relied on the general assumption that reward-based linkages 
necessarily generate relationships of subordination, control or co-optation. This approach was 
useful because it allowed a more nuanced understanding of the complexities of the 
relationships between the party in public office and its social allies. During the Lula years, 
many of these allies made a trade-off which had positive and negative consequences. 
Working in government, for instance, helped some leaders to promote their agendas, but it 
generated constraints and often made them lose critical capacity; receiving massive resources 
helped to improve the lives of small farmers and the practical needs of their organisations, but 
made civil society organisations gravitate almost entirely around the state, and be less 
concerned in modifying rules and the status quo; exploiting personal connections sometimes 
helped to redistribute public goods and shape certain policies, but promoted relationships that 
were not always participatory and democratic. 
 
Authors have argued that, by depending on the state for jobs or subsidies, social organisations 
become organisationally weak and narrow their activities to very specific concerns 
(Middlebrook 1995), while in their discretionary logic they promote a detachment from 
broader programmatic interests (Roberts 2002). Further research needs to be done to find if 
this is what occurred during the Lula years. As far as the PT is concerned, however, the 
increasing predominance of reward-based linkages is regrettable because it was often at the 
expense of programmatic linkages or undermining the scope of institutions of participatory 
governance which were one of the elements that made the PT a qualitatively different 
political party. Indeed, programmatic linkages, as well as the promotion of participatory 
mechanisms, which are analysed in the next two chapters, were some of the elements that 
challenged the predominant way by which the Brazilian state and political parties have 
historically related to civil society organisations and citizens at large. 
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9. Programmatic linkages: accomplishments within the balance of forces  
 
The relationships that parties in public office establish with civil society organisations are 
largely shaped by the different governability dimensions – political, economic and social. 
Within the possibilities of Lula’s elite-centred strategy, I contend, the capacity of the PT to 
maintain its programmatic linkages with civil society organisations and to deliver on its 
campaign promises, largely depended on the balance of forces among the most relevant 
strategic actors for governability on any given issue and their relative power. Based on this 
approach, I show how the PT in national executive public office established bargains in order 
to balance the interests of its allies in civil society vis-á-vis dominant strategic actors. The PT 
in government was willing to maintain programmatic linkages with these allies and deliver on 
its main campaign pledges. In doing so, however, the party had to perform in a way which 
would not damage the relationships with the dominant strategic actors and put at risk its elite-
centred governability strategy.  
 
Allegations of co-optation, control or subordination of civil society under Lula are largely 
unfounded, among other reasons because PT social allies and their grassroots did manage to 
obtain gains under his administration. Party leaders in public office and their social allies 
maintained a dialectic process characterised by convergence and divergence of goals and 
interests. As social leaders eventually understood, the Lula administration was a government 
in which a wide range of groups, classes and ideologies were represented, constantly trying to 
promote their views and advance their interests (Henrique 15/04/09; Stédile 06/09/07). In 
their bargains with the Lula administration, social allies in the PT field obtained different 
results. In the following pages I study three scenarios which resulted in different outcomes 
for civil society organisations, and which I label, following the perceptions of social leaders 
interviewed for this study, as “limited progress”, “relative victories” and “substantial 
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achievements”.256 Land reform is an example of a limited progress experienced by 
organisations such as the MST; the trade union reform illustrates the case of a relative victory 
for the trade unions in the PT field, while the rise of the minimum wage exemplifies a 
substantial achievement. Thus, by and large, the objectives of civil society organisations had 
a limited progress when the interests of powerful strategic actors were at stake, and such 
actors articulated significant pressure to protect their interests. Relative victories took place 
when a wide range of strategic actors negotiated in more or less equal terms, but did not 
manage to reach consensus after long negotiations. Finally, substantive achievements were 
possible when certain decisions did not face a strong and articulated opposition among the 
dominant strategic actors, but also when the government had greater margins for 
manoeuvring. 
 
This chapter is divided in three sections, each looking at the main scenarios described above. 
Section 1 explores land reform as a case of limited progress in which strategic actors such as 
landowners and the agribusiness sector used their veto power, reinforced by conservative 
parties representing their interests in the National Congress. Section 2 looks at the labour and 
trade union reforms in which, despite multiple negotiations among a wide range of groups, 
the lack of consensus resulted in only relative victories for PT allies. Finally, Section 3 
analyses the minimum wage increases, considered a major achievement of the Lula 
administration, and studies the conditions under which they became possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 These labels capture the views of a number of social leaders expressed during the interviews. Among others 
Lisboa (21/10/10), Moraes (16/12/09 and Severo (15/12/09), In CUT; Martines (07/07/09), Rangel (08/04/09) 
and Stédile (06/09/07), in the MST, and Beze (03/07/09), Borba and Cleia (03/04/08) in CONTAG. 
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9.1 Land reform: the veto power of dominant strategic actors  
Several scholars have argued that land reform, mainly understood as expropriation for 
redistribution, made little progress during the Lula administration (Boito 2005:60; Carter 
2010; Ondetti 2006; Sauer 2008; Vergara-Camus 2009). The assessment of the MST is that 
land reform under Lula did not go deeper or any faster than during the Cardoso 
administration and the land structure in the country was not significantly altered (Santos 
07/05/09).The aim of this section is to highlight the way in which the veto power of the 
dominant strategic actors created obstacles to obtaining meaningful gains in a policy area 
embraced by the PT since its creation and which constituted the basis of a strong 
programmatic linkage with the MST and other organisations. I have explained that these 
linkages were weakened during the 1990s, as a result of the electoral strategy adopted by the 
PT (See Chapter 3). In the following pages I show how the strategy to achieve political and 
economic governability weakened these linkages even further once Lula assumed national 
executive public office.   
 
Despite the fact that Lula softened his discourse on land reform during the 1990s, his 
electoral manifesto in 2002 still incorporated a pledge to conduct a land reform capable of 
altering the highly unequal land structure in the country (Coligação Lula Presidente 
2002a:21-2). This objective was formally endorsed when the administration adopted the 
Second National Plan on Land Reform.257 In the quota logic promoted by his administration, 
Lula invited Plínio de Arruda Sampãio, an MST sympathiser and member of the PT Left, to 
coordinate the drafting of this plan in negotiations between government representatives and 
rural organisations. The document emphasised that state expropriation of unproductive 
properties would be one of the main strategies for the redistribution of land. After long 
discussions it was established that before the end of the first Lula administration 400,000 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 The First National Plan on Land Reform was issued by the Sarney administration in 1985. 
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families would receive new land, while another 500,000 squatter families would be granted 
legal rights to their plots, and 130,000 would receive credit to purchase land (INCRA 2004). 
 
Although the expropriation of unproductive rural property on the grounds of wider social 
interests is contemplated in the Brazilian Constitution,258 in order to expropriate a vast 
amount the government needed to modify the land productivity indices, which set the legal 
criteria under which a property can be considered unproductive, and thus subject to 
expropriation. These indices, which dated back to 1975, reflected the realities of another 
period and made it difficult to justify mass expropriations.259 Because the indices take no 
account of massive leaps in productivity and Brazil’s newfound status as an agricultural 
superpower, they artificially restricted the supply of land available for redistribution 
(Meszaros 2009:580). The II National Plan on Land Reform, therefore, established that the 
indices would be updated, a measure that did not necessarily require congressional approval. 
Despite the fact that the government had the power to do so by decree, it never updated these 
indices.   
 
From the outset, Lula and his inner circle regarded land reform as a divisive issue that could 
generate political and economic instability; “a source of problems” (Borba and Cleia 
03/04/08), in short. Even before the election, Lula knew that powerful interests were clearly 
against land expropriation and acknowledged the implications that a massive land reform 
would have for his governability strategy. On the one hand, Lula and his closest advisors on 
rural issues considered the importance of the agribusiness sector as a source of macro-
economic stability. On the other hand, this group expected that strong opposition against land 
reform would most likely come from the National Congress, in which the lobby groups of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 According to Articles 184 and 185 of the Brazilian Constitution, the Union has powers to expropriate on 
account of social interest, for purposes of agrarian reform, any rural property which is not performing its social 
function, except when it comes to productive land (National Constituent Assembly 1988). 
259 Meszaros (2009:580) argues that these indices take no account whatsoever of massive leaps in productivity 
and Brazil’s newfound status as an agricultural superpower, thereby artificially restricting the supply of land 
available for redistribution. 
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landowners have played a key role for several years (Arruda Sampãio 11/12/08; Borba and 
Cleia 03/04/08; Russo 01/12/08; Teixeira 07/04/09).  
 
By the time Lula assumed the Presidency, the agribusiness sector260 represented more than 20 
percent of Brazilian GDP (Teixeira 2009:25) and played a key role in achieving a primary 
surplus and a favourable trade balance. These objectives were part of the core commitments 
that Lula made to the financial sector in his “Letter to the Brazilian People”, as mentioned in 
earlier chapters. Given that the economy was in a critical situation, members of Lula’s inner 
circle considered from the beginning that the public accounts would be heavily dependent on 
the performance of the agribusiness. Gerson Teixeira, a PT Parliamentary advisor on rural 
issues who participated in drafting the party’s rural programme, recalls that for these reasons 
Lula’s advisors did not want to do “anything” that could “upset” such an important sector 
(Teixeira 07/04/09). These estimations were confirmed already in the first year, when the 
exports of agribusiness reached US$ 25. 8 billion, US$ 1 billion more than the total trade 
balance (US$ 24.8 billion in one year). Without this successful performance, Brazil’s trade 
balance would have been in the red. It was clear to the government that the agribusiness 
sector was “an essential element to balance the public finances” (Russo 01/12/08), hence to 
support economic governability.  
 
The other important factor that Lula’s inner circle could not ignore was the great strength of 
landowners and the agribusiness sector in the National Congress. Indeed, the Bancada 
Ruralista (or rural caucus) constitutes one of the strongest lobby groups in the National 
Congress, consisting in those years of around 200 deputies from various political parties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 Strictly speaking, any exchange of agricultural merchandise would fall into the category of agribusiness, 
whether practised by small farmer or large rural enterprises. Among Brazilian landless workers, however, the 
term is rhetorically usually used to define a specific way of organising rural activities which usually involves 
large properties, and a high degree of specialisation dedicated to satisfying the demands of external markets, 
monoculture, the use of pesticides and high technology.  
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(mainly PFL, PMDB, PSDB, PP and PR). These legislators were either landowners 
themselves, members of the agricultural business chambers, such as the ultra-conservative 
Brazilian Agriculture and Livestock Confederation (CNA), or parliamentarians directly 
associated with their interests.261 Through the years, this powerful strategic actor has 
systematically opposed land reform.262 Margarida Teixeira (2009), who conducted an 
investigation on the Bancada Ruralista, shows that the influence of this group on the 
parliamentary agenda in rural issues often exceeds the power of the executive branch, usually 
preponderant in most legislative agendas. According to Gerson Teixeira (07/04/09), members 
of Lula’s inner circle argued before the election that embracing land reform decisively could 
generate an “uprising from the rural caucus in Parliament” and stimulate a “conservative 
political reaction against the future government”. 
Testimonies gathered for this study reflect that from the outset Lula himself considered land 
reform politically unviable and even counter-productive. Being a politician who “doesn’t like 
conflict”, as many party leaders describe him (Pereira 04/04/09; Pomar 30/09/08 and 
08/04/09; Rodrigues 13/11/08; Soriano 31/10/09) the hopes for land reform were probably 
truncated from the beginning. Nevertheless, the Lula administration could not simply leave 
off the agenda a discourse that was mapped in the PT “genetic model” and still had many 
adherents within the PT field.263 Furthermore, the government could not leave this agenda on 
the side because the MST, one of its most important historical allies, was capable of 
disruptive practices. In the years prior to Lula’s arrival in power, for instance, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 73 percent of the members of this lobby group own rural property, while 45 percent of them have between 
100 and 1,000 hectares of land (Teixeira 2009:74). 
262 The rural caucus was so determined to block attempts to conduct land expropriation that it even rejected a 
constitutional amendment bill (PEC 438/2001) that would facilitate the expropriation of land in rural properties 
in which slave labour still takes place. 
263 Even in 2007, during the Third PT National Congress, the party dedicated several pages of its final resolution 
to reaffirming its commitment to land reform (Partido dos Trabalhadores 2007:55-2) The large majority of party 
leaders interviewed for this study (79 percent) still consider land reform a relevant matter. I gathered the opinion 
of 78 party leaders from different factions. Even within Lula’s faction (CNB), 62 percent of them still regard 
land reform as a relevant topic. Within Left Articulation, the cause has 100 percent of adherents (see Appendix 
III for details). 
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organisation had increasingly started to invade government offices, blocking roads and 
promoting other actions that not only aimed at forcing land expropriation, but also, among 
other objectives, to ensure its share in the fight for scarce public resources (Mueller and 
Mueller 2006). The MST was not a threat to political stability as a whole, but its importance 
could not be underestimated.264 For that reason, Lula acted as “an administrator of balances 
between contradictory interests” (Russo 01/12/08). As in other areas, his government aimed 
at accommodating strategic actors however antagonistic and polarised their views were. One 
of the main strategies of the Lula administration to accommodate the different actors in the 
rural world was the distribution of jobs and state resources, as Chapter 8 explains. Both the 
agribusiness sector and organisations that claimed to represent the rural poor benefited from 
these strategies, to a great extent in proportion to their respective economic and political 
power.265  
 
Eventually, the goals of the Second National Plan on Land Reform were not met. Studies 
confirm that the performance of the two Lula administrations was not very different from that 
of the Cardoso government.266 After the 2005 political crisis, when the formation of a stable 
legislative majority became one of the main priorities of the Lula administration, it was more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 Perhaps for that reason Lula might have said in a private conversation that “land reform is important because 
we have the MST”. This was mentioned by a high ranking official who requested anonymity. 
265 Following the quota distribution logic, the rural areas in government were divided between the agribusiness 
establishment and movement leaders or their associates, as I explained in the previous chapter. Initially, the 
Ministry of Agriculture was used for accommodating the Agribusiness (the president of the Brazilian 
association of Agribusiness, Roberto Rodrigues, was installed as Minister).  Conversely, Rural Development, 
which deals with small-scale family agriculture, was delivered to members of popular rural organisations. 
However, because the latter were weakly represented in Congress no Minister was appointed among its ranks. 
The distribution of state resources followed a similar pattern. Commercial agriculture benefited from debt 
renegotiations and abundant financing at generous terms, increasing its credit from R$ 18 billion in 2002 (US$ 
7.5 billion) to R$65 billion in 2009 (US$38.23 billion) (Guimarães 2009:17). In lower proportions, rural 
organisations such as CONTAG or the MST benefited from the expansion of credit for small farmers. As the 
previous chapter mentions, PRONAF increased its resources to more than 300 percent. 
266 According to Ondetti (2008:527), between 2003 and 2006 Lula only granted land to 228,098 families, for an 
average of 57,025 per year. This figure is somewhat higher than Cardoso’s overall average of 51,326, but lower 
than his first term average of 66,968. Most land used for settlement under the PT administration was either 
public or unclaimed. Land expropriation, the main instrument contemplated in the Second National Plan on 
Land Reform, was relatively rare. Certainly, only 8.4 percent of the land distributed between 2003 and 2006 was 
obtained in this manner.  The situation did not change much during the second Lula administration. During both 
the first and second terms, the largest part of the land distributed was state-owned or purchased (Carter 2009; O 
Globo 05/07/10). 
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evident than ever that promoting a meaningful land reform would generate serious obstacles 
to the formation of legislative alliances. By choosing conservative parties such as the PMDB 
and the PP as its main allies in Congress, the PT was in a rather uncomfortable position, since 
more than 60 percent of all the deputies in Lula’s parliamentary base of support (Teixeira 
2009:61) were members of the rural caucus.267 It is not difficult to understand why, in his 
second term in office, Lula became “more reluctant to expropriate land” (Santos 03/07/09). 
Although the government was not particularly committed to a massive land reform, the rural 
caucus made matters worse by blocking all attempts to promote measures that could have 
resulted in further land expropriation and putting great pressure on the Minister for 
Agriculture not to sign the decree to update the productivity indices, as the Second National 
Plan contemplated.  
9.2 The labour and trade union reforms: relative victories of an uneasy consensus 
The labour policy and trade union reforms of the Lula administration have been analysed in 
several academic studies. Many scholars have pointed out that despite the fact that CUT 
obtained some gains, trade unions in general did not acquire greater autonomy and strength 
and workers did not expand their rights significantly under the PT government (Druck 2006; 
Galvão 2007; Hall 2009; Martins 2005). The approach that I adopt clarifies how the scope of 
both the labour and trade union reforms were largely shaped by the need to accommodate the 
interests of a wide range of strategic actors in the capital/labour axis. As I show, these 
reforms were areas in which the administration, anticipating that the National Congress 
would not easily reach consensus, promoted negotiations with a wide range of strategic actors 
convened not only those representing antagonistic interests, irreconcilable in some cases, but 
also groups opposed to the very spirit of the reforms that the government wanted to put in 
place. The strategy gave limited results and, in some aspects, resulted in a zero sum game. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 Among two of the most important PT allies in Congress, the PMDB and the PP, 55 percent and 45 percent of 
its deputies respectively were members of the rural caucus (Teixeira 2009: 61). 
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Because consensus among these actors proved uneasy, the gains for labour organisations in 
the PT field were relatively small. 
 
During his presidential campaign, Lula promised a broad reform of labour and trade union 
legislation. Such reform aimed at promoting “truly modern labour legislation” and at 
constituting “free, autonomous, representative and independent trade unions” (Coligação 
Lula Presidente 2002a:22-3). Hall explains that debates around these reforms were intended 
to find “an acceptable balance between flexibility and rights”, by incorporating some aspects 
of the “discourse of flexibility” (Hall 2009, 138), internationally demanded by the business 
sector,  while avoiding other elements more damaging to workers’ interests.268 In that 
context, the government sought to secure “the existence of representative and democratic 
trade unions” with sufficient strength to face employers successfully in future collective 
bargaining processes (Hall 2009:158). Defending the old principles that gave birth to the 
“new unionism” in the late 1970s, and which constituted an important programmatic linkage 
between CUT and the PT, the Lula administration intended to modify some of the most 
corporatist elements that remained untouched since 1943, when President Vargas enforced 
the so called Consolidation of the Labour Laws (Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho, CLT). 
Essential elements of this corporatist system, as labour specialists have emphasised, are the 
state recognition as a pre-condition for the existence of trade unions; the principle of 
unicidade (or single union system), which allows only one union per category in a specific 
sector; the restrictions faced by grassroots unions to freely organise in the shop floor; and the 
union tax, which obliges all workers, either union members or not, to pay a contribution in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 One of the first decisions adopted by Lula in defence of labour rights was to withdraw from Congress a bill 
proposed by the Cardoso administration to modify Article 7 of the Constitution and Article 618 of the 
Consolidation of Labour Laws (CLT), by which it was established that “what is negotiated should prevail over 
what is legislated”, meaning that guarantees in labour law would be subject to bargaining between workers and 
employers (Hall 2009:155; Nespolo 16/12/08; Reiner and Melleiro 2007). Given the fact that many unions in 
Brazil are small and might not be able to defend workers effectively, critics point out that such a measure could 
undermine workers’ rights, particularly in the context of an economic crisis.  
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proportion to their salaries (Boito 1991; Galvão 2007; Hall 2009; Perondi 2010). The 
government’s proposal intended to tackle all of these elements. 
 
High ranking officials in the Lula administration, aware of the difficulty in passing a reform 
in Congress, attempted to reach consensus among strategic actors before sending a bill to the 
legislative chambers. In doing so, however, they opted to listen to all the major labour peak 
confederations. CUT, despite being the largest and most representative, only reached one 
third of the Brazilian working population and less than a half of those belonging to a central 
sindical.269 More importantly, the government estimated that the interests of both capital and 
labour should be brought to the bargaining table. The administration created a tripartite 
National Labour Forum (FNT), in which three different sectors were formally represented in 
equal numbers – the administration, the unions and the business sector. 72 members were 
appointed: one third of representatives from the administration, one third of members from 
the sectoral chambers of trade, industry, agriculture, finance and transport, and one third of 
members from the six centrais.270 Among the later, half of the membership came from CUT 
and Força Sindical, the largest labour peak organisations in the country.   
 
According to Quintino Severo (15/12/09), CUT’s General Secretary, most of the demands of 
this labour organisation were not incorporated in the final project. Reaching a compromise on 
labour issues among strategic actors proved very difficult. Most business representatives were 
reluctant to agree to important government proposals endorsed by the centrais such as lifting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 In 2003 CUT represented 3,352 affiliated unions and 22 million workers (Folha de S. Paulo 03/06/03). 
Surveys conducted in 2001 showed that CUT represented 32 percent of the total number of Brazilian Workers 
(unionised and non-unionised) and 48 percent of those who belong to a labour peak organisation. Forza 
Sindical, the second largest central, had 6,120,759 workers (20.52 percent), Social Democracia Sindical 
represented 2,376,778 members (15.54 percent), while the rest were distributed among 14 other organisations 
(IBGE 2002, in Santos 2007:294-5). 
270 The National Labour Forum was formed by 72 members: 21 from each category and 9 representatives and 
cooperatives and other forms of work. The block of the labour peak organisations was formed by CUT (6), 
Forza Sindical (5), CGT (3), SDS (3), CGTB (2), CAT (2) and CNTI (1). The block of the business sector 
incorporated members of the different chambers, including Agriculture (CNA), Industry (CNI), Transport 
(CNT), Trade (CNC) and Finance (CFN) who were represented in more or less equal proportions (Perondi 
2010:60; Rozentino 2007:58-1).    
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the ban on the prohibition of union activities on the shop floor (Nespolo 16/12/08; Perondi 
2010:65), the proposed reduction in the working week without effects on the salary (Campos 
16/12/09), or the adoption of the ILO Convention 158 that impedes the termination of 
employment without a valid reason (Campos 16/12/09). Nevertheless, compromise also 
proved difficult, because many of the labour organisations represented in the FNT supported 
key elements of the corporatist legislation, particularly those aspects that were essential to 
their own material survival, such as the unicidade sindical and the union tax (Hall 2009:158). 
As a result, the agreements that were eventually reached maintained many elements from the 
old model.271   
 
The broad labour reform that Lula promised in 2002 fell off the agenda after the 2005 
political crisis, which established other political priorities such as maintaining a stable base of 
support in Congress and put the government into a “defensive position”, as Hall (2009:160-1) 
explains. Lula’s elite-centred governability strategy, I argue, impeded the debate from being 
brought back. Initially, this was because CUT, which had largely internalised the constraints 
of the balance of forces and was seeking to protect the government, refrained from applying 
additional pressure, according to their own version of events, in order to avoid destabilisation. 
Indeed, some union leaders interpreted this at a time in which conservative parties were 
promoting Lula’s impeachment, as a pressure from CUT which could have been “politically 
manipulated by the right” (Nespolo 16/12/08). After the crisis, however, the labour agenda 
did not come back. Eventually, as part of the efforts to secure a reliable majority in Congress, 
Lula sacked the Labour Minister, Luiz Marinho, a member of CUT who was a more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 The unicidade was formally abolished on paper, but plurality is still restricted, as some unions are now able 
to maintain exclusive representation in their areas, provided that they can enrol 20 percent of the workers and 
meet other criteria (Galvão 2007:11; Hall 2009:159). The union tax was formally abolished, but unions were 
allowed to create other compulsory contributions. Scholars observe that the final proposal of the FNT created 
new forms of state control over the unions, mainly through a newly established National Council on Labour 
Relations, whose members will be appointed by the Ministry of Labour among workers, business and 
government representatives. This body will have powers to register or legalise trade unions and centrais 
sindicais, or even to dissolve the existing ones, following certain rules (Druck 2006:334; Galvão 2007:10-1).   
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enthusiastic supporter of the reform, and appointed Carlos Lupi, head of the Partido 
Democrático Trabalhista, who could guarantee the support of 18 deputies in Congress. 
Eventually, Lupi declared in March 2007 that his party was the “heir of Getúlio Vargas” and 
he had no intention of ever changing the Consolidation of the Labour Laws “unless workers 
want to” (Hall 2009:161). This shows how the need to secure a parliamentary base of support 
compromised programmatic linkages during the Lula administration. 
 
It was not until 2008 that the government was able to promote a mini-reform of the trade 
union legislation in Congress. One of the most important outcomes was the long denied 
formal recognition of the centrais as legal bargaining agents, a status that was given to those 
capable of affiliating more than 100 unions. CUT leaders interviewed for this study claim that 
this recognition, which the PT had promised during the 2002 electoral campaign and for 
which their organisation had long campaigned, strengthened their capacity to participate in 
negotiations with national institutions (Nespolo 16/12/08; Severo 15/12/09). According to 
Marcos de Verlaine, a member of the Departamento Intersindical de Assessoria Parlamentar 
(DIAP), a lobby group of trade unions in Congress, the recognition of the centrais sindicais 
allowed the “trade union movement” to promote its own agenda in Congress after many years 
in which it had been virtually absent (Verlaine 18/10/10).272 Despite these achievements, no 
major gains were obtained in expanding labour rights or in modifying Brazil’s corporative 
system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 A research conducted in 2007 by Luiz Alberto dos Santos as part of a PhD thesis on the practice of lobbying 
in Brazil showed that, despite their historical weaknesses and limited resources to influence decision-making 
processes, during the Lula administration the centrais sindicais became one of the groups with the greatest 
capacity to represent their interests in Congress, coming only after government officials and business groups 
(Santos 2007:417-8). 
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9.3 Substantial achievements in the minimum wage  
One of the main achievements that workers and labour organisations obtained during the Lula 
administration was the increase in the value of the minimum wage, which eventually allowed 
a cumulative 50 percent rise above inflation during two government terms. I argue that this 
significant achievement was possible due to the confluence of five different factors: (i) 
parties represented in the National Congress, even opposition parties, mostly supported the 
wage increases (sometimes pushing them even further to seek electoral rewards); (ii) business 
groups, despite being reluctant, did not articulate significant pressure against these; (iii) a 
favourable economic context made it possible after the initial constraints; (iv) the presidency 
had sufficient political will; and (v) the centrais sindicais mobilised and negotiated with the 
government. This was not the main driving force, however. 
 
In 2003, when the PT assumed the national executive, the minimum wage was only R$ 240 a 
month (US$ 76.92), and had severely lost its real value during the previous years.273 Bearing 
this in mind, Lula had clearly pledged during the presidential campaign that his government 
would double the purchasing power of the minimum wage in four years. The value of the 
minimum wage in Brazil is established annually in the federal budget that the Executive 
sends to Congress for approval. Since it is tied to social security benefits and other 
government programmes and salaries, it tends to have an effect on public accounts and, 
according to some interpretations, also on inflation. Concerned with maintaining the balance 
in public accounts, the Ministry of Finance has usually been reluctant to see high increases 
and tends to push for moderate ones when negotiations take place every year. In contrast, 
political parties in Congress, especially the opposition, have intended to amend the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 According to DIEESE, between 1995 and 1998 the minimum wage decreased its real value by 2.40 percent, 
(Folha de S. Paulo 30/04/06). Although from 2000 the second Cardoso administration increased the minimum 
wage above the inflation, the adjustments were never sufficient to recuperate its pre-1995 levels (Magalhães and 
Araújo 2010:3).  
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executive’s proposal by seeking to move the values upward in order to obtain electoral 
dividends. 
 
The Lula administration modified the internal way in which previous governments had 
discussed the minimum wage, mostly among technocrats in the Ministry of Finance, and 
came to bargain more directly with the centrais sindicais in the Ministry of Labour and the 
Presidency (Dulci 10/12/08; Severo 15/12/09). The gains that workers obtained from these 
negotiations, however, were not alien to dynamics of governability, and were largely subject 
to the political agenda of the administration. Increases with real effects on purchasing power 
only materialised after 2005, once the government had gained the confidence of the financial 
sector and fears of instability had dissipated, as I advanced in Chapter 6. During the first two 
years, rises were mediocre in real terms. In April 2003, despite increasing by 40 Reais (see 
Table 9.1), this only represented a 1.23 percent real gain above inflation; in 2004, the 
increase was even lower (1.19 percent).  
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Table 9.1 Minimum wage adjustments (2003-2010) 
Period 
Monthly 
value 
R$ 
Monthly 
value US$ 
Nominal 
Growth Inflation 
Real 
growth 
April 2002 200 86.21    
April 2003 240 76.92 20.0 18.54 1.23 
May 2003 260 83.87 8.33 7.06 1.19 
May 2005 300 122.45 15.38 6.61 8.23 
April 2006 350 164.37 16.67 3.21 13.04 
April 2007 380 187.01 8.57 3.30 5.10 
March 2008 415 240.20 9.21 4.98 4.03 
Feb 2009 465 201.52 12.05 5.92 5.79 
Jan 2010 510 291.31 9.68 3.45 6.02 
Total  155 65.93 53.67 
Source: Adapted by the author, based on DIEESE (2008:3); Magalhães and Araújo (2010:2) 
 
CUT and leaders from other centrais, such as Forza Sindical, the second largest after CUT, 
expressed their understanding of the initial adjustments (Folha de S. Paulo 01/04/03) and 
even publicly acknowledged that the minimum wage “could not be hugely increased from 
one year to the next” (Lisboa 21/10/10).274 In December 2004, labour peak organisations, 
encouraged by CUT, timidly started to mobilise for increases by organising a national march 
in which some three thousand union members walked to the Palace of Planalto. In the 
following year, the minimum wage increased for the first time in a more meaningful way 
(8.23 percent above inflation). Marches were also organised during the next two years, 
gathering, according to CUT (2011), 15,000 participants in November 2005 and 20,000 in 
December 2006. Eventually, in 2007, labour organisations and government representatives 
agreed a formula by which the minimum wage would be adjusted year on year, until 2023, 
taking into account inflation and the GDP growth. 
 
There is no evidence that mobilisation played a key role in the negotiations that led to raise 
the value of the minimum wage. However, given the reluctance of conservative sectors in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 According to the Departamento Intersindical de Estatística e Estudos Sócio-Econômicos (DIEESE), the 
minimum wage at the time had to be R$ 1,399 a month (US$ 451) in order to cover the basic needs of a family 
with four members; in other words, to cover food, housing, health, education, transport, hygiene, clothing, 
leisure and social security (Folha de S. Paulo 01/04/03). 
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government, such as the Central Bank or the Ministry of Finance, the business sector, bankers 
or rural producers (Lisboa 21/10/10; Folha de S. Paulo 21/12/06), party and social leaders 
considered that, by marching, they could “show strength” in the face of public opinion, as one 
staff member of CUT argued (Campos 16/12/09). In any case, the actors who opposed the 
minimum wage increases did not articulate a particularly strong opposition and did not find 
many supporters in Congress, where few legislators wanted to appear against the expansion 
of the minimum wage. Despite organising public demonstrations, CUT never engaged in an 
active confrontation over the minimum wage (Magalhães 20/10/10). A mid-ranking official 
in the Presidency, who preferred to speak anonymously, argued that this organisation did not 
play a decisive role in the increases. In his view, the “political and the ideological choice 
made by the government” together with the “presidential commitment” were the main driving 
forces. In his view, the increasing value of the minimum wage that took place was mostly 
part of a government strategy to promote economic growth that took shape during the second 
term.   
 
This story suggests that CUT, as the main social base of the PT, was not a particularly 
dynamic actor capable of playing a decisive role in pushing for progressive transformations 
during the Lula administration. Testimonies gathered among both government officials at 
different levels and CUT members show that not only was the role of the party in public 
office far more important, but also that the party in government set the pace and the 
modalities in which progressive transformation could take place. It is interesting to note, for 
instance, how only “when the possibility arose”, and not before, “the centrais went to the 
streets to demand a rise in the minimum wage” (Lisboa 21/10/10, my emphasis). Certainly, 
mobilisation might have been instigated by sectors in government, as the following anecdote 
anonymously told by a high ranking official suggests:  
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When we were negotiating the minimum wage, the economic area of the government 
met considerable resistance against any adjustment on top of inflation. The Ministry of 
Finance was arguing that increasing the minimum wage would add pressure to the 
pension system and consequently to the national public accounts. Our position was 
different: we thought that increasing it would have a positive effect on the internal 
market and bring other benefits… anyway, I spoke to the centrais sindicais and told 
them: ‘this is only not going to happen if you march’. When Palocci [the Minister for 
Finance] realised that I had spoken to them, he came and asked us to avoid the march by 
finding a middle way solution. Obviously, he knew that with the prospect of a march he 
would have to adopt a more flexible position.     
 
The minimum wage probably constituted one of the few cases in which PT leaders in 
government encouraged a proactive mobilisation. It was one of the cases in which the party in 
public office used its social base to show strength vis-à-vis the dominant strategic actors in 
order to promote its progressive agenda. However, this did not constitute a case of 
mobilisation for reform, along the lines that I defined in Chapter 1, because it was not 
intended to alter the balance of forces in Congress and did not do so, at least in any 
significant way. Mobilisation was mostly used to show strength among some sceptics who 
resisted the hikes within the government itself. Cândido Vaccarezza (21/10/10), a former 
unionist who was Leader of the Lula Government in the Chamber of Deputies reflects that, 
after all, “it was not difficult” to achieve minimum wage increases because “the fiscal 
balance allowed it, many sectors were interested and even right-wing parties supported it”. 
“In these negotiations”, Vaccarezza concluded, “We stretched the string, but we never 
breached the limits”. 
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Final remarks  
 
In this chapter I have shown how programmatic linkages between the PT in public office and 
its allies in civil society were largely shaped by the elite-centred governability strategy of the 
Lula administration. By emphasising the importance of accommodating dominant strategic 
actors I do not intend to argue that this is the only reason why certain programmatic linkages 
might be dissolved or maintained when parties are in office. Indeed, there are reasons to 
presume that Lula and his inner circle were much more committed in the second term to 
increasing the minimum wage, as part of a strategy to foster economic growth and alleviate 
poverty, than they were to land reform as a development project. In fact, many in the Lula 
administration considered that rather than distributing more land, the government had to 
improve living conditions within the existing settlements and secure their productivity.275 
However, there is no doubt that the balance of forces among strategic actors does play a 
significant role in determining what a party delivers to its social allies in public office, as well 
as how and when.  
 
 
This chapter has also shown that governability strategies also have consequences for the 
relationship with its allies in civil society. Indeed, the constraints seem greater when 
progressive parties assume elite-centred strategies that are aimed at accommodating the 
interests of dominant strategic actors. This is not only because parties need to secure a 
majority in Congress. The cases studied in the previous pages show that having such a 
majority was not the only issue at stake, however important. If the administration did not 
promote some of its progressive agendas more seriously it was also because it did not want to 
undermine its relationship with the dominant strategic actors in general. Land reform, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 These types of arguments were made by Cassel (04/12/08), Minister of Rural Development; Carvalho 
(10/04/09), Lula’s Chief of Staff, or José Genoino, former PT President (08/12/08). The latter argued: “Land 
reform is not so important today as it was in the past. The main question now is to invest in the small rural 
properties, in family agriculture and in cooperatives”. 
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instance, did not necessarily require a majority in Congress, as an executive decree could 
have been used to alter the productivity indices and expropriate more land. Nevertheless, this 
would have meant confronting the agribusiness, landowners and conservative parties, thereby 
undermining political, economic and social governability.  
 
By and large, civil society organisations were not able to alter the balance of forces and social 
mobilisation did not play an important role in promoting progressive transformations under 
the Lula administration. As I have shown, whenever significant changes took place the 
initiative of the party in government was by far the main driving force. Under the PT 
administration it was the party in public office, and Lula in particular, the one establishing the 
main tactics and strategies. In this regard, another comparison with the Allende experience in 
Chile can be made. Unlike Chile’s “revolution from below” (Winn 1986:6), explained in the 
previous chapter, a clearer hierarchy of command, as well as a sense of strong leadership and 
direction existed in the PT and its socio-political field. The relationship between the PT and 
its social allies seemed closer, but not identical, to what Winn (1986:140) interprets as 
Allende’s original project: one in which the masses would provide political and social 
support “when called on”, but otherwise “await patiently the advances and benefits of the 
revolution from above” (Winn 1986:140).  
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Conclusion 
In these final passages I review the most important arguments made throughout this thesis 
and examine some of its implications for the debates on progressive parties in government. I 
examine the recent experience of the PT and the Lula administration and make some 
contrasts with other left-wing or left-of-centre parties in Latin America, but also in other 
countries in which emblematic transformations have taken place, such as South Africa. 
Rather than making a comparative analysis and presenting evidence from other cases, my 
intention is to briefly highlight some of the differences between the PT’s trajectory and that 
of other progressive parties, based on the way in which they have been portrayed in academic 
studies. Analysing the lessons learnt from the PT experience I also present some of my views 
on the main charactaeristics that should be embraced by political parties in order to promote 
progressive agendas.  
This thesis has brought a new perspective to the study of progressive parties and the 
transformations they experience in executive public office, by bringing the notion of 
governability to the party literature. I have shown how the governability dilemma – the need 
to reconcile conflicting interests and accommodate strategic actors – affects the performance 
of parties in public office and argued that it is a powerful reason why progressive parties alter 
their strategies and discourses when they enter the executive. My account has not rejected 
other important explanations of party change, particularly the way in which electoral 
competition shapes parties’ political behaviour. I have shown, however, that there is a 
powerful rationale that shapes the behaviour of parties in public office and goes far beyond 
the electoral dimension.  
Interestingly, as well as being a neglected issue in the party literature, governability has been 
downplayed by the Left. Many of its related issues have been appropriated by the Right, 
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which tends to capitalise on concerns with public order, social stability, the crime and 
security agendas or the efficient and effective functioning of state institutions. Rooted in the 
Huntingtonian tradition, the governability discourse is conservative in its origin and some of 
its motivations, as I argued in Chapter 1. Yet the attributes of governability are relevant to 
Latin American citizens, particularly in a region in which state institutions have proved to 
have a limited capacity and where recurrent episodes of political and economic crisis have 
taken place. These are sensitive issues which might also have electoral consequences for 
progressive parties, related as they are to the capacity of any political party in government to 
perform its basic functions and to deliver on its campaign pledges. Ultimately, if progressive 
parties have an interest in creating conditions to govern and remain in power they need to 
solve the governability dilemma in one way or another. 
When looking at the three main governability dimensions analysed in this study – the 
political, the economic and the social – the role that public resources played in 
accommodating the interests of strategic actors under Lula stands out. The administration 
distributed a vast amount of resources among different groups, ranging from political allies 
represented in Congress to civil society organisations, from large infrastructure companies to 
the influential financial establishment. While political parties benefited from pork-barrelling, 
social allies received state subsidies, infrastructure companies were granted ambitious 
projects in the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC), and the financial sector profited from 
high interest rates. These resources were available not only because the Brazilian state has a 
heavy tax burden by Latin American standards,276 but also because of the international 
economic context. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the economic bonanza which benefited Brazil 
and other South American countries between 2003 and 2008 allowed the PT government a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276  In 2010 the tax burden in Brazil reached 33.5 percent of the country’s GDP (English News 23/09/11). This is 
far above that of countries such as Mexico (19.82), Chile (21.28), Ecuador (15.58) or Bolivia (20.13) (Tribunal 
de Contas da União 2009:2) 
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margin for manoeuvre to simultaneously accommodate the interests of the powerful financial 
establishment and, eventually, to loosen public spending and benefit other groups.  
In this thesis I have shown that progressive parties in public office, like any other party in the 
executive, have to face the governability dilemma. Yet progressive parties such as the PT – 
with a mass-based origin and multiple ramifications in civil society – also have the 
opportunity to solve this dilemma differently, by promoting the mobilisation of their own 
social bases, by strengthening civil society or by effectively articulating collective actors with 
governing institutions in participatory mechanisms which also help to manage social 
conflict. The PT at the sub-national level did all of this creatively. The introduction of the 
Participatory Budget, in particular, contributed to improving efficiency and transparency in 
the delivery of public services and at the same time helped to accommodate the interests of 
strategic actors and neutralise the power of a conservative opposition in the legislative 
branch. Given the limited number of cases studied in this work, it is not possible to claim that 
such strategies were successfully adopted by most PT sub-national governments. 
Nevertheless, even if not all of them secured the achievements of Porto Alegre, it is 
undeniable that the party as a whole gave great value to this experience, which was a source 
of inspiration for its national project. 
At first sight, the adoption of an elite-centred governability strategy under Lula can be seen as 
a corollary of the transition from the local to the national sphere. In 2003 the PT was 
occupying the executive branch for the first time, as one of the first democratically elected 
left-wing parties in Latin America since Allende. In such a context, the most influential 
leaders within Lula’s inner circle preferred to act guardedly and cautiously. The majority of 
those who occupied positions in the Lula administration only had municipal government 
experience, and only a few had worked for the limited number of PT state governments. At 
the national level the political landscape was more complex and the party had to deal with 
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more powerful strategic actors. With many of these actors, PT leaders had had little or no 
relationship in the past, as it occurred with the financial establishment, the largest business 
groups or state governors who are influential in the National Congress. Even with political 
parties, which the party leaders did liaise with in the municipal sphere, the relationship was 
more complicated because the party system is usually more fragmented at the national level.  
Nevertheless, I have shown that the transition from the sub-national to the national sphere is 
not the only reason for the weakening of a social counter-hegemonic strategy and the 
strengthening of an elite-centred one. As Chapter 4 explains, before Lula became president, 
elite-centred strategies were already part of the PT governability repertoire in large cities 
such as São Paulo. One cannot but speculate as to whether the PT and the Lula administration 
acted too cautiously or, as Hunter (2011) thinks, more pragmatically than needed given the 
favourable economic situation it enjoyed and the availability of public resources. If resolving 
the governability dilemma is facilitated when public resources are more abundant, the PT was 
eventually less constrained because the commodity boom provided greater margins for 
manoeuvre.  Lula also enjoyed high approval ratings, which enhanced his personal leverage 
in the second term.  
I have argued that one of the reasons why the PT in government ruled out a social counter-
hegemonic governability strategy, particularly one based on mobilisation for reform, was the 
fear of political and social instability within Lula’s inner circle. What some observers and 
leaders in the party Left characterised as “Lula’s aversion to conflict” might have also played 
a role. This conflict averse stance possibly resulted from Lula’s recognition and acceptance of 
a political culture which is in itself “inimical to conflict”, as the Brazilian anthropologist 
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Roberto DaMatta (1991:139) has persuasively argued.277 Lula’s position against conflict was 
not just part of a strategy to become palatable to dominant strategic actors. It was also a 
strategy that might have spoken to the perceptions of the unorganised poor, those who voted 
for him en masse in 2006 and then for his hand-picked successor, Dilma Rousseff, in 2010. 
There is some evidence that this electorate had conservative positions. Singer (2009:87) 
found, for instance, that in 1989 an important segment of what he calls the sub-proletariat in 
Brazil opposed strike actions, tended to favour “order”, rejected instability, were particularly 
afraid of inflation and even showed hostility towards strikes.  
The way in which conflict is managed has profound implications for the transformative 
potential of progressive politics and it is something that the Left needs to reflect upon. There 
is little doubt that Lula’s personal characteristics as a leader, coupled with the abundance of 
public resources, contributed a great deal to solving the PT’s governability dilemma in 
national executive public office. During his two terms in office, Lula and his closest team, 
many of them product of the trade union tradition like him, proved to have a formidable 
capacity to reach agreements with a wide range of sectors by seating the most relevant actors 
(especially labour, business groups and politicians) round bargaining tables and hammering 
deals with them. These deals, however, were often made backdoors rather than in the more 
open participatory spaces that helped a number of PT administrations to solve disputes over 
public resources. Lula’s strategy may well have prevented or efficiently solved a number of 
conflicts. One wonders, however, whether this type of conflict management may compromise 
transformative politics.  
In any case, a political project is not inherently progressive because it confronts dominant 
strategic actors directly, and even less so because it adopts an incendiary rhetoric that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 In this influential work, Carnival, Rogues and Heroes, DaMatta (1991:140) explains that in a society 
“heavily oriented toward the universal and the cordial”, conflict is seen as a “failure” or as a “crisis” that would 
entail “efforts to change the whole web of relationships implied in the social structure”. 
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demonises economic elites or opposition parties, such as the one employed by Chávez in 
Venezuela or, to a lesser extent, Morales in Bolivia. Different from both, Lula´s bargaining 
style and the PT participatory agenda, which seeks to institutionalise conflict management, 
the strategy of some of these leaders –  including others in the Andean region (see Tanaka 
and Jácome 2011) – seems to be to intensify conflict largely by means of rhetoric.  
Nevertheless, the high “level of conflictivity” attributed to some of these leaders (Jácome 
2011:324) would be hard to find in Lula’s Brazil. This is not merely a matter of personal taste 
or political ideology, neither is it a set of differences that one can explain within the discourse 
of the “two lefts” in Latin America (Castañeda 2006),278 in my view reductionist, Manichean 
and with little explanatory power. Many of the countries that adopted confrontational 
approaches against dominant strategic actors such as conservative parties, oligarchies or 
business groups experienced a collapse of their political system which generally weakened 
the power of traditional elites and political parties (see among others Arditi 2007; Cleary 
2006; Luna 2007; Luna and Filgueira 2009). In Venezuela, as Hellinger (2005:27-8) explains, 
the collapse of the Punto Fijo party system and seven decades of “oil-based rentier politics” 
left the country with a “weak traditional oligarchy”. The situation was very different in 
Brazil, where the power of economic and political elites remained very strong; the economy 
was highly dependent on international investors and the political system was more 
consolidated. Lula had to negotiate with dominant strategic actors from a position of relative 
weakness in comparison to some of his South American counterparts. He would probably 
have lost more than he could win by adopting a position of open conflict against them. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 Castañeda (2006:28) argues that there are two lefts in Latin America: one that is “open-minded and modern”, 
and the other one is “closed-minded and stridently populist”. In his view, whereas the former “respects 
democracy”, the latter is “irresponsible and abusive”; while the first operates within an orthodox market 
framework, the second is “statist”; while one seeks “good relations with the United States”, the other taunts the 
U.S. and seeks confrontation. 
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A progressive political project does not necessarily have to exclude or sideline dominant 
strategic actors.279 Progressive politics do require, however, an extra-institutional element and 
a critical mobilisation of society capable of giving the Left more power to negotiate with the 
political and economic elites. This can eventually help to alter the balance of forces in order 
to make possible the redistributive policies and reforms that dominant strategic actors tend to 
oppose. For this reason the political parties’ capacity to promote meaningful social change 
largely depends on their willingness to encourage mobilisation and participatory democracy, 
as well as on the relationships they establish with progressive collective actors, as a number 
of scholars have argued (Chalmers, Vilas, and Hite 1997; Chávez 2004; Fung and Wright 
2003; Gaventa and McGee 2010; Goldfrank 2004; Heller 2001; Huber, Rueschemayer, and 
Stephens 1997; Laclau and Mouffe 2001; Mouffe 1992; Osterman 2002; Roberts 1998; 
Stolowicz 2004).  
It is still not clear, however, whether counter-hegemonic governability strategies with these 
characteristics, which have been successful at the sub-national level, can have similar effects 
in the national sphere. In Latin America, Bolivia280 and Venezuela, with progressive parties 
with different characteristics than the PT, are two of the countries which have seen these 
counter-hegemonic strategies put in place. Their results are controversial, however, and in 
some cases the price has been high. The strategies that the leftist leaders in these countries 
have implemented tend to rely more on state power than on civil society (in this sense they 
are not properly social counter-hegemonic along the lines defined in Chapter 1). In some 
cases the strategies of these leaders have been accompanied by a strong form of personalismo 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 Even the Chávez administration has negotiated with a number of sectors of international and national capital, 
such as the oil and construction industries or the banking sector (Hellinger 2005:28). 
280 In Bolivia, this was the strategy that Morales used in order to pass important reforms, such as the extension 
of agrarian reform, the establishment of a pension that citizens receive monthly from the revenue of 
hydrocarbons, and the constitutional referendum. Córdova (2011:165) tells us that on these occasions, social 
movement activists surrounded congress “in order to prevent certain senators from entering, so that their 
substitutes, from MAS, could establish the necessary quorum, thereby ensuring the legitimacy of the sessions”. 
In other cases, however this strategy has generated what Mayorga (2009:114) calls “a catastrophic deadlock”, 
resulting in a “no win” situation. 
274	  
	  
which concentrates power in the executive branch and relies heavily on the use of presidential 
decrees (Kohl 2010:113; Mayorga 2011:21), reproducing one of the vices of progressive 
parties in Latin America. In the case of the Movement to Socialism  in Bolivia, some authors 
have criticised the counter-hegemonic governability strategies adopted, on the grounds that 
the Morales administration transformed social organisations into “instruments of violent 
mobilizations, and even into de facto troops for political coercion” and “intimidation” 
(Larson et al. 2008:7).281  
Some of these Latin American leaders have sought to advance participatory democracy (or 
“protagonist democracy” in the case of Chávez) in opposition to formal representative 
democracy or even in detriment to the latter. This stands in stark contrast with both sub-
national and national PT administrations, which regard participatory and representative 
democracy as complementary. In the chavista discourse liberal democracy tends to be 
regarded as a “false democracy” or a “democracy of the elites” (French 2008:13; Hellinger 
2005:9). This approach, in my view, does not contribute to deepening democracy in Latin 
America. Notwithstanding that certain strategic actors have advantages in the current formal 
representative institutions, as I argued in Chapter 1, it is also in the interests of the 
disadvantaged to strengthen and change these institutions, as it is to promote broad social 
participation, as a number of studies show. Rather than regarding formal representative 
democracy and participatory democracy as antagonistic projects, progressive agendas should 
combine the two and find creative ways by which they can reinforce each other. 
It is also my view that a progressive agenda cannot exclusively derive from political parties 
in control of state institutions, nor from the concentration of power in personalistic or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 These authors fail to mention, however, that such practices have also been deployed by the conservative 
opposition in Bolivia, a country in which, often, neither the Right nor the Left is willing to be bound by 
institutional politics and the rule of law. 
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charismatic leaders. Such an agenda will neither exclusively result from the mobilisation of 
civil society, in which some authors have placed their hopes as “the only available or most 
important domain for organizing cultural and political contestation” (Escobar, Dagnino et al. 
1998:48). Rather, progressive agendas can be implemented when parties – in a better position 
to formulate policies and aggregate social interests – establish linkages with a mobilised civil 
society and promote further engagement by citizens. It is by establishing programmatic 
linkages based on common goals that progressive parties can help integrate (the often 
narrow) demands of civil society organisations into a more global political project and 
increase the transformative potential of their actions (Roberts 1998; Stolowicz 2004). Such an 
objective can be compromised, however, when reward-based linkages become predominant, 
as occurred in the PT case, because rather than encouraging “collective solutions”, they 
mainly provide benefits to specific groups, offering individual and particularistic advantages 
(Kitschelt 2000; Roberts 2002). 
Lula and the PT changed Brazil in profound ways and for the better. Certainly, they did not 
do it in many of the ways in which the party and its socio-political field had envisaged, 
particularly because civil society was not regarded by the most important players in public 
office as essential for the mission and success of the party in government and no significant 
efforts to “organise the people” were seen. Despite this gap, the relationships between the 
state and civil society improved, if only for the inclusive approach towards civil society, the 
greater deployment of dialogue and negotiation and the absence of repression. Despite the 
fact that many perceive Lula’s record in promoting participatory democracy as mediocre, it 
would be hard to argue that PT administrations do not listen to civil society organisations. 
The PT has not become like the African National Congress (ANC), a party which also 
promoted participatory agendas in the past, but once in government adopted a “dirigiste” 
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style of politics, came to exercise a “direct political control of civil society” and “almost 
completely neutralized or sidelined social movements” (Heller 2001:13, 155).  
The PT has not adopted an “autocratic strategy of transformation that is by definition hostile 
to participatory local development” as the ANC did, according to Heller (2001:155; see also 
Bond 2004; Glaser 1997; Sinwell 2011). The Brazilian Workers’ Party has by no means 
degenerated in such a way. In this thesis I have provided some evidence that this is because 
of the characteristics of its “genetic model”. The ANC was different from the PT in its origins 
because it was always “more of a political organization than a social movement” and because 
its formal structures operated in a clandestine fashion, mainly from abroad and 
“independently of domestic struggles” (Heller 2001:156). The PT’s “genetic model”, in 
contrast, was one of strong involvement in a network of grassroots civil society organisations; 
the strong linkages that were established between party and social leaders could not be so 
quickly dissolved and the participatory ideology that evolved from this relationship has 
played a very important role since the party’s formation. 
A question arises as to whether the PT has definitively buried those features from which a 
progressive agenda could emerge. The answer seems to be that it has not necessarily done so. 
In Chapter 7, I argued that one of the reasons why the participatory agenda was left aside 
under the Lula administration was the fact that Lula came to be regarded as the incarnation of 
the poor and the excluded. Under a different administration in which no leader plays such a 
charismatic role, some elements of the participatory agenda might be revitalised at least for 
the sake of building social legitimacy.282 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282	   In 2011 Rouseff appointed two figures in the Presidential Office who during our interviews criticised the 
poor record of participation under Lula and said that a lot more could had been done: Gilberto Carvalho 
(10/04/09), Lula’s former Chief of Staff and General-Secretary of the Presidency under Rouseff, and Pedro 
Pontual (17/10/08), an enthusiastic promoter of participatory mechanisms, who was appointed Secretary for 
Social Articulation. These figures can, however, eventually be marginalised just as were those who sought to 
promote meaningful broad-based participatory mechanisms during the first years of the Lula administration.  	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In this thesis I have made the case that the PT did not abandon its social allies when it 
penetrated state institutions. Rather, the party penetrated those institutions with its social 
allies. An assessment on the transformation of the PT should also acknowledge the way in 
which Brazilian civil society changed, for the good and for the bad, during those years. When 
Perry Anderson compares Roosevelt’s social reforms, introduced under “pressure from 
below” with those of Lula, in which “no comparable industrial militancy either sustained or 
challenged” his administration (2010:9), this British leftist intellectual is making a 
comparison with a historical period in which organised labour had become a very influential 
force. That was not the case when Lula assumed the presidency in 2003. If the PT at the 
national level relied on state power, rather than on civil society, as the main source of 
transformation, it was not only because Lula and the hegemonic faction of the PT so decided. 
It was also because civil society did not seemed prepared to play the role envisioned by those 
who formed the progressive socio-political field in the late 1970s.  
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Appendix 1: Statistical information on interviewees 
 
Party in public office 
Execu-
tive 
branch 
National Sub-national 
Ministers 
Secretaries 
and deputy 
ministers 
 
Presidential 
advisors Mayors Secretaries 
Others 
 
10* 18 13 7 27 13 
Legisla- 
tive 
branch 
 
 
Congressional 
representatives 
Parliamentary 
advisors 
Members of state 
congress 
City 
councillors Advisors 
15 7 8 13 4 
 
Party in central office 
National Sub-national 
Executive Commission Party presidents (including interims) 
Executive 
Commission 
Party presidents 
 
12 6 10 6 
 
Factions or intra-party groups 
Left Articulation 
(AE) 
Message to the 
Party (MP) 
Building a new 
Brazil (CNB) Other factions Independents 
11 23 48 13 23 
 
Civil society organisations** 
CUT CONTAG MST Housing movement Others 
10 5 8 7 4 
 
Non PT members 19 
Civil servants with no party affiliation but identified or close to the PT  2 
Civil servants with no party identification 4 
Technocrats close to the PT with no party affiliation 2 
Parliamentary advisors with no party affiliation 4 
Members of sectoral policy councils  4 
Former President of the Republic (Fernando H. Cardoso) 1 
 
Constituency 
São Paulo 55 
Rio Grande do Sul 33 
Minas Gerais  5 
Others 47 
 
*Includes two names who occupied different ministerial positions each, Ricardo Berzoini and Tarso Genro. 
** Refers only to active members of these organisations at the time of interviews. 
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Appendix 2: List of interviewees and biographies 
Agustin, Arno – Brasilia, 20/10/10. Secretary to the Treasury during the second Lula 
administration. Formerly Finance Secretary in Porto Alegre and Rio Grande do Sul; member 
of the faction Democracia Socialista (Socialist Democracy).   
Almeida, Alfonso – Brasilia, 03/04/09 (non-recorded interview). Secretary for Strategic 
Investments in the Ministry of Planning. A civil servant. 
Almeida, Gerson – Brasilia, 03/04/09. Secretary for Social Articulation at the General 
Secretariat of the Presidency. Was Home Affairs Secretary in Rio Grande do Sul and 
Secretary for the Environment.   
Alves, Antonio – Brasilia, 03/12/08. Secretary for Strategic and Participatory Management at 
the Ministry of Health. Was a union leader in the health sector.  
Américo, José – São Paulo, 11/11/08. President of the PT in São Paulo. Responsible for 
Food Supplies and Communications in the Suplicy administration (2000-2004). One of the 
principal figures of Novo Rumo (New Direction). 
Ananias, Patrus – Brasilia, 16/07/09. Minister for Social Development and Hunger 
Eradication (2004-2010). Has strong links to the Catholic Church. He started his career as a 
lawyer, advocating for trade unions and popular movements. Was Mayor of Belo Horizonte 
(1993-1996).  
Ant, Clara – Brasilia, 26/11/08 and 03/12/08. Deputy Chief of Staff to the President. Part of 
Lula’s inner circle for over three decades. Former unionist who started her political activity in 
the Trotskyist movement Liberdade e Luta (Freedom and Struggle).  
Árabe, Carlos Henrique – São Paulo, 30/10/08.  Has occupied various executive positions 
within the party, but has never been elected to public office. Belongs to the faction Socialist 
Democracy. 
Aranha, Adriana – Brasilia, 07/07/09. Chief of Staff to the Minister for Social Development 
(2004-2010). A social worker who started her activism in the Catholic Church and worked on 
food security issues under the Patrus Ananias administration of Belo Horizonte.   
Arbix, Glauco – São Paulo, 06/11/08. An economist who advised Lula´s campaign 
committee in 2001. President of the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), a 
public research institution, during the first term.  
Arruda Sampãio, Plinio de – São Paulo, 11/12/08. Former member of the PT left, 
abandoned the party in 2006. Was largely involved in rural issues and has strong ties to the 
MST, many rural movements and the progressive Church.  
Appy, Bernardo – Brasilia, 08/04/09. Deputy Minister of Finance during the first Lula 
administration. He presents himself as a non-active petista and a “technician”.   
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Avritzer, Leonardo – Rio de Janeiro 13/06/10. A scholar who has written extensively on 
participatory government institutions and Brazilian civil society, former PT member.  
Baccarin, Giacomo – Interviewed by e-mail, 11/8/09. Deputy Minister for Food Security and 
Hunger Eradication at the Ministry for Social Development (2003-2004) and Secretary for 
Food Security (2004-2005). Was Mayor of Jabotical in São Paulo, and Congressman in the 
São Paulo State Assembly. 
Barbosa, Benedito (Dito) – Brasilia, 02/12/08. Member of the Coordination for the National 
Movement for Popular Housing (UNMP). Active in the housing movement for thirty years. 
Has always considered himself a PT member despite lacking formal membership.  
Barbosa, Guilherme – Porto Alegre, 15/12/08. City Councillor in Porto Alegre. Was 
Secretary for Sanitation and Drainage during the Dutra administration; belongs to Left 
Articulation.   
Barbosa, Nelson – Brasilia, 20/07/09. Secretary for Economic Policy at the Ministry of 
Finance during the second Lula administration. Contributed to the drafting of Lula’s 
economic program in 2002.Claims to be “a supporter, but not a PT member”.   
Belchior, Miriam – Brasilia, 06/07/09. Lula’s special advisor, responsible for monitoring the 
Growth Acceleration Program (PAC). Very influential over strategic programmes. Worked in 
several positions for the government of Santo André, São Paulo, during the 1990s.  
Bemerguy, Esther – Brasilia, 20/07/09. Secretary to the Economic and Social Development 
Council (CDES). Occupied several positions in the municipality of Belém in the late 1980s 
and 1990s.  
Benevides, Maria Vitoria – São Paulo, 29/10/09. Party intellectual, became increasingly 
critical of the PT after the mensalão scandal in 2005. Supports the group “Message to the 
Party”. 
Bertoto, Luiz Carlos – Brasilia, 01/12/08. Worked for the National Secretariat of Transport 
at the Ministry of Cities. Former head of the Transport Enterprise Company in Porto Alegre 
and Municipal Secretary of Transport.  
Berzoini, Ricardo – São Paulo, 29/10/08. President of the PT (2007-2010). Was twice a 
Minister, first for Social Security (2003), then for Labour (2004-2007). Started his political 
career as a union leader in the banking sector. Three times a member of Congress.  
Beze, Zeke – Brasilia, 03/07/09. Advisor to the National Confederation of Agricultural 
Workers (CONTAG). Has no formal affiliation to the PT, but has been close to the party 
since its formation.  
Bittencourt, Gilson – Brasilia, 20/10/10. Secretary for Rural Policy at the Ministry of 
Finance. Was a PT member between 1986 and 2001. Served for the Cardoso administration 
as Secretary for Family Farming.  
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Bohn Gass, Elvino – Porto Alegre, 19/12/08. Representative in the State Assembly of Rio 
Grande do Sul. Former president of the Rural Workers’ Trade Union in his home state. Has 
strong ties to rural organisations; member of the faction Socialist Democracy. 
Bonduki, Nabil – São Paulo, 08/12/08. Former city councillor in São Paulo; responsible for 
the popular housing sector during the Erundina administration (1989-1992). 
Borba, Adriana and Cleia, Anice (Nicinha) – Brasilia, 03/04/08 (interviewed together). 
Advisors to the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG). They lack 
formal party affiliation but define themselves as “PT activists”.  
Camilo, Jorge – João Pessoa, 16/11/10. City Councillor in the north-eastern state of Paraiba. 
Initiated his career as a lawyer, on behalf of CUT and other organisations.  
Campos, Anderson - São Paulo, 16/12/09. Advisor of CUT. Former leader of the National Students’ 
Union (UNE), joined the PT in 1998; member of the faction Socialist Democracy. 
Campos, Edson – Brasilia, 03/07/09. Advisor to the National Confederation of Agricultural 
Workers (CONTAG). Former trade union member with ties to the banking sector; PT 
member since the party’s foundation. 
Capp, Mario – Brasilia, 20/10/10. PT parliamentary advisor on budgetary issues, but with 
no party affiliation. 
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique – Ithaca, NY, 07/04/10. President of Brazil (1995-1998/1999-
2002).  
Cardozo, José Eduardo Martins – Brasilia, 04/12/08. PT General-Secretary (2007-2010) 
and National Congress Representative. Was Home Affairs Secretary during the Erundina 
administration (1989-1992). One of the main leaders of the faction Mensagem ao Partido 
(Message to the Party). 
Carneiro, Ricardo – Campinas, 14/04/09. PT economist between 1989 and 2001. Distanced 
himself from the party during the 2001 presidential campaign. 
Carvalho, Gilberto – Brasilia, 10/04/09. Lula’s Chief of Staff. Was Home Affairs Secretary 
in Santo André (São Paulo); has strong links to the progressive Church and organisations in 
the PT field. 
Cassel, Guilherme – Brasilia, 04/12/08. Minister of Rural Development (2006-2010). 
Occupied several positions in his home state, Rio Grande do Sul; belongs to the faction 
Socialist Democracy. 
Celestino, José - São Paulo, 16/12/09. CUT’s Secretary for Training. Represents the 
teachers’ unions; supported João Felício against Luiz Marinho.  
Cotta, Teresa – Brasilia, 02/07/09. Civil servant with no party affiliation. Advised the Bolsa 
Família Programme at the Ministry for Social Development and witnessed internal debates 
over the Zero Hunger Programme management committees.     
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Cury, Betto – Brasilia, 02/12/08. Under-secretary for Social Articulation during Lula’s fist 
term. Organised the Plano Pluri Annual: “Um Brasil para Todos” (“Pluriannual Plan: one 
Brazil for all”] 2004-2007. 
Daneris, Marcelo – Porto Alegre, 15/12/08. City councillor in Porto Alegre. Joined the PT in 
1996.  
Diniz Macedo, Elcione – Brasilia, 28/11/08. Head of Institutional Development at the 
Ministry of Cities; Executive Coordinator of the Conference of Cities. Not a PT member. 
Dirceu, José – São Paulo, 07/1/09. President of the PT five times (1995-2002), and Minister 
for the Civil House (2003-2005), a position similar to a Prime Minister being responsible for 
all domestic functions. The main political architect of the party’s shift to a moderate, centre-
left strategy. Started in a student movement and was later involved in a guerrilla organisation. 
Was exiled in Cuba, where he changed his face through plastic surgery, and came back to 
Brazil in the early 1970s with a different identity. Four times PT General-Secretary; three 
time federal deputy.  
Donato, Antonio – São Paulo, 12/11/08. City councillor in São Paulo. Former manager of 
the city’s local transport services in São Paulo and head of sub-municipalities during the 
Suplicy administration (2000-2004). Belongs to Novo Rumo (New Direction). 
Dulci, Luiz – Brasilia, 10/12/08. General Secretary of the Presidency (2003-2010). Was 
politically responsible for the relationship with civil society; the organisation of national 
conferences and sectoral policy councils. Former PT Vice-President, General Secretary and 
Secretary for Organisation. Was Home Affairs Secretary in Bello Horizonte, Minas Gerais.  
Dutra, Domingos – Brasilia, 02/04/09. National Congressman and PT President in the north-
eastern state of Maranhão. Close to rural trade unions and landless movements. Coordinated 
the rural activities of the PT parliamentary group in the mid-1990s.  
Erundina, Luiza – São Paulo, 14/11/09. First PT mayor in São Paulo (1989-1992). A social 
worker of humble origins, born in the north-eastern state of Paraiba. Was active in popular 
movements during the 1980s. After being Mayor, she left the PT to join the Brazilian 
Socialist Party (PSB) in 1996; ran unsuccessfully for the São Paulo City Hall three more 
times. 
Falcão, Rui – São Paulo, 11/12/08. Home Affairs Secretary during the Suplicy 
administration in São Paulo (2000-2004). Was President of the PT in the same city during the 
Erundina administration (1989-1992). Interim National PT President in 1994 and coordinator 
of Lula’s second campaign. The main leader of Novo Rumo (New Direction), one of the most 
influential factions in São Paulo. 
Felício, Jõao, São Paulo – 28/10/08. Twice President of CUT (2000-2003/2005-2006) and 
once General-Secretary (2003-2005). Led the São Paulo’s main state education trade union. 
Was PT National Secretary for Trade Unions.  
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Fernandes de Oliveira, Donicete & Abrão, Jose de - São Paulo, 07/1/09 (interviewed 
together). Leaders of the National Union of Popular Housing (UNMP).  
Fernandes, Francisco (Mineiro) – Brasilia, 01/04/09. Parliamentary advisor on rural issues. 
Claims to be “both an MST and a PT member without any distinctions”; belongs to the 
faction Left Articulation. 
Ferreira, Duvanir – Brasilia, 07/07/09. Secretary for Human Resources in the Ministry of 
Planning. Was a trade union leader in the Health sector and a member of CUT until 2002.  
Ferro, Fernando – Brasilia, 02/07/09. National Congressman and Deputy Coordinator of the 
PT in the Lower Chamber. Belonged to Lula’s faction, Articulaçao, but then joined the 
faction Movimento PT (PT Movement) in 1994.  
Fier, Florisvaldo (Rosinha) – 03/12/08. National Congress Representative. Has occupied 
various positions in the party bureaucracy in the southern state of Paraná. Belongs to the 
faction Socialist Democracy; close ties to the MST and other organisations. 
Fiorilo, Paulo – São Paulo, 12/11/08. City councillor in São Paulo. Former Chief of Staff to 
Marta Suplicy (2000-2004) and PT president in the city (2005-2007). Belongs to the local 
faction Novo Rumo (New Direction). 
Fisher, Nilton – 15/12/08, Porto Alegre. Former Secretary for Education in Porto Alegre. 
His political activism started within church-based organisations and urban social movements. 
Has distanced himself from the party. 
Fonseca, Ana – São Paulo, 07/09/07.  
Frateschi, Paulo – São Paulo, 11/11/08. PT Secretary for Organisation (2007-2010). Was 
three times president of the PT in the state of São Paulo. Former education union leader; his 
political career has mainly developed within the party bureaucracy.  
García, Marco Aurélio – 10/04/09, Brasilia. Lula’s advisor on International Affairs and 
Deputy-President of the PT (2007-2010). One of the main party intellectuals within the 
moderate sector. Coordinated the drafting of Lula’s government programmes in 1994 and 
1998, and was the main campaign coordinator in 2006.   
Genoino, José – São Paulo, 08/12/08. PT President (2002-2005). Former member of the 
Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB) who was involved in the guerrilla movement of 
Araguaia and later imprisoned. National Congressman, re-elected six times. 
Genro, Tarso – Brasilia, 31/04/09. Minister for Justice (2007-2010) and former Minister for 
Education (2004-2005). Mayor of Porto Alegre twice (1993-1997/ 2001-2002). Defeated in 
2002 in his attempt to become governor of Rio Grande do Sul. Supports the group “Message 
to the Party”. Interim PT President in 2005. 
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Gomes, Dorival -- São Paulo, 13/11/08. Member of the housing movement in São Paulo. 
Works for Arselino Tatto; city councillor, since 1994; belongs to the faction PT for Mass and 
Struggle (PTLM).    
Gonçalves, Edson and Guareto, Renato- Brasilia, 02/12/08 (interviewed together). 
Members of the PT Transport Section. 
Gonzales, Luiz (Gegê) São Paulo, 11/11/08. Leader of the housing movement and 
Coordinator of the PT Housing and Urban Reform Section. Member of the PT National 
Directorate.  
Hackbart, Rolf – Brasilia, 20/10/10. President of the Institute for Colonisation and Land 
Reform (INCRA) during the two Lula administrations. He has maintained close relations 
with the MST and other rural organisations.  
Heck, Selvino – Brasilia, 01/04/09. Presidential Advisor in charge of mobilising support for 
the Zero Hunger Programme. Started to participate in politics in church-based communities 
and helped to found the MST; was Representative in the State Assembly of Rio Grande do 
Sul and party president in that state. 
Henrique, Arthur - São Paulo, 15/04/09. President of CUT (2006-2012). Was elected after 
its former President, Luiz Marinho, was appointed Minister for Labour. Former CUT 
Secretary for Organisation (2003-2005). Union leader from the gas and electricity sectors. 
Hipólito, Sonia – Brasilia, 3/04/09. Parliamentary advisor. PT Secretary for Social 
Movements during the 1990s; member of the faction Left Articulation.  
Kieji, Jean Uema – Brasilia, 21/10/10. Advisor to the Presidential Office in charge of 
executive-legislative relationships.  
Lacerda, Guillermo – Brasilia, 22/07/09. President of FUNCEF, a pension fund of the 
Caixa Economica Federal (one of the largest state banks in Brazil) (2003-2010). Former 
union leader in the banking sector and founder of CUT.  
Leite, Carlos José – Brasilia, 20/10/10. Parliamentary advisor to Cândido Vaccarezza -
leader of the Lula government in the Lower House of the National Congress.  
Lisboa, Antonio – Brasilia, 21/10/10. Member of CUT’s National Executive Committee. 
Lisboa coordinates CUT’s national office in Brasilia, where he liaises between the 
organisation and government institutions.  
Lopes, Iriny – Brasilia, 03/2I/08. Three times federal deputy from Espiritu Santo. She is one 
of the leading figures in her faction, Left Articulation.  
Lopez Feijóo, José – São Paulo, 16/12/09. CUT’s Vice-President (elected in 2009). He has 
also been its General-Secretary and President in the state of São Paulo. Feijóo is one of the 
most prominent leaders of the Metallurgic Workers’ Trade Union in the ABC region (Lula’s 
original political base of support).  
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Ludwig, Paulo – Porto Alegre, 18/12/08. Coordinator of the PT Section on Rural Issues in 
Porto Alegre, parliamentary advisor and a member of the faction Socialist Democracy. 
Maciel, Paulo Sergio – São Paulo, 06/11/09. PT Secretary for Mobilisation in the city of São 
Paulo. 
Magalhães, Inês – Brasilia, 07/07/09. National Secretary for Popular Housing, Ministry of 
Cities (2003-2010). Magalhães was Secretary for Planning, Urban Development and 
Environment in the municipality of São Vicente (1995-1996). One of her first jobs was in the 
government of Luiza Erundina (1989-1992).  
Magalhães, Luis Carlos – Brasilia, 20/10/10. Parliamentary advisor to the PT in the 
Chamber of Deputies. A public servant with no party affiliation.  
Marcon, Dionilso – Porto Alegre, 15/12/08. Twice local deputy in the state of Rio Grande do 
Sul, he was the party leader in Congress in 2002. He is an MST member who made his 
political career within the PT.  
Martines, Evelaine- Brasilia, 07/07/09. Member of the national coordination of the MST. 
She was a PT affiliated member from 1988 to 1994, but maintained relations with the party 
until 2002.  
Mauro, Gilmar – São Paulo, 17/04/09. Member of the National Coordination of the MST. 
He was politically active in the PT during the 1980s, but gradually distanced himself in the 
1990s. 
Menezes, Francisco – Rio de Janeiro, 26/07/09. President of the Food Security National 
Council during the first Lula administration; Head of the Brazilian Institute for Economic and 
Social Analysis (IBASE), a research-oriented NGO. Participated in the drafting of the Zero 
Hunger Programme.  
Merss, Marinete – Brasilia, 10/12/08. PT’s Secretary for Social Mobilisation.  
Mesquita, Camille – Brasilia, 02/07/09. A Civil servant with no party affiliation; worked for 
the Ministry for Social Development and Hunger Eradication where she was responsible for 
coordinating mechanisms of social oversight (controle social) of Bolsa Família.  
Moraes, Leandro – São Paulo, 16/12/09. CUT’s advisor. Morães has participated in the PT 
since 1999; belongs to Left Articulation.  
Morales, Carlos – Brasilia, 27/07/09. Advisor to the Secretary of State Patrimony in the 
Ministry for Planning as well as Head of Urban Regulation during the first Lula’s term. At 
the local level, he was president twice of the public transport companies (Santo André, 1989-
1999 and São Bernardo do Campo, 1991-1992).  
Moreira, Crispim – Brasilia, 03/04/09. Secretary for Food Security in the Ministry for 
Social Development. He worked for various municipal governments in the state of Minas 
Gerais.      
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Moroni, Jose Antonio – Brasilia, 07/10/08. He is one of the top coordinators of the Brazilian 
Association of NGOs (ABONG), a national network of civil society organisations. Moroni 
left the PT in 1988 and has worked in civil society organisations ever since.  
Moura, Senival – São Paulo, 07/11/09. City councillor in São Paulo. President of the Bus 
Cooperatives’ Trade Union in São Paulo. He worked for the Suplicy administration (2000-
2004) in the Department of Transport; belongs to one of the most influential factions in the 
city. 
Nespolo, Claudir - Brasilia, 16/12/08. Coordinator of the PT Section on Trade Unions in 
Porto Alegre; president of the Metallurgic Trade Union and member of CUT.  
Netto, Orlando – Brasilia, 20/10/10. Head of the Senate’s Budget Office, a non-partisan 
body that advises senators and provides information to the public on budgetary and financial 
issues. 
Núñez, Tarson – Porto Alegre, 18/12/08. Parliamentary advisor. He was one of the 
architects of the participatory budget in Porto Alegre, where he coordinated the participatory 
planning cabinet. 
Oliveira, Carlos Roberto – Brasilia, 07/04/09. Housing movement activist and member of 
the National Union for Popular Housing. He has been a PT member since the party’s 
foundation.  
Olivoni, Aldacir – Porto Alegre 18/12/08. City councillor. Former union leader from the 
health sector, he joined the PT in 1996. He belongs to the faction Movimento PT.  
Ortega, César – 17/11/09 (e-mail interview). Former consultant to the Ministry for Food 
Security and Hunger Eradication; PT member until the mid-1980s. 
Paes, Rómulo – Brighton, 15/10/10 (unrecorded interview). Deputy Minister for Social 
Development (2010). He was also Secretary for Evaluation and Information Management and 
Assistant Deputy Minister. He is a non-active PT member.   
Pedroso, Maria – Brasilia, 28/11/08. Parliamentary advisor on rural issues.  
Pereira, Athos – Brasilia, 04/04/09. Coordinator of the PT group of parliamentary advisors 
in the Lower House.  
Pereira, José Antonio – Brasilia, 18/10/10. Advisor to the Secretary for Economic Policy in 
the Ministry of Finance. Public servant without party militancy. 
Pereira, Solaney – São Paulo, 19/11/08. CUT’s Secretary of Social Policy and a PT 
member. He belongs to the faction Left Articulation.  
Pestana, Carlos - Porto Alegre, 17/12/08. PT General Secretary in the state of Rio Grande 
do Sul; belongs to the faction Socialist Democracy.   
314	  
	  
Piai, Glauco – São Paulo, 05/11/08. PT Secretary for Organisation in São Paulo. He started 
his political career within church-based organisations and was active in the health movement 
in Capela do Socorro (East of São Paulo). He belongs to the faction PT for Mass and Struggle 
(PTLM), very influential in São Paulo.  
Pont, Raúl – Porto Alegre, 19/12/08. Mayor of Porto Alegre (1997-2001). Has been a 
congressional representative at the local and national level. In 2005, he ran for the PT 
presidency. Pont is a founder of the faction Socialist Democracy and one of its main leaders.  
Pomar, Valter – Brasilia, 30/09/08 and 08/04/09. PT Secretary for International Relations, 
the main leader of Left Articulation. Pomar has belonged to the PT National Directorate since 
1997. In the 2007 internal elections, he launched his candidacy for president of the PT, but 
only managed to obtain 12 percent of the vote. He was Secretary for Culture, Sports and 
Leisure in Campinas (São Paulo).  
Pontual, Pedro – São Paulo, 17/10/08. Member of the Polis Institute, an NGO which 
advocates social participation. He coordinated literacy programmes with Paulo Freire, when 
the latter was Secretary of Education in São Paulo (1989-1991) and was Secretary of Social 
Participation in Santo André (1997-2002). He belongs to the faction Socialist Democracy. 
Preto, Adão – Brasilia, 02/12/08. Three times Representative at the National Congress. Preto 
is a member of both the MST and the PT.  
Rabelo, Lourimar and Lopes, Flavia – Brasilia, 21/10/10 (interviewed together). 
Parliamentary advisors to the Leader of the Lula government in the Chamber of Deputies, 
Candido Vaccarezza. Not PT members. 
Rangel, Alexandre – Brasília 08/04/09. Young MST activist. Participated in the PT from 
1994 to 2003, before leaving the party, disillusioned with the Lula administration. Worked 
for the government of Christovam Buarque in Brasília between 1996 and 1998. 
Reske, Alexandra – Brasilia, 08/04/09. Secretary for National Patrimony at the Ministry of 
Planning. Former Secretary for Housing in Santo André. A former Trotskyist who 
participated in church-based communities and supported housing movements.  
Rezende, Conceição – Brasilia, 28/11/08. Coordinator of the PT Health Section; 
parliamentary advisor; former Secretary for Health in the municipality of Betim (Minas 
Gerais). Was a union leader in the health sector. 
Ribeiro, Miguel – Brasilia, 04/12/08. Chief of Staff to the Secretary for National Patrimony 
at the Ministry of Planning.  
Rodrigues, Evaniza – São Paulo, 12/12/08. Activist in the housing movement. Member of 
the executive committee of the National Union of Popular Housing (UNMP). Under-
Secretary for Urban Policy during the first Lula administration. 
Rodrigues, Julian – São Paulo, 13/11/08. Coordinator of the PT Sector on GLBT issues. He 
is a young member of Left Articulation who works for the PT executive office in São Paulo. 
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Rosetto, Miguel – Rio de Janeiro, 24/06/09 (non-recorded interview). Minister for Rural 
Development (2003-2006). Former Deputy Governor of Rio Grande do Sul (1998- 2002). 
Was twice president of the Oil Industries’ Trade Union (1986-1992) and occupied various 
executive positions in CUT, where he was active until the mid-1990s. Belongs to the faction 
Socialist Democracy.    
Russo, Osvaldo – Brasilia, 01/12/08. Coordinator of the PT Rural Section, parliamentary 
advisor, and Head of the Land Reform Brazilian Association (ABRA). Former president of 
INCRA with President Itamar Franco (1993 - 1994).  
Santos, Clarice dos – Brasilia, 07/05/09. Head of the National Educational Program for 
Land Reform (PRONERA) at the National Institute for Colonisation and Land Reform 
(INCRA). Former Church activist, developed her political career simultaneously in the MST 
and the PT.  
Santos, Manoel dos – Brasilia, 03/07/09. President of the National Confederation of 
Agricultural Workers (1997-2009). Started his political activism in Catholic Rural Action; 
has belonged to the PT since its formation. 
Schmidt, David – Brasilia, 03/12/09. Advisor to the Social Articulation Secretariat in the 
Presidency. Was involved in the Participatory Budgeting process in Porto Alegre.    
Selma, Rocha – Brasilia, 12/12/08. Coordinator of the PT Section on Education, Member of 
the PT National Directorate and the Directorate of the party’s foundation Perseu Abramo.  
Sell, Adeli – Porto Alegre, 15/12/08. City councillor. Former Secretary for Production, Trade 
and Industry in Porto Alegre (2003 – 2004). First belonged to a Trotskyist faction, O 
Trabalho (The Work), until he entered Articulaçao (Articulation), Lula’s faction, in 1983. 
Severo, Quintino – São Paulo, 15/12/09. CUT’s General Secretary (2006-2012). With a 
background in the metallurgic sector, he was president of CUT in the state of Rio Grande do 
Sul twice. 
Silva, Francisco – São Paulo, 05/11/08. Secretary for Social Movements in the city of São 
Paulo. A member of the PTLM, one of the most important factions in the city.  
Simões, Renato – São Paulo, 04/11/08. Secretary for Popular Movements (2007-2010) and 
three time Representative in the State Assembly of São Paulo. Belongs to Militância 
Socialista	  (Socialist Activism), a small leftist faction.   
Singer, André – São Paulo, 16/04/09. (Unrecorded interview). Party intellectual, Professor 
of Political Science, University of São Paulo. Was part of the presidential campaign 
committee in 2001 and later spokesman of the Presidential office during Lula’s first term. 
One of the main ideologues of the faction “Message to the Party”.  
Singer, Paul – Brasilia, 02/07/09. Secretary for Fair Trade, with Lula (2003-2010). Former 
Secretary for Planning in São Paulo under the administration of Luiza Erundina (1989-1992); 
belongs to “Message to the Party” (MP).   
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Soriano, Joaquim – São Paulo, 31/10/08. Member of the PT National Directorate several 
times. Has been Party Treasurer, Secretary for Organisation, General Secretary and four 
times Secretary for Political Formation. He belongs to the faction Socialist Democracy. 
Souza, Maria Celeste – Porto Alegre, 15/12/08. City councillor in Porto Alegre; belongs to 
Democratic Left, a local faction.   
Sousa, Ubiratan de – Porto Alegre, 19/12/08. Coordinated the Cabinet for the Participatory 
Budget, in Porto Alegre, during the administrations of Tarso Genro and Raul Pont (1993-
1998). Later was secretary for Budget and Finance in Rio Grande do Sul and was in charge of 
scaling-up PB at the state level. Belongs to the faction Socialist Democracy.  
Stédile, João Pedro – São Paulo, 06/09/07. The most visible figure of the MST and its main 
intellectual guide. Member of its National Directorate. Joined the PT during the party’s 
foundation. He distanced himself from the party during Lula’s first term in office, like many 
other MST members.   
Stival, David – Porto Alegre, 17/12/08. President of the PT in Rio Grande do Sul (2001-
2005). MST member who made his career within the PT. Participated in the first land 
occupations in the mid-1980s and soon afterwards started work as a PT parliamentary 
advisor. Belongs to Left Articulation. 
Suplicy, Eduardo – Brasília, 07/04/09. One of the most respected parliamentarians in the 
PT. Was the party’s first Senator, elected in 1990 and re-elected three times. He claims to be 
a strong supporter of civil society organisations, including the MST.  
Suplicy, Marta – São Paulo, 09/1/09. Mayor of São Paulo (2000-2004) and Minister for 
Tourism (2007-2008). A psychologist who was married to Senator Eduardo Suplicy. First 
gained public attention in a TV programme concerning sexual issues. Her political career 
started in 1994, when elected Representative at the National Congress. Although Suplicy 
claims to be independent, she draws most of her political support from the factions Novo 
Rumo (New Direction) and the PT de Luta e de Massas (PT Mass and Struggle). 
Takagi, Maya – Brasilia, 06/07/09. Advisor to the Presidency. Specialist on rural issues and 
food security; participated in the drafting of the Zero Hunger Programme at the Citizenship 
Institute. Later, she advised the Minister for Food Security (2003-2004). 
Tatto, Arselino – São Paulo, 12/11/08. Five time city councillor, he is one of nine brothers, 
all of them involved in politics. Arselino, Jilmar and Ênio, known as “the Tatto brothers”, are 
the creators of PT Mass and Struggle (PTLM), a powerful intra-party group.  
Terribili, Alessandra – São Paulo, 06/10/08. Vice-President of the PT in the city of São 
Paulo. Started her career in the National Students’ Union (UNE) and entered the PT in 2001; 
belongs to the faction Socialist Democracy.  
Teixeira, Gerson – Brasilia, 07/04/09. Parliamentary advisor on rural issues. Worked for the 
PT Secretary for Rural Issues during the 2001 presidential campaign.  
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Teixeira, Paulo – Brasilia, 14/07/09. National Congress Representative. Former Secretary 
for Housing and Urban Development during the Suplicy administration (2000-2004). 
Member of the PT National Directorate; supports the faction “Message to the Party”. 
Todeschini, Atilio – Porto Alegre, 16/12/08. City councillor in Porto Alegre. Former 
Secretary for Sanitation and Drainage and Secretary for Public Policies in Porto Alegre.  
Toni, Jackson de – Brasilia, 02/04/09. Advisor to the Office of the Civil House of the 
Presidency. Has written on participatory mechanisms implemented during the Lula 
administration.  
Vaccarezza, Cândido – Brasilia, 21/10/10. National Congress Representative, Leader of the 
Lula Government in the Lower House (2010). Former Secretary of Culture, Sports and 
Leisure in the municipality of Mauá São Paulo. Occupied several positions in the PT 
bureaucracy. Belonged to the public trade union sector.   
Vargas, Pepe – Brasilia, 02/12/08. National Congress Representative. Former legislator at 
municipal and state levels in Rio Grande do Sul; belongs to the faction Socialist Democracy. 
Verlaine da Silva Pinto, Marcos and de Queiroz, Antonio Augusto – Brasilia, 18/10/10.  
Members of the Departamento Intersindical de Asessoria Parlamentar (DIAPP), a think tank 
that promotes trade unions in Congress.  
Vilela Nelsis, Luiz Felipe – Brasilia, 04/12/08. Advisor and Chief of Staff to the Minister for 
Rural Development. Was PT’s General Secretary in Porto Alegre and Secretary for Trade and 
Industry at the City Hall; a member of the faction Socialist Democracy. 
Villaverde, Adão – Porto Alegre, 19/12/08. Congress Representative at the State Assembly 
of Rio Grande do Sul. Former Secretary for Planning under the state government of Olívio 
Dutra (1999-2002). Was president of the PT in his home state.  
Welik, Walter – Campinas, 14/04/09. Specialist in Rural Economy, University of Campinas. 
Participated in the drafting of the Zero Hunger Programme at the Citizenship Institute; later 
advised the Ministry for Food Security and Hunger Eradication (2003-2004).  
Zimmerman, Tarcisio - Brasilia, 03/12/08. Three time National Congressman. Former 
Secretary for Transport, Citizenship and Social Assistance during the administration of Olívio 
Dutra in Rio Grande do Sul (1999-2002); member of the faction Socialist Democracy. 
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Appendix 3: Answers to semi-structured questions 
1. Opinions on the MST  
 
Number of party leaders who are critical of the MST 
Question: Are you critical of the MST?/ Do you have criticisms about the MST? 
 
 PT  CNB MP AE 
Yes 52 24 9 4 
No 26 7 6 6 
Total 78 31 15 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Perceptions on party-civil society relationships 
 
Number of party leaders who consider that the PT distanced itself from civil society.  
Question asked: Has the PT distanced itself from civil society? 
 
    
 PT  CNB MP AE 
Yes  62 21 15 7 
No  23 17 0 0 
total 85 38 15 7 
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3. Support for counter-mobilisation strategies 
 
Number of party leaders who support counter-hegemonic governability strategies  
Question: Do you think that the PT could have instigated social mobilisation in order to put 
pressure on Congress and change the balance of forces in its favour? 
 
 PT CNB MP AE 
Yes 42 8 13 9 
No 38 19 4 2 
Don't 
know 
12 8     -    - 
Total 92 35 17 11 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Opinions on economic policy  
 
 
Number of party leaders who are in favour of the economic policy of the Lula administration     
Question: Do you agree with the economic policy of the Lula administration? 
 
 PT CNB MP AE 
Yes 28 13 2 1 
No 26 7 3 5 
Opposed to 
monetary 
policy 
16 9 4 1 
Total 70 29 9 7 
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5. Estimations of progress on social participation 
 
Number of party leaders who consider that the Lula administration made progress on participation  
Question: Do you think that participation made progress under the Lula administration? 
 
 
6. Support for a national Participatory Budget 
 
Party leaders who support the establishment of a Participatory Budget the national level 
Question:  Do you support a Participatory Budget at the national level? 
 
 PT CNB MP AE 
Yes 42 12 15 5 
No 25 12 0 1 
“it would be difficult” 3 10 2 1 
total 70 34 17 7 
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Yes 42 24 5 1 
No 31 4 12 6 
Relative 
progress 
20 10 3 1 
total 93 38 20 8 
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7. Importance of land reform  
 
Party leaders who consider land reform an important matter 
Question:  Is land reform still an important issue on the agenda? 
 
 PT  CNB MP AE 
Yes 62 18 13 10 
No 16 11 12 0 
Total  78 29 25 10 
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